COA 369519 DANA MARIE BAUER V TIMOTHY JOHN WAIDELICH Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/23/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
DANA MARIE BAUER,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 2026
8:37 AM
v Nos. 369519; 370605; 373564;
374353
St. Clair Circuit Court
Family Division
TIMOTHY JOHN WAIDELICH, LC No. 14-000583-DM
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated appeal, the parties dispute issues relating to legal custody, parenting
time, and contempt of court. We dismiss defendant-father’s appeals arising from the contempt
proceedings for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding legal custody
and parenting time.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This matter has a lengthy history. The parties divorced in March 2015 and initially shared
joint legal and physical custody of their two children, HW and AW. An earlier appeal to this Court
involved concerns about father’s aggressive approach to the children’s medical treatment:1
1 An even earlier appeal to this Court involved a petition by father seeking sole physical custody
of the children due to what he alleged was a series of baseless complaints plaintiff filed against
him with Children’s Protective Services; the trial court denied the motion and this Court affirmed.
Bauer v Waidelick, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 25, 2017
(Docket No. 336876), pp 2, 4-6. Defendant’s name was misspelled in this opinion.

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The hotly disputed issue in this case is the medical care of the children.
From October 2016 to May 2017, the two children visited the pediatrician a total
of 28 times. In between those visits, [father] repeatedly took the children to after-
hours clinics seeking antibiotics when the children experienced symptoms like
stuffy noses and sore throats. . . . [Mother] became concerned with [father’s]
aggressive approach to the children’s medical care, which prompted her to seek
sole legal custody. [Father] responded with his own motion seeking the same.
The parties disagreed over how to characterize the nature and frequency of
these medical visits. [Mother] believed the visits were medical child abuse and
lodged a complaint with [Children’s Protective Services], which declined to
investigate. [Mother] testified that during their marriage [father] wanted her to be
sick all the time. Since their divorce, [father] would routinely take the children to
after-hours clinics and not notify [mother] of the visits until it was too late for her
to attend. [Father] refused to share information with her about the clinic visits, and
[mother] found out information by cold calling various facilities around the area.
[Mother] admitted that, except for the clinic visits, she consented to all of the
children’s medical treatments. . . . [Mother] further testified that [father] engaged
in inappropriate behavior by spending too much time with the children at their
school, and by taking pictures of AW through her classroom window. . . .
[Father] believed that each visit was made out of medical necessity.
[Mother’s] failure to continue the children’s antibiotic regimen during her parenting
time resulted in the children relapsing during [father’s] parenting time. [Father]
testified that he never supported sinus surgery for HW, and has always tried his best
to communicate with [mother] regarding the children’s medical treatment and
requested mediation on these matters, which [mother] declined. [Father] never
sought treatment for the children without [mother’s] consent, and he always tried
to see the children’s pediatrician before taking the children to a clinic. [Father]
used to walk his children into their school to comfort them during the divorce.
However, he stopped that and only continued to walk them in so that he could use
the restroom, help the children carry in their projects, or help install a server that he
had donated to the school. . . .
The various doctors who testified generally agreed that [father] was
aggressive in seeking treatment for his children, but that he acted appropriately and
did not cross the line into medical abuse. The children’s counselor testified that,
although she was not capable of diagnosing [father] with Munchausen’s syndrome
by proxy, [father] did not display any of the traits associated with that disease.
[Father’s] therapist testified that he did not have Munchausen’s syndrome by proxy.
[Mother’s] counselor testified that despite having never met the children or [father],
she believed that [father] bullied [mother] and that “emotional violence” was
present during the parties’ marriage. [Bauer v Waidelich, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 6, 2019 (Docket No. 345756), pp 1-
2.]

