COA 373471 BERTHA BALDWIN V MICHAEL EDWARD WILLIAMS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/21/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
BERTHA BALDWIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 21, 2026
11:34 AM
v No. 373471
Ionia Circuit Court
MICHAEL EDWARD WILLIAMS, LC No. 2024-036536-AV
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WALLACE, P.J., and LETICA and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This action for possession after land contract forfeiture under the summary proceedings
act, MCL 600.5701 et seq., was filed in district court by plaintiff, Bertha Baldwin, as the vendor
of a land contract, against defendant, Michael Williams, the vendee (and plaintiff’s nephew).
Following a bench trial, the district court entered an April 24, 2024 judgment of possession
after land contract forfeiture for the property in question stating that “An order of eviction may be
issued upon expiration of 90 days . . . after the entry of this judgment if the defendant does not: . . .
b. cure the following breach: property to be kept in good order inside and out.” Plaintiff thereafter
filed an application for order of eviction. After a July 17, 2024 hearing thereon, the district court
entered an order of eviction that same day. The circuit court granted defendant’s application for
leave to appeal from the foregoing judgment and order, and, after briefing and oral argument,
entered an order denying that appeal, i.e., affirming the district court. Plaintiff thereafter filed an
application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted.
For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the present case under the summary proceedings act. We accordingly vacate the
circuit court order, vacate the district court judgment of possession after land contract forfeiture
and order of eviction, and remand to the district court for entry of an order dismissing this matter
without prejudice.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In June 2013, plaintiff and defendant entered into a land contract. It indicates that it was
drafted by Bertha “Bert” Baldwin and provides for Michael E. Williams’ purchase of property
located at 5845 East Borden Road in Fenwick, Michigan, from her, for a purchase price of
“$35,454.97 balance on mortgage at Chase Bank + interest.” It is dated June 19, 2013, signed by
both parties, and provides for the following: a $2,000 down payment; a monthly payment amount
of $400 to start on July 1, 2013; that purchaser is responsible for maintaining property and liability
insurance; and a late fee of $30 on payments. The land contract further provides:
1. Property to be keep [sic] in good order inside & out.
2. No more than 3 audits [sic, adults] living in trailer or on property at one time.
Notably, nowhere does the land contract “expressly provide for termination or forfeiture, or give
the vendor the right to declare a forfeiture, in consequence of the nonpayment of any moneys
required to be paid under the contract or any other material breach of the contract.” MCL
600.5726.
Plaintiff served a forfeiture notice on Michael E. Williams on January 17, 2024. It states
in part on the pre-printed form that the land contract “is in default because of nonpayment of
installments of principal and/or interest, and also because of,” after which a box labelled “other:”
is checked next to the following handwritten language: “destruction of property, failure to keep
house in good condition.” The notice further provides: “You have forfeited your rights under the
land contract, and payment is demanded by Bert Baldwin who holds the land contract as,” after
which a box is checked next to the word “seller.” The notice further provides: “The sum of
$______ is now past due in principal and interest under the land contract, plus the sum of:” after
which a box is checked next to the following language: “$30 other: late fee, payment given 1 week
late 1/8/24 still owes late fee.”
Plaintiff thereafter filed a summons and complaint for possession after land contract
forfeiture, along with copies of the forfeiture notice and the land contract at issue on February 7,
2024. The complaint states at ¶ 3 that “[t]he plaintiff has a right to recover possession of the
property for” after which it provides the following:
At ¶ 4, the complaint states “The land contract was forfeited in accordance with the terms of the
land contract.”

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The district court register of actions indicates that, at a February 26, 2024 pretrial
conference, defense counsel indicated his belief that this matter should be before the circuit court.
The district court responded by indicating defense counsel should file a motion and by resetting
the matter for a March 13, 2024 pretrial conference. The district court register of actions further
indicates that, at that subsequent pretrial, defense counsel reiterated that the claim should be heard
in circuit court; plaintiff’s counsel opposed such removal and requested an order for defendant to
escrow contested land contract payments; and the district court indicated its “need to move [the]
case forward,” that it “looked for motions or pleadings regarding removal,” and it had “hoped [the]
case would be resolved, [but that was] not the case.” The court indicated it would order plaintiff
to escrow contested land contract payments, set a status conference for April 9, 2024, and set the
matter for an April 18, 2024 bench trial.
