COA 375687 EAGLE TOWNSHIP V SHAUN VANALSTINE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/30/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
EAGLE TOWNSHIP,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
April 30, 2026
2:53 PM
v No. 375687
Clinton Circuit Court
SHAUN VANALSTINE, LC No. 2024-012489-CZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and REDFORD and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Shaun VanAlstine, built a structure on his property in Eagle Township,
Michigan without the proper permitting and in violation of the Eagle Township Interim Zoning
Ordinance (IZO)’s size and setback requirements. Plaintiff, Eagle Township, brought this action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The township moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) and requested an injunction to abate the zoning violations by removing the
structure. The trial court granted the township’s motion, ordered VanAlstine to remove the
structure, authorized the township to enter the property to abate the violations if VanAlstine failed
to do so, and awarded the township its costs and attorney fees. VanAlstine appeals by right the
trial court’s order. We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
VanAlstine is the record owner of the subject property, which is approximately 2.43 acres
and located in an agricultural zoning district. Although the property does not conform to the 10-
acre minimum lot size for the agriculture district, it is considered to be a legal nonconformity
because the parcel existed before the township’s adoption of the IZO, which became effective on
January 1, 2024. Previously, Clinton County promulgated all zoning regulations for the township.
All exterior construction work within the township requires a zoning permit approved by the
township’s zoning administrator. The zoning permit must be obtained before applying for a
building permit from the county.
Early in 2024, VanAlstine planned to build an addition to the existing pole barn on the
property. He intended to use the addition to store and maintain work vehicles and equipment. In

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March 2024, VanAlstine’s wife, Brittney, contacted Joel Haviland, Clinton County’s building
official, and informally inquired about the required setbacks for an addition to an existing pole
barn. She did not provide any information about the property address, the lot size, the size of the
current pole barn, or the size of the proposed addition. Haviland responded:
The minimum front yard setback is 83”, measuring from the center of the road.
However, there are many other requirements for barns that you will need to
consider. Please see the link below to Clinton County Zoning requirements for
Accessory Buildings (barn) section 4.1.
Brittney clarified, “The add on of the polebarn [sic] will be toward the road and not toward any
other structure. So essentially, it needs to be 83” from the center of the roadway and all of the
matching structure colors and roofing material[?]” Haviland responded, “Yes, that is correct. Let
me know if you need anything else.”
On June 9, 2024, Brittney e-mailed Haviland to inquire about obtaining a permit to build
the addition. The following day, Haviland e-mailed Brittney the applications and instructed her to
provide the construction plans and site plan with the completed applications for consideration. A
few hours later, Brittney inquired whether the permits should be requested through the township
or the county.
VanAlstine began constructing the addition before applying for a zoning permit from the
township or a building permit from the county. On July 1, 2024, after construction of the addition
was mostly complete, VanAlstine applied to the township for a zoning permit. VanAlstine
reported that the proposed addition would be 18 feet tall, 40 feet wide, and 60 feet long.
On July 10, 2024, the zoning administrator denied the application.1 The zoning
administrator stated that the existing pole barn was “considered as a legal non-conforming
structure due to the placement of the structure within the required front yard.” The zoning
administrator explained that the minimum front yard setback was 50 feet, but the proposed addition
would only be approximately 24 feet from the right-of-way. The zoning administrator also stated
that the maximum floor area of an accessory structure for the property was approximately 2,654
square feet,2 but the existing pole barn was approximately 2,160 square feet of floor area and the
proposed addition would be an additional 2,400 square feet of floor area. The application was
denied because the addition would violate the minimum front yard setback, exceed the maximum
floor area for accessory buildings on the property, and would unlawfully expand the legally
nonconforming structure toward the front lot line.
1 McKenna, a planning firm, serves as the township’s zoning administrator.
2 The township alleged in its complaint that detached accessory buildings were limited to a total
square footage of 3,708 feet, which was confirmed by Skunda. Regardless of the discrepancy in
the maximum square footage allowed, the 4,560 total square footage of the detached accessory
structures clearly exceeded the limit.

