COA 372782 CHARLES BLACKWELL V CITY OF INKSTER Opinion - Authored - Published 4/7/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CHARLES BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 07, 2026
11:12 AM
v No. 372782
Wayne Circuit Court
CITY OF INKSTER, LC No. 24-009573-CZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RICK, P.J., and YATES and MARIANI, JJ.
YATES, J.
Plaintiff, Charles Blackwell, has earned a reputation as a thorn in the side of local officials
in the Detroit area, but plaintiff is confined to a wheelchair due to a spinal-cord injury that rendered
him paraplegic, so he cannot readily attend in-person meetings, including those of the city council
of defendant, city of Inkster. As a result, the self-styled “local government watchdog and political
activist” asked to participate in the public-comment portion of city council meetings by submitting
in advance comments that could be read aloud at meetings. Defendant initially accommodated his
request at two meetings in June 2024 by reading plaintiff’s comments, but subsequently adopted a
policy limiting public comments to in-person remarks. Plaintiff filed suit, seeking injunctive relief
under the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., to require
defendant to read aloud his comments at city council meetings. The trial court issued an injunction
obligating defendant to read aloud plaintiff’s comments at meetings, and defendant then appealed
of right. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
By all accounts, plaintiff was paralyzed because of a spinal-cord injury, and he now faces
great difficulty attending meetings of the Inkster city council in person. The meetings are streamed
to the public, so anybody can virtually watch the meetings, but defendant does not have the present
ability to allow for virtual participation. Plaintiff apparently avails himself of the opportunities to
watch the meetings, but his paraplegia prevents him from attending the meetings in person.
In June 2024, plaintiff contacted the Inkster city clerk and the city attorney to request an
accommodation that would enable him to offer public comments at city council meetings. Under

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plaintiff’s proposal, he would submit his prepared public comments by e-mail to the city clerk and
the city attorney before each city council meeting, and then a person employed by defendant would
read aloud his public comments at each meeting. At first, defendant granted the accommodation
by reading aloud the comments that he submitted before two city council meetings in late June.
But on July 1, 2024, the Inkster city council adopted a policy requiring public comments
to be made in person. After that, plaintiff complained to city officials, who offered him no relief.
On July 5, 2024, plaintiff filed this action alleging a violation of the PWDCRA and requesting an
injunction barring “the City of Inkster from further enforcing its ‘in-person only’ public comment
policy against citizens who have a qualified disability under [the] PWDCRA.” Further, plaintiff
demanded injunctive relief “requiring the City of Inkster to provide reasonable accommodations
as required by [the] PWDCRA.”
On July 15, 2024, the trial court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting
defendant “from enforcing the ‘in-person only’ public comment policy passed by the Inkster City
Council at the July 1st, 2024, Inkster City Council meeting.” In addition, the trial court instructed
defendant to promptly show cause “why a preliminary injunction should not be ordered according
to the terms” of the temporary restraining order.
Seemingly in response to the trial court’s order, defendant’s city council revised its public-
comment policy by permitting members of the public to submit by e-mail written public comments
72 hours before each city council meeting. Under the revised policy, the written public comments
would then be provided to each city council member before the meeting and would be included in
the record as part of the meeting minutes. But the revised policy did not require or permit written
comments to be read aloud at any city council meeting.
Meanwhile, in the trial court, defendant argued that its amended policy was compliant with
the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq. Defendant contended that an injunction was
improper because it would impose an undue hardship and it would fundamentally change meetings
of the city council. Defendant submitted no evidentiary support for any of its arguments, however,
choosing instead to rely on legal theories and bare factual allegations to fend off plaintiff’s request
for injunctive relief.
The trial court took up the show-cause order at a hearing on August 27, 2024, and then the
trial court issued a written opinion and order on September 25, 2024. The trial court reasoned that
plaintiff “had made a prima facie showing” that defendant “failed to accommodate his disability,”
so the burden shifted to defendant to establish “that the requested accommodation would impose
‘undue hardship.’ ” The trial court explained that defendant had “failed to provide any evidence
that allowing [p]laintiff’s public comments to be read during City Council meetings would cause
an undue hardship.” Indeed, as the trial court noted, “[d]efendant has twice before accommodated
[p]laintiff’s disability by having [p]laintiff’s comments read during City Council meetings.” Also,
the trial court stated “that [p]laintiff’s comments, if read out loud during the meeting, would still
be subject to any other rules and policies which generally apply to those making public comments
before the City Council.” Hence, the trial court ruled in plaintiff’s favor on his PWDCRA claim,
issued a permanent injunction that prohibited defendant “from enforcing against [p]laintiff . . . the
‘in-person’ only public comment policy passed by the Inkster City Council on July 1, 2024[,]” and
instructed defendant “to read written public comments submitted by [p]laintiff . . . out loud during

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Inkster City Council meetings, subject to any other rules and policies which apply generally to
public comments made before the Inkster City Council.” Defendant now challenges that injunctive
order.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by employing an injunctive order to
prevent defendant from enforcing its “in-person only” public comment policy against plaintiff and
to compel defendant to read aloud at city council meetings the public comments sent by plaintiff.
