COA 374403 PAUL SATKOWIAK V TOWNSHIP OF BEAVER Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/15/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PAUL SATKOWIAK and PRIZZA SATKOWIAK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 2026
8:43 AM
v No. 374403
Bay Circuit Court
TOWNSHIP OF BEAVER, LC No. 2021-003474-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and PATEL and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Paul and Prizza Satkowiak appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting
summary disposition to defendant, Beaver Township. We affirm for the reasons stated in this
opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
The Satkowiaks own property on River Road in Beaver Township. Sometime in the early
2000s, the Satkowiaks began operating a snowplowing and lawn care business on the property. In
2008, they started another business, P&P Contracting, which they also operated on the property.
Sometime in 2015, at the request of the then-Township Supervisor, the Satkowiaks applied
for a special use permit. The Township granted the permit, but imposed several conditions on the
Satkowiaks’ commercial use of the property. That permit was later revoked on August 20, 2019
after the Beaver Township Planning Commission determined that the Satkowiaks had violated the
permit’s conditions. The Satkowiaks did not challenge the permit’s revocation.
Thereafter, on December 6, 2019, the Township sent a letter to the Satkowiaks directing
them to cease commercial operations on the River Road property and to comply with the
Township’s zoning ordinance. The Township warned that continued commercial activity on the
property after January 1, 2020 would result in the issuance of a municipal civil infraction.
Subsequently, on January 8, 2020, the Township issued a civil infraction ticket to Paul Satkowiak,
asserting that he had “engaged in unauthorized commercial activity” in violation of the Township’s
zoning ordinance. The Township then initiated an enforcement action against him in the district

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court. Following a three-day bench trial, the district court found that Paul had violated the zoning
ordinance “by operating a trucking, landscaping, and snowplowing business” on the property. The
district court assessed a monetary fine and ordered Paul to “cease and desist from operating
trucking, landscaping, or snowplowing business” on the property and to refrain from further
violating the Township’s zoning ordinance. Paul appealed that decision to the circuit court, which
affirmed the district court in part and reversed and remanded in part. Paul applied for leave to
appeal in this Court, but his application was denied.
In the meantime, the Satkowiaks filed the instant action in the circuit court, asserting that
the Township’s zoning ordinance, as it related to the special-use-permitting process, was
unconstitutional and “void for vagueness.” In response, the Township filed a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), contending that the Satkowiaks’ claim was
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Following supplemental briefing
and a hearing on that motion, the trial court denied the Township’s motion for summary
disposition.1
The Satkowiaks filed an amended complaint, again asserting that the Township’s zoning
ordinance and its former zoning ordinance were unconstitutionally vague and seeking a declaration
that they could continue to operate their businesses without interference from the Township. The
Township answered the amended complaint. It eventually filed a second motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), arguing that the Satkowiaks were unable to show
that the zoning ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it was too vague. Following oral
argument on the motion, the trial court granted the Township’s motion and summarily dismissed
the Satkowiaks’ complaint. This appeal follows.
1 On appeal, the Township again asserts that the Satkowiaks’ claim is barred by res judicata and
collateral estoppel. The Township, however, has not filed a cross appeal challenging the trial
court’s denial of their first motion for summary disposition. “Generally, failure to file a cross
appeal precludes an appellee from raising an issue not appealed by appellant.” Kosmyna v Botsford
Comm Hosp, 238 Mich App 694, 696; 607 NW2d 134 (1999). And, although “an appellee need
not file a cross appeal in order to argue an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s decision,
even if that argument was considered and rejected by the trial court,” id., in this case, the trial
court’s denial of summary disposition was in response to an entirely separate motion for summary
disposition. Moreover, the Township does not state in its brief that the trial court denied its first
motion for summary disposition, nor does it argue that the trial court erred by doing so. Instead,
the argument is couched entirely in the form of an alternative basis for relief. But in the
Township’s second motion for summary disposition, which led to the order that is the basis for the
present appeal, the Township did not properly raise the issue of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Considering the procedural history of their case, we conclude that a cross appeal of the denial of
summary disposition was necessary. And, because no such appeal has been filed, the Township’s
argument relating to res judicata and collateral estoppel is precluded. See id.

