COA 374313 PEOPLE OF MI V SHAWN MICHAEL DEGEN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2026
10:02 AM
v No. 374313
Oakland Circuit Court
SHAWN MICHAEL DEGEN, LC No. 2023-284049-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BAZZI, P.J., and PATEL and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Shawn Michael Degen, appeals by leave granted1 the order denying his motion
to correct an invalid sentence. We affirm, but remand to the trial court for the ministerial task of
correcting the judgment of sentence.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from multiple incidents of theft that Degen perpetrated in Independence
Township, Michigan in the summer of 2022. Among these incidents, Degen entered and stole
property from two garages and two parked vehicles. A search of Degen’s home and vehicle
revealed that he was in possession of numerous items that were reported stolen. Police also
discovered boxes containing ammunition and a credit card belonging to another individual at his
home. Degen was eventually arrested, and while detained at the police station he attempted to
remove his handcuffs, permanently damaging them in the process.
1 This Court initially denied Degen’s application for leave to appeal. People v Degen, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 5, 2025 (Docket No. 374313). Degen then sought
leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to this
Court “for consideration as on leave granted.” People v Degen, ___ Mich ___, ___; 25 NW3d 125
(2025).

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In September 2023, the parties approached the trial court with a “plea agreement for
delayed sentence,” under which Degen would plead guilty—as a third habitual offender, MCL
769.11—to two counts of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); breaking and entering a
motor vehicle causing damage, MCL 750.356a(3); larceny from a motor vehicle, MCL
750.356a(1); being a felon in possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6); malicious destruction
of police property, MCL 750.377b; and possession of another person’s financial-transaction device
with the intent to use, deliver, circulate, or sell it, MCL 750.157p.
Under the plea agreement, the prosecution requested a delay in sentencing for 11 months,
during which Degen was required to comply with several conditions including his participation in
mental-health treatment, alcohol and drug testing, employment, and payment of restitution, in
addition to any other conditions set by the court. Upon Degen’s successful completion of the
conditions, the prosecution would agree to reduce his first-degree home invasion charges to third-
degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(4). The agreement also provided: “There is no sentencing
agreement. This agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties and there have been
no promises or threats, oral or otherwise, other than those appearing in this writing.” Further, the
agreement did “not bind any government agency except the Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office.”
The trial court reviewed Degen’s rights on the record. It specifically asked Degen whether
it “made [him] any promises with regard to [his] sentence,” to which Degen responded, “No, Your
Honor.” The court confirmed the same with the prosecution and defense counsel:
The Court. All right. People and defense counsel agree that the Court has
made no representation with regard to the Defendant’s possible sentence?
[The Prosecution]. That is correct, Your Honor.
[Defense Counsel]. Yes, Your Honor.
The court subsequently accepted Degen’s plea and delayed his sentencing for 11 months.
Degen complied with the conditions of his plea agreement during the delay period and the
parties appeared before the court for sentencing in October 2024. The presentence investigation
report (PSIR) recommended the court grant the terms of the delay and sentence Degen to two days
in jail with two days of jail credit. The parties both indicated agreement with the recommendation,
and defense counsel emphasized that Degen was “a candidate for probation” given his adherence
to the conditions. The court dismissed the first-degree home invasion charges and added
convictions for third-degree home invasion pursuant to the agreement. However, it declined to
adopt the sentencing recommendation, which it “[found] to be appalling.”
It noted that Degen “received an extraordinarily generous delay of sentence, which
involve[d] the dismissal of two counts of home invasion first degree . . . .” While the court
recognized and was pleased that Degen complied with the conditions of his delay of sentence, it
“note[d] that the defendant has engaged in serial violations of the criminal law for a long time.”
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Degen to serve concurrent jail terms of 365 days for each of
his third-degree home invasion, breaking and entering a motor vehicle causing damage, larceny
from a motor vehicle, felon in possession of ammunition, and malicious destruction of police

