COA 371811 VELOCITY MRS -- FUND IV LLC V 411 HELP LLC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
VELOCITY MRS -- FUND IV, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
411 HELP, LLC, 4 TRANSPORT, INC, GRAVITY
IMAGING, LLC, and SPINE & HEALTH, PLLC,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
HASSAN FAYAD,
Defendant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2026
1:42 PM
and No. 371811
Wayne Circuit Court
4 UR RECOVERY, LLC, 411 PT, INC, and FOUR
TRANSPORT, INC,
LC No. 21-013338-CB
Appellants.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
4 UR Recovery Therapy, LLC, 411 PT, Inc, and Four Transport, Inc, nonparty appellants
to this case, appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to quash or set aside a court order.
Plaintiff and defendant-appellees (collectively “appellees”) argue that this Court does not have
jurisdiction because the appealed order was not a final order and, alternatively, we should deny
appellants’ request for appellate relief. We agree with appellees’ first argument and dismiss this
case for lack of jurisdiction.

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I. FACTS
Defendants 411 Help, LLC; 4 Transport, Inc.; Gravity Imaging, LLC; and Spine & Health,
PLLC (referred to collectively as the Medical Facilities), are companies that provided a variety of
health care related services to Michigan residents with no-fault insurance who were injured in
automobile accidents. Defendant Hassan Fayad (“Hassan”) is a member and authorized
representative of the Medical Facilities. Based on their operations, the Medical Facilities had
accounts receivable worth millions of dollars.
At some point in the late 2010s, plaintiff and the Medical Facilities were engaged in a
business dispute and, eventually, litigation was filed in Texas in about 2019. Eventually, on
April 27, 2020, plaintiff and defendants (including both the Medical Facilities and Hassan) entered
into a settlement agreement under which defendants assigned to plaintiff certain of the Medical
Facilities’ receivables worth millions of dollars. Plaintiff learned shortly afterwards, however, that
defendants had breached the settlement agreement by double assigning certain receivables to
plaintiff and another company and by receiving and keeping payments made to defendants on the
receivables by insurance companies.
In 2021, plaintiff sued defendants for breach of contract and conversion in Texas.
Defendants consented to a judgment against them in that case and, on May 14, 2021, the Texas
court entered a judgment requiring defendants to pay plaintiff more than $6.3 million.
Simultaneously with the consent judgment, plaintiff and defendants entered into a forbearance
agreement that established a payment plan for defendants.
It appears that defendants almost immediately breached the forbearance agreement and by
late June 2021 plaintiff was serving writs of garnishment to defendants’ banks and the attorneys
representing the insurance companies who owed money on the no-fault benefit receivables.
Meanwhile, in July 2021, Mirna Fayad, Hassan’s sister (“Mirna”), incorporated new entities in
Michigan with names very similar to two of the defendants, including Four Transport, Inc., and
411 PT, Inc., which are two of the nonparty appellants.
Based on concerns that their debt collection efforts would not succeed, in October 2021,
plaintiff sued defendants in this case for breach of the forbearance agreement, fraudulent transfer,
and the appointment of a receiver over the Medical Faculties. In lieu of a receiver, on
November 15, 2021, plaintiff and defendants 411 Help, 4 Transport, and Gravity Imaging (three
of the Medical Facilities, which will be referred to as the “Stipulating Defendants”),1 stipulated to
the appointment of a chief restructuring officer (CRO) to manage the businesses. Among other
things, the stipulated order gave the CRO broad authority, including access to and control over:
[a]ll personal property owned by or in the possession of any of the Stipulating
Defendants . . . whether or not such personal property assets are in the possession
of the CRO, the Stipulating Defendants, or any third party, including any successor-
1 The record indicates that a separate Collection Order addressed one of the Medical Facilities,
Spine & Health, PLLC, and that entity is not involved in this appeal.