At the April 9, 2024 status conference, plaintiff’s counsel indicated they were ready to
proceed to bench trial. Defense counsel yet again indicated that he would like the matter removed
to circuit court based upon defendant’s “equitable claims that this court does not have the authority
to grant, . . . [including] indemnity, restitution, and quiet title” and that he is prepared to file “a
written response” to the complaint either that day or the next.
I understand there’s a trial date next week but I believe that the Court has authority,
once we file the answer, to either sua sponte grant removal and give us a chance to
make arguments or require me to file a motion for removal, which I’m prepared to
do.
The district court responded that the notes from the March 13, 2024 pretrial conference indicate
that the issue of removal was discussed at that time and that it thought that a motion or demand for
removal would have been filed by today’s date (almost a month later). The district court further
indicated that it’s “not willing to proceed on anything that’s verbal right now,” “I was told on
March 13th that there were going to [be] motions filed and an answer filed and we still haven’t
seen motions or an answer,” so the matter would be left on the schedule for a March 18, 2024
bench trial.
Defendant filed an answer to the complaint later that same day. Defendant denied the
allegations at ¶¶ 3-4 of the complaint that plaintiff had a right to recover possession or that “[t]he
land contract was forfeited in accordance with the terms of the land contract.” He likewise pleaded
a counterclaim for breach of contract, alleging that he had met his obligations under the land
contract, paid the full purchase price on or before June 2020, and that he was entitled to a deed to
the property and repayment of any amounts paid to plaintiff after that time. Defendant pleaded
multiple additional counterclaims that he contended exceeded the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
district court and required that the case be transferred to the circuit court pursuant to MCR 4.002,
including “counterclaims for indemnity, restitution, and quiet title, all on principles of equity under
the theory of unjust enrichment.”
Defendant failed to file a motion for removal or transfer to the circuit court, but on April
18, 2024, the same date as the bench trial was held in district court, defendant filed a separate
complaint against plaintiff for breach of contract, indemnity, restitution, and to quiet title in circuit
court.

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Following the parties’ presentation of their cases at the bench trial, the district court made
the following findings:
It seems to me, at least for what we agree on, it was a pretty good agreement
going. [Plaintiff] was getting her mortgage paid. She was helping out her nephew.
And [defendant] had a place to live at a fair price. And it’s too bad it’s all gone
south. . . .
So at this point, the Court’s left in the unenviable position of trying to judge
this land contract, such as it is, on its four corners. . . . Everyone wants to agree we
have a land contract. What we disagree on is what this handwriting on page four
of eight says, or means, rather.
It says purchase price, $35,454.97, balance on mortgage at Chase Bank plus
interest. A down payment, interest rate is scratched out with a deposit, $500 to be
returned at the end of the payoff. Monthly payment amount, $400.
And what we find out in practice is that the monthly payment amount
changes. [Plaintiff] has testified that the defendant . . . knew all about the
mortgage, knew all about the variable rate, knew all about, therefore, the variable
prices, but that’s not in the contract. That’s not what the contract says. The contract
says monthly payment amount, $400, 35,000 as the purchase price.
Mr. Williams has testified he thought that’s just what it meant, that there
was gonna be 2,000 down and that he was gonna be paying $400 a month over the
course of the contract. It sounds like he paid a lot more than that.
And with that kind of dispute, I’m not sure. I’m not sure what that means.
Obviously, the parties disagree, and perhaps a circuit judge is going to have to
make—make a finding on that.
. . . I don’t know if I can enforce that. If I don’t know what the contract
means, I don’t know if I can enforce that.
What is clear is that the property is to be kept in good order inside and out.
There’s no dispute about that. The dispute involves who is entitled to the deed and
who is entitled to ownership. But at this point, that’s still left undetermined.
At least what I can be sure of is that [plaintiff] owns the property, whether
she needs to deed it over to the defendant or not is another question. The circuit
judge is going to make that decision based upon the fuzzy contract we’ve got, the
fuzzy terms of the amounts and what’s to be paid.
But what’s not fuzzy in this contract is that the property needs to be kept in
good order inside and out. So at this point, I’m finding no cause of action as it
relates to the money. I guess you can go figure that out in circuit court.

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As to the condition of the property, I do find that [plaintiff] is the owner. In
fact, she holds a mortgage on it . . . .
At any rate, in the meantime, I’m—I’m of the mind that given the
circumstances and the backdrop of a case being started in circuit court, that
immediate possession is not the remedy. This can be fixed. It just takes some work.