“A trial court’s decision to grant or deny injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
Janet Travis, Inc v Preka Holdings, LLC, 306 Mich App 266, 274; 856 NW2d 206 (2014). Such
an abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes. Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). Questions
of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo, In re Klein Estate, 316 Mich App 329, 333; 891
NW2d 544 (2016), so this Court need not afford deference to the trial court’s resolution of a legal
issue. Applying these standards, we shall first consider one threshold argument made by plaintiff,
and then turn to the central issue in this case by analyzing how the PWDCRA and the OMA interact
when a person with a recognized disability requests an accommodation in order to participate in a
public meeting.
A. PLAINTIFF’S CHALLENGE TO DEFENDANT’S APPELLATE BRIEF
Plaintiff insists that we should consider defendant’s appellate arguments waived for failure
to sufficiently brief the issues on appeal. “Insufficiently briefed issues are deemed abandoned” on
appeal. Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr Managers, LLC,
282 Mich App 410, 413; 766 NW2d 874 (2009). Defendant’s appellate brief, which is oddly called
an “amended claim of appeal,” contains assertions that are unsupported by evidence or citations to
the lower-court record, but we conclude that defendant has offered enough arguments, citations to
authority, and references to the record to enable us to undertake an informed analysis of the issues.
Thus, defendant’s arguments are properly before us, id., so we elect to consider those arguments.
B. DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT’S INJUNCTION
Defendant has framed this dispute as a conflict between the PWDCRA and the OMA. The
trial court relied on the PWDCRA to provide injunctive relief to plaintiff, but defendant contends
that the OMA controls the outcome of this case, no matter what the PWDCRA requires. Therefore,
we must initially address the viability of plaintiff’s claim under the PWDCRA, and then determine
whether the OMA mandates any modification of the outcome dictated by the PWDCRA.
1. PLAINTIFF’S PWDCRA CLAIM
From start to finish in the trial court, plaintiff relied on the PWDCRA to support his claim
that defendant had to accommodate his disability by reading his public comments aloud at the city
council meetings. The PWDCRA includes straightforward guarantees and protections for people
with disabilities. First, MCL 37.1102(1) guarantees “[t]he opportunity to obtain . . . full and equal
utilization of public accommodations [and] public services . . . without discrimination because of
a disability . . . .” Second, MCL 37.1102(2) mandates that “a person shall accommodate a person

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with a disability for purposes of . . . public accommodation [and] public services . . . unless the
person demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” Those provisions
define the general nature of a PWDCRA claim. Further, MCL 37.1302(a) prohibits “[d]eny[ing]
an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public service because of a disability
that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to utilize and benefit from the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations . . . .” A person claiming a violation of the PWDCRA
may bring a civil action for injunctive relief, MCL 37.1606(1), as plaintiff has done in this case.
A plaintiff with a disability who alleges a failure to accommodate under those provisions
first must “make a prima facie showing,” which includes proof of a disability as defined in the act.
Cebreco v Music Hall Ctr for the Performing Arts, Inc, 219 Mich App 353, 359-360; 555 NW2d
862 (1996); see MCL 37.1103(d) (defining “disability” for purposes of the PWDCRA). After the
plaintiff makes such a prima facie showing, “the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show
that the accommodation required would impose an undue hardship.” Cebreco, 219 Mich App at
360 (quotation marks and citation omitted). And if the defendant makes that showing, it becomes
the “plaintiff’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an accommodation would
not impose such a hardship.” Id. at 361. With that burden-shifting framework in mind, we must
decide whether the trial court properly applied the PWDCRA to the facts of this case.
