COA 372664 PEOPLE OF MI V CATRELL KEYSHAWN WOODS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/17/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2025
2:37 PM
v No. 372664
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
CATRELL KEYSHAWN WOODS, LC No. 2023-001351-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RICK, P.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Catrell Keyshawn Woods, appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of
second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a second-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction and
two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case arises from the May 11, 2023 shooting death of Omarre Williams. On that day,
Williams was in the parking lot of the Riverview Cooperative Apartments in Kalamazoo,
Michigan. At around 9:00 p.m., Williams, who had been socializing with others, went to retrieve
his phone that had been charging in his aunt’s parked car on the north side of the parking lot.1
Gunshots rang out, and Williams was next seen lying on the ground. Friends and family members
picked Williams up, placed him in the aunt’s vehicle, and drove him to the hospital. Williams did
1 Of some significance, the parking lot is described as being broken into two halves: a northern
side and a southern side, with the northern side being at a slightly higher elevation than the southern
side.

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not survive, and a pathologist determined that Williams died from a gunshot wound that entered
the right, backside of his head and exited through the left forehead.
After police responded, they conducted a search and investigation of the area. The vehicle
that Williams was near at the time he was shot was backed into a parking spot on the north side of
the parking lot, i.e., the vehicle was facing south. The vehicle was struck at least two times by
gunfire. The trajectory of the shots was from the rear passenger side toward the driver’s front side.
They found eight spent cartridges on Bridge Street, just west of the entrance to the parking lot.2
The cartridges were from two interchangeable types of ammunition: .223 caliber and 5.56 caliber.3
And in the parking spot where Williams had been, the police saw a pool of blood and recovered a
fired bullet. A resident in a unit southeast of where Williams had been shot reported damage to
her second-floor bathroom after hearing the gunshots. Police found that a bullet entered through
the brick wall of the apartment and caused the damage. Extrapolating the trajectory of the bullet
from the path it took through the brick wall, police determined that the trajectory was at a
downward angle toward the northwest, which is in the direction of the area where Williams was
shot and where the casings were found on Bridge Street.
The police also found a spent nine-millimeter casing on the south side of the parking lot.
But the police did not find any damage that was caused by any shot being fired in a northerly
direction from the south parking lot. Further, Williams’s aunt, who was on a porch facing the
southern end of the parking lot at the time of the shooting, testified that the shots came from the
direction of Bridge Street. Based on this evidence, the police determined that the nine-millimeter
casing was not related to the shooting of Williams.
Det. Sean Szekely, the lead detective assigned to the case, had heard a report of a black car
fleeing the area westbound on Bridge and had another officer review security footage from a
nearby party store. The officer went to the nearby “13½ liquor store” and obtained video footage
from it. The video showed a black Ford Fusion arriving in the area approximately 30 minutes
before the shooting and leaving at a high rate of speed a little before 9:00 p.m. A review of images
collected by nearby Flock cameras4 revealed the license plate number of the vehicle.5 Flock
images and the videos from the liquor store also showed that the Ford Fusion had distinctive
2 Bridge Street runs east-west, and is on the north side of the parking lot.
3 There was testimony that some manufacturers use “inches” for measurement, resulting in a .223
nomenclature, while others use “millimeters,” resulting in 5.56 label; .223 inches is very close to
5.56 millimeters. Regardless, multiple witnesses testified that .223-caliber and 5.56-caliber
ammunition can be interchangeable.
4 The city of Kalamazoo had more than 20 such cameras located at various intersections within the
city. The cameras attempt to capture images of vehicles’ license plates, and the license-plate data
goes into a database.
5 The vehicle was registered to defendant’s sister.