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property convictions; and 273 days for his possession of another’s financial-transaction device
conviction.
Degen thereafter moved to correct his sentence, arguing that it was invalid because the trial
court violated MCL 771.1(2) when it sentenced him to one year of incarceration in jail. Degen
also contended that his sentence was invalid under MCL 769.31(b) and MCL 769.34(4) because
he should have been sentenced to an intermediate sanction, and that his sentencing guidelines for
Offense Variable (OV) 13 and OV 16 were improperly scored.
The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Degen’s sentence was within the
guidelines range, there was no sentencing agreement between the parties, and the court made no
representations to Degen about his sentence. Further, the court complied with MCL 771.1(2) by
dismissing the first-degree home invasion convictions, which provided leniency by dramatically
reducing the guidelines range. Though the trial court acknowledged that it did not explicitly state
the reason for the delay of sentence at the time of the plea under MCL 771.1(2), it maintained that
the record obviously demonstrated the reason for the delay, namely, to allow Degen “the
opportunity to complete the terms and conditions of the Delay of Sentence to avail himself of the
Plea Agreement.” The trial court rejected Degen’s argument that his guidelines were improperly
scored. It also concluded that Degen’s sentence did not violate MCL 769.31(b) or MCR 769.34(4)
because the guidelines range for one of his offenses exceeded 18 months and the court otherwise
articulated reasonable grounds to sentence him to a term of incarceration rather than impose an
intermediate sanction. This appeal followed.
II. SENTENCING
Degen argues that the trial court’s sentence of 365 days in jail was invalid because he
complied with the terms of his delayed sentence agreement and was entitled to an intermediate
sanction under a proper scoring of the guidelines. We disagree.
We review sentencing issues for an abuse of discretion. People v Sabin, 242 Mich App
656, 660; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Maben, 313 Mich App 545,
552; 884 NW2d 314 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review de novo questions
of law at sentencing as well as issues of statutory interpretation.” People v Jackson, 348 Mich
App 280, 285; 18 NW3d 360 (2023). “Under the sentencing guidelines, a trial court’s findings of
fact are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”
People v Carlson, 332 Mich App 663, 666; 958 NW2d 278 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record,
we are definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake.” Id. “We review de
novo whether the facts as found were adequate to satisfy the statutory scoring conditions.” Id.
“When calculating the sentencing guidelines, a court may consider all record evidence, including
the contents of a PSIR, plea admissions, and testimony presented at a preliminary examination.”
People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015).

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A. DELAYED SENTENCE
Degen argues that the trial court’s sentence violated MCL 771.1(2) by imposing a term of
incarceration in jail, contrary to the recommendation of the probation department and his
compliance with the terms of his delayed sentence agreement.2 MCL 771.1(2), which governs
delayed sentencing in criminal matters, provides:
In an action in which the court may place the defendant on probation, the
court may delay sentencing the defendant for not more than 1 year to give the
defendant an opportunity to prove to the court his or her eligibility for probation or
other leniency compatible with the ends of justice and the defendant’s
rehabilitation, such as participation in a drug treatment court under . . . MCL
600.1060 to 600.1088. When sentencing is delayed, the court shall enter an order
stating the reason for the delay upon the court’s records. The delay in passing
sentence does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to sentence the defendant at any
time during the period of delay.
“The purpose of delaying a defendant’s sentence pursuant to this statutory provision is entirely for
the benefit of the convicted defendant—it is to give the defendant an opportunity to prove to the
court that he is worthy of probation or other leniency compatible with the ends of justice and
rehabilitation.” People v Smith, 496 Mich 133, 139; 852 NW2d 127 (2014) (quotation marks
omitted).
Degen contends that the imposition of a jail sentence was inconsistent with the purpose of
MCL 771.1(2) because he proved his eligibility for probation by complying with the conditions of
his delayed sentence agreement.3 The parties do not dispute that Degen complied with the
conditions of the delay. However, nothing in the statute requires a trial court to sentence a
defendant to probation after the delay, even when a defendant complies with the conditions of the
2 The prosecution argues that Degen’s appeal is moot because he has already served his sentence.
However, we already rejected this argument, which was initially asserted in a motion to dismiss
filed by the prosecution. We stated that, “[a]lthough technically moot, the issues are of some
public significance and likely to recur and yet evade appellate review if dismissed as moot on the
completion of the defendant’s sentence.” People v Degen, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered January 27, 2026 (Docket No. 374313). We decline to reconsider the issue.
3 On appeal, the prosecution challenges whether MCL 771.1(2) is even applicable, arguing that
“[t]hough the People included a delay in the sentence as part of the terms . . . the agreement was
solely a plea agreement with no agreement on the terms of sentencing.” However, the prosecution
did not raise this argument in the trial court, nor does it explain how the issue amounts to plain
error given that the court denied Degen’s motion to correct an invalid sentence. See People v
Allen, 507 Mich 597, 604; 968 NW2d 532 (2021) (“Unpreserved, nonconstitutional errors are
reviewed for plain error.”). Further, the trial court analyzed the applicability of MCL 771.1(2)
below, making it appropriate to address the issue on appeal.