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in-interest, transferee, related party, party related through common ownership or
affiliate of a Stipulating Defendants [sic].
The CRO began working and continued doing so into 2023. Then, on June 6, 2023, the
trial court entered an order on the stipulation of the parties that, in relevant part: (1) dismissed the
case without prejudice; (2) provided that prior orders, including the stipulated order appointing the
CRO, “shall continue in full force and effect after dismissal . . . until further order of this Court;”
and (3) provided that the parties could reopen the case with an ex parte motion if needed to enforce
any provision in a prior order or seek other authority from the trial court.
Then, in early September 2023, the CRO filed an emergency ex parte motion to reopen the
case and for an order authorizing the CRO to seize certain items of the Stipulating Defendants and
related entities. On September 14, 2023, the trial court granted the motion and issued an ex parte
order. The order first “affirmed in its entirety” the November 12, 2021 order that appointed the
CRO over the Stipulating Defendants, as well as “their affiliates, subsidiaries, assigns, successors-
in-interest, any related party through common ownership or common officer, director, member,
and/or executive in any form . . . . ” The ex parte order also identified by name about eight specific
affiliates, which included the appellants.
On September 18, 2023, employees of the CRO entered the building in which the
Stipulating Defendants operated and took control of the personal property used by their employees,
including computers, books, and records. According to plaintiff and the CRO (who now controls
the Stipulating Defendants), these records showed that the Fayads had been diverting money from
the Stipulating Defendants to other parties, including appellants.
On September 29, 2023, in their roles as the “[s]ole members of” the Stipulating
Defendants, Hassan and Mirna filed an emergency motion to “quash or modify” the September 14,
2023 ex parte order and “for the release of wrongfully seized property.” Hassan and Mirna alleged
that the CRO had seized the assets of multiple companies unrelated to the litigation and requested
that the trial court order the CRO to return all seized items. Hearings on the motion, including an
evidentiary hearing, were postponed several times with the Fayads’ agreement.
On February 9, 2024, appellants separately moved to “quash and/or set aside” the trial
court’s September 14, 2023 order authorizing the CRO to seize their assets.
On May 22, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motions to quash and denied them.
Though the movants labeled them motions to “quash,” the trial court noted that there is no
mechanism in Michigan law to quash a trial court order in a civil proceeding, thus it treated them
as motions for reconsideration. In its June 2024 written order, the trial court stated that the order
“does not resolve the last pending claim nor close the case.” Appellants moved for reconsideration
and the trial court denied that as well in a July 2024 order. This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION
Appellants initially argued that this Court has jurisdiction under MCR 7.203(A)(1), the rule
providing appeals of right for final judgments or orders. In response, appellees briefly argued that
this Court does not have jurisdiction because the order appealed from is a nonfinal order and so
appellants did not have an appeal as of right.

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On its own motion, the court ordered supplemental briefing on this issue. In its
supplemental brief, appellants concede that their initial statement asserting jurisdiction over this
purported appeal as of right under MCR 7.203(A)(1) was wrong because the order they appealed
from was not final. Instead, appellants argue the court should exercise its discretion and treat their
claim as if on leave granted under MCR 7.203(B)(1). The appellees argue that the court should
not treat the pending appeal as if we had granted leave to appeal.
The issue of jurisdiction over an appeal is one this Court determines de novo. Wardell v
Hincka, 297 Mich App 127, 131; 822 NW2d 278 (2012). Jurisdiction may be raised at any time.
New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Twp of Covert, 334 Mich App 24, 45-46; 964 NW2d 24 (2020).
“This Court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal by right is determined by application of the court
rules.” Id. at 46.
The parties unanimously agree that, contrary to their initial claim, appellants had no right
to appeal under MCR 7.203(A)(1), and the June 2024 written order confirms they are right. Thus,
appellants should have filed an application for leave to appeal. See MCR 7.203(B). They did not
do so, and we are not persuaded that we should exercise our discretion to treat appellants’ claim
of appeal as a granted application for leave to appeal.
We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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