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stickers on the rear of the vehicle, a broken driver’s side taillight, and a broken driver’s side mirror
that was hanging down.
The police the next day conducted a stop of the Ford Fusion. Defendant was the driver.
During a search, a loaded AR-style rifle was located in the trunk area, and a cell phone was found.
Defendant denied any knowledge of the rifle and claimed that he had never seen the rifle or touched
it. There was something similar to a shoelace attached to the rifle. While the loaded magazine
had a 30-round capacity, only 22 rounds were remaining.
Defendant’s DNA was found on the rifle. Further, videos and photos obtained from
defendant’s iCloud and Snapchat accounts show him wielding a rifle with the same identifiable
lace or string as the rifle found in the Ford Fusion.6 Ballistics testing revealed that all eight spent
cartridges that were retrieved from Bridge Street were fired from the rifle found in the Ford Fusion.
The bullet found in the parking spot where Williams was shot was consistent with being a .223 or
5.56 caliber. Additionally, cell-phone tower-usage records placed defendant’s phone near the
Riverview Apartments near the time of the shooting and, as corroborated through Flock images,
generally matched the location the Ford Fusion that day.
Defendant was charged with open murder and felony-firearm. Defendant did not testify or
offer any other witnesses, but his main defense was that the prosecution did not meet its burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. During closing argument, defense counsel focused on
the fact that there was no evidence that any shot from the rifle was the cause of Williams’s death
and that the police never adequately investigated the nine-millimeter casing. The jury convicted
defendant of second-degree murder on the open-murder count and convicted him of felony-
firearm. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. REFERENCES TO “MURDER WEAPON”
Defendant argues that testimony from two police witnesses referring to a weapon found in
the trunk of the vehicle defendant was driving as the “murder weapon” denied him a fair trial. We
disagree.
Although defendant frames his issue as one of prosecutorial misconduct, his trial counsel
successfully objected to the testimony, resulting in the trial court striking the inappropriate
references to the “murder weapon” by the police witnesses. Defendant’s actual argument on
appeal appears to be that the trial court should have granted a mistrial because of the prejudicial
nature of the comments. Defendant never requested a mistrial; accordingly the issue is not
preserved. See People v Haynes, 338 Mich App 392, 410; 980 NW2d 66 (2021); People v Heft,
299 Mich App 69, 78; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Hanks, 276 Mich App 91, 92; 740 NW2d 530
6 As will be explained in greater detail below, two different witnesses referred to the rifle as the
“murder weapon.” Defendant objected in each instance, and the trial court sustained the objection,
instructing the jury to disregard the inappropriate comments.

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(2007). To prevail, a defendant bears the burden of showing that “(1) an error occurred, (2) the
error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights.” People v
Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662 NW2d 376 (2003). An error that affected substantial rights is one
that affected the outcome of the lower-court proceedings. Id. at 356.
To the extent defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct, it is important to recognize that he never identifies any conduct on behalf of the
prosecutor that his claim is based on. Instead, defendant relies solely on the characterizations of
the two police witnesses. During the examination of Det. Szekely, the following exchange
occurred:
Q. And, what are we observing in this video [stored in defendant’s Apple
iCloud account]?
A. I know it’s kind of hard to see with the glare on the screen here. But,
this video shows [defendant] with the murder weapon that was used during this
case.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection. That calls for a legal conclusion of what
weapon was used as the murder weapon.
THE COURT: And, the objection is sustained. Please, disregard the last
comment that the witness just mentioned. It’s not appropriate for it to be referred
to that way.
Det. Szekely apologized and simply referred to the weapon in the video as looking similar to the
one found in the Ford Fusion.
The prosecution later asked a different police witness, Michael Fry, who was an
intelligence analyst and manager in the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety, about similar
videos found in defendant’s accounts:
Q. Okay. And what is this like?
A. This is a video recovered from the search warrant to Apple for the iCloud
account associated to [defendant]. And, this is a video of the defendant, . . . holding
a firearm, driving down Hayes Park Avenue on the south side on April 30th.
[The Prosecutor]: And, that was evidence number 80. Next.
Q. All right.
A. Now, we go to May 6th of 2023. This is approximately five days before
the homicide. This is from the defendant’s Snapchat account. The Snapchat
account is pulled off of the cellular device that we gained extraction from, AI-74G.
This associates an individual that has a birthday of 2-13-2003, last active on May
12th of 2023, and it’s active. And, the verified phone number is the device that we
are mapping phone records for, associated to [defendant].

