COA 378821 IN RE CRANDALL MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/8/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
September 08, 2026
10:04 AM
In re CRANDALL, Minors.
No. 378821
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 24-050339-NA;
24-050340-NA
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to
the minor children, CC and SC, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication
continue to exist and are unlikely to be rectified within reasonable time) and (j) (reasonable
likelihood of harm if returned to parent).1 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred by
finding (1) that petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), made
reasonable efforts toward reunification, (2) that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), and (3) that it was in the children’s best
interests to terminate his parental rights. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. THE PETITION
This case arose after Children’s Protective Services (CPS) received a complaint on
February 5, 2024, alleging that mother and her boyfriend engaged in a physical altercation in front
of the children, which ultimately led to the boyfriend’s arrest.
1 The order also terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother. She is not a party to this
appeal.

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On February 6, 2024, DHHS petitioned the trial court alleging that the children came
within the court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). While respondent was not
implicated in the February 5 incident, he also had a long history with CPS and other issues included
in the petition. The petition alleged that respondent owed over $7,000 in child support, had a
criminal history including third-degree felony child abuse of CC from 2015, had another pending
charge for misdemeanor domestic violence stemming from a domestic-violence incident in
December 2023, and had admitted to abusing crack cocaine and alcohol. At the time the petition
was filed, the children were living with mother. Respondent could not be located and had been
homeless for a while.
At the preliminary hearing on February 9, 2024, respondent waived probable cause and
requested that petitioner explore relative placement. The trial court found probable cause that one
or more of the allegations in the petition were true and that it was contrary to the children’s welfare
to remain placed with either parent “due to substance abuse, homelessness, and ongoing domestic
violence.” The trial court authorized the petition and placed the children with DHHS. It also
ordered that DHHS was required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Following respondent’s plea of admission at a combined adjudication and dispositional
hearing on April 5, 2024, the trial court found statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over the
children. The trial court determined that the “continual exposure of [the] children to neglect by
domestic violence and drug use” made respondent’s plea appropriate. The children were jointly
placed in a licensed, but not preadoptive, foster care home, and respondent was granted supervised
visitation. The court also ordered respondent to cooperate with DHHS services. Over
respondent’s objection, it determined that petitioner had been making reasonable efforts toward
reunification, even though there was a delay in DHHS completing the paperwork for services.
B. ADJUDICATIVE PHASE
At a dispositional review hearing in June 2024, respondent continued to struggle with
substance abuse, and he was on a waitlist for substance-abuse counseling. Respondent had begun
participating in weekly counseling sessions for domestic violence issues and participated in 12 of
the 16 weekly sessions. He also attended four out of eight available sessions in a “Men Choosing
Alternatives to Violence” group. Regarding housing and employment, respondent found
employment doing handyman work but was living with his boss and being paid under the table.
DHHS shared housing resources with him and reported he was working toward saving enough
money for a security deposit on an apartment. Petitioner reported “[p]arenting times go very well.
The kids are always very excited to see him. He’s very engaged throughout the whole visit. He’s
very affectionate. Very loving. Visits go very well.” Respondent had attended all parenting time
visits, and despite being late numerous times, always let caseworkers know when he was running
late.
Following these updates, petitioner recommended, and the trial court ordered, continued
reunification efforts for another 90 days, that the children remain in foster care, and that parenting
time remain supervised. The trial court found, however, that “progress toward alleviating the
conditions that cause[d] the children to be placed were minimally made by both parents,” and that
“[i]f there continues to be a lack of full engagement . . . and I hear that there’s a lot of missed
appointments and a lot of missed drug screens, I may take that away and say that progress is not

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being made.” Another dispositional review hearing was scheduled for September 2024, but for
unknown reasons, it did not occur.