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II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Satkowiaks argue that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to the
Township. We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d
618 (2009). Challenges to the constitutionality of an ordinance are also reviewed de novo. People
of Grand Rapids v Gasper, 314 Mich App 528, 535-536; 888 NW2d 116 (2016). Likewise, we
review de novo the interpretation of an ordinance. Id. at 536. The rules governing the
interpretation of a statute also govern the interpretation of an ordinance. Shepherd Montessori
Center Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Township, 259 Mich App 315, 342; 675 NW2d 271 (2003).
B. ANALYSIS
“All statutes and ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and are construed so unless
their unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Kenefick v City of Battle Creek, 284 Mich App 653,
654-655; 774 NW2d 925 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Challenges to the
constitutionality of an ordinance may allege that the ordinance is unconstitutional “as applied” or
that it is unconstitutional “on its face.” Paragon Properties Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576;
550 NW2d 772 (1996). “A facial challenge is a claim that the law is invalid in toto—and therefore
incapable of any valid application, whereas an as-applied challenge considers the specific
application of a facially valid law to individual facts.” Promote the Vote v Secretary of State, 333
Mich App 93, 117; 958 NW2d 861 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the
Satkowiaks do not claim that the Township’s zoning ordinance is unconstitutional only when
applied in a specific circumstance. Rather, they contend that it is unconstitutional under all
circumstances. Accordingly, they have raised a facial challenge to the validity of the zoning
ordinance.2
“A party challenging the facial constitutionally of an ordinance faces an extremely rigorous
standard.” Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 223; 848 NW2d 380 (2014) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “To prevail, plaintiffs must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the ordinance would be valid and the fact that the ordinance might operate
2 In their amended complaint, the Satkowiaks contended that both the current and former versions
of the Township’s zoning ordinance were unconstitutionally vague. And, in their brief on appeal,
they maintain that both versions of the ordinance are unconstitutional. However, the Satkowiaks’
argument as it relates to the former version of the ordinance consists only of an announcement of
unconstitutionality. They do not direct this Court to the allegedly unconstitutional language in the
former version of the ordinance, nor do they proffer any argument as to why that language is
unconstitutionally vague. As a result, we conclude that they have abandoned their challenge to
the former ordinance. See Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959) (“It is not
enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave
it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for
him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.”).

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unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it invalid.”
Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). As explained by our Supreme Court in
Bonner, “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the ordinance, the
existence of the state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed and the ordinance
upheld.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Satkowiaks contend that the sections of the Township’s zoning ordinance that govern
the special-use permitting process are unconstitutional because they are vague. “A constitutional
challenge based on vagueness ‘is brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.’ ” Gasper, 314 Mich App at 536, quoting People
v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575 n 2; 527 NW2d 434 (1994). “An act [or ordinance] is void for vagueness
if ‘(1) it is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms, (2) it does not provide fair
notice of the conduct it regulates, or (3) it gives the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited
discretion in determining whether the statute has been violated.’ ” Kenefick, 284 Mich App at 655,
quoting Proctor v White Lake Twp Police Dep’t, 248 Mich App 457, 467; 639 NW2d 332 (2001).
There is no claim that the Township’s zoning ordinance impinges upon First Amendment
freedoms. Accordingly, only the latter concerns are relevant to this appeal.
The version of the zoning ordinance at issue in this appeal was adopted in 2019. Beaver
Township Zoning Ordinance, 2019-02. The Satkowiaks challenge the constitutionality of the
provisions governing special-use permitting process in the agricultural district. Within the
agricultural district, the following uses are explicitly permitted:
(a) Farms, together with farm dwellings and buildings and other
installations necessary to such farms.
(b) Greenhouses, nurseries, orchards, vineyards, apiaries, chicken
hatcheries, poultry and livestock farms.
(c) Single family dwellings.
(d) Roadside stands which sell only products grown or produced on the
premises.
(e) State licensed residential facility which provide resident service for six
(6) or fewer persons, such as family day care homes, adult foster care homes, foster
family homes, or foster family group homes . . . . [Beaver Township Zoning
Ordinance, § 6.02.]
In turn, the following special land uses are allowed if a special land use permit is granted by the
Planning Commission:

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(a) Removal and processing of topsoil, stone, rock, sand, gravel, lime or
other soil or mineral resources, subject to the provisions of Section 15.04(b).[3]
(b) Limited Commercial Enterprises (LCE). Limited commercial
enterprises are those land uses permitted by right in the B Business District which
are conducted within a completely enclosed structure, which do not involve the
outside storage of equipment, material, supplies, or inventory and which do not rely
upon public water and/or public sewer service in their operations. LCE are subject
to the provisions in Section 15.04(c).
(c) Nursing homes, convalescent homes, and assisted living facilities when
authorized as a special land use, subject to the provisions in Section 3.23.
(d) Group day care homes and child care centers, when authorized as a
special land use, subject to the provisions in Section 3.22.
(e) Solar energy systems—free standing utility when authorized as a special
use by the Planning Commission. When considering such authorizing, the Planning
commission shall consider the provisions of Section 3.24 and Chapter XV.
(f) Solar energy systems—attached small (2 – 20 kW) when authorized as
a special use by the Planning Commission. When considering such authorizing,
the Planning commission shall consider the provisions of Section 3.24 and Chapter
XV.
(g) Solar energy systems—free standing small (2 – 20 kW) when authorized
as a special use by the Planning Commission. When considering such authorizing,
the Planning commission shall consider the provisions of Section 3.24 and Chapter
XV.
(h) On-Site Wind Energy Conversion Systems (WECS) described in part
(c) of Section 3.25 and Utility-Scale Wind Energy Conversion Systems (WECS)
when authorized as a special use by the Planning Commission. When considering
such authorization, the Planning commission shall consider the provisions of
Sections 3.25 and 5.03, and Chapter XV.
(i) Other uses which are of the same general character as other uses
permitted in the AG District. In consideration of a similar use, the Planning
Commission shall consider the following standards
3 On appeal, the Satkowiaks suggest that their use of the River Road property could potentially fall
under the special use set forth in Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance, § 6.03(a). However,
because this is a facial challenge, not an as-applied challenge, the specific facts surrounding their
claim are not relevant. See Bonner, 495 Mich at 223.

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(1) The size, nature, and character of the proposed use;
(2) The proximity of the proposed use to adjoining properties;
(3) The parking facilities provided for the proposed use;
(4) Any traffic congestion or hazard which will be created by the proposed
use;
(5) How well the proposed use harmonizes, blends with, and enhances
adjoining properties and the surrounding neighborhood;
(6) The need or necessity for the proposed use to service the needs of the
surrounding neighborhood; and
(7) The effect of the proposed use on adjoining properties and the
surrounding neighborhood. [Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance, § 6.03
(emphasis in original).]
Finally, any uses not “explicitly permitted” by the Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance are
prohibited. Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.16.
Chapter XV of the Township’s Zoning Ordinances addresses special use permits. The
Beaver Township Planning Commission is required to consider applications for special use permits
“in accordance with the criteria for approval stated in Section 15.03, and such standards contained
in this Ordinance which relate to the special uses under consideration.” Beaver Township Zoning
Ordinance, § 15.02(e). The following criteria are stated in § 15.03:
(a) General Standards—The Planning Commission shall review the
particular circumstances of the special use request under consideration in terms of
the following standards, and shall approve a special use only upon a finding of
compliance with each of the following standards, as well as applicable standards
established elsewhere in this Ordinance:
(1) The special use shall be designed, constructed, operated and maintained
in a manner harmonious with the character of adjacent property and the surrounding
area.
(2) The special use shall not change the essential character of the
surrounding area and shall be designed to be compatible with the natural
environment.
(3) The special use shall not be hazardous to adjacent property, or involves
uses, activities, materials or equipment which shall be detrimental to the health,
safety or welfare of persons or property through the excessive production of traffic,
noise, smoke, fumes or glare.

