COA 376972 IN RE JONES/JOHNSON MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2026
1:46 PM
In re JONES/JOHNSON, Minors.
No. 376972
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2021-883921-NA
In re JOHNSON, Minors. No. 377027
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2021-883921-NA
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MALDONADO and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother appeals as of right the termination of her
parental rights regarding KLJ, KAJ, JDJ-1, JDJ-2, JKJ, and JDJ-3, and respondent-father appeals
as of right the termination of his parental rights regarding JDJ-1, JDJ-2, and JKJ.1 Respondents’
parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication
1 Respondent-father never established paternity of JDJ-3. KLJ and KAJ’s legal father was named
as a respondent is this matter but died during the pendency of these proceedings. Accordingly,
any reference to respondent-father in this opinion refers to respondent-father Johnson.

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continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood
of harm if the child is returned to the parent). We affirm.2
I. BACKGROUND
This family came to the attention of the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) in June 2021 after an allegation of improper supervision of the older boys, KLJ and KAJ.
The boys entered a neighbor’s home without permission, took a firearm, and then pointed it at
people in the neighborhood and even discharged the weapon. Further, in October 2021,
respondent-mother gave birth to JKJ who tested positive for THC3 and cocaine at birth.
After initially referring respondent-mother to a program focused on providing support and
services to the family, in December 2021, the DHHS filed a petition initiating these child-
protective proceedings, naming respondent-mother. In April 2022, respondent-mother pleaded no
contest to allegations in the petition, and the trial court exercised jurisdiction over KLJ, KAJ, JDJ-
1, JDJ-2, and JKJ. The children remained in respondent’s care, under the supervision of the
DHHS. In October 2022, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition, naming respondent-father. The
DHHS alleged that respondent-mother failed to complete in-home services, which were terminated
because of respondent-mother’s noncompliance. Although respondent-father had lived with
respondent-mother throughout the proceedings, he had refused to participate in the in-home
services and denied any issues. Moreover, the DHHS also alleged that respondent-mother and
respondent-father engaged in substance abuse and domestic violence. Respondent-father later also
pleaded no contest to the allegations in the supplemental petition.
During these proceedings, respondent-mother was placed on 12 months of probation after
pleading guilty to failure to return rental property, MCL 750.362a(3)(a). Respondent-mother was
on probation throughout this entire proceeding because her probation was extended until she paid
the full amount of restitution. Then in January 2023, a warrant for respondent-mother’s arrest was
issued because she violated her probation by testing positive for drugs. At this time, respondent-
mother was also pregnant with JDJ-3.
Throughout the proceedings, the children exhibited serious behavioral problems. Notably,
in February 2023, KLJ and KAJ were involved in an altercation with a neighbor, and the police
2 Although we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate both respondents’ parental rights, it
bears mention that respondent-mother’s brief on appeal is severely lacking in light of the long
history and circumstances of this case. Notably, respondent-mother’s brief is only 10 pages, and
the argument section is at most 2 double-spaced pages. It is also concerning that both respondents’
briefs discuss a child that does not exist and is not involved in this appeal. It is possible that this
is simply a typo in the parties’ briefs, but the misspellings differ significantly from the names of
any of the children involved in these proceedings. Therefore, it is not clear what child, if any, was
being discussed by respondents.
3 “Tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC, is the physiologically active component of marijuana.” People
v Koon, 494 Mich 1, 3 n 3; 832 NW2d 724 (2013), citing Stedman's Medical Dictionary (26th ed),
p 1791.

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were called.4 The police report indicated that the neighbor had bite marks on her body and had
reportedly been struck with a wooden stick or pole. In addition, at the review hearing in the same
month, it was reported that JDJ-2 had “ripped a chunk of hair off a staff member” and was “flipping
over tables and chairs” at Head Start, dumping toys, and leaving the classroom. Further, JDJ-2
was referred for mental-health counseling, and the lawyer guardian ad litem (LGAL) requested
that all the children be referred for trauma assessments.