A permanency planning hearing or dispositional review hearing occurred in December
2024, though there was some confusion on the record as to the type of hearing it was. A caseworker
provided updates that the children were “both doing very well” in foster care. CC was now in
sixth grade, doing well in school, was “processing her trauma” in therapy, and was “very engaged”
in visits with respondent. CC expressed an interest in living with respondent. However, SC was
“slightly behind emotionally, socially, and in language,” but looked forward to seeing respondent
as well during parenting time. The caseworker reported there were no appropriate in-state
placements available with relatives, and DHHS continued looking for preadoptive foster homes
for the children.
Regarding housing and employment, respondent was still living with his boss and working
under the table. However, he was also working with petitioner to find a job where he could receive
a pay stub and save money for a security deposit for an apartment. He had completed a monthly
budget with the caseworker, was participating weekly in therapy, but was “kicked out” of the Men
Choosing Alternative’s to Violence group. Respondent had made no progress with substance
abuse—he only completed 7 of 28 required drug screens and tested positive in all of them. He
expressed interest in going to in-patient rehabilitation for 90 days, which the caseworker could
arrange for January 2025, and upon release, he could obtain housing and a new job. Respondent
was participating in parenting time without issue. The caseworker reported CC “adores and loves
him so much,” and SC “feels the same way.”
The trial court remarked that the children had now been in foster care for ten months, “and
we have lack of housing, no improvement with regard to domestic relations, substance abuse is a
significant issue. So, a lot of stuff needs to be done for [respondent] as well for reunification to
occur . . . . ” Petitioner recommended at the December 2024 hearing that reunification remain the
goal, and to continue as is with supervised parenting time. The trial court adopted the
recommendation but remarked “you’ve got 90 days to get it together,” and that had this been a
permanency planning hearing, the trial court would have ordered that adoption be the goal, and
that a termination hearing be scheduled. Petitioner then informed the court that the current hearing
should have been a permanency planning hearing because one was required within one year of the
children entering care. As such, petitioner recommended that termination proceedings begin and
that the permanency goal should be changed to adoption. The caseworker remarked that
respondent’s success in rehab would be “tremendous progress” that would “give him that chance
to . . . continue with reunification . . . . ” Respondent objected to the recommendation. The trial
court allowed for reunification to remain the goal but scheduled a termination hearing for March
19, 2025 “because of the permanency for the children . . . .”
In January 2025, petitioner filed a supplemental termination petition alleging that the
children came within the provisions of MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) and requesting the trial
court to terminate the parental rights of respondent and mother. With respect to respondent, the
DHHS alleged that he “expresses strong desire to work [with] services but makes little progress.”
Regarding domestic violence, the supplemental petition alleged respondent participated in
counseling and “made some progress in addressing this barrier,” but continued to deny a history
of domestic violence which caused petitioner concern of repeated domestic violence due to lack

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of accountability. The supplemental petition alleged respondent attended weekly counseling and
discussed inpatient treatment, but missed several drug screens, and when he did screen, he tested
positive for cocaine and had made little progress. Concerning employment and housing, the
supplemental petition alleged respondent lived with his employer and was paid in cash, so he was
unable to verify his income. Respondent continued to struggle with inappropriate housing and had
no verifiable income. Based on these allegations, and the allegation that that respondent had made
little progress toward saving money for a security deposit on an apartment, petitioner alleged
employment and housing continued as barriers to reunification.
A termination hearing occurred on February 6, 2025, only 45 days after the last hearing.
Respondent stated that he began participating in a 90-day in-patient rehabilitation program on
January 23, 2025, where he was able to continue supervised parenting time, and requested an
adjournment. Petitioner opposed an adjournment and argued that respondent had only entered
rehab “less than a week or two ago,” and that the same barriers remained that caused the children
to enter care. Petitioner stated that it did not foresee a change in circumstances based on the history
of the case “and how the parents have progressed throughout their treatment plan.” The lawyer-
guardian ad litem for the children also opposed adjourning the termination hearing, arguing
respondent would not have independent housing when he left rehab and that “[t]hese children need
stability. They’re young children . . . . They weren’t in a preadoptive home before, they are now.
