COA 374852 PEOPLE OF MI V PETER TIMOTHY O'BRIEN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
April 17, 2026
11:12 AM
v No. 374852
Tuscola Circuit Court
PETER TIMOTHY O’BRIEN, LC No. 2024-016415-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and YOUNG and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Peter Timothy O’Brien, appeals by leave granted1 his above-guidelines
sentence of 40 to 60 months for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious injury (OWI-
injury), MCL 257.625(5). On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence was unreasonable. For
the reasons set forth in this opinion, we disagree and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
On the evening of February 16, 2024, Tuscola County Sherriff’s Office Deputies Thomas
Peterson and Marcus Armstrong were investigating an unrelated matter on Mertz Road in Fremont
Township. In rendering assistance to the drivers of two vehicles and to protect the scene, the
deputies activated the emergency lights on their vehicles and parked them primarily on the
shoulder of the northbound lane, but the vehicles still jutted out into the lane. As Deputy Peterson
stood adjacent to Deputy Armstrong’s vehicle on the roadway-side of that vehicle, defendant, who
had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.151g per 100ml, approached the scene. Defendant’s
vehicle first struck Deputy Peterson’s vehicle, which was positioned behind Deputy Armstrong’s
vehicle. Defendant’s vehicle next struck Deputy Peterson and then the open driver’s-side door of
Deputy Armstrong’s vehicle. Deputy Peterson thus was pushed against that open door of Deputy
Armstrong’s vehicle and “rode the front of” defendant’s vehicle as it passed the vehicles the
1 People v O’Brien, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 22, 2025 (Docket
No. 374852).

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deputies had been assisting before Deputy Peterson eventually became dislodged and landed in a
ditch. Defendant had initially been traveling at 47 mph, then slowed to 45 mph through 2.4 seconds
before the crash, and to 34 mph 0.1 seconds before impact. Deputy Peterson suffered significant
injuries as a result of this accident.
Defendant was charged with three counts arising from the accident: operating while
intoxicated, third offense (OWI-third), MCL 257.625(1)(a); OWI-injury, MCL 257.625(5)(a); and
failure to use due care when passing a stationary vehicle causing injury to emergency personnel,
MCL 257.653a(3). The prosecution and defendant later reached an agreement under which
defendant agreed to plead no contest to the OWI-injury and failure-to-use-due-care counts in
exchange for the prosecution’s dismissal of the OWI-third charge. Defendant pleaded in
accordance with that agreement, and the trial court accepted these pleas.
At sentencing, defendant’s prior record variables (PRVs) were calculated to total 15 points
and his offense variables (OVs) were calculated to total 56 points. Defendant’s PRV score was
composed of 5 points for PRV 5, MCL 777.55 (prior misdemeanor convictions or prior
misdemeanor juvenile adjudications), and 10 points for PRV 7, MCL 777.57 (subsequent or
concurrent felony convictions). Defendant’s OV score was composed of: 10 points for OV 3,
MCL 777.33 (physical injury to victim); 10 points for OV 4, MCL 777.34 (psychological injury
to victim); 10 points for OV 9, MCL 777.39 (number of victims); 1 point for OV 12, MCL 777.42
(contemporaneous felonious criminal acts); 10 points for OV 17, MCL 777.47 (degree of
negligence exhibited); and 15 points for OV 18, MCL 777.48 (operator ability affected by alcohol
of drugs). Defendant was accordingly assessed an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 7 to 23
months.
The prosecution requested that the trial court exceed the advisory guidelines range and
sentence defendant to 40 to 60 months for OWI-injury and to 16 to 24 months for failure to use
due care, the maximum penalties for those offenses allowable under the relevant statutes. The
prosecution supported this request by noting the obviousness of the police vehicles’ presence, that
defendant had operated a vehicle while intoxicated before, defendant’s BAC of 0.151, and Deputy
Peterson’s extensive and long-lasting injuries, among other factors.
In fashioning defendant’s sentence, the trial court highlighted a wide variety of
considerations and noted that the law required its sentence to be reasonable and proportionate. The
trial court ultimately concluded that a sentence within the guidelines range was unreasonable and
imposed concurrent sentences of 40 to 60 months for OWI-injury and 130 days for failure to use
due care, with credit for 130 days served.
Defendant later filed a motion for correction of an invalid sentence, which the trial court
denied. This Court granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion, People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171,
182; 987 NW2d 58 (2022), and the factual findings underlying those decisions for clear error,
People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 125-126; 933 NW2d 314 (2019).