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[Defense Counsel]: Objection. He made the statement “murder weapon”
again. That’s inappropriate.
THE COURT: [Mr. Prosecutor]?
[The Prosecutor]: I agree.
Q. If we could just refer to it as a weapon.
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, please disregard the comment that
the witness just made. It is not for your consideration.
At the outset, the transcript does not reflect that Fry mentioned “murder weapon,” and from
his testimony, it is hard to see where it would have been. Unless there is an entire paragraph
missing, Fry only was discussing the metadata of the video, not what the video actually depicted.
Regardless, because the prosecutor “agree[d],” we will accept that Fry made the reference to
“murder weapon.”
Defendant does not identify what the prosecutor did that forms the basis of his claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, and we can find none. From the above exchanges, it is evident that the
prosecutor did not ask any inappropriate questions or otherwise seek to elicit the inappropriate
responses. In both instances, the witnesses volunteered their responses. Thus, to the extent
defendant avers that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, that argument is without
merit.
However, the gravamen of defendant’s argument is that the prejudice introduced by the
police officers’ testimony referring to the firearm they found as the “murder weapon” was so
severe that the trial court should have granted a mistrial. “The trial court should only grant a
mistrial for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and impairs his ability
to get a fair trial and when the prejudicial effect of the error cannot be removed in any other way.”
People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 60; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). “The trial court may consider, among other things, whether the prosecutor intentionally
presented the information to the jury or emphasized the information.” Id.
Defendant has failed to show how his right to a fair trial was violated. While the two
witnesses referred to the firearm defendant was wielding in the videos and pictures as the “murder
weapon,” those references had minimal impact. First and foremost, the trial court instructed the
jury to disregard the witnesses’ characterizations of the weapon. “Jurors are presumed to follow
their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v Abraham, 256
Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). Second, it was clear that the witnesses were not
speaking with some type of “hidden knowledge” about the firearm. In other words, the witnesses
were not relying on or referencing any other scientific testing whose results were inadmissible—

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they were instead expressing the clear inference from the overwhelming admissible evidence.7
While the testimony referring to the firearm as the “murder weapon” was inappropriate, see MRE
602,8 the charaterizations did not unfairly prejudice defendant.
Indeed, after making the comment, Det. Szekely admitted that there was no scientific
evidence to conclusively say which weapon fired the fatal shot. Thus, there is no reason to suggest
that the jurors placed any undue weight on any “murder weapon” references, in light of the officer-
in-charge explicitly agreeing that no such direct evidence exists and in light of the trial court’s
explicit instructions.
We also note that defense counsel was able to turn these comments against the prosecution.
During closing argument, defense counsel addressed the erroneous comments head on:
They kept referring to it as the murder weapon to try to get you to connect
the dots that they don’t have connected. They’re trying to cut corners and they’re
hoping that you will allow them to cut these corners. No evidence as to what
weapon hit Mr. Williams.
Thus, aside from generally being able to argue that the prosecution failed to meet its evidentiary
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the witnesses’ comments allowed defense
counsel to highlight how the police and prosecution may have been trying to “cut corners” to prove
guilt, which undermines their case.
7 That overwhelming circumstantial evidence includes, at a minimum, (1) the firearm found in the
Ford Fusion matches the firearm in the photos and videos of defendant; (2) while the firearm had
a capacity for 30 rounds, only 22 were in the loaded magazine; (3) eight spent casings were found
in on Bridge Street, where defendant had driven the Ford Fusion; (4) those eight casings were
identified as being shot from the firearm recovered from the Ford Fusion; (5) defendant was seen
arriving on Bridge Street shortly before the shooting and departing at a high rate of speed
immediately afterward; (6) defendant’s DNA was found on the firearm; (7) the trajectory of shots
being fired from Bridge Street is consistent with the other physical evidence, including damage to
Williams’s aunt’s car and damage to the one apartment; and (8) defendant’s denial of having any
knowledge of the firearm, when the evidence emphatically establishes that this was not true.
8 MRE 602 requires a witness to have personal knowledge of the subject of the testimony, and the
witnesses did not have any such personal knowledge about which weapon fired the fatal shot.
Additionally, MRE 701 provides that lay witnesses are allowed to express opinions or inferences
only when those opinions or inferences are “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.” But it is not apparent that either of these conditions applies because the two witnesses did
not base the inferences on their own perception of events—they were simply inferring from the
various collected evidence, and the inferences were not all that helpful because the inferences were
obvious to any fact-finder.

