COA 371663 NEAL J CAMPBELL V STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/15/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
NEAL J. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2026
1:20 PM
v No. 371663
Clare Circuit Court
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
LC No. 2023-900342-NF
Defendant-Appellant,
and
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
PLACEMENT FACILITY,
Defendant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for allowable expenses under
Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., arises out of catastrophic personal injuries suffered
by plaintiff in an April 26, 2023 accident involving a motor vehicle that occurred while plaintiff
was operating his motorcycle. When an issue arose as to which insurer had priority in the payment
of his PIP benefits, plaintiff brought suit against the automobile driver’s insurer, Auto Club
Insurance Association (ACIA); his own insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (State Farm); and the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF).
Plaintiff brought a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and, simultaneous

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with responding to this motion, ACIA and State Farm each likewise sought summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). State Farm appeals from the trial court’s January 25, 2024 opinion
and order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition against it, and granting ACIA’s
counter-motion for summary disposition.1 We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting
summary disposition in favor of State Farm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle on April 26, 2023 when he was struck by an automobile
operated by Vanessa Bauswell, suffering catastrophic injuries as a result, including amputation of
his left leg below the knee, pelvic injury, and injury to his thoracic spine resulting in paralysis.
Bauswell maintained a policy of automobile insurance with MemberSelect Insurance Company,
which is a member of ACIA (ACIA policy),2 on her motor vehicle as required by MCL 500.3101.
Bauswell selected “$250,000 per person per accident with exclusions” for herself and Brendan Isa
Smith for the PIP coverage on her policy. Plaintiff also maintained insurance as required by MCL
500.3101 on his motor vehicle, and likewise had a policy on his motorcycle, with State Farm. As
it pertained to PIP coverage, plaintiff selected unlimited coverage for allowable expenses on his
State Farm motor vehicle policy for the applicable policy term.
Following the accident, plaintiff sought payment of allowable expenses from State Farm,
and State Farm then denied benefits by way of a letter providing:
[Plaintiff] would be entitled to the PIP coverage chosen by the striking vehicle.
Since the striking vehicle had PIP coverage that excluded allowable expenses, but
extended Replacement Services and Lost wages, then [plaintiff] would be afforded
Replacement Services and Lost wages only. [Plaintiff] may be afforded allowable
expenses through [the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP)].
Plaintiff thereafter filed a civil suit with claims for PIP benefits against State Farm, ACIA
and the MAIPF, seeking declaratory relief as to which defendant owed what benefits. Plaintiff
then moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). ACIA’s response to the summary
disposition motion argued that it was not liable for plaintiff’s PIP benefits as it was “not in the
highest priority” in light of Bauswell having taken an exclusion from PIP coverage, and likewise
sought summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2).3 State Farm also responded to the
motion, arguing that ACIA was the higher priority insurer, and likewise sought summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2).
1 Appellant did not challenge the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant MAIPF.
2 No party disputes ACIA’s role as Bauswell’s insurer in this action.
3 MCR 2.116(I)(2) provides: “If it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the
moving party, is entitled to judgment, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing
party.”

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At the summary disposition hearing, State Farm’s counsel contended that Bauswell
excluded allowable expenses only for herself and Brendan Smith and therefore ACIA “owes
$250,000 in allowable expense coverage to the Plaintiff.” ACIA’s counsel countered that State
Farm was responsible for allowable expenses, again, in light of Bauswell having taken an
exclusion from PIP coverage.
The trial court took plaintiff’s motion and ACIA and State Farm’s counter-motions for
summary disposition under advisement and, on January 25, 2024, issued an opinion and order
granting summary disposition to plaintiff and ACIA, denying State Farm’s MCR 2.116(I)(2)
counter-motion, and dismissing plaintiff’s claim against the MAIPF. The court ruled that because
Bauswell took an exclusion from PIP coverage, the ACIA policy is skipped in the order of priority.