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In September 2018, following a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted
mother’s motion for sole legal custody, and father appealed in this Court. Id. at 3. This Court
affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it found that proper cause was established
under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 3, 6. This Court rejected father’s argument that the
treatment of the children’s medical conditions and illnesses was a routine matter that should be
handled by the parent exercising parenting time. Id. This Court reasoned that while the case was
a close call,
the sheer number of visits over a short period of time is concerning, and [father’s]
insistence on seeking specialist treatments for the children for even the most routine
of ailments certainly raises the issues beyond normal parenting. Most convincingly
though, is that the parties’ failure to cooperate resulted in the children having not
had their annual physical, vision, or dental appointments at the time of the
evidentiary hearing. Perhaps such appointments are routine, but the failure of the
parties to work together to meet the children’s basic medical needs cannot be
classified as unimportant or insignificant. . . . Therefore, [father’s] claim of
routineness fails. [Id. at 6-7 (citation omitted).]
This Court held that the issue came down to credibility, and the trial court was in the best position
to assess the credibility of the parties. Id. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to award
mother sole legal custody. Id. at 7-9.
The parties were able to coparent the children without court intervention for about five
years after mother was granted sole legal custody, and they continued to share equal parenting
time under a week-on, week-off schedule. But the relationship began to break down during the
latter half of the 2022–2023 school year.
On May 26, 2023, mother moved the trial court to order father to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court after HW experienced 17 school absences during father’s
parenting time, resulting in a warning from his high school that further absences might cause him
to fail the tenth grade. In contrast, HW stayed home sick from school over the course of the school
year for only 2½ days while in mother’s care. Mother argued that the frequent absences during
father’s parenting time violated her sole legal custody because father did not inform her of most
of the absences in advance, and she was not permitted to decide whether HW should stay home
from school. Additionally, mother argued father obtained blood work for HW for food sensitivities
without her consent, which was another violation of her sole legal custody. She also asserted that
father administered breathing treatments to the children without her consent. Finally, mother
contended that father interfered with her authority to make educational decisions for HW by
meeting privately with HW and a school counselor and convincing HW to switch his class
schedule.
Father reacted to mother’s contempt efforts by moving to reinstate joint legal custody and
modify the parties’ parenting time. Father’s position was that HW was experiencing serious
gastrointestinal problems, similar to problems father faced when he was younger, and that mother
was not taking the issue seriously. According to father, these problems were the source of HW’s
frequent absences. Father acknowledged setting up a meeting with HW and his school counselor
regarding HW’s desire to switch his school schedule but claimed he informed the counselor that

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mother would have to make the final decision. Father argued that mother’s indifference toward
HW’s medical condition established proper cause and a change in circumstances warranting joint
legal custody and an expansion of father’s parenting time with HW. In his response to the show-
cause motion, father acknowledged purchasing an over-the-counter blood-testing kit from a
Walgreens store, and that he pricked the children’s fingers to test for allergies or food sensitivities.
He noted that both children took the test and that it was simply “a matter of curiosity and fun.” He
denied administering any breathing treatments.
Mother responded that father’s custody motion was in retaliation for her show-cause
motion. Mother argued HW had a physical examination at the beginning of the school year and
did not complain about any gastroenterological issues at that time. He likewise did not complain
of significant stomach issues during mother’s parenting time or when attending tennis practice
three to four times per week. Regarding HW’s minor stomach complaints, which mother attributed
to dairy products, HW’s doctor told mother to give HW probiotics and keep a food diary. Father
refused to do either. To address father’s concerns, mother scheduled an appointment for HW with
a gastroenterologist, which was scheduled to occur in September 2023.
The trial court heard both mother’s show-cause motion and father’s custody motion during
a June 22, 2023 hearing. During the hearing, mother (who is a registered nurse) proposed that on
days when HW might be sick during father’s parenting time, father could drop HW off at her house
and allow mother to examine HW and make the final decision on whether he should stay home.
Mother stated she would make herself available during father’s parenting time and that, in the
worst-case scenario, HW might miss only his first-period class. The parties acknowledged that
AW was not the focus of their dispute and that she was doing well both medically and
educationally.