In February 2023, the trial court determined that removal of the children was necessary.
The trial court explained that it was concerned that the children had been exposed to violence on
multiple occasions in the home and that the children were learning poor behaviors. Although
respondent-mother had been provided numerous services and been successful with substance-
abuse counseling, having only one positive drug screen, she was not regularly participating in
services. Further, the trial court did not want the children to be returned to an environment with
criminal activity. As there was no safety plan in place in the event that respondent-mother was
arrested, which was a possibility due to the warrant for her arrest, the trial court ordered the
removal of the children.
In April 2023, the DHHS reported that respondent-mother was complying with her case
service plan and her recent drug screens had been negative. In addition, parenting time had gone
well, and both respondents attended every parenting time that they were offered. As respondents
were cooperative, the DHHS recommended that all the children be returned to respondents’ care,
under the supervision of the DHHS. Although the trial court expressed concern with KLJ’s and
KAJ’s aggressive behaviors, the trial court followed the DHHS’s recommendation, and the
children were returned to respondents’ care. Respondent-mother signed a new case service plan,
but respondent-father did not. Shortly after the children were returned, JDJ-3 was born. A petition
concerning JDJ-3 was ultimately filed, though not right away.
Following the children’s trauma assessments that occurred in May 2023, the DHHS
reported that the children were doing very well and that respondents were complying with services
and participating in therapy. However, this progress was short lived. Later that same month,
respondent-father was charged with aggravated domestic violence against respondent-mother,
MCL 750.81a(2). Respondent-father was sentenced to two years of probation and was prohibited
from having contact with respondent-mother. Respondent-father moved out of respondent-
mother’s home and was discharged from parenting education service because he failed to attend
the classes. Respondent-father then stopped communicating with the DHHS and did not attend
any of the subsequent proceedings in this matter until 2025 when he was in jail for violating his
probation.
With regard to respondent-mother, in October 2023, the police were notified that a person
had been robbed after visiting respondent-mother’s home. When the police arrived, respondent-
mother was not there, and the police noted that the children present were “unkept” and “smelly as
if they hadn’t showered recently.” The police also noticed that the home was “pretty dirty and
unkept” and was “infested with bugs” that were “crawling all over the place.” JDJ-3 was left alone
4 Respondent-mother was also involved in this altercation and when police knocked on the door
of respondent-mother’s home, no one answered.

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on the couch and had “some roaches crawling on her” along with “multiple” bug bites.
Respondent-mother did not return despite attempts to contact her, so the children were taken to the
police station. During that time, KAJ had attempted to touch an officer’s pistol “multiple times”
and had kicked and yelled at the officer.
When respondent-mother arrived at the police station, she admitted that she had been with
respondent-father. With regards to the alleged robbery, respondent-mother stated that she worked
as a prostitute and that the complaining witness was one of her clients. The police did not find any
evidence to support that respondent-mother was involved in the robbery; however, they contacted
CPS. As a result, CPS learned that respondent-mother had taken JDJ-1, JDJ-2, and JKJ with her
to see respondent-father and that she left KLJ, KAJ, and JDJ-3 alone in the home. CPS also learned
that KLJ and KAJ had been suspended from school because of behavioral issues, and that KAJ
had not taken his ADHD medication because respondent-mother had not refilled it for several
months. CPS also received a complaint that KAJ had stolen respondent-mother’s car and crashed
it.
Between August 2023 and October 2023, respondent-mother did not submit to any
substance screening, and in November 2023, the DHHS filed a second supplemental petition
requesting removal of the children from respondent-mother’s care. The trial court authorized the
petition and ordered removal.
Throughout 2024, respondent-mother inconsistently submitted to substance screenings,
largely refused to participate in substance abuse services and therapeutic parenting times, failed to
maintain consistent employment, and did not do well in parenting times. KAJ acted aggressively
and violently toward respondent-mother during parenting times and threatened, swore at, and
shoved a DHHS worker. At one point, the police had to be called to calm KAJ down because
respondent-mother could not. When KAJ calmed down, respondent-mother refused to talk to him.