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delay. Instead, the Legislature provided that a defendant may demonstrate eligibility “for
probation or other leniency” under the statute. MCL 771.1(2) (emphasis added).
In this case, by delaying sentencing, the trial court provided Degen the opportunity to take
advantage of the delayed sentence agreement, thus giving him “an opportunity to prove to the court
his . . . eligibility for probation or other leniency compatible with the ends of justice and [his]
rehabilitation,” consistent with MCL 771.1(2). Having demonstrated his eligibility for leniency at
the end of the 11-month period, the trial court reduced Degen’s most serious charges from first-
degree home invasion to third-degree home invasion, which resulted in a considerable reduction
of his sentencing guidelines range. In other words, the delay gave Degen an opportunity to prove
his eligibility for the leniency of a reduction in the home invasion charges, which in turn, provided
leniency by reducing the guidelines range.
Degen cites People v Cannon, 145 Mich App 100, 103; 377 NW2d 354 (1985), for the
proposition that “[t]he purpose of a delayed sentence is to give the defendant an opportunity to
satisfy the trial court that he or she can fairly be placed on probation instead of sentenced to
prison.” However, this Court has since clarified “that the Cannon Court’s view of the statute was
too limited in scope since the statute also authorized a delay to give the defendant an opportunity
to prove his eligibility for other leniency compatible with the ends of justice and the rehabilitation
of the defendant.” People v Saenz, 173 Mich App 405, 409; 433 NW2d 861 (1988) (quotation
marks omitted).
Degen also relies on the holding in Cannon, 145 Mich App at 104, that “incarceration in a
county jail cannot be a valid condition of a delayed sentence.” He argues that, because jail is not
a valid condition to impose during a delay, the imposition of a jail sentence following a delay
cannot be permitted where a defendant complies with the necessary conditions. The Cannon Court
explained that being in jail does not assist the sentencing court in determining whether a defendant
should be placed on probation after a delay because “spending time in jail does not reflect upon
either the willingness or the ability of the defendant to voluntarily comply with terms of a probation
order.” Id.
Degen’s argument overlooks the significant distinction between the conditions a trial court
may impose during the delay and the sentence imposed after the delay. While the delay conditions
are intended “to give the defendant an opportunity to prove to the court his or her eligibility for
probation or other leniency compatible with the ends of justice,” a final sentence has no such
purpose and is determined after the delay has ended. MCL 771.1(2). Indeed, this Court has
cautioned about the distinction between conditions of a delay and the sentence ultimately imposed.
See Saenz, 173 Mich App at 409 (“Nevertheless, jail incarceration cannot be a valid condition
because it is the precise type of punishment authorized by the Legislature for the offense. . . . The
three sentencing options are jail, state prison, or probation with up to one year in jail.”). Nor does
the language of the statute suggest any limitation on the trial court’s sentencing authority upon
completion of the delay. See Smith, 496 Mich at 142 (“After the one-year statutory limitation
elapses, sentencing may no longer be delayed for the purpose of permitting a defendant the
opportunity to prove that he is worthy of leniency, and the judge is required to sentence defendant
as provided by law.”). Accordingly, a sentence involving incarceration in jail following a
defendant’s successful completion of a delay period is not necessarily improper under MCL

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771.1(2), and Degen has not established that the trial court was obligated to sentence him to
probation.
Degen also argues that his sentence violated MCL 771.1(2) because the trial court failed to
state the reason for the delay on the record. MCL 771.1(2) provides that “[w]hen sentencing is
delayed, the court shall enter an order stating the reason for the delay upon the court’s records.”
The trial court recognized that it did not enter a specific order to that effect, but stated the
conditions enumerated in the judgment of delayed sentence paired with the plea agreement clearly
demonstrated that the delay was to allow Degen the opportunity to avail himself of the plea
agreement. We conclude that any procedural error arising from the trial court’s failure to explicitly
state the reason for the delayed sentence is harmless. As discussed above, Degen cannot
demonstrate that the trial court’s sentence substantively violated MCL 771.1(2), and the record
supports that the delay was entered to allow Degen the opportunity to benefit from the plea
agreement—which he did by having his first-degree home invasion charges dismissed.
Accordingly, any error did not result in a miscarriage of justice to warrant disturbing the judgment
of sentence. See MCL 769.26 (providing that no judgment should be set aside or reversed for
procedural error “unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it
shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”).
B. INTERMEDIATE SANCTION
Degen claims that the trial court violated MCL 769.31(b) and MCL 769.34(4) by imposing
a term of incarceration in jail instead of an intermediate sanction. MCL 769.34(4) provides that
“[i]ntermediate sanctions must be imposed” under certain circumstances, including:
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range for a
defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII is
18 months or less, the court shall impose an intermediate sanction unless the court
states on the record reasonable grounds to sentence the individual to incarceration
in a county jail for not more than 12 months or to the jurisdiction of the department
of corrections for any sentence over 12 months. [MCL 769.34(4)(a).]
MCL 769.31(b) defines “intermediate sanction” as “probation or any sanction, other than
imprisonment in a county jail, state prison, or state reformatory, that may lawfully be imposed.”
“The statute includes a long list of possible sanctions, including probation and rehabilitation
programs. Jail is not among the options.” People v Pinson, 344 Mich App 305, 311; 1 NW3d 815
(2022). See also People v Stauffer, 465 Mich 633, 635; 640 NW2d 869 (2002) (“An ‘intermediate
sanction’ can mean a number of things, but it does not include a prison sentence.”).
Degen argues that the court should have imposed an intermediate sanction because the top
of his guidelines range for all of his convictions was less than 18 months, except for his conviction
of malicious destruction of police property, which he contends was improperly scored.4 In this
4 We disagree with Degen’s contention that his guidelines were improperly scored. He argues that
OV 13 should have been assessed 5 points rather than 10. However, Degen’s relevant criminal