The court modified the parenting-time schedule to adopt mother’s suggestion that father
take HW to mother’s house when father suspected he was sick to allow her to make the final
decision on whether he should stay home from school. After defense counsel questioned how
father should approach the administration of medications, the court required father to administer
medications to the children as recommended or required by their pediatrician, or as provided on a
list prepared by mother, as necessary. The court ruled that father did not demonstrate proper cause
or a change in circumstances warranting a change in legal custody or a modification of the
parenting-time schedule. The court explained that there was no evidence mother ignored the
children’s medical conditions and noted that HW might be using father to get out of going to
school. The court later denied father’s motion for reconsideration of the changes to the parenting
time, explaining father would have to use his “best judgment to make good faith efforts to comply
with the Court’s orders.” In Docket No. 373564, father appeals as of right from the trial court’s
order denying his motion to change legal custody. See MCR 7.203(A)(1); 7.202(6)(a)(iii). In
Docket No. 374353, he appeals from that same order by leave granted, raising issues that are
outside the scope of his appeal of right, see MCR 7.203(A)(1)—specifically, challenging the
requirements imposed on him by the trial court when he exercises parenting time.
After denying father’s motion to change custody, the trial court conducted a three-day
evidentiary hearing on mother’s show-cause motion. Mother testified that she did not approve
HW’s excessive absences or the at-home blood testing. Father testified on his own behalf and
called two additional witnesses to support his argument that HW was genuinely ill during his

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parenting time. Father also testified that the blood test was an at-home kit he purchased from a
Walgreens in early 2020 to give the children an activity while their school was closed temporarily
in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. He denied that he was attempting to circumvent the
sole-custody order or prove to mother that the children had food sensitivities.
The trial court ruled that the issues of HW’s absences and his school schedule did not
constitute contempt of court because mother ultimately acquiesced in father’s behavior by failing
to intervene earlier with HW’s frequent absences and by agreeing to modify HW’s school
schedule. The court also dismissed the allegation relating to the breathing treatments, finding no
evidence to support this allegation. However, the court held that father committed what the trial
court described as criminal contempt of court for administering the at-home blood test. The court
found father’s intention was to determine whether there was something medically wrong with HW.
The court further found that father was “deliberately trying to conceal these things because of the
history of what’s happening,” and thus his conduct was willful. In Docket No. 369519, father
claims an appeal from the court’s order holding him in contempt.
As a sanction, the court ordered father to pay mother’s attorney fees associated with the
contempt proceedings. The court directed mother to move for attorney fees in compliance with
the Michigan Supreme Court’s opinion in Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269; 884
NW2d 257 (2016). Mother then moved for $11,985 in attorney fees and costs. In response, father
argued mother’s fees should be limited because he admitted in his briefing to administering the
blood test, rendering the entire evidentiary hearing unnecessary. Father did not dispute the
requested $250 hourly rate but argued that most of the billing entries were excessive. Father
requested that the court award mother $2,375 in attorney fees. During a brief hearing on the
motion, in which the court did not hear any testimony, the court noted that although father admitted
to giving HW the blood test, he also attempted to rationalize his conduct, which warranted the
evidentiary hearing. The court rejected father’s argument that it should not award mother attorney
fees for issues that were ultimately found not to constitute contempt of court, explaining that it
could take a more “holistic” approach to the matter:
So, no dispute about the hourly rate. There’s some dispute about the actual
entries. That’s really not going to make a big difference. The last thing I was going
to say, I think that [mother] knew she was going to incur some attorney’s fees as
part of this, and that’s just going to be part of this if people can’t agree. I don’t
think she should bear the burden of all these attorney’s fees, because I think a great
deal of them were incurred, first of all, by [father’s] actions, and then by his refusal
to take ownership or responsibility for his actions, and insisting, I’m going to say,
on an evidentiary hearing without admitting to things. In hindsight it’s real easy to
say, well yeah, you know, that’s true. Well, yeah, you should say it before we get
to the evidentiary hearing because that saves everybody attorney’s fees.
So, I do believe that the rate, the general amount of hours is appropriate.
I’m not going to award 100 percent of the fees. But what I’m going to award to
[mother] is I’m going to say she gets, $8,500.00 towards her attorney’s fees. That
is to be paid within 30-days of today’s date.