At that time, KAJ was suspended from school. The other children also struggled during parenting
times. In one instance when parenting time was ended early, KLJ pushed the caseworker down
and JDJ-1 and JDJ-2 “had a pretty serious tantrum.” When respondent-mother briefly returned to
retrieve something from the room, she did not attempt to assist the caseworker in calming down
the children, and it reportedly took 10 caseworkers to calm the children down. At other parenting
times, JDJ-2 climbed on chairs and urinated on the floor and KLJ started to “assault and batter
another worker.” Respondent-mother blamed the caseworker for the children’s behaviors.
Finding that the parenting times were emotionally harmful to the children, the DHHS
requested that respondent-mother’s parenting time be suspended. The trial court agreed with the
request and respondent-mother’s parenting time remained suspended for the majority of the year.
When parenting time did occur, the children struggled emotionally, and respondent-mother
struggled to meet their needs.5
5 Additionally, KLJ was sent to Whaley Children’s Center, a residential treatment facility to
address his behavioral issues. KLJ remained at Whaley from January 2024 through the termination
proceeding.

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In March 2025, the trial court noted respondent-mother’s failure to engage in services and
expressed concern that respondent-mother continued to be in a relationship with respondent-father,
which she denied. The trial court changed the permanency planning goal to adoption and ordered
the DHHS to file a termination petition.
In April 2025, respondent-father was sentenced to 60 days in jail because he violated his
probation for the aggravated domestic violence charge. Notably, the first time the DHHS had
contact with respondent-father since June 2023 was while he was in jail; however, even then,
respondent-father made it clear that he did not need to participate in services and did not want to
speak with the caseworker. In addition, the DHHS acquired respondent-father’s messages and
phone recordings from the jail and confirmed that respondents were in constant communication
despite respondent-mother’s statements that they were not.
In June 2025, respondent-mother’s parenting time was again suspended because it was
reported that it was harmful to the children. That same month, respondent-mother tested positive
for cocaine and alcohol. Accordingly, the DHHS petitioned the trial court to terminate
respondents’ parental rights to the children. At the termination hearing in July 2025, the
caseworker testified about respondent-mother’s lack of sufficient progress, respondent-father’s
complete lack of progress, and the children’s significant needs because of the neglect and trauma
they endured.
The trial court then found that respondent-mother did not want to “directly face” her
“parenting deficits,” substance abuse, and issues with domestic violence, and that respondent-
mother blamed others for her issues instead of benefiting from services. The trial court found that
the children experienced trauma and neglect in respondent-mother’s care and that the children
were not emotionally or physically safe. With regard to respondent-father, the trial court found
that he entirely failed to participate in services, had not seen his children since June 2023, and had
not communicated with the DHHS or his counsel until he was incarcerated in May 2025. The trial
court determined that respondent-father had demonstrated no desire to parent his children and that
the children were not emotionally or physically safe in respondent-father’s care.
The trial court found that termination was in the children’s best interests and held that
termination of the respondents’ parental rights were proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and
(j). Both respondents appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondents argue that the trial court clearly erred by finding termination of their parental
rights was in the best interests of their respective children. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RELEVANT AUTHORITY
“We review for clear error the trial court’s determination of best interests.” In re Sanborn,
337 Mich App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Appellate courts are obliged to defer to a trial court’s factual findings at

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termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Before a trial court may terminate parental rights, the court is required to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 277. “Parents
have a significant interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children,
and the interest is an element of liberty protected by due process.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210;
661 NW2d 216 (2003). However, “[t]he focus at the best-interest stage has always been on the
child, not the parent.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
“In making its best-interest determination, the trial court may consider the whole
record . . . .” In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 237; 894 NW2d 653 (2016) (quotation marks
omitted). The court may consider factors including “the child’s bond to the parent[;] the parent’s
parenting ability[;] the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality[;] and the advantages of
a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d
144 (2012) (citations omitted). When considering the child’s bond to the parent, whether the
existing bond is healthy for the child is also a relevant consideration. See In re CR, 250 Mich App
185, 196-197; 646 NW2d 506 (2001), overruled on other grounds In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394,
422-423; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). See also In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 477; 951 NW2d
704 (2020). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s
compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the
children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App
701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Moreover, we consider the length of time that the child has been
removed from a parent and whether it was likely “that the child could be returned to [his or] her
parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 249; 824
NW2d 569 (2012).