This is not something that’s going to be a huge problem if someone sets their mind
to it. The property can be cleaned up inside and out. You can do the dishes for
starters.
So I’m going to enter a judgment that finds that there’s been a material
breach of the contract and that the defendant has 90 days to remedy that. . . . Let’s
schedule this for another hearing on July 17 at 11 a.m., and we can probe into the
issue of whether the property’s been cleaned up.
Plaintiff stated that res judicata may come up in the circuit court case. She asked for
clarification of the district court’s decision “[r]egarding the payment issue, you decided there’s no
cause of action. Is that a decision with prejudice?” The district court stated, “I didn’t—my ruling
does not mean that he doesn’t owe your client any money. I’m just saying I can’t figure out what
that is based upon the evidence and the fuzzy contract.”
As already noted, the district court entered an April 24, 2024 judgment of possession after
land contract forfeiture for the property in question. Plaintiff thereafter filed an application for
order of eviction, and, after a July 17, 2024 hearing thereon, the district court entered an order of
eviction on that same day.
Defendant then filed an application for leave to appeal from the judgment and order of
eviction in the circuit court, which was granted.1
Meanwhile, in the district court, defendant moved for a stay pending appeal. He also filed
a motion to remove to circuit court. At the October 2, 2024 hearing, regarding the motion to
remove, defendant argued that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case
because the land contract, which was attached to the complaint, did not mention “the summary
proceedings act or anything like that. And when that happens, then, there is no authority for this
court to issue any orders on—over that subject matter; that belongs in the circuit court.” The
district court held that it would deny the motion to remove, explaining in part:
1 The April 24, 2024 judgment of possession after land contract forfeiture contains language stating
that defendant has 10 days from entry to take an appeal. MCR 4.202(J). Defendant did not take a
timely appeal of right from that decision. On the other hand, the July 17, 2024 order of eviction
does not indicate it is a final order or that there is a right of appeal therefrom. This appears to
explain why an application for leave to appeal was filed in the circuit court, after the order of
eviction, to raise the issues on appeal addressed herein.

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[I]n my view of this case . . . there is a factual question that [this] court may
determine as to whether a plaintiff in a particular case has standing and has the
authority to bring a summary proceedings case.
But I think the power of this court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, has a
boundary, a clear boundary. I don’t think I can establish rights. I think I can
conduct an inquiry, a factual inquiry, as to whether plaintiff has the right to file.
But I don’t have the ability to establish rights. And that’s basically what I hear
defense saying, is that [plaintiff] does not have rights and—to be the plaintiff here.
And maybe a circuit court will disagree with me.
But I—I was pretty comfortable, based upon the evidence I had here, that
she did [have the right to be the plaintiff here].
The district court also held that it would stay the order of eviction. The district court’s oral ruling
was memorialized in an October 28, 2024 order stating that it “resolves the last pending claim and
closes the case.” See MCR 2.602(A)(3).
In the briefing and at oral argument on the circuit court appeal, defendant argued: (1) the
district court should not have heard the case because for the court to have subject-matter
jurisdiction, the land contract was required to but did not contain a clause indicating that summary
proceedings were available; (2) even if the district court had jurisdiction, its jurisdiction was
limited to the question of possession, and did not include defendant’s counterclaims for equitable
relief; and (3) the district court failed to make a determination regarding the purchase price, but
then it only gave defendant a 90-day redemption period provided when less than half of the
purchase price has been paid rather than the six-month redemption period. See MCL 600.5744(4).
Plaintiff in turn argued that the district court’s grant of only a 90-day redemption period,
“leads us to the assumption that less than 50 percent of the purchase price had been paid,” which
finds support in the evidence at trial that more than 50% of the original purchase amount was left
as principal on the mortgage at the time. Next, even if defendant should have been granted a six-
month redemption period, more than six months had passed since entry of the April 24, 2024
judgment of possession after land contract forfeiture and the property is in worse condition than it
was when the July 17, 2024 order of eviction entered, such that the issue is moot. Further, even if
the district court erred by not determining the specific amount due under the land contract, the case
should be remanded to the district court. Plaintiff admitted there was no forfeiture clause in the
land contract, but argued that this is not a jurisdictional issue. Rather, pursuant to MCL 600.5704,
a district court has jurisdiction over summary proceedings to recover possession of property and
plaintiff filed a complaint to recover possession of the property. Plaintiff argued that because
defendant did not raise any issue about the absence of a forfeiture clause in the land contract in the
district court, that issue was waived. Plaintiff also argued that defendant had failed to preserve his
equitable claims because he did not file a motion for removal despite the district court directing
him to do so.