In Docket No. 370605, father claims an appeal from the trial court’s award of $8,500 as a sanction.

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II. CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
In Docket Nos. 369519 and 370605, father challenges the trial court’s decisions to (1) hold
him in contempt and (2) award mother $8,500 in attorney fees as a sanction. We conclude that we
lack jurisdiction to review either issue. Even when no party challenges this Court’s jurisdiction,
it is always within the scope of our review, and we review the question de novo. Nonhuman Rights
Project, Inc v DeYoung Family Zoo, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket
No. 369247); slip op at 2. Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss these appeals.
This Court recently addressed its jurisdiction in contempt matters. See Alpena Co Bd of
Co Rd Comm’rs v Tadajewski, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374166).
“To determine whether we have jurisdiction, . . . we must identify the type of contempt involved.”
Id. at ___; slip op at 2. In short, there are three forms of contempt: criminal contempt, coercive
civil contempt, and compensatory civil contempt. Id. at ___; slip op at 2-3. This Court lacks
jurisdiction on an appeal of right from civil contempt orders, whether coercive or compensatory.
Id. at ___; slip op at 3. “[W]e review de novo whether contempt was civil or criminal, and ‘[i]t is
irrelevant whether the trial court labels the contempt as civil or criminal.’ ” Id. at ___; slip op at 2,
quoting In re Contempt of Pavlos-Hackney, 343 Mich App 642, 666; 997 NW2d 511 (2022).
Although the trial court characterized its decision as criminal contempt, our de novo review
shows that it was compensatory civil contempt. The sanction imposed on father was not a criminal
penalty authorized under MCL 600.1715. Instead, it was an indemnification award under
MCL 600.1721, which “codifies the compensatory sanction” for compensatory civil contempt. In
re Contempt of Dougherty, 429 Mich 81, 97; 413 NW2d 392 (1987). As a result, we lack
jurisdiction over this appeal of right.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the trial court was imposing general contempt
sanctions, not attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D). Mother did not invoke MCR 3.206(D), and the
trial court made no finding that mother was unable to pay, as that rule requires. See also
MCL 552.13(1). Nor is this case controlled by LAC v GLS, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2024) (Docket No. 365120). There, this Court imposed contempt sanctions under
MCR 3.708(H)(5), which is specific to personal protection orders. Here, the sanction was an
award of damages “measured in part by plaintiff’s attorney fees” but “not an award of attorney
fees as such” and therefore not a “final judgment” as that term is defined for civil cases in
MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv). Alpena Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3.2
2 Father’s own filings implicitly recognize this distinction. In his jurisdictional checklists filed
under MCR 7.204(C)(6), he relies on MCR 7.202(6)(b)(ii)—which defines a final judgment in a
criminal case as including the original sentence imposed following conviction—for Docket
No. 369519, but on MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv)—which defines a final judgment in a civil case as
including a postjudgment order awarding or denying attorney fees under court rule or law—for
Docket No. 370605. That position would require the supposed criminal proceeding to transform
into a civil matter once the sanction issued. We conclude, consistent with Alpena Co Bd of Co Rd
Comm’rs, that the proceeding was civil throughout and that an award under MCL 600.1721 is not

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III. LEGAL CUSTODY
In Docket No. 373564, father argues the trial court abused its discretion and violated
MCR 3.210(C)(8) by denying his motion to reinstate joint legal custody without an evidentiary
hearing, asserting that he established proper cause and changed circumstances by a preponderance
of the evidence. We disagree.
The trial court’s custody decision must be affirmed unless the trial court made factual
findings against the great weight of the evidence, committed a palpable abuse of discretion, or
committed a clear legal error on a major issue. MCL 722.28. This Court should not substitute its
judgment on factual questions unless the factual decision “clearly preponderate[s] in the opposite
direction.” Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010) (cleaned up).
