COA 379121 PEOPLE OF MI V DELON MARTEASE BOULER Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/22/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2026
11:45 AM
v No. 379121
Jackson Circuit Court
DELON MARTEASE BOULER, LC No. 2025-004418-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and FEENEY and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant stands charged with one count of carrying a
concealed weapon, MCL 750.227. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
of the firearm found during a search of his person, and defendant now appeals by leave granted.1
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS
In April 2025, Jackson City Police Officer Emily Smith responded to “a weapons call from
an anonymous caller,” who stated that there were “juvenile,” “mixed males” “waiving [sic] guns
around” outside of a residence located at 506 McNeal Street before they entered the residence.
Detectives, who also responded to that location, set up surveillance to observe the behavior of
anyone who entered or exited the residence. One of the detectives eventually radioed that he had
observed two males walking down the driveway between the residences located at 506 and 508
McNeal Street, who were “believed to come from the side door” of the 506 McNeal residence.
Three officers, including Officer Smith, approached the two adult males, who informed the officers
that they had just come from a residence located at 508 McNeal Street and were going to a store;
defendant’s companion produced identification confirming 508 McNeal Street as their address.
1 People v Bouler, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 6, 2026 (Docket
No. 379121).

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Officer Smith candidly conceded that she could see that neither defendant nor his companion were
juveniles.
Body camera footage demonstrates that defendant and the other individual stood on the
sidewalk and engaged in conversation with the officers.2 During that time, defendant stood with
his hands clasped together in front of his groin area. A fourth officer arrived on scene and
immediately inquired whether either of the men had any weapons “or anything like that” on them
and whether they minded if he checked them for weapons.3 Defendant placed his hands out in
front of his person in a defensive posture, backed away from the fourth officer, and informed the
officer that he could not search him, while shaking his head in a negative manner to reaffirm his
denial of the search request. The fourth officer ignored defendant’s refusal to submit to a
consensual search; instead, the officer approached defendant and ordered him to “hold still” as he
reached out and grabbed defendant’s left arm and hand. Another officer then grabbed defendant’s
right hand. At that point, defendant stated, “I do got a weapon.” Officers proceeded to handcuff
and search defendant, ultimately discovering a firearm in his jacket pocket.
After his bindover, defendant moved to suppress evidence of the firearm discovered during
his arrest, arguing that the evidence failed to demonstrate reasonable suspicion justifying a stop
and frisk under Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). The trial court
denied the motion, finding that
the officers approached the defendant and another gentleman on the sidewalk,
approximately a block from the area where the crime had been reported. And then,
when the police approached him, he began to back away with his hands in his
pockets.[4] And the officer testified at exam that they felt as though he was trying
to find a way to escape; wouldn’t take his hands out of his pocket; and they believed
that they had a reasonable belief the subjects coming from the house may have been
involved in the crime that was being committed.
So I do think that based on a totality of the circumstances, the police did
have a right to briefly detain and pat down the defendant, and a weapon was
recovered during that pat-down.
2 When we have access to the same video that was presented to the trial court, we “need not rely
on the trial court’s conclusions as to what the video contains.” People v Kavanaugh, 320 Mich
App 293, 298; 907 NW2d 845 (2017). We can review a video “as easily as the trial court . . . .”
People v White, 294 Mich App 622, 633; 823 NW2d 118 (2011).
3 There is nothing in the record evidence explaining why the fourth officer responded to, and
immediately took control of, the scene.
4 Although Officer Smith testified that defendant “would not take his hands out of his pockets,”
the body camera footage clearly shows that defendant was standing with his hands clasped together
in front of his groin area.