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Following the zoning permit denial, VanAlstine applied for three variances: (1) a variance
to reduce the required front yard setback from 50 feet to 24 feet; (2) a variance to increase the
allowable square footage of accessory buildings on the site to 4,560 square feet; and (3) a variance
to expand a legal nonconforming structure. VanAlstine maintained that the county zoning
commissioner had stated that the proposed addition followed all guidelines for Clinton County,
the neighbors all agreed to the addition, and the addition would not interfere with any roadway
travel or safety. On August 8, 2024, the township issued a stop work order to halt construction of
the structure. On August 26, 2024, the township Zoning Board of Appeals (the ZBA) held a public
hearing on the variance application. The ZBA adopted the findings of the zoning administrator,
and denied the variance requests. VanAlstine did not appeal the ZBA’s decision.
On September 11, 2024, Ken Skunda, the township’s code enforcement officer, sent a letter
to VanAlstine stating that the pole barn addition violates the IZO and demanded that it be removed
from the property by October 11, 2024. Skunda stated that the township would take legal action
to abate the nuisance and enforce the IZO if the structure was not removed by the deadline.
VanAlstine did not remove the structure.
In December 2024, the township commenced this action alleging that the pole barn addition
violated the IZO and thus was a nuisance per se. The township further alleged that VanAlstine
continued building the structure in violation of the stop work order. The township sought a
declaration that the structure was a nuisance per se and requested an injunction to enjoin
construction. On January 7, 2025, the parties stipulated to a preliminary injunction enjoining
VanAlstine from continuing construction.
In his answer to the township’s complaint, VanAlstine admitted that he constructed the
structure without a zoning or building permit but maintained that he acted in a good faith manner.
He also admitted to the size and location of the structure. VanAlstine maintained that construction
was completed before the stop work order was issued. He contended that any additional steps
taken after the stop work order were simply “to protect the already-built structure,” and denied that
any further construction was done. VanAlstine asserted a series of affirmative defenses, including
equitable estoppel, regulatory taking, and arguments contesting the equity of the township’s
request that the structure be removed.
The township moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) arguing that there
were no genuine issues of material fact whether the structure violates the IZO and thus is a nuisance
per se. The township requested an injunction to abate the zoning violations by removing the
structure. In response, VanAlstine maintained that he relied in good faith on his wife’s
communications with Haviland about the setback requirements, which were incorrect. VanAlstine
argued that he had a right to conduct discovery to develop his affirmative defenses. For example,
he contended that the township’s denial of his zoning permit and his variance application resulted
in a regulatory taking. He asserted that he should be afforded “the chance to prove his affirmative
defense by presenting evidence of the impact of the Township’s actions on his investment-backed
expectations, the economic impact of the Township’s action, and the character of the Township’s
actions.” The township replied that discovery would be futile because VanAlstine admitted that
he built the structure without a zoning or building permit, did not dispute the size and location of
the structure, and acknowledged that the structure remained on the property. The township argued
that VanAlstine was liable for a nuisance per se regardless of his alleged defenses.

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Following a hearing, the trial court granted the township’s motion, ordered VanAlstine to
remove the structure, authorized the township to enter the property to abate the violations if
VanAlstine failed to do so, and awarded the township its costs and attorney fees. This appeal
followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” El-
Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted when, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or
partial judgment as a matter of law.” MCR 2.116(C)(10). “A genuine issue of material fact exists
when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” El-Khalil, 504
Mich at 160 (cleaned up). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), a court must consider the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary disposition should be granted when, after
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no remaining
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lowrey v
LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016).
The interpretation and application of an ordinance poses a question of law, which we also
review de novo. Great Lakes Society v Georgetown Charter Twp, 281 Mich App 396, 407; 761
NW2d 371 (2008).3 Nuisance-abatement proceedings are generally equitable in nature, and
equitable rulings are reviewed de novo, but we review for clear error any underlying factual
findings rendered by a court in support of its decision. Ypsilanti Charter Twp v Kircher, 281 Mich
App 251, 270; 761 NW2d 761 (2008). Whether an act or condition constitutes a nuisance per se
is a question of law. Id. at 269.
Finally, “a trial court’s decision to grant injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Dep’t of Environmental Quality v Gomez, 318 Mich App 1, 32; 896 NW2d 39 (2016).
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes.” Id. at 33-34 (cleaned up).
III. ANALYSIS
VanAlstine argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the structure constitutes a
nuisance per se and abused its discretion by ordering removal of the structure. We disagree.
The township’s complaint alleged that the structure violated the IZO and thus was a
nuisance per se. A nuisance per se is “an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all
3 “Ordinances are treated as statutes for the purposes of interpretation and review.” Great Lakes,
281 Mich App at 407. “The goal of statutory construction, and thus of construction and
interpretation of an ordinance, is to discern and give effect to the intent of the legislative body.”
Id. at 407-408. “Terms used in an ordinance must be given their plain and ordinary meanings[.]”
Id. at 408.