As an initial matter, defendant faults the trial court for ruling that public comments at city
council meetings are a “public service” under the PWDCRA. Under MCL 37.1301(b), a “public
service” includes “a county, city, village, [or] township[.]” Thus, according to MCL 37.1301(b),
defendant, as a city, is a “public service.” See Bertrand v City of Mackinac Island, 256 Mich App
13, 18; 662 NW2d 77 (2003) (“The applicable statutory definition of a ‘public service’ includes a
city, . . . and thus includes defendant.”). Opportunities to make public comments at a city council
meeting are “services,” “privileges,” “advantages,” and “accommodations” provided and regulated
by defendant, as contemplated by MCL 37.1302(a).
According to the PWDCRA, a disabled person is entitled to “the full and equal enjoyment”
of the services, privileges, advantages, and accommodations provided by a city. MCL 37.1302(a).
Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff’s condition constitutes a “disability” in the context of this
case. See MCL 37.1103(d)(i)(B). Plaintiff contended that, because of his condition, he was unable
to attend the city council meetings. The trial court found that “[a]lthough [p]laintiff had been able
to make in-person appearances in the past, he is no longer able to do so.” Accordingly, in bringing
this action requesting to have his public comments read aloud at city council meetings, plaintiff is
asking for the same “full and equal enjoyment” as nondisabled people of the opportunity to make
public comments during city council meetings.
Defendant contends that plaintiff was not deprived of “the full and equal enjoyment” of the
opportunity to publicly comment during city council meetings because the 72-hour written notice
provision would allow plaintiff’s written comments to be in the record and to be distributed to the
city council members. But under the 72-hour written notice provision, plaintiff’s comments would
not be heard by the public or members of the city council during the meetings. Although plaintiff’s
comments would reach some of the public as part of the official record of the meeting, that public
exposure is much less significant than being heard by the attendees of the meeting. Nondisabled
people who speak at meetings have their public comments heard not only by members of the city

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council, but also by all members of the public in attendance. The 72-hour written notice provision
does not provide plaintiff with “the full and equal enjoyment” of the opportunity to provide public
comments during city council meetings. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim falls within the ambit of the
PWDCRA, MCL 37.1302(a), because he is seeking the same measure of full and equal enjoyment
as people without disabilities of services, privileges, advantages, or accommodations provided by
defendant. Bertrand, 256 Mich App at 19.
Because plaintiff established a prima facie case under the PWDCRA, the burden shifted to
defendant “to show that the accommodation required would impose an undue hardship.” Cebreco,
219 Mich App at 360 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A duty to provide an accommodation
to a disabled person exists “if accommodation can be accomplished without undue hardship on the
person offering the goods or services to the public.” MOSES, Inc v SEMCOG, 270 Mich App 401,
421; 716 NW2d 278 (2006). The PWDCRA does not define what constitutes an “undue hardship,”
but that concept implies “a standard of reasonableness” that depends on the circumstances. Rourk
v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 458 Mich 25, 35-36; 580 NW2d 397 (1998); see also Buck v Thomas M
Cooley Law Sch, 272 Mich App 93, 103-104; 725 NW2d 485 (2006) (“[D]enial of some or all of
a request for accommodation is not a violation of the act if that denial is not unreasonable.”). An
accommodation is considered reasonable whenever it “imposes no fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program or undue financial and administrative burdens.” Bachman v Swan Harbour
Assoc, 252 Mich App 400, 420; 653 NW2d 415 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
An “undue hardship” may include “financial expenses, inconvenience to other patrons, safety or
fire hazards, and so forth.” Cebreco, 219 Mich App at 361.
Here, as the trial court aptly observed, defendant accommodated plaintiff at two meetings
of the city council in June 2024 by reading his comments aloud at the meetings, and nothing in the
record indicates that that accommodation imposed any “undue hardship” on defendant. Defendant
elected to stop accommodating plaintiff in that manner after the city council adopted the policy on
July 1, 2024, that allowed only in-person public comments. The adoption of that policy did nothing
to render unreasonable the accommodation that defendant had afforded plaintiff at two city council
meetings in June. In fact, it seemed just as reasonable in July 2024 as it was in June 2024 to read
aloud the public comments submitted in advance by plaintiff. Thus, the trial court did not commit
an abuse of discretion when it entered an injunction that merely required defendant to keep doing
what it had done without any difficulty at two city council meetings in June 2024. In sum, the trial
court’s permanent injunction conformed to the standards established in the PWDCRA.