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(4) The special use shall not place demands on public services and facilities
in excess of current capacity.
(5) The special use shall be consistent with the general principles and
objectives of the Township’s Master Plan and shall promote the intent and purpose
of this Ordinance.
(6) The location of the special use within the zoning district shall minimize
the impact of the traffic generated by the proposed use, taking into account
proximity and access to thoroughfares and intersections, adequacy of sight
distances, location of and access to off-street parking, and provisions for pedestrian
traffic.
(7) Planning Commission shall also consider the following factors:
(i) The size, nature and character of the proposed use.
(ii) The proximity of the proposed use to adjoining property and the
general effect on the surrounding neighborhood.
(iii) The parking facilities provided for the proposed use.
(iv) How the proposed use mixes with adjoining properties and the
surrounding neighborhood.
(v) The need or necessity for the proposed use to service the needs
of the Township. [Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance, § 15.03.]
The Satkowiaks contend that § 15.03(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(6) fail to provide
fair notice of what is required of an applicant and that they fail to establish explicit standards for
the Planning Commission to apply when considering an application for a special use permit. We
disagree.
As explained in Kenefick, 284 Mich App at 655:
An ordinance provides fair notice if it gives a person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited or required. The statute cannot
use terms that require persons of ordinary intelligence to guess its meaning and
differ about its application. A statute if sufficiently definite if its meaning can fairly
be ascertained by reference to judicial interpretations, the common law,
dictionaries, treatises, or the commonly accepted meanings of words. [Quotation
marks and citation omitted.]
In order to be constitutional, an ordinance need not define every term in “minute detail,” Dep’t of
State Compliance & Rules Division v Mich Edu Assoc, 251 Mich App 110, 120; 650 NW2d 120
(2002), nor does it have to be drafted with mathematical precision, Mich Wolfdog Ass’n, Inc, v St.
Clair Co, 122 F Supp 2d 794, 802 (ED Mich, 2000). Rather, it is sufficient if the language used
is “reasonably precise.” Dep’t of State Compliance & Rules Division, 251 Mich App at 120.

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Finally, an ordinance encourages “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” when it fails to
“place any constraints on” the discretion of those tasked with enforcing the ordinance. Gasper,
314 Mich App at 537-538. With these principles in mind, we turn to the sections of the Township’s
zoning ordinance identified by the Satkowiaks as being void for vagueness.
First, as noted above, Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance, § 15.03(a)(1) provides that a
proposed “special use shall be designed, constructed, operated and maintained in a manner
harmonious with the character of adjacent property and the surrounding area.” We conclude that
the language used in § 15.03(a)(1) is reasonably precise and gives a person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is required when applying for a special use permit. It also
places restraints upon the exercise of the Planning Commission’s discretion when determining
whether or not a proposed special use is in compliance with this criterion.
Specifically, this criterion requires the Planning Commission to compare the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of a proposed special use against the adjacent property
and the surrounding area to determine if the proposed special use and the existing uses are
harmonious. Thus, there are constraints upon the Planning Commission’s discretion in that it has
to compare specific aspects of the proposed use to adjacent properties and the surrounding area.
The Satkowiaks nevertheless contend that this is “fuzzy” language because of the use of the term
“harmonious.” Yet, the meaning of the term “harmonious” can be fairly ascertained by reference
to a dictionary. See Kenefick, 284 Mich App at 655. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (12th ed) (defining “harmonious” as “having the parts agreeably relate : CONGRUOUS
<blended into a ~ whole>”).
Considering that definition, we conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would be
capable of determining whether a use is or is not harmonious with adjacent properties and the
surrounding area. For instance, if a proposed special use is the operation of a professional
racetrack, the adjacent property is a single-family home, and the surrounding area consists entirely
of single-family homes, it is clear that the proposed use does not agreeably relate with the adjacent
property and surrounding area because of the noise, glare, smells, and traffic inherent in the
operation of a racetrack. Alternatively, if the proposed use is an in-home child-care facility that
cares for a small number of children, the adjacent property is used as a single-family residence,
and the surrounding area is vacant farmland, a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to
determine that the proposed use blends agreeably with the adjacent property and the surrounding
area. Because a set of circumstances exist under which Section 15.03(a)(1) would provide fair
notice of what is required and because the Planning Commission’s discretion is not unfettered, the
fact that the section might be unconstitutionally vague under a different circumstance does not
render it invalid. See Bonner, 495 Mich at 223.4
4 This does not mean that there will not be circumstances under which persons of ordinary
intelligence would be left to guess whether a proposed use does or does not harmonize with the
adjacent property or properties. However, under such circumstances, an as-applied challenge
could be raised.