“[T]he trial court has a duty to decide the best interests of each child individually.” In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42. “[I]f the best interests of the individual children
significantly differ, the trial court should address those differences when making its determination
of the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 715.
B. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
In the present case, the trial court considered each child individually and found that
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests because the
bonds with respondent-mother were unhealthy and minimal, the children were not physically or
emotionally safe in respondent-mother’s care, the children were doing much better in the care of
their foster parents, and the children required permanence, stability, and guidance which
respondent-mother could not provide. The trial court also emphasized respondent-mother’s failure
to benefit from the many services offered by the DHHS, and the trauma endured by the children,
which resulted in behavioral problems that had improved when the children were removed from
respondent-mother’s care. We agree that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests.

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Respondent-mother first argues that she was bonded with KLJ, KAJ, and JKJ.6
Respondent-mother does not provide any support for this argument. Further, this argument is
clearly contrary to the record and the trial court’s findings.
Regarding KLJ, the trial court found that respondent-mother and KLJ were bonded.
However, it further found that KLJ had “an unhealthy attachment” to respondent-mother and that
the bond was “significantly diminished” after respondent-mother’s parenting time with KLJ was
suspended and she did not submit the paperwork to reinstate it, causing KLJ to become angry and
disappointed with respondent-mother. The trial court also noted that KLJ had been placed in
Whaley Children’s Center and had received several different services throughout the proceedings
to address his significant needs, and that his needs had been met only once he was removed from
respondent-mother’s care. The trial court also explained that KLJ made noticeable progress in
therapy when his parenting time with respondent-mother was suspended because KLJ was able to
put his needs first, and that KLJ indicated that he did not want to return to respondent-mother’s
care, be physically disciplined again, or assume a parental role with his siblings.
Regarding KAJ, the trial court found that respondent-mother and KAJ also had an
unhealthy bond and respondent-mother had not demonstrated an ability to parent KAJ. The trial
court explained that KAJ’s bond with respondent-mother was “destructive to his own well-being”
noting that KAJ exhibited extremely delinquent behavior while in respondent-mother’s care,
which respondent-mother failed to address. The trial court also noted that although only 11-years-
old at the time of the termination hearing, KAJ had engaged in “a lot of unsafe, sometimes illegal
behavior” including: threatening neighborhood children with a gun, which resulted in criminal
proceedings being initiated; driving respondent-mother’s vehicle and crashing it; and assaulting
and battering others, including a neighbor and caseworkers. The trial court also found that KAJ
did not make significant progress in therapy during the proceedings because he wanted to protect
respondent-mother, refused to openly discuss his past trauma, and put respondent-mother’s needs
before his own. However, it noted that KAJ’s needs were now being met “as best as possible by
his foster parent and service providers” and that respondent-mother could not meet his needs
because she could not acknowledge “the problems she created for him.”
Regarding JDJ-1, the trial court noted that JDJ-1 suffered a significant amount of trauma
in respondent-mother’s care, and after parenting times resumed in December 2024, JDJ-1
displayed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) having a “very visceral reaction
crying, sobbing, shaking.” The trial court further found that “whatever bond he’s had with his
mother no longer exists” and that JDJ-1 reported that he had nightmares and questioned whether
he and his siblings would be safe if returned to respondent-mother. The trial court also noted JDJ-
1 “has done more work than any of his other siblings to deal with his trauma” and that respondent-
mother is “unable to give him what he needs from a parent.”
