COA 382335 ROBERT DAVIS V HIGHLAND PARK CLERK Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ROBERT DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 09, 2026
9:30 AM
v No. 382335
Wayne Circuit Court
HIGHLAND PARK CLERK and HIGHLAND
PARK ELECTION COMMISSION,
LC No. 26-014115-AW
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and O’BRIEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this expedited1 election matter, defendants Highland Park Clerk and Highland Park
Election Commission appeal as of right the circuit court’s September 1, 2026 opinion and order,
which, as relevant here, granted the request of plaintiff, Robert Davis, for a writ of mandamus
directing defendants to remove Cidia Wicker-Brown and Tony Lampkin from the November 2026
ballot as putative candidates, respectively, for the offices of Highland Park City Clerk and City
Treasurer. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
The background facts are aptly stated in the trial court’s opinion, and given that appellants
do not argue that the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, we see no need to
reiterate those facts here. Instead, given the emergent nature of this election dispute and the need
for us to resolve it promptly, we delve directly into the merits of defendants’ two claims of error.
Defendants first argue that the trial court erred2 by refusing to hold that plaintiff’s instant
claims for mandamus and declaratory relief—most of which were asserted in his initial complaint,
1 Davis v Highland Park Clerk, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 8,
2026 (Docket No. 382335).
2 “[W]e review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding whether to apply an equitable doctrine,
such as laches.” City of Fraser v Almeda Univ, 314 Mich App 79, 100; 886 NW2d 730 (2016).

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rather than the amended complaint he later filed on August 26, 20263—were barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches. Specifically, noting that “Lampkin and Wicker-Brown filed their
Affidavits of Identity [‘AOIs’] on March 24, 2026 and March 17, 2026, respectively,” defendants
argue that the trial court “failed to acknowledge the harm to the public and the election process
due to Plaintiff waiting four months, without explanation, to file this matter.” But, as noted in the
trial court’s opinion, the delay in this instance was not “without explanation”; rather, plaintiff
alleged below that defendants were responsible for most of the delay because City officials had
refused to timely provide plaintiff with copies of the pertinent AOIs. In their brief on appeal—
which spans a mere 12 pages—defendants have not even attempted to refute that allegation. And
as the parties asserting laches as an affirmative defense, they bear the burden of providing
sufficient evidence to support its proposed application. See Glorycrest Carpenter Rd, Inc v Adams
Outdoor Advertising Ltd Partnership, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 366261); slip op at 11 (“Because laches is an affirmative defense, the party asserting laches
has the burden to present evidence in support of its application.”). In the absence of any evidence
or argument concerning how much of the delay in commencing this action was truly attributable
to plaintiff, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed any error warranting reversal by
refusing to apply the doctrine of laches as a bar to all of the claims in this action.4 See Pub Health
Dep’t v Rivergate Manor, 452 Mich 495, 507; 550 NW2d 515 (1996) (holding that laches “is
applicable in cases in which there is an unexcused or unexplained delay in commencing an action
and a corresponding change of material condition that results in prejudice to a party”).
Any related factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Tenneco Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co,
281 Mich App 429, 444; 761 NW2d 846 (2008).
3 Defendants offer no argument on appeal that the newly asserted claims in the amended complaint
should have been deemed barred by laches given plaintiff’s delay in filing that amended complaint.
Hence, defendants have abandoned any such claim of error. See MOSES Inc v SEMCOG, 270
Mich App 401, 417; 716 NW2d 278 (2006) (“If a party fails to adequately brief a position, or
support a claim with authority, it is abandoned.”); see also In re Knight, 333 Mich App 681, 691;
963 NW2d 676 (2020) (“In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party
presentation, which means that in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal,
we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter
of matters the parties present.”) (quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis omitted).
4 Standing alone, this conclusion is also fatal to defendants’ request that we order Lampkin to be
placed on the disputed ballot. In their brief on appeal, defendants admit that they do not challenge
the trial court’s conclusion that Lampkin was ineligible for the disputed office because he “was
not a registered voter of the City of Highland Park one year prior to the filing of his AOI, as
required” under § 4-2 of the Highland Park City Charter. Because defendants do not challenge
that independent basis for the trial court’s decision to grant mandamus relief excluding Lampkin
from the ballot, and defendants have failed to carry their burden concerning laches, there is no
basis for us to conclude that Lampkin is entitled to inclusion on the ballot.