The court stated that an insurer is exempted “from paying PIP benefits when a 3109a exclusion
applies,” and, where this is so, “then the injured plaintiff claims PIP benefits ‘only under other
policies[.]’ ” Quoting MCL 500.3114(6). The court found that “[t]his result in this case is clearly
directed by the plain language of MCL 500.3114(5) and (6).” The court held that the ACIA policy
exclusion was for Bauswell “alone as it pertains to her benefits,” but determined that MCL
500.3114(6)’s priorities provision looked only “to see if that exclusion applies to an insured.” The
court found that State Farm’s argument, that it was not the highest priority insurer, was erroneous
and provided State Farm with “no excuse for the delay in payment of PIP benefits to [p]laintiff.”
Further, because State Farm’s error had “resulted in needless delay in [p]laintiff’s compensation
for loss,” the trial court found an award of attorney fees and penalty interest was justified. The
court dismissed the claims against ACIA and the MAIPF, and ordered State Farm “to pay personal
protection insurance benefits, penalty interest, and attorney fees in accord with [p]laintiff’s policy
and state law.”
On June 24, 2024, plaintiff and State Farm agreed to a consent judgment, which the trial
court entered. The court ordered State Farm to “issue payment for [p]laintiff’s medical
expenses[,] . . . replacement services for the months of January 2024, February 2024, March 2024
and April 2024[,] . . . attendant care services he received from Mary Jo Campbell from January 8,
2024 through March 30, 2024[,] . . . [and] medical mileage,” and reiterated that plaintiff was
“entitled to interest and attorney fees” pursuant to its January 25, 2024 opinion and order. The
consent judgment further stated:
[T]he parties agree that State Farm reserves the right to appeal any and all decisions
rendered by the [c]ourt in this matter, including . . . but not limited to the terms and
agreements outlined in this consent judgment, and . . . State Farm intends to appeal
the Court’s January 25, 2024 order resolving the priority dispute between State
Farm and [ACIA]. It is further understood that the result of that appeal will be
binding and take precedent over any conflicting agreement reached in this consent
judgment.
The consent judgment further ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, stating that it resolved
the last pending claim and closed the case.
State Farm then filed the present appeal.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118;
597 NW2d 817 (1999). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . tests the factual sufficiency of a
claim.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).
In reviewing a (C)(10) motion, a court must examine the pleadings, affidavits, depositions,
admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties and, drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden, 461 Mich at 120; Downey v Charlevoix
Co Bd of Road Comm’rs, 227 Mich App 621, 626; 576 NW2d 712 (1998). A genuine issue of fact
exists when reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.
West v Gen’l Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).
“This Court also reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied
the statutory provisions to the facts.” MEEMIC Ins Co v Michigan Millers Mut Ins, 313 Mich App
94, 99; 880 NW2d 327 (2015).
III. RELEVANT NO-FAULT STATUTES
As it pertains to this appeal, MCL 500.3101(1) states in part that “[e]xcept as provided in
sections 3107d and 3109a, the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in
this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance . . . .”
(Emphasis added.) Notably, § 3101(1) only governs a policy for a “motor vehicle,” which is
defined for purposes of Michigan’s no-fault act as having “more than 2 wheels,” MCL
500.3101(3)(i), and expressly does not include “[a] motorcycle,” MCL 500.3101(3)(i)(i). MCL
500.3101(2) states in relevant part: “Except as provided in section 3107d, all automobile insurance
policies offered in this state must include benefits under personal protection insurance . . . .” MCL
500.3107(1)(a) states that PIP benefits are payable for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of
reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for
an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
Pursuant to the amendments to Michigan’s no-fault act contained in 2019 PA 21, certain
PIP benefits and specifically allowable expenses are now subject to coverage limits under MCL
500.3107c, which provides in part pertinent to this appeal:
(1) Except as provided in sections 3107d and 3109a, and subject to
subsection (5), for an insurance policy that provides the security required under
section 3101(1) and is issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the applicant or named
insured shall, in a way required under section 3l07e and on a form approved by the
director, select 1 of the following coverage levels for personal protection insurance
benefits under section 3107(l)(a):
* * *
(b) A limit of $250,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any
personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107(l)(a).