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We next consider whether Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance, § 15.03(a)(2), is facially
unconstitutional because it is vague. That section provides that “[t]he special use shall not change
the essential character of the surrounding area and shall be designed to be compatible with the
natural environment.” The Satkowiaks take issue with the requirement that the use be designed to
be compatible with the natural environment. To support their position, they argue that “corn” is
arguably incompatible with the natural environment because it is not a naturally occurring food.
We will not delve into such technical definitions, however, because it is well-settled that an
ordinance is not vague if the meaning of the ordinance to be fairly ascertained using the
“commonly accepted meaning of words.” See Kenefick, 284 Mich App at 655.5
We further conclude that the term “natural environment” is not strictly confined to an
environment that exists solely in nature because, when construing a statute or ordinance, terms are
not read in isolation. TruGreen Ltd Partnership v Dep’t of Treasury, 338 Mich App 248, 258; 979
NW2d 739 (2021). Rather, they must be considered in context. In this case, the criterion set forth
in § 15.03 applies to all special use permits, including those areas zoned for agricultural,
residential, or business purposes. See Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance, §§ 6.03 (agricultural
district); 7.03 (rural residential); 8.03 (medium density residential); and 9.03 (business district).
The “natural environment” of a business district will necessarily include urban characteristics that
do not occur strictly in nature. Thus, the key consideration is not whether the purposed special use
would be incompatible with nature, but whether it is incompatible with the natural environment of
the relevant district. In that regard, the ordinance requires that the “essential” character of the
“surrounding area” not be changed. The term “essential” is defined as “something basic or
fundamental.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (12th ed). Thus, the essential character
of farmland would include the storage and operation of farm equipment, the use of fertilizers and/or
pesticides, the employment of farm workers, and the operation of trucks to transport the farm
product.
We conclude that when considered in context this section is not facially unconstitutional.
Similar to how a person of ordinary intelligence can reasonably ascertain whether a proposed use
is harmonious, a person of ordinary intelligence can reasonably ascertain if a proposed use is
compatible with the natural environment and whether it would change the essential character of
the surrounding area. By way of example, a proposed special use in the agricultural district can
include operation of an assisted-living home. Such a use would not change the essential character
of farmland, nor would it be incompatible with the natural environment that would be created by
farmland, which would reasonably include structures to house farmers, their staff, their equipment,
and their crops. Additionally, because this section sets forth explicit standards for the Planning
Commission to consider, there are constraints upon its discretion. In sum, because a person of
ordinary intelligence can reasonably determine what is required by § 15.03(a)(2) and because there
are constraints upon the Planning Commission’s exercise of discretion, we conclude that there is
a set of circumstances under which the ordinance is valid. See Bonner, 495 Mich at 223.
Accordingly, the Satkowiaks’ facial challenge to § 15.03(a)(2) fails.
5 Moreover, the growing of corn is expressly permitted under Beaver Township Zoning Ordinance,
§ 6.02(a), so a person would not need to apply for a special-use permit in order to grow it.

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Next, the Satkowiaks challenge Sections 15.03(a)(3), which provides that “[t]he special
use shall not be hazardous to adjacent property, or involve uses, activities, materials or equipment
which shall be detrimental to the health, safety or welfare of persons or property through the
excessive production of traffic, noise, smoke, fumes or glare.”6 Specifically, they contend that a
person must guess what constitutes “excessive” traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, or glare. They
maintain, for example, that as written, the addition of one, ten, a hundred, or a thousand vehicles
could all be considered excessive. The term “excessive” is defined as “exceeding what is usual,
proper, necessary, or normal.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (12th ed). In isolation,
the Satkowiaks are correct that even a single additional vehicle could be considered to exceed what
is “normal.” But, as noted above, language in an ordinance must be considered in context.
TruGreen, 338 Mich App at 258-259. In context, traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, or glare is excessive
only when it is detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of persons or property. A person of
ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand that the addition of a single additional vehicle
would not produce traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, or glare that is detrimental to the health and safety
of a person or property.
We can also conceive a set of circumstances under which the ordinance would be valid.
See Bonner, 495 Mich at 223. In the case of a proposed special use of an in-care child-care facility
for a small number of children, there would be an increase in traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, and
glare. This would be caused by the parents of the children driving to the facility to drop off and
pick up their children. Their vehicles would be additional traffic and could result in the emission
of smoke or fumes and cause glare that did not exist previously. Yet, considering that only a small
number of children would be served at the facility, the increase in traffic would not reasonably be
understood to be excessive. The potential glare, smoke, and fumes caused by the parents dropping
off and picking up their children would be minimal and limited in duration. Nothing in this set of
circumstances suggest that the additional traffic, noise, glare, fumes, and smoke would be
excessive or that it would be detrimental to the health and safety of persons or property. As such,
the proposed use would be consistent with Section 15.03(a)(3).
Because a person of ordinary intelligence could understand what is required by the
ordinance, it provides fair notice of what is required. Moreover, as there are explicit standards that
the Planning Commission has to apply, it does not leave the Commission free to determine
compliance on an arbitrary basis. Because there are circumstances under which the ordinance is
valid, the Satkowiaks cannot prevail on their facial challenge to § 15.03(a)(3). See Bonner, 495
Mich at 223. Therefore, the Satkowiaks’ facial challenge to § 15.03(a)(3) fails.
Finally, the Satkowiaks contend that § 15.03(a)(5) is unconstitutionally vague. That
section places restraints upon the Planning Commission in that it must consider whether the
proposed use is consistent with the general principles and objectives of the Township’s Master
6 The Satkowiaks also emphasize the requirement in § 15.03(6) that the location of the special use
“minimize the impact of traffic generated by the proposed use . . .” Other than emphasizing the
language, they offer no argument as to whether this language is unconstitutionally vague. As a
result, we conclude that, to the extent that they intended to challenge this section, they have
abandoned their argument on appeal. See Mitcham, 355 Mich at 203.