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In sum, defendant has failed to show that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of the
stricken testimony referring to a “murder weapon.”
Defendant alternately argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a
mistrial. Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Generally, to
establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2)
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012).
Defendant’s claim of error fails because any such request for a mistrial would have been
futile. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (“Failing to advance
a meritless argument . . . does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). For the reasons
described above, had counsel requested a mistrial, the trial court would have denied the request.
Any prejudice was cured by the court’s instructions and by Det. Szekely’s admission that no
evidence exists to positively link defendant’s firearm with the fatal shot.
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel should have requested a curative instruction.
This argument is perplexing because in each instance, the trial court explicitly provided a curative
instruction. With the court sua sponte instructing the jury to not consider the “murder weapon”
references, it was wholly reasonable for counsel to not make a redundant request.
B. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE
Defendant argues that his right to due process was violated through the police’s failure to
fully investigate the nine-millimeter casing that was found in the southern part of the parking lot.
We disagree. We review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Hanks, 276 Mich App at 92.
In support of his argument, defendant relies on caselaw emanating from Brady v Maryland,
373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). “A criminal defendant has a due process right
to obtain exculpatory evidence possessed by the prosecutor if it would raise a reasonable doubt
about defendant’s guilt.” People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448; 709 NW2d 152 (2005); see also
Brady, 373 US at 87. In order to establish such a due-process violation, a defendant must prove
“(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is
material.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150; 845 NW2d 731 (2014), citing Strickler v
Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282; 119 S Ct 1936; 144 L Ed 2d 286 (1999). “Evidence is favorable
to the defense when it is either exculpatory or impeaching.” Chenault, 495 Mich at 150, citing
Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 154; 92 S Ct 763; 31 L Ed 2d 104 (1972). “To establish
materiality, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Chenault,
405 Mich at 150.
However, fatal to his claim of error, defendant has identified no evidence that the
prosecution possessed that it failed to disclose. Instead, he argues that the police should have more
fully investigated the nine-millimeter casing. But due process does not require the police to seek