“Discretionary rulings, including a trial court’s decision to change custody, are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” Kuebler v Kuebler, 346 Mich App 633, 653; 13 NW3d 339 (2023) (cleaned
up). An abuse of discretion in this context “retains the historic standard under which the trial
court’s decision must be palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic.” Id. (cleaned up). A
clear legal error occurs when the trial court chooses, interprets, or applies the law incorrectly. Id.
“This Court gives deference to the trial court’s factual judgments and special deference to the trial
court’s credibility assessments.” Id. (cleaned up).
When a party seeks to modify an existing custody or parenting-time order,
MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that the movant must establish first that proper cause or a change in
circumstances exists before the court may amend a previous judgment or order on child custody.
Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 81; 900 NW2d 130 (2017). The standard for determining
whether proper cause or a change of circumstances exists is outlined in Vodvarka v Grasmeyer,
259 Mich App 499; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). To establish “proper cause” to revisit a custody order,
the moving party must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an appropriate legal
ground exists for the court to act. Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 82, citing Vodvarka, 259 Mich
App at 512. “ ‘[T]he appropriate ground(s) should be relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory
best interest factors, and must be of such magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-
being.’ ” Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 82, quoting Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. For change
of circumstances “the movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘since the entry
of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could
have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.’ ” Lieberman, 319
Mich App at 81-82, quoting Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512-513.
Regarding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary, MCR 3.210(C)(8) provides:
In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary with regard to a
postjudgment motion to change custody, the court must determine, by requiring an
an award of “attorney fees” under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv). And while this Court has at times
assumed that it can treat a claim of appeal from a non-final order as an application for leave and
grant it to reach the issue presented, see, e.g., In re Investigative Subpoena, 258 Mich App 507,
508 n 2; 671 NW2d 570 (2003), we do not choose to exercise any such discretion to do so.

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offer of proof or otherwise, whether there are contested factual issues that must be
resolved in order for the court to make an informed decision on the motion.
“Although the threshold consideration of whether there was proper cause or a change of
circumstances might be fact-intensive, the court need not necessarily conduct an evidentiary
hearing on the topic.” Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 605; 766 NW2d 903 (2009). Issues
relating to medical care may give rise to proper cause or change in circumstances warranting a
change in custody. Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 666; 811 NW2d 501 (2011).
If the proposed modification in custody would change the child’s established custodial
environment, the movant must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the change in custody
would be in the child’s best interests. Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 83-84. An established
custodial environment exists
if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that
environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.
The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian
and the child as to the permanency of the relationship shall also be considered. [Id.
at 81 (cleaned up), quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c).]
If the proposed modification would not change the child’s established custodial environment, then
the movant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the change is in the best
interests of the child. Id. at 84. In this case, the trial court never reached the issues of the
established custodial environment or the children’s best interests because it found father did not
establish proper cause or a change in circumstances.
The focus of father’s argument on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to recognize proper cause or a change in circumstances warranting a return to joint legal
custody. He emphasizes our holding in Dailey that issues relating to medical care can support a
finding that proper cause or a change of circumstances exists to justify revisiting custody. He
argues proper cause existed under these statutory best-interest factors:
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.
* * *
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to
be of sufficient age to express preference. [MCL 722.23(c)-(e) and (i).]

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In his view, the trial court overlooked that mother was ignoring HW’s medical condition and
alienating father from the children’s educational decisions.
When denying father’s custody motion, the trial court explained there was no evidence
mother ignored the children’s medical conditions. The court noted that although HW had
significant absences from school during father’s parenting time, HW was continuing his
extracurricular activities. The court suggested that either father had poor dietary options at his
home, or that HW might have been manipulating the situation to avoid attending school. The court
was also concerned about father projecting his own health issues onto HW.