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Nor are we persuaded by defendants’ second argument—i.e., that the trial court erred or
abused its discretion5 by granting plaintiff’s requested writ of mandamus. That request was
founded on plaintiff’s allegations that both Wicker-Brown and Lampkin were, as City employees,
ineligible for the offices they sought in light of § 4-3(e) of the Highland Park City Charter, which
provides:
No employee of the City shall be eligible for candidacy for or appointment
to an elected office of the City, unless he shall resign from his employment with
the City before filing his nominating petition therefore or acceptance of
appointment thereto, except that no elected officer of the City shall be required to
resign the office held by him in order to be a candidate for City office. (Emphasis
added.)
On appeal, defendants admit that Wicker-Brown and Lampkin were, in fact, unelected City
employees at all relevant times. Defendants also admit that the language of § 4-3(e) plainly
“requires City employees to resign employment in order to even be eligible for candidacy for”
elected City offices. Defendants contend, however, that the trial court erred in rejecting their
argument that § 4-3(e) represents “an unconstitutional First Amendment restraint on political
speech.” (Emphases omitted.)
In support, defendants rely heavily on Franklin v City of Highland Park, unpublished
opinion of Wayne Circuit Court, issued August 4, 1975 (LC No. 75-075099-CZ) (holding “that
the right to become a candidate for public office is a protected right under the First Amendment”
and “can be denied only for reasons of compelling interest”). But as defendants candidly concede,
as an unpublished opinion issued by a lower court, Franklin is not binding on this Court; after all,
it is axiomatic that the weight of binding authority rolls always horizontally or downhill, never
upward. See generally In re AGD, 327 Mich App 332, 339; 933 NW2d 751 (2019) (discussing
vertical stare decisis); Ramos v Louisiana, 590 US 83, 124 n 5; 140 S Ct 1390; 206 L Ed 2d 583
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (contrasting vertical and horizontal stare decisis).
Unlike Franklin, this Court is bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on
questions of federal law, Bienenstock & Assoc, Inc v Lowry, 314 Mich App 508, 515; 887 NW2d
237 (2016), and, with certain limited exceptions that are inapplicable here, this Court is also
required to follow its own prior published decisions, see generally Plachta v Plachta, ___ Mich
App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 374260). Given the great weight of both binding
5 As this Court explained in Berry v Garrett, 316 Mich App 37, 41; 890 NW2d 882 (2016):
We review de novo, as questions of law, whether defendants have a clear
legal duty to perform and whether plaintiff has a clear legal right to performance of
any such duty. Related issues of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo.
Contrastingly, because mandamus is a discretionary writ, we review for an abuse
of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding whether to grant mandamus relief.
[Quotation marks and citations omitted.]

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and highly persuasive6 authority that contravenes Franklin’s relevant holding, we find defendants’
reliance on Franklin to be entirely misplaced. See, e.g., Clements v Fashing, 457 US 957, 960-
961, 971-973; 102 S Ct 2836; 73 L Ed 2d 508 (1982) (holding that “a ‘resign-to-run’ or ‘automatic
resignation’ provision” of the Texas Constitution, which applied to certain elected state officials
who might wish to run as candidates for different public offices, did not unconstitutionally infringe
upon First Amendment rights, while also noting that the Supreme Court had previously issued
several decisions upholding similar restrictions on political activity by unelected civil servants);
Loftus v Bobzien, 848 F3d 278, 285-287 (CA 4, 2017) (collecting federal authorities in accord with
those principles from Clements).7 See also Barrow v City of Detroit Election Comm, 301 Mich
App 404, 422 n 11; 836 NW2d 498 (2013) (observing, in the context of an equal-protection
challenge, that “there is no fundamental right to candidacy”).
In sum, we perceive no merit in either of defendants’ two stated arguments for reversal.
Accordingly, we affirm. No taxable costs will be awarded, given that questions of public policy
and public interest are involved.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
6 “Though not binding on this Court, federal precedent is generally considered highly persuasive
when it addresses analogous issues.” Wilcoxon v Minnesota Min & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347,
360; 597 NW2d 250 (1999).
7 We are cognizant of at least one outlier decision—not cited by defendants—that could arguably
lend some support to their position here. See Randall v Scott, 610 F3d 701, 713 (CA 11, 2010).
As noted, however, Randall appears to be an isolated outlier. And in the absence of any actual
argument on the matter from the parties, we are not persuaded to follow Randall in lieu of the
greater weight of federal authorities collected by the Fourth Circuit in Loftus.

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