COA 375466 PEOPLE OF MI V SEAN ALLEN CONLEY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 09, 2026
9:20 AM
v No. 375466
Allegan Circuit Court
SEAN ALLEN CONLEY, LC No. 2025-027123-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution charged defendant with one count of possession of a controlled substance,
MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i), after an officer found a glass tube containing methamphetamine in
defendant’s vehicle following a search. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the glass tube
and any evidence related to it, and the trial court denied the motion in an order. From that order,
defendant appeals by leave granted.1 We vacate and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a search of defendant’s vehicle after he was stopped by Allegan City
Police Department Officer Zachery Dykema. Defendant claims that Dykema’s bodycam recorded
the entirety of the at-issue search, but that recording was not reviewed by the trial court, and it has
not been provided to this Court on appeal. Nevertheless, in his motion to suppress, defendant
recounted what Dykema’s bodycam supposedly showed, and the prosecution in the trial court
“largely adopt[ed] the statement of facts by the defendant.” Therefore, for purposes of this appeal,
we accept as true the statement of facts in defendant’s motion to suppress.
Dykema stopped defendant at 11:23 p.m. on September 5, 2024, because defendant’s
vehicle had an expired plate. During the stop, Dykema asked defendant if he had any weapons,
1 People v Conley, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 19, 2025 (Docket
No. 375466).

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and after defendant said no, Dykema asked if he could “check just to make sure there’s no weapons
or anything like that.” Defendant replied in the affirmative. During the ensuing search, Dykema
opened the center console and “shuffle[d] items around with his hand,” then picked up a clear glass
tube. Dykema examined the tube, “noticing a speckled pattern on the tube,” then set the tube down
on the passenger seat. After searching several other areas, Dykema reexamined the glass tube,
“rotating it in his fingers and hitting it against the passenger seat, attempting to knock some
material loose.” Dykema then asked defendant “what the powder dusting” inside the tube was,
and defendant said that he did not know. Dykema proceeded to search the rest of defendant’s
vehicle but found nothing of evidentiary value. Following this search, Dykema told defendant that
he was going to send the glass tube “to the state lab and if it comes back positive [defendant] will
have a warrant out for his arrest.” Dykema let defendant go “with a citation,” then took the glass
tube and field tested it, which gave “a presumptive match for Methamphetamine.”
After defendant was charged, he moved to suppress any evidence related to the glass tube
and its contents. Defendant argued that suppression was necessary because Dykema exceeded the
scope of defendant’s consent to search his vehicles for weapons when Dykema searched and seized
the glass tube. Defendant additionally argued that the search and seizure of the glass tube was not
justified by the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement because the criminal nature of the
glass tube was not obvious and apparent, as evidenced by the fact that Dykema needed to spend
time investigating the glass tube to determine its possibly-criminal nature.
In answer, the prosecution adopted defendant’s statement of facts with the caveat that,
based on Dykema’s training and experience, the incriminating nature of the glass tube was
immediately apparent to Dykema. That Dykema immediately recognized the incriminating nature
of the glass tube was supported by the facts, argued the prosecution, as the glass tube was the only
item that Dykema singled out and asked defendant questions about. Because, according to the
prosecution, the incriminating nature of the glass tube was immediately apparent to Dykema, his
search and seizure of the tube was justified under the plain view-exception.
At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court asked the prosecution if Dykema was
available to testify, and the prosecution said that it would need an adjournment if the court wanted
to hear from Dykema. In response, the court said, “I mean you stipulated essentially to the facts,”
to which the prosecutor said, “Yeah.” The court then told the prosecutor, “If you want to proceed
to argument we can certainly,” and the prosecution, in line with its briefing, argued that the
incriminating nature of the glass tube was immediately apparent to Dykema based on his training
and experience “in drug enforcement, recognition,” so his search and seizure of the tube did not
violate defendant’s rights.
After listening to argument, the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress in a ruling
from the bench. The court reasoned that Dykema’s search of the center console was permitted in
light of defendant’s consent to search the vehicle for weapons because the center console was
“where one would anticipate finding weapons if they were to be had in a vehicle.” The court
further reasoned that, after gaining access to the center console, it was permissible for Dykema to
search and seize the glass tube under either the plain-view or plain-feel exception to the warrant
requirement because, based on Dykema’s “training and experience,” the incriminating nature of
the tube was immediately apparent to him.

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This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to suppress is reviewed in two ways. The trial court’s factual findings in support
of the motion are reviewed for clear error, while the trial court’s determination about whether a
defendant’s rights were violated under the facts as found by the court is reviewed de novo. See
People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446, 457; 894 NW2d 732 (2016).
III. ANALYSIS
Both the United States and Michigan Constitution protect the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures. US Const Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. The touchstone of this protection
is reasonableness. People v Dagwan, 269 Mich App 338, 342; 711 NW2d 386 (2005). A search
or seizure conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless the search or seizure falls
“within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.” People v Kazmierczak,
461 Mich 411, 418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). One such exception is voluntary consent. Dagwan,
269 Mich App at 342. Such consent can be limited in scope, and “the constitutional standard for
determining the scope of a consent to search is that of ‘objective reasonableness’—what would the
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”
Id. at 343 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that defendant freely and voluntarily consented to a search of his
vehicle for weapons. Defendant contends that “the glass tube was not a weapon and fell outside
the scope of consent,” and he is correct insofar as he did not consent to Dykema seizing the glass
tube when he allowed Dykema to search his car for weapons. Accord Mahdi, 317 Mich App at
461-462 (holding that consent to search an “apartment for the limited purpose of uncovering illegal
drugs did not constitute consent to seize any item,” so “[t]he seizure of the wallet, keys, and cell
phone . . . fell outside the scope of [the] consent”). But no one has ever disputed this. Rather, the
trial court reasoned that Dykema’s search of the center console did not exceed the scope of
defendant’s consent to search the vehicle for weapons because a reasonable person would have
understood that consenting to search a vehicle for weapons included consent to search any location
in the vehicle that a weapon could be concealed, such as the center console. We agree and
accordingly conclude that Dykema lawfully searched the center console of defendant’s vehicle
because doing so was within the scope of defendant’s consent to search the vehicle for weapons.
As for the search and seizure of the glass tube itself, the trial court reasoned that it was
justified by the plain-view or plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement. “The plain view
doctrine allows police officers to seize, without a warrant, items in plain view if the officers are
lawfully in a position from which they view the item, and if the item’s incriminating character is
immediately apparent.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 101; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). The
plain-feel exception similarly allows the seizure without a warrant of an object that an officer feels
during a legitimate search if the object’s “incriminating character is immediately apparent” and