We agree that father failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions
surrounding custody of the children that have, or could have, a significant effect on the children’s
well-being had materially changed since the entry of the last custody order. Nor has father
established by a preponderance of the evidence that an appropriate legal ground existed for the
court to act on the basis of best interest factors (c), (d), (e), or (i). If anything, the facts continued
to demonstrate a pattern by father of aggressively pursuing medical treatment for the children and
imposing his medical beliefs on HW. Perhaps the most compelling evidence for father’s position
was his contention that HW had blood in his stool on one occasion during his parenting time. But
the evidence attached to the motion and answer did not support that mother ignored HW’s medical
conditions simply because she did not do as father demanded and take HW to father’s
gastroenterologist of choice. Instead, mother discussed the issue with HW’s pediatrician and
booked an appointment with another gastroenterologist. As the court noted, there was no dispute
during the June 22, 2023 hearing that HW missed 17 days of school while at father’s house, but
only 2½ days at mother’s house. During the time he missed school, he attended extracurricular
activities. Considering the history of the case and HW’s older age, the court aptly noted that HW
may be opportunistic when he was at father’s house because father was more inclined to allow him
to stay home.
Father also faults mother for not informing him of prior attendance letters, yet he fails to
explain why mother was obligated to do so or how that would have affected HW’s attendance,
given father’s position that HW was genuinely ill during the days he was kept home or picked up
from school. Father then failed to inform mother on the majority of the occasions he kept HW
home from school, which prevented mother from making the final decision. Moreover, text
messages showed mother was willing to take HW to the gastroenterologist, just not the doctor that
father wanted him to visit. Mother’s choice was understandable considering the history of father’s
aggressive medical treatment. More importantly, her choice fell within her discretion as the sole
legal custodian. There is no indication that mother was ignoring a serious medical condition on
the part of HW.3 Accordingly, there was no proper cause or change in circumstances as it related
to mother’s sole legal custody.
3 It is also noteworthy that the court ordered that HW attend a previously scheduled
gastroenterologist appointment in September 2023. Father does not suggest that any major
gastroenterological issue was uncovered during that appointment.

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Additionally, there was no evidence of any particular concerns relating to AW, other than
a minor issue involving her use of the application Snapchat on her cell phone to send photographs
to boys. The Snapchat issue was relatively minor and would not rise to the level of proper cause
or change of circumstances on its own. As mother points out, any concerns relating to HW,
including his alleged preference to stay with father, are moot because HW turned 18 while this
appeal was pending. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Porter v Porter, 285 Mich App 450, 462; 776 NW2d 377
(2009) (“Once a circuit court obtains jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, it retains that
jurisdiction over custody and visitation matters until the child attains the age of 18.”). Father
suggests on appeal that the issue is not moot because “AW may have similar problems, not only
now, but in the future.” But there is no indication that AW was facing any medical problems, and
she did not have any major attendance issues. And while father cites best interest factor (i) relating
to the reasonable preferences of the child, there is no evidence that AW’s preferences favored
father on this issue. So the practical effect of a change in legal custody is that it would affect only
AW, who was not the original focus of the custody motion.
Father also suggests mother alienated him from the children by preventing his involvement
in the children’s education. He asserts he was in an “awkward position” of explaining to the
children that he cannot take HW to the doctor for treatment. But these issues were the consequence
of the court’s 2018 custody order, which was itself a reaction to father’s excessive medical
treatment for the children. Father cannot engage in decision-making on important questions of the
children’s medical care or education because he is not a joint legal custodian, not because of any
conduct on mother’s part. Mother, as the sole legal custodian, has the final decision as it relates
to legal custody matters. Father has not demonstrated a change in circumstances or proper cause
simply because he is unhappy with the limits of mother’s sole legal custody. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by failing to find proper cause or a change in circumstances, and for this
reason, the court did not need to make additional findings on the best interests of the children.
Furthermore, father was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue. For the reasons
discussed, there was no factual dispute that HW missed a significant number of school days under
father’s care yet attended extracurricular events. There was no dispute that father did not inform
mother about most of the absences. Again, there was no evidence mother was ignoring a serious
medical condition. And there is no dispute that mother scheduled a gastroenterologist appointment
for HW, which the court ordered must occur. Thus, the facts as asserted by father were not legally
sufficient to demonstrate proper cause or change of circumstances. The trial court did not err or
violate MCR 3.210(C)(8) by declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
IV. PARENTING TIME
In Docket No. 374353, father argues the trial court abused its discretion and committed a
clear legal error by preventing him from making what he characterizes as routine decisions during
parenting time. Specifically, he objects to provisions requiring him to (1) bring the children to
mother’s home when he believes they may be ill to allow her to decide whether they should attend
school, and (2) administer only medications approved by mother or the children’s pediatrician. He
also argues that the court failed to apply the correct framework for modifying parenting time. We
disagree with both arguments.