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times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings.” Ypsilanti, 281 Mich
App at 269 n 4 (cleaned up). Under the plain language of § 407 of the Michigan Zoning Enabling
Act, MCL 125.3101 et seq., “a structure erected in violation of a zoning ordinance constitutes a
nuisance per se,” Morse v Colitti, 317 Mich App 526, 554; 896 NW2d 15 (2016), and a court shall
order it abated:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a use of land or a dwelling, building, or
structure, including a tent or recreational vehicle, used, erected, altered, razed, or
converted in violation of a zoning ordinance or regulation adopted under this act
is a nuisance per se. The court shall order the nuisance abated, and the owner or
agent in charge of the dwelling, building, structure, tent, recreational vehicle, or
land is liable for maintaining a nuisance per se. [MCL 125.3407 (emphasis added).]
As the moving party, the township bore the initial burden to identify the issues about which
there were no material factual disputes and provide supporting evidence. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v
Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369-370; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). The
township maintained that VanAlstine erected the structure without the proper permitting and in
violation of the IZO’s size and setback requirements, which constituted a nuisance per se. Section
6.02.C.1 of the IZO generally prohibits detached accessory buildings and structures in any front
yard, unless one of two sets of conditions are met. Eagle Township Ordinance 03-2023,
§ 6.02.C.1.4 The existing pole barn is a detached accessory structure in the property’s front yard.
4 Section 6.02.C.1 of the IZO states:
(C) Detached Accessory Buildings.
(1) Location. Detached accessory buildings and structures shall not be located in a
front yard, except if one of the following sets of conditions are met:
(a) Condition Set One:
(i) The parcel exceeds five (5) acres in lot area; and
(ii) All setback requirements of the district in which the accessory
structure is to be located are complied with; and
(iii) The accessory structure shall be located not less than two-
hundred and twenty-five (225) feet from the road right-of-way; and
(iv) The accessory structure shall be located no closer than fifty (50)
feet to an existing residential structure on an adjacent parcel.
(b) Condition Set Two:

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It does not meet either set of criteria § 6.02.C.1, but it is considered a legal nonconforming
structure because it was constructed before the township adopted the IZO.5 Although it is a legal
nonconforming structure, the pole barn can remain in place and be used. However, § 7.04.A of
the IZO prohibits enlarging, extending, or structurally altering any nonconforming structure. Eagle
Township Ordinance 03-2023, § 7.04.A6 The township presented evidence that the structure
(i) Accessory structure exterior siding generally matches the color
of the principal structure of which it is accessory to; and
(ii) Accessory structure roofing material generally matches the color
of the principal structure of which it is accessory to; and
(iii) Accessory structure must meet the minimum front yard setback
of a principal structure in the district that it is located and must be
located no more than seventy-five (75) feet from the principal
structure; and
(iv) The accessory structure shall be located no closer than fifty (50)
feet to an existing residential structure on an adjacent parcel; and
(v) No more than twenty (20) percent of an accessory structure floor
area shall be located within an area defined as between the principal
structure’s front building line and the public right-of-way and the
principal structures side building lines so as to not obstruct the view
of the principal structure from the public road right-of-way. [Eagle
Township Ordinance 03-2023, § 6.02.C.1.]
5 Condition set one is not met because the property is less than five acres. Condition set two is not
met because the existing pole barn has more than 20% of its floor area within the front yard.
6 Section 7.04.A of the IZO states in pertinent part:
(A) No nonconforming use or structure shall be enlarged, extended, or structurally
altered, nor shall any nonconformity be changed to a different nonconformity which
increases the intensity of use or nonconformity, except as permitted in this Section.
* * *
(4) Enlargement, Extension, or Alteration.
(a) Increase in Nonconformity Prohibited. Except as specifically
provided in this section, no person may engage in any activity that
causes an increase in the extent of any nonconformity. For example,
physical alteration of structures or the placement of new structures on
open land is unlawful if such activity results in:

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violated the IZO because it did not meet the minimum front yard setback requirement and enlarged
a nonconforming structure. In both sets of criteria for allowing an accessory building in a front
yard, § 6.02.C.1 states that the accessory building must meet the minimum front yard setback
requirement for principal buildings. In the agricultural zoning district, the minimum front yard
setback requirement is 50 feet. The existing pole barn has setback of approximately 80 feet and
thus meets the requirement. But the addition reduced the setback to 24 feet. VanAlstine knew
that the addition did not comply with the IZO because he applied for a variance from § 6.02.C.1
to reduce the required front yard setback from 50 feet to 24 feet. He also applied for a variance
from § 7.04.A to expand a legal nonconforming structure. Both requests were denied, and
VanAlstine did not appeal either denial.
The township also presented evidence that the structure violated the IZO’s square-foot
limitations for accessory buildings. Section 6.02.C.5 of the IZO limits the total floor area of
accessory buildings on lots larger than one acre but smaller than five acres to 1,600 square feet
plus an additional two square feet of floor area for every 100 square feet of lot area, up to 5,000
square feet. Eagle Township Ordinance 03-2023, § 6.02.C.5.7 Because the property is
(i) An increase in the total amount of space devoted to a
nonconforming use, or
(ii) Greater nonconformity with respect to dimensional restrictions,
such as setback requirements, height limitations, density
requirements, or other requirements in the district in which the
property is located.
(b) Permitted Extension. Any nonconforming use may be extended
throughout any part of a building which was manifestly arranged or
designed for such use at the time of adoption or amendment of this
Ordinance, but no such use shall be extended to occupy any land outside
such building. No nonconforming use of land shall be enlarged,
increased, or extended to occupy a greater area of land, nor shall any
such use be moved in whole or in part to any portion of the lot or parcel
than was occupied on the effective date of this Ordinance or amendment
thereto.
(c) Alterations that Decrease Nonconformity. Any nonconforming
structure or any structure or portion thereof containing a nonconforming
use, may be altered if such alteration serves to decrease the
nonconforming nature of the structure or use. [Eagle Township
Ordinance 03-2023, § 7.02.A.]
7 Section 6.02.C.5 of the IZO states:
Size. The total of all detached accessory buildings located on a parcel shall be
subject to maximum lot coverage requirements and accessory structure size shall

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approximately 2.43 acres, all detached accessory buildings are limited to 3,708 total square feet.
The existing pole barn is 2,160 square feet, and the addition’s floor area is approximately 2,400
square feet. The total square footage of detached accessory structures on the property is 4,560
square feet, which violates § 6.02.C.5. VanAlstine knew that the structure did not comply with
§ 6.02.C.5 because he applied for a variance to increase the allowable square footage of accessory
buildings on the site to 4,560 square feet. The ZBA denied the request, and VanAlstine did not
appeal the denial.
Additionally, all exterior construction work within the township requires a zoning permit
approved by the township’s zoning administrator. The zoning permit must be obtained before
applying for a building permit from the county. Eagle Township Ordinance 03-2023, § 14.02.8
VanAlstine did not obtain a zoning or a building permit. His July 1, 2024 zoning permit
application was denied on July 10, 2024.9 According to VanAlstine, “The structure was mostly
complete by July 14, 2024.”
The township met its initial burden of establishing that the structure was erected in
violation of the IZO and thus was a nuisance per se under MCL 125.3407. See Morse, 317 Mich
App at 554. Accordingly, the burden shifted to VanAlstine as the nonmoving party to present
evidence that a factual dispute remained to be resolved by the finder of fact. See Barnard Mfg,
285 Mich App at 370. VanAlstine conceded that he did not obtain the necessary permits and that
the structure violated the IZO’s size and setback requirements. Because there were no genuine
be subject to the restrictions in floor area based upon parcel size listed in the
schedule below.
[Eagle Township Ordinance 03-2023, § 6.02.C.5.]
8 Section 14.02 of the IZO states:
A Zoning Permit, approved by the Zoning Administrator, shall be required prior to
the any application to the Clinton County Building Department for a building
permit for any exterior construction work in Eagle Township. Interior construction
work shall not require a Zoning Permit. For activities requiring Site Plan Approval,
the Site Plan Approval shall be considered the Zoning Permit. Alterations to the
exterior of a building that do not alter the footprint, or the height of the building
shall be exempt from the Zoning Permit requirement. [Eagle Township Ordinance
03-2023, § 14.02.]
9 VanAlstine contended he did not receive the denial until July 18, 2024.

