PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN JAMES SNYDER

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN JAMES SNYDER
Docket No. 377544
LC No. 05-010625-01-FC
Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
Presiding Judge
Matthew S. Ackerman
Christopher M. Trebilcock
Judges
The delayed application for leave to appeal is DENIED because defendant has failed to
establish that the trial court erred in denying the successive motion for relief from judgment. Specifically,
we hold that defendant has failed to carry his burden of satisfying the “good cause” requirement under
MCR 6.508(D)(3). See People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 253-254; 732 NW2d 605 (2007) (“regardless
of whether a defendant files a prior motion in propria persona or with representation, he or she is required
to fulfill the good cause requirement in MCR 6.508(D)(3)”); Davila v Davis, 582 US 521, 529; 137 S Ct
2058; 198 L Ed 2d 603 (2017) (“[I]n proceedings for which the Constitution does not guarantee the
assistance of counsel at all, attorney error cannot provide cause to excuse a default.”). And assuming,
arguendo, that appellant’s counsel has accurately summarized the evidence that was submitted below in
support of the disputed motion for relief from judgment, we are not persuaded that waiver of the “good
cause” requirement is warranted on actual-innocence grounds under MCR 6.508(D)(3). As this Court
observed in People v Snyder, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November
29, 2007 (Docket No. 272542), p 2, “the case against defendant was strong.”
That said, it bears emphasis that defendant’s retained counsel, Phillip Comorski, has failed
to provide this Court with almost any of the pertinent record that would be necessary to review the issues
raised here on the merits. In other words, appellant’s counsel has failed to carry his burden of furnishing
the necessary record to substantiate the claims of error raised on appeal. See People v Elston, 462 Mich
751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000) (noting that appellants bear the burden of furnishing the necessary record
to substantiate their claims of error). See also MCR 7.205(E)(1) (“The application is decided on the
documents filed . . . .”); IOP 7.205(B)(1) (“The Court strongly recommends that the appellant file copies
of relevant transcripts and pleadings because the Court does not receive the lower court record when
deciding applications for leave to appeal.”). Nor is this the first time that this particular attorney has failed
to provide the necessary record in an appeal like this one. On the contrary, although this Court has
previously taken the time to bring the matter to counsel’s attention, the same problem has continued to
recur. See People v Childs, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 18, 2025 (Docket
No. 373251) (denying leave to appeal for counsel’s failure “to provide the necessary record for this Court
to determine whether the trial court might have abused its discretion by denying the successive motion for
relief from judgment”).
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to again admonish counsel about the importance of
providing the necessary record in support of applications for leave to appeal like the one at bar. For the
reasons already explained, his failure to do so had no impact on our decision to deny leave to appeal here.
But in the wrong case, this sort of “advocacy” might cause one of counsel’s clients to procedurally forfeit

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a substantively meritorious ground for relief. And because criminal defendants have no constitutional
right to counsel in such collateral proceedings, see Davila, 582 US at 529, such a client would be left
without the normal method of seeking recourse for such failures: a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Indeed, aside from the potential prejudice to his clients, counsel’s failure to provide the necessary
record tends to needlessly waste the limited resources of this Court. For that reason, we caution him that
repetition of this problem might well be viewed as sanctionable conduct in future appeals.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge

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