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As with custody orders, “ ‘[o]rders concerning parenting time must be affirmed on appeal
unless the trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court committed
a palpable abuse of discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on a major issue.’ ” Shade v
Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 20-21; 805 NW2d 1 (2010) (citation omitted). This Court must not
substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless the facts of the case “clearly preponderate in the
opposite direction.” Id. at 21. An abuse of discretion exists for purposes of parenting-time
disputes “ ‘when the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that
it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.’ ” Id.
(citation omitted). A clear legal error occurs “ ‘when the trial court errs in its choice, interpretation,
or application of the existing law.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
A. ROUTINE DECISIONS
Under MCL 722.26a, joint legal custodians “shall share decision-making authority as to
the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.” MCL 722.26a(7)(b). By contrast, a
parent exercising parenting time decides “all routine matters.” MCL 722.27a(11); 722.26a(4).
The statute does not define a “routine matter,” but this Court has held that important decisions
include medical and educational decisions. Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 327; 729
NW2d 533 (2006).
The challenged order provides, in relevant part:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if either of [the] minor children are sick
at [father’s] home and it is a school day, then [father] shall inform the [mother] and
transport the sick child to [mother’s] home within a reasonable time before school
start time. [Mother] shall determine and decide if the children are sick and need to
stay home, and/or if the children need medical intervention.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [father] shall administer prescription or
non-prescription medication to the minor children as recommended/required by
their Primary Care Doctor, Dr. Barnes. Further [mother] will provide the
recommended/required medication list to [father] as necessary.
Contrary to father’s argument on appeal, the order does not prohibit him “from administering any
forms of medication.” Instead, it requires that any medication be consistent with the pediatrician’s
recommendations or with a list provided by mother. Outside these parameters, the parties retain
flexibility to decide how to arrange for medication distribution during father’s parenting time. The
order only requires that mother provide a list “as necessary,” contemplating that the list may not
always be required. The order was designed to give father clarity about what medications he may
distribute to the children. The order does not prevent him from obtaining mother’s permission
when in doubt.
In fact, during the June 22, 2023 hearing, father’s counsel stated that father would need
guidance on what he could and could not do during his parenting time:
Well, your Honor, I guess if you look at what we’re being accused of, is my
client allowed to, and I don’t want to be ridiculous and say buy a Band-Aid. Is he

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allowed to get salt, salt water gargle? Can he go, what can he do? Is he allowed to
do anything?
The court suggested that father obtain mother’s permission for any treatment that was not done
historically. The court then indicated that mother could put together a list of permitted over-the-
counter medications. The court also cautioned father that just because something was available
over the counter did not mean it was appropriate to administer to the children—clearly responding
to his decision to perform the over-the-counter blood test on the children. The court’s decision to
have mother provide father a list of medications was a direct response to father’s confusion and
does not interfere with his ability to make routine decisions during parenting time.
As for the provision requiring that father drive a suspected sick child to mother’s home so
she can decide whether the child should stay home from school, this too involved an important
educational and medical decision rather than a routine one. While in other families the decision
to keep a child home from school might be considered a routine matter, in this family the issue
was an important one considering the history of the parties and the fact that HW was nearing the
point of having to repeat the tenth grade. Another factor was whether HW was taking advantage
of father to stay home from school. Having mother make the final call on whether the children
stayed home from school addressed the concern that HW was feigning illness while in father’s
care. Under these circumstances, the provisions of the court’s order did not affect father’s
authority over routine matters under MCL 722.26a(4) or MCL 722.27a(11).