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Plan. This requires a comparison of the proposed use with the general principles and objectives
of the Master Plan. This criterion also requires that the proposed use promote the intent and
purpose of the Zoning Ordinance, which can be ascertained by looking to the stated intent and
purpose of the Zoning Ordinance. Because it contains explicit standards, it does not encourage
arbitrary enforcement. See Gasper, 314 Mich App at 539. As a result, the ordinance is not facially
unconstitutional on the basis of vagueness as to the enforcement of the ordinance. As to whether
it provides fair notice of what is required, we conclude that the Satkowiaks have abandoned this
issue on appeal by failing to reference the relevant language stating the purpose of the Township’s
zoning ordinance or the Township’s Master Plan. See Mitcham, 355 Mich at 203.
On appeal, the Satkowiaks contend that Section 15.03 of the Township’s Zoning Ordinance
is akin to the noise ordinance determined to be unconstitutionally vague in Gasper. We disagree.
In Gasper, the ordinance provided that “ ‘[n]o person shall use any premises or suffer any premises
under his or her care or control to be used which shall destroy the peace and tranquility of the
surrounding neighborhood.’ ” Gasper, 314 Mich App at 531, quoting § 9.63(3) of the City of
Grand Rapids’ Noise Control Ordinance. In finding the ordinance void for vagueness, the Gasper
Court reasoned that the ordinance provided “virtually no guidance to a citizen in determining
whether his or her conduct is prohibited” and that it also vested “the enforcing officer with almost
complete discretion to determine whether the ordinance has been violated.” Id. at 538. That is,
“[a] person making noise in a neighborhood” would have “to guess whether law enforcement
would consider his or her conduct as destroying the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood”
because the ordinance did not provide any “standard for determining what destroys the peace and
tranquility of a neighborhood . . . .” Id. at 539. The Gasper Court, however, noted that a reasonable
person would be sufficiently aware of conduct that merely disturbs, rather than destroys, the peace.
Id. at 539-540. See also City of Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 342; 539 NW2d 781
(1995) (holding that “[a]n ordinary person exercising common sense can sufficiently understand
the term ‘loud or boisterous,’ especially when the term is modified by the phrase ‘disturb the public
peace and quiet’ and that the term was not so subjective and vague so as to permit unlimited
discretion by those tasked with enforcing the ordinance).
Here, unlike the ordinance in Gasper, a person of ordinary intelligence would be aware of
what is required under the challenged sections of § 15.03, and the Planning Commission’s
discretion to approve or deny a special use permit is constrained by explicitly identified criteria.
The fact that some conceivable circumstances might exist under which the ordinance is invalid is
insufficient to establish that a statute is facially invalid. See Bonner, 495 Mich at 223.
In sum, to prevail upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute—including a
challenge based upon vagueness—the burden is on the plaintiff to show “that no set of
circumstances exists under which the ordinance would be valid.” Bonner, 495 Mich at 223.
Because the Satkowiaks have not met that burden, we conclude that the Township’s Zoning
Ordinance is not unconstitutional.
Finally, the Satkowiaks contend that their use of the property constitutes a prior non-
conforming use. We will not address the validity of this claim because it was not raised in their
complaint or their amended complaint. As such, it is not properly before this Court. See Walters
v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008).

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Affirmed. The Township may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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