It’s time to move forward. From my perspective, these parents have made no progress and an
adjournment will not change anything that they haven’t done in the past year, which is nothing.”
The trial court reminded petitioner “that the overarching goal in the beginning is reunification”
and adjourned the termination hearing to give respondent an opportunity to achieve sobriety and
obtain housing and a verifiable income. However , the court emphasized the children’s need for
permanence and finality as part of its ruling.
At a continued termination hearing in March 2025 to check on respondent’s progress,
respondent’s counsel requested another adjournment to give respondent time to complete the in-
patient program. Caseworkers provided an update that the children were in a new preadoptive
placement as of February 28, 2025, because CC was not doing well in the prior placement, and
that parenting time with respondent was still “going well.” The trial court granted the adjournment
and remarked “I am cautiously optimistic that [respondent and mother] will overcome their barriers
so that their children can have permanency with clean and sober parents,” and “I do think that the
parents are, at this time, making a concerted effort to try to be just that.”
At the third continued termination hearing in May 2025, which the parties agreed to treat
as a consolidated review hearing, petitioner informed the trial court that respondent completed
rehab in late April 2025, achieved sobriety, was living in a Sober Living House, attending AA and
NA meetings four times a week, and had just begun attending weekly domestic violence
counseling. The court heard testimony from caseworkers that CC, then 12 years old, was
“thriving” in her new placement, was “asking for this to be over,” but felt “the stress of the foster
care case and what her parents are going through.” The caseworker reported CC wanted to either
“be returned home or stay where she’s at,” and not “continue to be in the limbo.” SC, then three
years old, was exhibiting “explosive” and “aggressive” behaviors, and caseworkers were seeking
to get her started in play therapy and occupational therapy. Housing and employment remained
barriers to reunification despite the caseworker submitting 11 housing applications for respondent

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and a referral to Michigan Works for employment, and respondent was applying to jobs on his
own.
Respondent had achieved sobriety for about four to five months by May 2025, but the trial
court continued to be concerned with the length of time the children had been in care, and the fact
that respondent had still not found appropriate housing and or provided verifiable income.
However, it acknowledged respondent was still earning money under the table and was still “doing
something [] positive to try to . . . make a difference.” Petitioner agreed to adjourn the request for
termination with the expectation that respondent continue engaging in all services, find a job and
housing, and act “as a father to his children, as opposed to . . . a more friend relationship . . . . ”
Petitioner agreed to not seek termination if respondent complied with those directives.
The trial court acknowledged respondent had “stepped up,” “albeit late,” and said it could
not expect more from him because he was “doing everything.” The trial court addressed
respondent: “Do I expect perfection? Not in all areas. But I do expect to continue progress.” The
trial court stated the next hearing would either be for termination “or we’re heading back in the
other direction,” and remarked that termination depended on respondent making progress toward
employment and housing. The trial court found DHHS had made reasonable efforts toward
reunification and that respondent made progress toward alleviating or mitigating the conditions
that led to the children’s removal but ordered that DHHS initiate termination proceedings.
C. TERMINATION PHASE
Termination proceedings began in August 2025. At that hearing, petitioner reported that
respondent had found a job, was providing paystubs as verifiable income, and had completed a 16-
week supportive visitation course to prepare him to be the children’s primary parent upon
reunification. But, according to petitioner, respondent was still living in a Sober Living Home
where rent cost $600 a month, which was an unsuitable place for the children to reside.
Respondent was now “very inconsistent” with attendance at parenting time, and petitioner believed
he could not financially support the children if they were returned to his care, and that he was not
ready to be reunified with them. The termination hearing itself was adjourned to a later date for
reasons unrelated to respondent’s appeal.
In September 2025, the children underwent trauma assessments. CC was diagnosed with
generalized anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder with dissociative symptoms which impacted
her functioning, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, indicated “low levels of hope,” and
exhibited parentification2 when caring for SC While testimony on SC’s trauma assessment was
limited, other testimony showed SC was experiencing significant stress, so much she was
experiencing regressions in behavior, including in potty training, despite being three and a half
years old.