B. CHANGE IN PARENTING-TIME
The minor adjustments to parenting time did not amount to a change in the established
custodial environment that would require a finding of proper cause or change in circumstances
under the Vodvarka framework or an express finding on each statutory best-interest factor.
Moreover, proper cause and a change in circumstances existed under the more expansive
framework that allows the trial court to make slight modifications to the parenting-time
arrangements.
Substantial modifications of parenting time are considered significant enough that they
affect the established custodial environment. Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 89. However, “minor
modifications that leave a party’s parenting time essentially intact do not change a child’s
established custodial environment.” Id. at 89-90. In Shade, 291 Mich App at 26-27, this Court
held that the Vodvarka framework for determining the existence of proper cause or a change of
circumstances for custody decisions only applies to decisions on parenting time when the change
would modify the established custodial environment. When the change is “not so significant” that
it results in the modification of the child’s custodial environment, “a more expansive definition”
is used for proper cause or change of circumstances. Id. at 27-28. And normal life changes may
be enough to modify parenting time even though they would not be considered sufficient to modify
custody. Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 83. When the proposed change would not affect the
established custodial environment, the movant need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the change in parenting time is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 84. Additionally, a
modification of parenting time does not require findings on each best-interest or parenting-time
factor but rather requires findings only on contested issues. Shade, 291 Mich App at 31-32.

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This approach is “more flexible” and encompasses “the very normal life change factors”
that would be insufficient to justify a change in custody. Marik v Marik, 325 Mich App 353, 367-
368; 925 NW2d 885 (2018) (cleaned up). When the modification in parenting time would not
change the established custodial environment, the trial court’s failure to explicitly state a proper
cause or change in circumstances does not constitute a clear legal error when the court’s reasoning
is otherwise clear from the record. See Rains v Rains, 301 Mich App 313, 341-342; 836 NW2d
709 (2013).
The issue in Shade involved a change in a parenting-time schedule to accommodate the
child’s extracurricular activities. Shade, 291 Mich App at 20. This Court concluded that the
circumstances of the case would not amount to a change of custody. Id. at 29. The minor child
was a high school student whose schedule was shifting, and the existing parenting-time
arrangement prevented her from participating in extracurricular activities. Id. The normal life
changes she experienced were sufficient to justify modifying parenting time, though this Court did
not expressly define proper cause or changed circumstances in that context. Id. at 31. This Court
also explained that the trial court was not required to explicitly address each best-interest factor or
the parenting time factors in MCL 722.27a(6), because its statements on the record made clear that
it had considered the child’s best interests. Id. at 32. This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling,
explaining:
The trial court’s modification of defendant’s parenting time, which was minimal
and did not significantly alter the number of defendant’s parenting time days, was
in the minor child’s best interests because it allowed the child to participate in social
activities and extracurricular activities in which she desired to participate in high
school. [Id.]
As in Shade, the provisions at issue had only a minimal effect on father’s parenting time.
The order did not change the total number of parenting-time days or alter the schedule. Although
the trial court did not expressly use the terms “proper cause” or “change in circumstances,” its
reasoning is apparent from its order. See Rains, 301 Mich App at 341-342. The court’s goal was
to clarify how father should address certain situations during his parenting time that implicated
mother’s sole legal custody. Its primary concern was the children’s health—particularly HW—as
reflected in its remark, “I don’t want to play games with the child’s health.”
These modest adjustments did not alter whom the children looked to for guidance,
discipline, the necessities of life, or parental comfort, especially given their ages and the fact that
mother had exercised sole legal custody for five years. See Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 81. The
court therefore could apply the more expansive definition of proper cause, which was satisfied by
the evident confusion between the parties about medications and school absences. And although
the court did not conduct an explicit best-interest analysis, it was not required to do so; its
statements on the record make clear that it was focused on the children’s best interests. We discern
no abuse of discretion, and none of the court’s pertinent factual findings were against the great
weight of the evidence. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in making these modest
adjustments to the parties’ parenting time.

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In Docket Nos. 369519 and 370605, we dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction over
the civil contempt sanction. In Docket Nos. 373564 and 374353, we affirm.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Anica Letica

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