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case, the recommended minimum sentence range was 0 to 16 months for the third-degree home
invasion, breaking and entering a motor vehicle causing damage, and larceny from a motor vehicle
convictions; 0 to 13 months for the felon in possession of ammunition conviction; 0 to 25 months
for the malicious destruction of police property conviction; and 0 to 9 months for the possession
of another’s financial-transaction device conviction.
Even assuming that the trial court was required to impose an intermediate sanction for
Degen’s offenses, it was permitted to sentence him to no more than a year of incarceration in jail,
provided that it “state[d] on the record reasonable grounds to sentence [Degen] to incarceration in
a county jail for not more than 12 months . . . .” MCL 769.34(4)(a). In this case, the trial court
extensively detailed its reasoning for imposing a one-year jail term at the sentencing hearing,
which it summarized in its opinion and order denying Degen’s motion to correct an invalid
sentence:
[T]he reasons for the sentencing included (1) a very generous reduction in the
charges, having counts 1 and 2 dismissed, (2) having served four jail terms, (3)
having served five probationary terms, (4) two prior felonies, (5) a juvenile home,
(6) his criminal history beginning in 2006, (7) receiving [Holmes Youthful Training
Act] and losing it, (8) violating his probation in the past, (9) participating in [Special
Alternative Incarceration] boot camp, and (10) another home invasion in 2022.
Degen argues that the reasons articulated by the trial court were improperly based on
factors that were already accounted for in calculating his Prior Record Variable (PRV) score,
contrary to MCL 769.34(3)(b) (prohibiting sentencing courts from basing a departure on a
characteristic “already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence range unless the
court finds from the facts contained in the court record, including the [PSIR], that the characteristic
has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.”).5 For each of his offenses, Degen received
a score of 20 points for PRV 7, which is appropriate when “[t]he offender has 2 or more subsequent
or concurrent convictions” for felony offenses. MCL 777.57(1)(a).
While the trial court considered Degen’s prior felony convictions in imposing a one-year
jail term, the other reasons it articulated were not accounted for in Degen’s PRV score. Further,
the trial court was permitted to consider dismissal of the more serious first-degree home invasion
history—two convictions of third-degree home invasion, and convictions for breaking and entering
a motor vehicle causing damage, larceny from a motor vehicle, malicious destruction of police
property, and possession of another’s financial-transaction device—meet the statutory requirement
for assessing 10 points. See MCL 777.43(1)(d) (providing that OV 13 be assessed 10 points if
“[t]he offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving a combination of 3 or
more crimes against a person or property”). Further, while Degen challenges the scoring of OV
16, a reduction of one point would not affect the OV level or his sentencing guidelines range.
5 We note that although the trial court’s sentence was within the guidelines range, imposition of a
jail or prison sentence when the guidelines provide for an intermediate sanction is effectively
evaluated as an upward departure. See People v Muttscheler, 481 Mich 372, 375; 750 NW2d 159
(2008).

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charges, along with Degen’s history of recidivism and previous convictions for the same types of
offenses. See People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 44-45; 755 NW2d 212 (2008) (“[R]epeated
offenses and failures at rehabilitation—constitute an acceptable justification for an upward
departure.”); id. at 45 (noting that an upward departure may be justified by “factors includ[ing] a
history of recidivism, and obsessive or uncontrollable urges to commit certain offenses”); People
v Armstrong, 247 Mich App 423, 426; 636 NW2d 785 (2001) (permitting a trial court to consider
the dismissal of more serious charges pursuant to a guilty plea when determining whether
departure is justified). Contrary to Degen’s assertion, the trial court adequately stated reasonable
grounds to sentence him to one year of incarceration in a county jail under MCL 769.34(4)(a).
C. JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
On appeal, the prosecution notes that the trial court’s amended judgment of sentence is
incorrect because it does not include Degen’s convictions and sentences for third-degree home
invasion. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court added two convictions of third-degree
home invasion, for which it sentenced Degen on the record. However, these convictions and
sentences are not reflected on the amended judgment of sentence. When a judgment of sentence
misstates the crime for which the defendant was convicted, the proper remedy is to remand for
correction. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 521; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). We therefore remand
to the trial court to amend the judgment of sentence accordingly.
Affirmed and remanded for the ministerial task of correcting Degen’s judgment of
sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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