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the officer has probable cause to believe that the object to contraband. Id. at 105-106.2 These
exceptions allow seizures of incriminating items, but “[n]o searching, no matter how minimal, may
be done under the auspices” of either exception. Id. at 101.
It is unclear from the facts to which the parties stipulated whether Dykema saw the glass
tube before seizing it, or whether he seized the tube only after feeling it in the center console.
Citing Dykema’s bodycam recording, defendant wrote in his motion to suppress, “After opening
the center console, [Dykema] shuffles items around with his hand for approximately 10 seconds.
After 12 seconds, he picks up a clear, glass tube from the console.” On these opaque facts, the
trial court reasoned that “based on just feel if not plain view, a vile of some sort like that to an
officer who in his training and experience could anticipate that maybe there would be drugs.”
Later, the court reasoned that “based on plain view and then through his own training and
experience had the ability to pick that up and seize [the glass tube].”
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, as already alluded to, it is not clear from
the stipulated facts whether Dykema observed the glass tube before picking it up, and, notably, the
prosecution never claimed that Dykema did, in fact, see the glass tube before seizing it. On this
record, we can only conclude that the prosecution failed to carry its burden of establishing that
Dykema saw the glass tube before seizing it, which necessarily means that the trial court erred by
holding that Dykema’s seizure of the glass tube was permissible under the plain-view exception
to the warrant requirement.
The second problem with the lower court’s holding is that there is no evidence in the record
to support that the incriminating nature of the glass tube would have been immediately apparent
to Dykema on the basis of his training and experience. As explained above, the prosecution
stipulated to the statement of facts that defendant provided in his motion to suppress with the
caveat that, on the basis of his training and experience, Dykema would have immediately
recognized the incriminating nature of the glass tube. The prosecution did not walk this back at
the hearing on defendant’s motion—the prosecution agreed with the trial court that it had
“stipulated essentially to the facts,” which was accurate because, again, the prosecution stipulated
to defendant’s statement of facts with a significant caveat. Equally significant, however, is that
defendant never stipulated to the prosecution’s claim that Dykema had the training and experience
necessary to immediately recognize the incriminating nature of the glass tube. This factual dispute
would have been irrelevant if its resolution was not necessary for the trial court to render its
decision, but that was clearly not the case because the trial court relied on Dykema’s purported
training and experience to reach its conclusion.
This problem can be resolved in one of two ways. First, we could conclude that, due to the
lack of evidence concerning Dykema’s training and experience, the trial court clearly erred by
finding that the incriminating nature of the glass tube was immediately apparent to Dykema due
to his training and experience, and the court consequently erred by concluding that the seizure of
the glass tube was permissible under the plain-feel exception. But this would not fully resolve
defendant’s motion to suppress because the case would still have to be remanded for the trial court
2 Defendant does not argue that the plain-feel exception is inapplicable under the facts of this case,
so we assume that it is without deciding the issue.

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to decide whether to apply the exclusionary rule. See People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 499; 668
NW2d 602 (2003); Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 223; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983) (“The
question whether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long
been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the
party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”). That decision would not be
an easy one under the circumstances because “the aim of the [exclusionary] rule is one of police
deterrence,” Hawkins, 468 Mich at 499, and it is not clear what police misconduct would be
deterred by suppressing evidence where a Fourth Amendment violation is found simply because
the record is undeveloped. See also United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L
Ed 2d 677 (1984) (explaining how the exclusionary rule is “designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Alternatively, we could conclude that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing to resolve a material factual dispute, and that remand is necessary for the court to do what
it should have done in the first instance—hold an evidentiary hearing in which it can hear from
Dykema and determine whether he had training and experience that would have made the
incriminating nature of the glass tube immediately apparent. Because this case needs to be
remanded for further proceedings either way, we conclude that the latter option is the more prudent
one. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for that court to hold an evidentiary hearing
on defendant’s motion to suppress. If, following that hearing, the court concludes that the glass
tube was illegally seized, it can then decide whether the exclusionary rule should apply. We also
note that, by holding an evidentiary hearing, the court will presumably be able to ascertain whether
Dykema saw the glass tube before seizing it, and thus decide whether the plain-view or the plain-
feel exception to the warrant requirement applies.3
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress is vacated, and the case is
remanded for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Anica Letica
3 We also note that, if only the plain-feel exception applies, the trial court will need to explain why
Dykema had probable cause to believe that the glass tube that he felt was contraband, i.e., what
training and experience Dykema had that led him to believe that, under the totality of the
circumstances, there was a probability or substantial chance that what he felt in the center console
of defendant’s vehicle was contraband. See Champion, 452 Mich at 112 n 11 (explaining what
the “probable cause” standard requires); id. at 112-113 (explaining how “applying the plain feel
exception must appreciate the totality of the circumstances”).

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