2 “Parentification” is a type of behavior that is a “role reversal between parent and child—when a
child takes on responsibility that’s not developmentally appropriate for their age.” Cleveland
Clinic, What is Parentification? <https://health.clevelandclinic.org/parentification> (accessed
August 24, 2026).

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The next termination hearings occurred over three dates beginning on October 3, 2025 and
concluding on December 1, 2025. The trial court heard from several witnesses during these
hearings, including respondent. At that time, respondent was still living in the Sober Living Home,
had been sober for over eight months and was attending domestic violence counseling. He was
still on a waiting list for housing and was filling out housing applications. However, he struggled
to save money to secure housing and admitted he had “been purchasing things that are scams” that
“wipe[d] out [his] bank account.” Respondent was attending domestic violence counseling,
although caseworkers testified that he had not benefited because he had still not taken
accountability for his past actions and began associating with individuals with a criminal history
that included domestic violence. Specifically, respondent began a relationship with a woman he
met in rehabilitation—the woman had her parental rights terminated, was convicted of domestic
violence and prostitution, and, at the time of the termination hearings, was incarcerated and
“looking at a felony for possession of cocaine.” Respondent “lack[ed] an understanding of what
having her involved in his life will affect the [children] negatively.” Respondent believed he
benefited more from counseling because he was sober, but when asked if he thought he could
benefit from additional services, respondent said he did not know.
Respondent also did not know whether CC exhibiting parentification was positive or
negative and caseworkers testified he never asked about the children’s progress in therapy or
attended their medical appointments. Caseworkers testified he had not taken full responsibility for
what brought the children into care. They believed CS was “trauma-bonded” to respondent father,
was eager to please him out of fear, and was afraid of disappointing him. They also testified the
reason respondent never progressed to unsupervised parenting time was “[d]ue to inappropriate
conversations that continued to be had.” This included respondent mentioning ex-girlfriends to CS
during parenting time, as well as mentioning to the children he could attend events like trick-or-
treating outside of parenting time when he did not yet have permission. The children’s foster
parent testified that the children were dysregulated when they returned from supervised parenting
time with respondent.
After hearing testimony, the trial court found that 182 days had elapsed since the initial
disposition. The trial court stressed that it did not have more time for respondents, acknowledged
the age difference between the children, and found that the children faced a reasonable likelihood
of harm if returned to respondent. Ultimately, the trial court found that reasonable efforts had been
made to preserve and reunify the family, and that clear and convincing evidence established a
statutory basis to terminate the parental rights of both respondents under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
and (j). The court found that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests and
ordered that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.
Respondent now appeals.
II. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that petitioner made reasonable
efforts toward reunification. We disagree.
Generally, this Court “review[s] for clear error a trial court’s decision regarding reasonable
efforts.” In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). A decision is clearly

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erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779
NW2d 286 (2009).
“Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except those
involving aggravated circumstances under MCL 712A.19a(2).” In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350,
355; 948 NW2d 131 (2019). “[T]ermination is improper without a finding of reasonable efforts.”
In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 90; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). “As part of these reasonable efforts,
[DHHS] must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify
the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.” Id. at 85-86. To prove a
claim of lack of reasonable efforts, a respondent must show that he or she would have fared better
had petitioner offered other services. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 543. Though the DHHS
“has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there
exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that
are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). “Not only must
respondent cooperate and participate in the services, [the respondent] must benefit from them.”
In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 711; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).
In this case, petitioner made reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification.
See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248. In its supplemental termination petition, DHHS alleged that
respondent’s barriers included “domestic violence, substance use, housing, and resource
management/availability.” DHHS provided services to address each barrier, and the court
adjourned hearings several times to allow “the parents time because [the court] saw potential.”