Regarding JDJ-2, the trial court explained that JDJ-2 appeared to be confused as to who
his parents were but that he was “certain that his foster family is his family and that he feels safe
and taken care of there.” In contrast, the trial court found that although JDJ-2 had a bond with
6 Notably, respondent-mother admits that she was not bonded with JDJ-3, and she does not mention
any bond with JDJ-1 or JDJ-2.

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respondent-mother, it was not a strong connection because he did not turn to respondent-mother
for parental comfort or guidance. Further, the trial court explained that JDJ-2’s anxiety and trauma
could not be managed or addressed by respondent-mother because she refused to acknowledge
that JDJ-2 had experienced trauma. It also found that JDJ-2 had “significant needs” that
respondent-mother did not try to understand or provide for, and if JDJ-2 were returned his needs
would not be met because he “will not make any effort to seek out any support or guidance or
assistance.”
Regarding JKJ, the trial court noted that respondent-mother used drugs while pregnant with
JKJ, who was born with substances in his system. It also found that he had “incredibly intense
behaviors,” was “very physical with other kids” and adults, and required consistent monitoring
and redirection. The trial court further explained that there was no indication JKJ viewed
respondent-mother as an authority figure or that she would ensure he received the services he
required to address his behavioral issues. The trial court noted that JKJ also regressed in toilet
training when respondent-mother’s parenting times resumed in December 2024 because he craved
attention from respondent-mother, who was unable to provide it because she was overwhelmed
when caring for all the children. The trial court found that although JKJ had a bond with
respondent-mother, it appeared “to be one more on the need for her to pay attention to him”
because JKJ did not “seek love, nurturing and guidance from her.”
Finally, regarding JDJ-3, the trial court found that JDJ-3 was not bonded with respondent-
mother. It explained that JDJ-3 was placed in the DHHS’s care when she was six months old and
that she never returned to respondent-mother’s care, and respondent-mother’s parenting times
were suspended between March 2024 and December 2024. The trial court also noted that when
parenting times resumed, JDJ-3 did not want respondent-mother to hold her and did not really
interact with respondent-mother, and when JDJ-3 eventually sat with respondent-mother, she was
very quiet. In contrast, the trial court explained that JDJ-3 was animated and talkative in the foster
home. The trial court also found that there was no indication that respondent-mother understood
JDJ-3’s needs, or that JDJ-3 looked to respondent-mother to meet her needs.
The parent-child bond is only one factor for the trial court to consider, see In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42. The trial court also found that the other factors supported a
finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.
Respondent-mother argues that the fact that she was employed and had housing, weighed
against termination. The trial court acknowledged that respondent-mother had housing and usually
had employment, however it noted that respondent-mother’s ability to provide stability for the
children was questionable. Specifically, the trial court emphasized that respondent-mother failed
to benefit from the case service plan during the lengthy proceedings, and she refused to accept
feedback or responsibility for her role in the children’s trauma. The trial court further explained
that respondent-mother tested positive for alcohol and cocaine in the weeks leading up to
termination, failed to address her issues with domestic violence and poor parenting ability, and
lied about her continued relationship with respondent-father. See In re Simpson, ___ Mich App
___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368248); slip op at 8 (noting that a parent’s history
of substance abuse and the ability to provide a safe and stable home is relevant to the best-interest
determination). The trial court also acknowledged that respondent-mother could “give the children
love and affection” but could not give them appropriate guidance.