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III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant contests the reasonableness of his sentence. Defendant argues that
the trial court failed to adequately justify its above-guidelines sentence, that he was not solely
culpable for the accident, and that the trial court disregarded his potential for rehabilitation. We
disagree.
In sentencing a defendant, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion by violating the principle of
proportionality, which requires that a sentence be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense
and the circumstances of the offender.” People v Brcic, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2026) (Docket Nos. 362727 and 366230); slip op at 10 (quotation marks omitted). In contrast to
within-guidelines sentences, sentences that depart from the guidelines do not enjoy a rebuttable
presumption of proportionality. Id. Nonetheless, trial courts may “depart from the guidelines
when, in their judgment, the recommended range under the guidelines is disproportionate, in either
direction, to the seriousness of the crime.” People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 352; 901 NW2d
142 (2017), quoting People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 657; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). In departing
from the sentencing guidelines range, trial courts need not “articulate substantial and compelling
reasons . . . ; rather, the sentence must only be reasonable.” Walden, 319 Mich App at 351, citing
People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 391-392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015).2
We require trial courts imposing an out-of-guidelines sentences to “justify the sentence
imposed in order to facilitate appellate review, which includes an explanation of why the sentence
imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence [i.e., one
within the guidelines] would have been.” People v Lydic, 335 Mich App 486, 500-501; 967 NW2d
847 (2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[R]elevant factors for determining whether a
departure sentence is more proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines range continue to
include (1) whether the guidelines accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime; (2) factors not
considered by the guidelines; and (3) factors considered by the guidelines but given inadequate
weight.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (citations omitted).
In the present case, defendant argues that the trial court inadequately justified the departure
and extent thereof because the reasons that the trial court provided for departing from the
guidelines range were already accounted for by the guidelines. In sentencing defendant to 40 to
60 months for OWI-injury, the trial court departed from the guidelines by 17 months and imposed
the statutory maximum for that offense. The trial court articulated various considerations in
imposing this sentence such as defendant’s prior OWI convictions and exhibition of remorse, but
2 To the extent defendant challenges his sentence as disproportionate because the trial court did
not provide “objective and verifiable” reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines, this
argument has no merit. We have explained that “the prior requirement for ‘objective and
verifiable’ reasons for departing from the guidelines was tied to the requirement for ‘substantial
and compelling’ reasons for departure, and courts are no longer required to articulate ‘substantial
and compelling’ reasons to impose a sentence above the advisory guidelines range.” People v
Carlson, 332 Mich App 663, 674; 958 NW2d 278 (2020) (citations omitted). Therefore, we review
defendant’s sentence for reasonableness, not whether its departure from the guidelines is grounded
in reasons that are “objective and verifiable.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392.

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the trial court’s discussion makes clear that the drivers of the departure and its extent were the
seriousness of defendant’s offense and the recklessness defendant exhibited in committing that
offense, as well as the severity of Deputy Peterson’s injuries.
Regarding the seriousness of defendant’s offense and defendant’s recklessness in
committing that offense, the trial court highlighted defendant’s high BAC and described the
extremity of defendant’s recklessness by explaining how defendant had “driv[en] at a high rate of
speed”3 so closely to obvious police units, “taking no evasive action,” such that “that it was
inevitable that something would happen to a piece of property[] [o]r worse yet, like it did in this
case, to someone.” Defendant is correct that these factors were taken into account, at least to some
degree, by the OVs he was assessed, specifically for placing “2 to 9 victims . . . in danger of
physical injury or death” or “4 to 19 victims . . . in danger of property loss” under OV 9, MCL
777.39(1)(c) (number of victims), for “show[ing] a wanton or reckless disregard for the life or
property of another person” under OV 17, MCL 777.47(1)(a) (degree of negligence exhibited),
and for operating a vehicle with a BAC of over 0.15 but less than 0.2 under OV 18, MCL
777.48(1)(b) (operator ability affected by alcohol of drugs). But we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in concluding that these OV scores inadequately accounted for the severity
of defendant’s offense and defendant’s recklessness. See Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 525. As
evidenced by the video from Deputy Armstrong’s bodycam submitted both to the trial court and
on appeal, the flashing lights on the police vehicles made apparent their location on the roadway,
but defendant (driving with a BAC almost twice the legal limit) began to slow his vehicle only
about two seconds before the incident, and then proceeded closely enough to the conspicuous
police vehicles such that he could strike them and Deputy Peterson. The trial court did not clearly
err in finding that defendant indeed acted extremely recklessly, without regard to the people or
property he encountered. Given this evidence, according greater weight to defendant’s
recklessness and the severity of his offense was not an abuse of discretion.
The trial court also focused heavily on the injuries Deputy Peterson suffered. Deputy
Peterson suffered significant injuries to his leg, face, body, and head, and the trial court
characterized those injuries as “to a degree where he may not be able to come back to the profession
that he chose.” The trial court also explained that Deputy Peterson had to undergo numerous
surgeries and extensive physical therapy and may not “physically ever be the same as a result of
what happened.” The trial court further noted that there was “a significant period of time” during
which Deputy Peterson could not walk, and at the time of sentencing, Deputy Peterson could do
so only with the assistance of a cane. The trial court also expounded on the extremity of Deputy
Peterson’s psychological injuries, including memory loss and anxiety “that will plague Deputy
Peterson for a very, very long time” and specifically in his job, should he ever be able to return to
his profession in law enforcement The court additionally emphasized that defendant had made a
3 Defendant challenges the trial court’s statement that he was “driving at a high rate of speed” as
inaccurate. But defendant takes this statement out of context. For the trial court concluded that
defendant was driving at a high rate of speed in the context of closely approaching individuals and
clearly-marked police vehicles that were impeding part of the roadway. The trial court committed
no clear error in characterizing this as reckless behavior.