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issues of material fact whether the structure violated the IZO, the trial court did not err by
determining that the structure was a nuisance per se. See MCL 125.3407; see also Morse, 317
Mich App at 554.
On appeal, VanAlstine admits that MCL 125.3407 provides that a use of land in violation
of a zoning ordinance is a nuisance per se. But he contends that “is not an absolute rule.” Rather,
VanAlstine claims that our Supreme Court has held that a “ ‘nuisance per se’ requires more than a
technical violation—it must involve a use inherently injurious to public health, safety, or morals.”
We find no merit in this argument. The Supreme Court case cited by VanAlstine, Highland Park
v Grifith Motors, 336 Mich 588, 592; 59 NW2d 54 (1953), does not exist—it’s a hallucinated
citation that is likely the product of generative artificial intelligence (AI).
VanAlstine contends that he “made diligent efforts to comply with local requirements,
including consulting with Clinton County Building officials,” and there is “no evidence of health
or safety risks caused by the structure with the zoning requirement.” VanAlstine began
construction before applying for the required building and zoning permits, and he stated that
construction was “mostly complete” before he requested a zoning variance. “[E]veryone dealing
with a municipality and its agents is charged with knowledge of the restrictive provisions of
lawfully adopted ordinances.” Hughes v Almena Twp, 284 Mich App 50, 78; 771 NW2d 453
(2009). “The general rule is that zoning authorities will not be estopped from enforcing their
ordinance absent exceptional circumstances.” Williamston Twp v Sandalwood Ranch, LLC, 325
Mich App 541, 553; 927 NW2d 262 (2018) (cleaned up). “Casual private advice or assurance of
success from township officials does not constitute exceptional circumstances.” Hughes, 284
Mich App at 78.
Further, VanAlstine confuses a nuisance in fact with a nuisance per se. “The difference
between a nuisance per se and one in fact is not in the remedy but only in the proof of it.” Ypsilanti,
281 Mich App at 269-270 (cleaned up). “To prove that a condition constitutes a nuisance in fact,
it is generally necessary to establish that the condition is harmful to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare.” Id. at 278. Whether an act or condition constitutes a nuisance in fact is a
question of fact. Id. at 269. Conversely, a nuisance per se is “an act, occupation, or structure
which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surroundings.” Id. at 269 n 4 (cleaned up). Whether an act or condition constitutes a nuisance per
se is a question of law. Id. at 269. There is no genuine issue of material fact whether structure
violates the IZO; therefore, the trial court did not err by determining that the structure was a
nuisance per se.10 See MCL 125.3407; see also Morse, 317 Mich App at 554.
VanAlstine further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that the
structure be removed. We disagree. After determining that the structure violated the IZO, the trial
court was required to order it abated under the plain language of MCL 125.3407, which states,
“The court shall order the nuisance abated, and the owner . . . of the . . . structure . . .is liable for
maintaining a nuisance per se.” (Emphasis added.) This Court has interpreted the use of “shall”
in statutory language as specifying a mandatory directive. Ellison v Dep’t of State, 320 Mich App
10 VanAlstine argued to the trial court that he had a right to develop his affirmative defenses
through discovery. He does not raise this argument on appeal; therefore, he has waived it.

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169, 180; 906 NW2d 221 (2017). See also Lima Twp v Bateson, 302 Mich App 483, 493; 838
NW2d 898 (2013) (“Generally, a violation of a zoning ordinance constitutes a nuisance per se, and
a court must order it abated.”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the structure
removed.
Finally, VanAlstine argues that township violated his due-process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by withholding “critical information regarding setback rules” in
contravention of “disclosure obligations” and failed to act reasonably. “In civil cases, Michigan
follows the ‘raise or waive’ rule of appellate review.” Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach
Servs & Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 289; 14 NW3d 472 (2023) (cleaned up). A party must
raise an issue in the lower court for it to be preserved for appellate review. Id. We will generally
decline to address an unpreserved issue unless the failure to do so “would result in manifest
injustice, if consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the issue
involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented.” Id.
at 289-290. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that this discretion should be exercised sparingly
and only in exceptional circumstances. Napier v Jacobs, 429 Mich 222, 233-234, 414 NW2d 862
(1987). Because this issue was not raised in the trial court, it is waived, and we decline to exercise
our discretion to review it. Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration, 347 Mich App at 289.
Affirmed. The township, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Sima G. Patel

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