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and find exculpatory evidence. People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 21; 669 NW2d 831 (2003); see
also People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 289 n 10; 537 NW2d 813 (1995) (“Neither the prosecution
nor the defense has an affirmative duty to search for evidence to aid the other’s case.”). Moreover,
assuming that there was such a duty to further investigate the nine-millimeter casing, defendant
has failed to show how the outcome of the trial would have been different. As a result, defendant’s
argument is without merit.
We further note that defendant’s reliance on People v Jordan, 23 Mich App 375; 178
NW2d 659 (1970), is misplaced. In Jordan, this Court held that a handkerchief allegedly used to
clean up the defendant’s semen following a sexual assault should not have been admitted without
chemical testing confirming it contained semen. Id. at 385-389. However, this holding was not
based on the principle that the police or prosecution have a duty to investigate. Instead, it was
based on the principle that the prosecution, by failing to have the handkerchief tested, had failed
to lay a proper foundation for its admission. Id. at 389. Defendant’s argument on appeal has
nothing to do with providing a necessary foundation for the admission of evidence, making Jordan
inapposite.
C. OFFENSE VARIABLES
Defendant next challenges the scoring of two offense variables (OV), OV 3 and OV 9.
Neither argument has merit.
This Court is to review a trial court’s factual determinations with respect to the scoring of
offense variables for clear error, and those findings must be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). A factual finding is clearly
erroneous when the reviewing court is left “with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 273; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). But this Court
reviews de novo whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions
prescribed by statute. Hardy, 494 Mich at 438.
Michigan’s sentencing-guideline statute factors in the severity of any victim’s physical
injury caused by a defendant by calculating the OV 3 score. MCL 777.33. A sentencing judge is
to score points ranging from 100 for causing a death down to zero for causing no physical injury
to any victim. MCL 777.33(1)(a)-(f). However, the statute explicitly provides that 100 points for
causing a death is not to be scored if the sentencing offense is a homicide crime. MCL 777.32(b).
A homicide crime is defined as one in which the death of a person is an element of the crime.
MCL 777.1(c). For OV 3, 25 points are scored if the victim suffered a life-threatening or
permanent-incapacitating injury. MCL 777.33(1)(c). The sole issue here is whether defendant
was properly scored 25 points for OV 3, causing a life-threatening injury, when he killed his victim
with a gunshot wound to the head.
Both parties acknowledge that the Supreme Court case of People v Houston, 473 Mich
399; 702 NW2d 530 (2005), is controlling. In Houston, the defendant shot and killed the victim
with a single shot to the head and was convicted of second-degree murder. Id. at 402. The Court
held that where a defendant kills a victim with a gunshot wound, that defendant obviously also
caused a physical injury. Id. Furthermore, just because the victim eventually dies does not mean
that the victim did not suffer a life-threatening injury. Such a victim “sustained an injury so life-

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threatening that it was followed by his death.” Id. at 407 n 16. Therefore, the Court held that in
such cases, 25 points is the proper amount to be scored for OV 3. Id. at 410.
Consequently, the trial court did not err by scoring OV 3 at 25 points in the instant case.9
OV 9 addresses the number of victims. Ten points are properly scored when “[t]here were
2 to 9 victims who were placed in danger of physical injury or death.” MCL 777.39(1)(c).
Conversely, zero points are appropriate when “fewer than 2 victims . . . were placed in danger of
physical injury or death.” MCL 777.39(1)(d). And for this OV, “each person who was placed in
danger of physical injury” is considered a “victim.” MCL 777.39(2)(a).
The trial court, while relying on testimony that placed multiple people in the parking lot
and the number of shell casings shot from defendant’s firearm, found that the number of “victims,”
i.e., the number of people placed in danger of physical injury, was between two and nine, and
scored 10 points for OV 9.
In his brief on appeal, defendant states:
The trial judge based his ruling on evidence that other people were in the
parking lot at the time of the shooting. Detective Szekely said that he did not
believe that the 9 mm casing found in the parking lot was of no [sic] concern based
on his conversation with [the victim’s aunt] who told him that no shooting occurred
in the parking lot. She was the only person who spoke to him about what happened
in the parking lot. He said he did not follow up because “there was no other leads.”
OV-9 should be scored at zero. [Citation to record omitted.]
Defendant’s reference to Det. Szekely and the nine-millimeter casing are non sequiturs and have
nothing to do with how many people were present and placed in danger of physical injury from
the eight shots the jury attributed to defendant. Accordingly, defendant has abandoned the issue.
See People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998) (“An appellant may not
merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.”).
Moreover, even if defendant had not abandoned the issue, the trial court’s finding that there
were multiple people in the parking lot is not clearly erroneous. The resident whose apartment
suffered damage saw “a lot of people” running in the parking lot immediately after shooting, and
Williams’s aunt described seeing “all the kids” from the apartment complex in the parking lot and
identified at least nine of them. One shot alone likely put many of these individuals in danger, but
eight shots certainly placed many of them at risk of physical injury. Consequently, the trial court
did not err by scoring OV 9 at 10 points.
9 Of note, defendant acknowledges the binding nature of Houston and wishes to preserve the issue
for appeal to that Court because only the Supreme Court can overrule its decisions. See Paige v
Sterling Heights, 476 Mich 495, 524; 720 NW2d 219 (2006).