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“lifelong impact” on Deputy Peterson’s life and that there was “no timetable whatsoever where we
know for a fact [that Deputy Peterson is] going to be better.”
Certainly, Deputy Peterson’s injuries were accounted for at least to some degree by the
assessments for “[b]odily injury requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim” under OV 3,
MCL 777.33(1)(d) (physical injury to victim), and for “[s]erious psychological injury requiring
professional treatment occurred to a victim” under OV 4, MCL 777.34(1)(a) (psychological injury
to victim). But again, we cannot quarrel with the trial court’s determination that these scores
inadequately accounted for the severity and circumstances of defendant’s offense. See Dixon-Bey,
321 Mich App at 525. Deputy Peterson suffered extensive injuries requiring surgeries and
significant physical therapy, was disabled completely from walking for a period of time and at
sentencing was using a cane, and was under monitoring for possible additional neurological
injuries caused by trauma to his head. In addition, Deputy Peterson suffered from memory loss
over four months after the accident and had long-lasting anxiety that the trial court anticipated
would impact his law-enforcement work. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that these extreme physical and psychological injuries, perhaps inhibiting Deputy Peterson from
ever returning to his profession, indeed warranted additional weight beyond his 10-point score for
OV 3, MCL 777.33 (physical injury to victim), and his 10-point score for OV 4, MCL 777.34
(psychological injury to victim). See People v Anderson, 298 Mich App 178, 187-189; 825 NW2d
678 (2012) (stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that an OV 3 score
inadequately accounted for the victims’ severe injuries that had long-lasting effects requiring
continuing treatment and noting how OV 4 does not “always account for the unique psychological
injuries suffered by individual victims”).
“An abuse-of-discretion standard recognizes that there may be more than one principled
outcome and the trial court may not deviate from that principled range of outcomes.” Boykin, 510
Mich at 182. Given the trial court’s reasoned explanation for its determination that an above-
guidelines sentence was more proportionate than a within-guidelines sentence, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the guidelines to impose a minimum
sentence of 40 months. See Lydic, 335 Mich App at 500-501; Walden, 319 Mich App at 352.
We are also unpersuaded by defendant’s other arguments as to why his sentence is
unreasonable. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly failed to consider how the opening
of the driver’s-side door of Deputy Armstrong’s vehicle contributed to the accident, asserting that
absent the opening of this door, “the accident would likely have never occurred.” As best we can
tell, this argument completely lacks support in the record. Deputy Armstrong’s bodycam video
shows that, just before defendant’s arrival at the scene, Deputy Peterson stepped backwards from
his prior position that was directly adjacent to the driver’s-side door of Deputy Armstrong’s
vehicle such that the driver’s-side door of the vehicle could be opened. As a result, Deputy
Peterson was struck before defendant’s vehicle made contact with the open driver’s-side door of
Deputy Armstrong’s vehicle; indeed, Deputy Peterson was lodged onto defendant’s vehicle at the
point defendant’s vehicle made contact with the open door and thus was pushed against that open
door. The trial court found the same in deciding defendant’s motion for correction of an invalid
sentence, stating that Deputy Peterson was not at the end of the open door, but rather “close to the
vehicle,” and that defendant’s vehicle “crash[ed] into Deputy Peterson, the door, and then the front
of the vehicle.” These findings by the trial court were not clearly erroneous.

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Defendant lastly argues that his above-guidelines sentence disregarded his potential for
rehabilitation. When fashioning a sentence, trial courts must consider, among other factors,
“reformation of the offender.” People v Copeland, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024)
(Docket No. 363925); slip op at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A trial court need not
consider an offender’s reformation solely prospectively, as the offender’s capacity to be reformed,
but may also consider whether an offender “ha[s] actually demonstrated the capacity for reform.”
See id. at ___; slip op at 5. The trial court here clearly considered defendant’s reformation, both
retrospectively and prospectively, explaining that defendant had been unable to “make changes in
[his] life to immediately eliminate” the possibility of drunk driving from occurring again after his
prior OWI convictions, noting that the “silver lining” was that defendant could emerge from this
case and become sober, and describing the court’s “sincere[] hope that when [defendant is]
released from incarceration, that” defendant emphasizes rehabilitation. The court simply believed
that the other factors it was required to consider—the protection of society, disciplining defendant,
and deterring others from committing similar offenses, id. at ___; slip op at 3—outweighed the
reformation of defendant, to the extent, as defendant argues, that it delayed his ability to access
particular means of treatment at an earlier date. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
inadequately considering defendant’s potential for reformation.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and defendant is not entitled to
resentencing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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