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Defendant now appeals.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
On appeal, defendant argues that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that
he was involved in any criminal activity or to justify a lawful seizure and search of his person, and
even if they had reasonable suspicion to seize him, they did not possess reasonable suspicion to
conduct a search of defendant’s person because there was no basis to believe that defendant was
armed. We agree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact made after a suppression
hearing, but reviews de novo the ultimate decision on a motion to suppress.” People v Rodriguez,
327 Mich App 573, 583; 935 NW2d 51 (2019). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves this
Court with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “[I]f resolution of a disputed factual question turns on the credibility of
witnesses or the weight of the evidence, we will defer to the trial court, which had a superior
opportunity to evaluate these matters.” People v Sexton, 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822
(2000). “We review constitutional questions de novo.” People v Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67;
768 NW2d 93 (2009).
B. ANALYSIS
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart in the
Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). See US Const,
Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. “ ‘[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.’ ” People v Pagano, 507 Mich 26, 32;
967 NW2d 590 (2021), quoting Terry, 392 US at 22. “Colloquially, a brief detention of this sort
is referred to as a Terry stop.” Pagano, 507 Mich at 32.
Under Terry, an officer can detain a citizen for a brief investigatory stop if
the officer has reasonable suspicion that the citizen is engaged in, or is about to be
engaged in, criminal activity. While the level of suspicion required for a Terry
seizure is less than that required for probable cause to arrest, an officer must have
more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Rather, a Terry
seizure is only lawful if an officer has an objectively reasonable particularized
suspicion that the specific individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.
Whether this standard is met in a particular case is fact-specific and requires an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances known by the officer when the seizure
occurred. [People v Prude, 513 Mich 377, 387; 15 NW3d 249 (2024) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).]
“The subjective intent of the police officer is irrelevant to the validity of the stop.” People v Dillon,
296 Mich App 506, 509; 822 NW2d 611 (2012). “The scope of any search or seizure must be

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limited to that which is necessary to quickly confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicion.” People v
Barbarich, 291 Mich App 468, 473; 807 NW2d 56 (2011).
“[T]here is no firearm exception to the Terry analysis,” and “a tip alleging an illegal gun
by itself is not sufficient to justify a stop and frisk.” People v Williams, 351 Mich App 254, 269;
35 NW3d 638 (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As observed in People v Custer, 465
Mich 319, 328; 630 NW2d 870 (2001),
A police officer may perform a limited patdown search for weapons if the officer
has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed, and thus poses a danger to
the officer or to other persons. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was
in danger. Reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or
unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required
for probable cause. In order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, an officer must
have specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. [(Quotation marks and citations
omitted.)]
As an initial matter, officers “had every right to seek a consensual encounter” with
defendant and his companion on the public sidewalk to determine whether they had any knowledge
of the reported criminal activity. Prude, 513 Mich at 391. But in order to detain him lawfully, the
officers were required to have an objectively reasonable particularized suspicion that defendant
and his companion were engaged in wrongdoing. Id.
Officers responded to “a weapons call from an anonymous caller,” who stated that there
were “juvenile” “mixed males” “waiving guns around” outside of a residence located at 506
McNeal Street before they entered the residence. Officer Smith candidly conceded that she could
see that neither defendant nor his companion were juveniles, and that concession is supported by
the body-camera footage. Additionally, although Officer Smith was not asked to clarify whether
defendant and his companion were of mixed race, the body-camera footage reveals that the men
were both black males, with nothing suggesting mixed-race ancestry. Moreover, when the men
identified themselves, they indicated that they had come from 508 McNeal Street, not 506 McNeal
Street. Accordingly, the information that the officers had before they conducted their search,
which is the measuring factor for the reasonableness of their suspicion,5 did not provide the officers
with an objectively reasonable particularized suspicion that defendant was “engaged in, or about
to be engaged in, criminal activity.” Prude, 513 Mich at 387. The fact that defendant was later
found to have a gun on his person does not suggest that the officers, before the frisk, had a
reasonable basis for suspecting defendant of engaging in unlawful conduct. See Florida v JL, 529
US 266, 271; 120 S Ct 1375; 146 L Ed 2d 254 (2000); see also Prude, 513 Mich at 387.
5 Florida v JL, 529 US 266, 271; 120 S Ct 1375; 146 L Ed 2d 254 (2000) (“The reasonableness of
official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their
search.”).

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The circumstances were also insufficient to justify physically restraining and patting down
defendant. Officer Smith testified that defendant “immediately started walking backwards” and
“would not take his hands out of his pockets” when officers approached him. But the body camera
footage demonstrates that defendant only began walking backward in response to the officers’
attempt to search his person. Before that, defendant and his companion were standing and
speaking with the officers, and at all times captured by the body-camera footage, defendant’s hands
were visible and out of his pockets. Defendant clearly informed the officers that he refused to
submit to a consensual search. Nevertheless, the fourth officer approached defendant and ordered
him to “hold still” as he reached out and grabbed defendant’s left arm and hand. Another officer
then grabbed defendant’s right hand. At that point, defendant stated, “I do got a weapon.” Officers
proceeded to handcuff and search defendant, ultimately discovering a firearm in his jacket pocket.
On this record, there is no evidence that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was
armed or dangerous before they physically restrained him. See Custer, 465 Mich at 328.
We reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress and remand this
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

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