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* * *
(d) No limit for personal protection insurance benefits under section
3107(l)(a). [(Emphasis added.)]
MCL 500.3107d and MCL 500.3109a, referenced in the preceding block quotation, refer
to people who elect not to be covered for § 3107(1)(a) benefits, i.e., allowable expenses, and to
people who accept “the exclusion related to qualified health coverage” insurers are required to
offer them when they select a personal protection benefit limit under § 3107c(1)(b), respectively.
In part pertinent to this appeal, MCL 500.3109a(1)-(2) provide:
(1) An insurer that provides personal protection insurance benefits under
this chapter may offer deductibles and exclusions reasonably related to other health
and accident coverage on the insured. Any deductibles and exclusions offered
under this section must be offered at a reduced premium that reflects reasonably
anticipated reductions in losses, expenses, or both, are subject to prior approval by
the director, and must apply only to benefits payable to the person named in the
policy, the spouse of the insured, and any relative of either domiciled in the same
household.
(2) For an insurance policy issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the insurer
shall offer to an applicant or named insured that selects a personal protection benefit
limit under section 3107c(1)(b) an exclusion related to qualified health coverage.
All of the following apply to that exclusion:
(a) If the named insured has qualified health coverage as defined in section
3107d(7)(b)(i) that will cover injuries that occur as the result of a motor vehicle
accident and if the named insured’s spouse and any relatives of either the named
insured or the spouse domiciled in the same household have qualified health
coverage that will cover injuries that occur as the result of a motor vehicle accident,
the premium for the personal protection insurance benefits payable under section
3107(1)(a) under the policy must be reduced by 100%.
(b) If a member, but not all members, of the household covered by the
insurance policy has qualified health coverage that will cover injuries that occur as
the result of a motor vehicle accident, the insurer shall offer a reduced premium
that reflects reasonably anticipated reductions in losses, expenses, or both. The
reduction must be in addition to the rate rollback required by section 2111f and the
share of the premium reduction for the policy attributable to any person with
qualified health coverage must be 100%.
(c) Subject to subdivision (d), a person subject to an exclusion under this
subsection is not eligible for personal protection benefits under the insurance
policy.
When “a person who suffers accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle
accident . . . shows evidence of the involvement of a motor vehicle while an operator or passenger
of a motorcycle,” MCL 500.3114(5) sets forth the “order of priority” in which that person “shall

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claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers . . . .” MCL 500.3114(5). First in
priority are the insurers of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in the motor
vehicle-motorcycle accident, § 3114(5)(a); followed by the insurer of the operator of the motor
vehicle, § 3114(5)(b). Next in sequential priority is “[t]he motor vehicle insurer of the operator of
the motorcycle involved in the accident,” § 3114(5)(c), and then finally, “[t]he motor vehicle
insurer of the owner or registrant of the motorcycle involved in the accident,” § 3114(5)(d).
MCL 500.3114(5) cross-references and is subject to MCL 500.3114(6), which states:
If an applicable insurance policy in an order of priority under subsection (5)
is a policy for which the person named in the policy has elected to not maintain
coverage for personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107d, or as to
which an exclusion under section 3109(2) [sic: 3109a(2)][4] applies, the injured
person shall claim benefits only under other policies, subject to subsection (7), in
the same order of priority for which no such election has been made. If there are
no other policies for which no such election has been made, the injured person shall
claim benefits under the next order of priority or, if there is not a next order of
priority, under the assigned claims plan under sections 3171 to 3175. [(Emphasis
added.)]