Although DHHS had a duty to provide respondent services, he had a corresponding duty
to participate in those services when offered. Id. A full review of the record reveals that
respondent was offered many services but only intermittently complied with those services
between the initial disposition and the commencement of termination proceedings. The petition
filed in February 2024 stated that respondent was unable to be located and was homeless. By
December 2025 he still had not found housing where the children could live with him. Foster-care
case manager Lena Sparks testified that she referred respondent to “Family Promise, Salvation
Army, Hope Network,” in addition to completing 11 housing applications for respondent and
following up with the family-unification program. Respondent also had not made progress in the
eight months after achieving sobriety to save money toward a security deposit on an apartment.
Sparks testified that he also still lacked insight into why domestic violence was a barrier to
reunification despite attending many counseling sessions. Moreover, Sparks testified that a
substance-abuse referral program contacted respondent “in the middle or end of July,” and
respondent relayed that he was “sober and did not need the service.” On a positive note, with
respect to parenting, Sparks confirmed that respondent was referred for, and successfully
completed, a supportive visitation course to prepare for being the children’s primary parent.
DHHS provided respondent numerous services over the course of these proceedings, but
respondent failed to timely complete and/or benefit from many of those services, and he likewise
failed to establish that he would have fared better if additional services had been offered. When
asked at the termination hearing if he thought he could benefit from additional services, he
answered that he did not know. Respondent did not benefit from, or sufficiently cooperate and
participate in, many of the services provided. See In re TK, 306 Mich App at 711. The trial court

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did not clearly err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the DHHS made reasonable
efforts to reunify respondent with the children before his rights to them were terminated. See In re
Fried, 266 Mich App at 542-543.
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent- next argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds for
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). We disagree.
“This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s ruling that a statutory ground for
termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the children’s best interests.”
In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
To terminate parental rights, a trial court must first find by clear and convincing evidence
that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met. In re
VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). At the termination hearing, the trial
court “may take into consideration any evidence that had been properly introduced and admitted
at the adjudication trial, MCR 3.977(E), along with any additional relevant and material evidence
that is received by the court at the termination hearing, MCR 3.977(H)(2).” In re Mota, 334 Mich
App at 316.
The trial court found statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights existed
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which is proper when there is clear and convincing evidence that
“there is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the
child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of the parent.” “The harm contemplated
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) includes emotional harm as well as physical harm.” In re Sanborn,
337 Mich App 252, 279; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
In making its findings, the trial court stated:
I saw potential and I gave the parents time because I saw potential. . . . I don’t have
the luxury of time. And I understand that the progress that was made and I
recognize that there is significant progress and I’m not taking anything away from
that, was made in this case.
* * *
There is a reasonable likelihood of harm in that neither of you yet have adequate
housing for me to return the children to.
Section 19(b)(3)(j) says that there’s a reasonable likelihood based upon
the . . . conduct or capacity of the children’s parents that the children will be harmed
if they are returned to the home of the parent. That piece is a significant piece,
and . . . despite the fact that there [were] efforts, sir, to try to gain housing . . . the
kids were in care for almost a year before you started making some significant
progress towards a stage where you are now. So I find that there is a reasonable
likelihood of harm if they are returned. There are still some barriers in the case that
still exist. And housing is one of them. Parenting skills still need to be sharpened

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a little. Domestic violence, and I think you could overcome that with time, and that
would have more to do with who you associated with more so than anything.
The trial court did not err in this regard. The record demonstrates the children were not in
respondent’s home or physical custody at the time the children were removed from mother’s care
as he was homeless and unreachable. He also was unable to find proper housing in the 20 months
since the children entered care. While he had achieved sobriety, provided verifiable income, and
filled out many housing applications, respondent had not made progress toward saving money for
a security deposit for an apartment. This indicates that even if respondent got off a waitlist for
housing, he could not have moved into an apartment. His parenting time never progressed to
unsupervised because, while many visits went well, issues with his parenting came to light during
the proceedings. For example, respondent mentioned things petitioner explicitly told him not to
mention to protect the children emotionally. Respondent also had not made meaningful progress
in addressing his domestic violence issues and had begun a new relationship during the termination
proceedings with someone who had substance abuse, prostitution, and domestic violence issues of
her own. Caseworkers opined respondent did not understand how this relationship could
negatively affect his children.