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D. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues in his Standard 4 brief that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel through counsel’s failure to consult experts. We disagree.
Defendants have the guaranteed right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 686; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Aceval, 282 Mich
App 379, 386; 764 NW2d 285 (2009). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the
defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. LeBlanc, 465 Mich at 578. Generally, to
establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2)
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51. However, such performance must be
measured without the benefit of hindsight. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721
(1995).
Defendant argues that People v Ackley, 497 Mich 381; 870 NW2d 858 (2015), stands for
the proposition that his trial counsel should have consulted with other experts. Defendant’s
reliance on Ackley is misplaced. In Ackley, the defendant was charged with first-degree felony
murder and first-degree child abuse after his live-in girlfriend’s young daughter died while in the
defendant’s care. Id. at 384. The prosecution called five different expert witnesses in support of
its theory was that “the child died as a result of abusive head injury caused either by nonaccidental
shaking, blunt force trauma, or a combination of both.” Id. at 384. Defense counsel consulted
with one expert, who said he did not think he could help, but he nonetheless advised counsel to
consult with a particular expert, who “was significantly more likely to agree with the defendant’s
claim that the child’s death . . . must have been accidental.” Id. at 390. Notably, this initial expert
informed trial counsel that the shaken baby syndrome (SBS)/abusive head trauma (AHT) diagnosis
was not universally accepted within the medical community. Id. Despite having been allotted
funding to hire experts and despite the referral to someone who may have been able to assist
defendant, counsel did not consult anyone else. Id. at 384, 386. The Supreme Court ruled that
counsel’s failure to engage with the other expert was not reasonable. Id. at 392. This was
especially true “in light of the prominent controversy within the medical community regarding the
reliably of SBS/AHT diagnoses.” Id. at 392.
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion on appeal, Ackley does not stand for the proposition
that trial counsel renders ineffective assistance whenever he fails to procure an expert to oppose a
prosecution’s expert. In the present case, defendant does not allege that there was any complex
scientific evidence that needed to be explained or rebutted. There primarily were two types of
scientific testing that implicated defendant’s guilt. The first was DNA testing that, with a virtual

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certainty, identified defendant’s DNA on the rifle.10 The second testing of note is the tool-mark
testing that established that the firearm found in the Ford Fusion was the firearm that ejected the
eight casings on Bridge Street. Defendant does not explain how an expert would have contradicted
either of these tests.11
In sum, defendant has failed to show that counsel’s decision to not produce any experts fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. The science at issue here, contrary to the science
in Ackley, was not of a “highly contested nature,” and there is nothing in the record to show that,
had defense consulted with some experts, a different scientific opinion would have been available,
let alone one that would have created a reasonable probability of a different result.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
10 However, this testing was far from necessary. The DNA’s significance was lessened because
of the videos and pictures that showed defendant wielding the rifle that was later seized from the
Ford Fusion. Regardless, DNA testing is generally accepted as reliable. See People v Lee, 212
Mich App 228, 282-283; 537 NW2d 233 (1995) (holding that courts in Michigan may take judicial
notice of the reliability of DNA testing using the PCR method).
11 Aside from the tool-mark analysis, there was strong circumstantial evidence that defendant’s
firearm fired the eight shots: (1) defendant was in seen in that specific area at the time of the
shooting; (2) he was seen leaving at a high rate of speed after the shooting; (3) shots being fired
from Bridge Street is consistent with the other physical evidence, including the damage to the
aunt’s vehicle and the damage to the one apartment building on the east side of the complex; and
(4) the firearm had 22 rounds in the chamber out of a capacity of 30, strongly suggesting that eight
shots had been fired.

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