This “pass through” or “skipping” procedure was an introduced by automobile insurance reform
legislation in 2019 PA 21. It appears that MCL 500.3114(6) and the manner in which it addresses
MCL 500.3109a(2) exclusions had not previously been addressed in Michigan caselaw until this
Court recently issued Love v Rudolph, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
369895).
IV. ANALYSIS
There is no dispute that plaintiff selected unlimited motor vehicle PIP coverage through
State Farm. MCL 500.3107c(1)(d). Likewise, Vanessa Bauswell selected coverage under the
§ 3109a(2) exclusion. Section 3109a(2) allows an insured who has qualified health coverage to
cover injuries occurring due to a motor vehicle accident to select the $250,000-limit on allowable
expenses and take an exclusion in exchange for a reduction in their premium, whereupon they are
not eligible for PIP benefits. See MCL 500.3109a(2)(a)-(c).
The facts from this Court’s recent Love decision are indistinguishable from the present
case. In Love, the plaintiff was likewise riding a motorcycle that was involved in an accident with
a motor vehicle that was insured by a policy of insurance that contained an exclusion for allowable
4 The reference to § 3109(2), instead of § 3109a(2), appears to be a scrivener’s error. Section
3109(2) is irrelevant as it defines “injured person” as “a natural person suffering accidental bodily
injury,” whereas § 3109a(2) deals with the exclusion being referenced. The Legislature’s website
page for MCL 500.3114 confirms this: “Compiler’s Notes: In subsections (4) and (6), the
reference to ‘section 3109(2)’ evidently should read ‘section 3109a(2).’ ” Legislative Service
Bureau, MCL Section 500.3114 <https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-
500-3114> (accessed December 3, 2025).

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expenses benefits under MCL 500.3109a(2). The plaintiff in that case was not a named insured,
spouse, or resident relative under the policy covering the motor vehicle. This Court analyzed the
situation as follows:
MCL 500.3107c(1)(b) and MCL 500.3109a(2) expressly work in tandem and can
be understood as providing both a limit on PIP coverage and a separate exclusion
from any PIP coverage available only to certain designated individuals meeting
certain conditions. The limit applies to anyone with a right to claim PIP benefits
under the policy. MCL 500.3107c(5). However, any exclusion under MCL
500.3109a “must apply only to benefits payable to the person named in the policy,
the spouse of the insured, and any relative of either domiciled in the same
household.” MCL 500.3109a(1).
Here, plaintiff undisputedly does not fall within the category of individuals
eligible for this exclusion. Accordingly, the statutory scheme plainly does not
provide the option, after choosing the coverage level of $250,000 in MCL
500.3107c(1)(b), to then choose to exclude anyone from eligibility for PIP benefits
other than “the person named in the policy, the spouse of the insured, and any
relative of either domiciled in the same household.” MCL 500.3109a(1).
Returning to MCL 500.3114(6), there is no exclusion under MCL
500.3109a(2) that could apply with respect to the claim by plaintiff. Auto Club
therefore is not excluded from the order of priority in MCL 500.3114(5) under
MCL 500.3114(6). The trial court did not err by denying summary disposition in
favor of Auto Club, and we affirm the trial court’s ruling. [Love, ___ Mich App at
___; slip op at 15.]
Because we are bound by Love, we must likewise hold that plaintiff does not fall into the
category of persons excluded by MCL 500.3109a(1). As a result, for the reasons stated in Love,
ACIA was responsible for the payment of plaintiff’s no-fault benefits because it is the insurer of
the owner and operator of the motor vehicle involved in the vehicle-motorcycle accident. MCL
500.3114(5)(a)-(b). Thus, the trial court should have granted summary disposition in favor of
State Farm and should not have granted summary disposition in favor of ACIA.
We reverse the order granting summary disposition against State Farm, reverse the order
denying summary disposition against ACIA, and remand to the trial court for entry of an order
granting summary disposition in favor of State Farm. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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