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In contrast, the trial court found that the children were doing well in their placements. KAJ,
JDJ-1, JDJ-2, JKJ, and JDJ-3 had healthy attachments and bonds with their foster parents, who
wanted to provide the children with permanency. JDJ-1 and JKJ were placed in the same foster
home, and review of the file reflects all the foster parents were willing to adopt. At the time of
termination, KLJ was still placed at Whaley, where he had been since January 2024, but was
developing a bond with his paternal grandfather, and the caseworker hoped KLJ could be placed
with him in the future. Although the paternal grandfather might have been interested in adopting
KLJ, the child was not placed with a relative at the time of termination; therefore, contrary to
respondent-mother’s argument, this possible placement with a relative does not have any bearing
on the best interest analysis. Notably, the trial court nonetheless found that it was still in KLJ’s
best interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. In re Alexander, ___ Mich App
___, ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 369324 and 369325); slip op at 8 (explaining that a trial
court “may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination
is in the child’s best interests”).
Lastly, respondent-mother argues that the fact that the children were all bonded to each
other but were put in different placements weighed against termination. Although termination
resulted in some of the children being separated, the trial court found that termination was still in
their best interests because their extensive individual needs could be met by their caretakers.
“Although in most cases it will be in the best interests of each child to keep brothers and sisters
together . . ., if keeping the children together is contrary to the best interests of an individual child,
the best interests of that child will control.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Notably, the trial court emphasized the significant needs
of each child and how those needs were met by the children’s caretakers, and how those needs
could not be met by respondent-mother.
In sum, the trial court appropriately considered the best-interest factors and clearly
explained how each factor weighed in favor of termination. Accordingly, the trial court did not
clearly err by finding that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interests.
C. RESPONDENT-FATHER
The trial court also found that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests because the children’s bond with respondent-father was weak or
nonexistent, respondent-father “showed no inclination to do anything as a parent,” the children
were doing much better with their foster parents, and the children needed stability, safety, and
permanency which respondent-father would not and could not provide. We agree that termination
of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Respondent-father first argues there “was at least some kind of bond” between him and his
children. Respondent-father does not provide any support for this argument, and it is clearly
contrary to the record and the trial court’s findings.
Regarding respondent-father’s bond with his children, the trial court found that whatever
bond that existed between respondent-father and JDJ-1, JDJ-2, and JKJ was minimal and
unhealthy. The trial court noted that at the time of termination, respondent-father had not seen his

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children for more than two years because he refused to participate in the proceedings. Regarding
JDJ-1, the trial court noted that he had “no bond to his father at all” and that he saw respondent-
father “in a very negative light.” Regarding JDJ-2, the trial court explained that there appeared
“to be a weak bond present” but that the bond was more of “a bond with the idea of what he thinks
[respondent-father] should be rather than what he is.” The trial court also noted that JDJ-2 did not
include respondent-father in his family portraits, which demonstrated “estrangement” and beliefs
that respondent-father was not “integral” to his family unit. Regarding JKJ, the trial court
explained that JKJ did not have a bond with respondent-father anymore because respondent-father
had not “engaged in any effort to be a parent” and because respondent-father had been “absent for
much of his life.”
Additionally, as found by the trial court, other record evidence also supported the finding
that termination was in the children’s best interests. The trial court noted that respondent-father
had “never complied with his agency treatment plan,” had failed to see his children, and had
“effectively ghost[ed] everyone involved in helping the family.” Notably, on appeal, respondent-
father acknowledges that he did not engage with the DHHS or comply with services because he
believed that it was better to do nothing. However, as properly found by the trial court, because
respondent-father did nothing, respondent-father never demonstrated he had stable housing or
employment, and he did not address his issues with domestic violence, substance abuse, and poor
parenting skills—the same issues that initially led to the children’s removal.
In contrast, the trial court explained that JDJ-1, JDJ-2, and JKJ were doing well in their
placements. They had healthy attachments and bonds with their foster parents, who wanted to
provide them with permanency and were willing to adopt. JDJ-1 and JKJ were placed in the same
foster home. Although JDJ-1 and JKJ were separated from JDJ-2 because of the termination, it
was in their best interests because they required safety, stability, and permanency, which
respondent-father could not provide but their caretakers could. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297
Mich App at 42. See also In re Simpson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8. Accordingly, the trial
court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in
the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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