2. DEFENDANT’S OMA ARGUMENT
Defendant contends that even if the trial court acted in conformity with the PWDCRA by
entering its injunction, the language of the OMA mandates a different result. The OMA “generally
requires ‘decisions’ or ‘deliberations’ of a ‘public body’ to be open to the public.” Davis v City of
Detroit Fin Review Team, 296 Mich App 568, 576; 821 NW2d 896 (2012), citing MCL 15.262
and MCL 15.263. Under the OMA, “a public body may establish reasonable rules and regulations
to minimize the possibility of disrupting the meeting.” MCL 15.263(1). The competing parties in
this case cite Attorney General Dana Nessel’s opinion analyzing how the OMA interacts with the

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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq.,1 and the Rehabilitation Act, MCL
395.81 et seq. OAG, 2022, No. 7,318 p 1 (February 4, 2022).2 Specifically, the Attorney General’s
opinion states that the OMA “does not contemplate wholly virtual meetings.” Id. at 4. According
to that opinion, “there is nothing in the OMA that requires a public body to accommodate . . . a
disabled member of the general public, who is unable to attend an in-person meeting of that body
due to a medical condition, . . . and requests an accommodation.” Id. at 6. “In fact, the OMA does
not even address the issue of accommodation.” Id. In addition, “a request for a fully virtual option
is more likely to be viewed as a fundamental alteration of a board’s or commission’s services, and
therefore not required.” Id. at 13. When “that option is not necessary to accommodate a qualified
individual with a disability, the ADA does not require it and the OMA would not permit it” because
“[t]he Legislature’s clear intent behind the OMA was to have in-person meetings.” Id.
Defendant describes the injunction granting plaintiff’s accommodation as requiring “fully
virtual” city council meetings. Defendant asserts, by analogy to the Attorney General’s reasoning
as to the ADA, that requiring fully virtual city council meetings would be a fundamental alteration
of those meetings. Whether a fully virtual meeting would be a fundamental alteration is not before
us, though, because the injunction issued by the trial court does not require a virtual meeting. The
trial court’s injunction simply instructed defendant to read plaintiff’s submitted public comments
“out loud during Inkster City Council meetings, subject to any other rules and policies which apply
generally to public comments made before the Inkster City Council.” The character of defendant’s
city council meetings, i.e., conducted in person and streamed virtually, remains unchanged under
the trial court’s injunction. Consequently, the trial court’s application of the PWDCRA to provide
an accommodation to plaintiff does not run afoul of the language or purpose of the OMA.
Defendant nonetheless claims that the injunction imposes a hardship because it contravenes
defendant’s authority to establish and enforce rules for city council meetings under the OMA. The
OMA does not obligate defendant to provide accommodations to people with disabilities, but the
PWDCRA plainly imposes such obligations. “We are required generally to harmonize all statutory
provisions if we can do so reasonably,” In re Huntington Estate, 339 Mich App 8, 22; 981 NW2d
72 (2021), and we can readily harmonize the language of the OMA and the PWDCRA with regard
to the accommodation of people with disabilities. Indeed, the injunction in this case does precisely
that, affording an accommodation to plaintiff that does not fundamentally alter the nature of city
council meetings.
The trial court’s injunction makes clear that the right granted to plaintiff to have his written
public comments read aloud at the city council meetings is “subject to any other rules and policies
1 Whenever this Court interprets provisions of the PWDCRA, “analogous federal precedents are
persuasive, although not necessarily binding.” Chiles v Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 462,
472; 606 NW2d 398 (1999) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457
Mich 593, 601; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). Thus, this Court “may look to the ADA and federal cases
interpreting the ADA for guidance,” but this Court need not “follow federal precedent in analyzing
the PWDCRA unless this Court concurs with such analysis.” Chiles, 238 Mich App at 472-473.
2 “Opinions of the Attorney General are not binding on the courts.” Martin v Murray, 309 Mich
App 37, 42 n 4; 867 NW2d 444 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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which apply generally to public comments made before the Inkster City Council.” The trial court
delicately struck an appropriate balance between the standards of the OMA and the requirements
of the PWDCRA, thereby harmonizing the statutory dictates prescribed by our Legislature. As a
result, the trial court’s injunction comports with the standards of the PWDCRA, and nothing in the
OMA undermines the trial court’s reliance upon the PWDCRA to obligate defendant to read aloud
at city council meetings the public comments submitted by plaintiff in advance of each meeting.
For those reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the
permanent injunction that it entered.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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