“[A] parent’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is
evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the child’s home.” In re White, 303 Mich App
701, 711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In more than 20 months since the children’s removal, respondent
failed to accomplish meaningful change to his housing situation, in resource management, and in
addressing his domestic violence issues. These issues, along with others, are what led to the trial
court taking jurisdiction over the minor children. In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 272. Despite
making significant and commendable progress in achieving sobriety, the trial court did not clearly
err in finding that these other unaddressed barriers would likely harm the children if they were
returned to respondent’s care. Because the trial court’s findings were supported by the record,
there was no clear error in its conclusion that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that it was in the children’s
best interests to terminate his parental rights. We disagree.
A trial court’s best-interest determination is also reviewed for clear error. MCR 3.977(K).
“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of
parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights
and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.”
MCL 712A.19b(5). “Best interests are determined on the basis of the preponderance of the
evidence.” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). The focus of the
best-interest inquiry is on the child, not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d
182 (2013). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s
compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the
children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App
at 714. When siblings are not similarly situated, the trial court is “obligated to consider each child
individually and assess the best interests of the children separately.” In re TK, 306 Mich App
at 711.

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Caseworkers testified it would take a year or more for respondent to complete services and
provide permanent stability and finality for the children. Regarding the children’s need for
permanence, stability, and finality, caseworkers opined:
[CC] and [SC] have been in care for 21-and-a-half months. [CC] is begging for
this to be done and get permanency. It is affecting [CC]’s schoolwork and how
she’s able to function at school, at home. She’s depressed. She’s stressed out.
Feels responsible. She needs the weight taken off of her shoulders.
Caseworkers also said parenting time caused CC stress due to the inappropriate conversations
respondent had with her, treating her more like a friend than a child. The trial court also heard
from the children’s foster parent, who said SC was “wound up” after parenting time. SC was
becoming “increasingly more aggressive physically, verbally, throwing things, hitting, biting,
saying awful things to caregivers, teachers, peers at school.” Caseworkers believed it would be
healthier for both children in the long run to not have a bond with respondent. Regarding the
advantages of a foster home over respondent’s home, the children were “thriving” in foster care:
The foster home has been able to continue to provide consistency, structure,
security, love, affection for the girls. They’ve been able to maintain all of their
medical, dental, occupational therapy, and counseling appointments. In the home,
there’s not substance use concerns, domestic violence. There’s not any resource
availability concerns.
The trial court did not clearly err by determining that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. In making its best-interest determination, the trial court
noted that it would keep the children’s best interests “front and center.” See In re Moss, 301 Mich
App at 87. Respondent still lacked child-appropriate housing and lived at a sober-living facility
with no expected time frame of when he would secure housing. The court considered the history
of domestic violence, considered that the children were bonded to each other, and considered each
child individually. See In re TK, 306 Mich App at 711. The court explicitly mentioned that SC
was about preschool age and CC was “a middle schooler.” The court added that SC had “been in
care for half of her life pretty much” and that CC exhibited trauma from witnessing domestic-
violence incidents when she was younger, and “really struggled.” The trial court considered CC’s
expressed desire to return home, and this preference “weighed heavily” on the court. Nonetheless,
the court did not “believe that it’s in her best interest, so [it was] not going to give in to her
preference.” Even though the children had a “significant” and “strong” bond to respondent, and
he made some progress in addressing the barriers that brought the children into care, the court gave
greater weight to the children’s need to permanence, stability, and finality.

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Considering the foregoing evidence, the trial court did not clearly err when it found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. See MCR 3.977(K); In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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