The circuit court held that it would deny the appeal (i.e., affirm the district court):

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Now, I understand your argument regarding jurisdiction, but I’m inclined
to agree with [plaintiff’s] argument, and I saw it particularly in her brief, that maybe
there was an issue regarding the amount that was due, or you’re making an
argument that there is, but there was also another provision that your client was to
keep it in appropriate condition, the premises itself, and I think Judge Voet made a
very clear finding that that simply had not been the case.
I guess I’m troubled here too by the fact that this is something that could
have been timely removed, but was not done so, so I believe that that precludes that
at this point in time in light of the fact that I think Judge Voet did have jurisdiction,
as it relates, clearly, to the condition of the premises, and he determined that your
client was not entitled to possession, in large part because of the fact that it was not
kept in proper condition. So I am unable to grant leave to appeal. Particularly,
recognizing that I think there was an opportunity to have an absolute right to appeal,
and that time passed.
I can appreciate that [defendant] may have some financial challenges here,
but it’s just unfortunate that he has not complied with Judge Voet’s directive, as it
relates to complying with the order, because I understand his position is that he’s
been paid in full—he has paid in full—but yet that certainly was not the case, and
Judge Voet very clearly indicated that money was to be put in escrow.
So as it relates to this matter, I am going to respectfully deny the request for
leave to appeal for the reasons indicated. Again, primarily in light of fact that there
was a full and fair opportunity at trial to address all of these issues, and even though
Judge Voet may have not made a determination on the amount due, that’s
something that could have been requested through a motion for clarification, or
something along those lines.
So I do affirm the finding of Judge Voet, as it relates to possession, and also
the order of [eviction] in July.
A November 4, 2024 order memorialized the circuit court’s oral ruling denying defendant’s
appeal and affirmed the judgment of possession and order of eviction.
Plaintiff thereafter filed an application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even if raised for the
first time on appeal.” Bank v Mich Ed Ass’n-NEA, 315 Mich App 496, 499; 892 NW2d 1 (2016)
(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Indeed, “all courts must upon challenge, or even
sua sponte, confirm that subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” Associated Builders and Contractors
of Mich v State Treasurer, 350 Mich App 532, 546; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (quotations marks and
citation omitted). “Whether this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed
de novo, as is the interpretation and application of statutes and court rules.” Nucast, LLC v Livonia
Pre Cast LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 367941); slip op at 3
(citations omitted).

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III. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to act and the authority of a court to hear
and determine a case. A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined only by
reference to the allegations listed in the complaint. If it is apparent from the
allegations that the matter alleged is within the class of cases with regard to which
the court has the power to act, then subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Any
subsequent error in the proceedings amounts to error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
When a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court’s acts and proceedings are
of no force and validity. [Grubb Creek Action Comm v Shiawassee Co Drain
Comm’r, 218 Mich App 665, 668-669; 554 NW2d 612 (1996) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).]
Jurisdiction always depends on the allegations and never upon the facts.
When a party appears before a judicial tribunal and alleges that it has been denied
a certain right, and the law has given the tribunal the power to enforce that right, if
the adversary has been notified, the tribunal must proceed to determine the truth or
falsity of the allegations. The truth of the allegations does not constitute
jurisdiction. [Altman v Nelson, 197 Mich App 467, 472; 495 NW2d 826 (1992).]
MCL 600.5704 provides that “[t]he district court, municipal courts and the common pleas
court of Detroit have jurisdiction over summary proceedings to recover possession of premises
under this chapter.”
MCL 600.5726, provides:
A person entitled to any premises may recover possession thereof by a
proceeding under this chapter after forfeiture of an executory contract for the
purchase of the premises but only if the terms of the contract expressly provide for
termination or forfeiture, or give the vendor the right to declare a forfeiture, in
consequence of the nonpayment of any moneys required to be paid under the
contract or any other material breach of the contract.
Looking to the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint for possession after land contract
forfeiture in this matter, we see that paragraph 4 alleges: “The land contract was forfeited in
accordance with the terms of the land contract.” However, plaintiff’s claim is based on the written
land contract agreement, which plaintiff attached to the complaint in compliance with MCR
2.113(C)(1). In doing so, the land contract “was made a part of the pleading for all purposes.”
MCR 2.113(C)(2). A review of the language of that land contract makes clear that its terms do
not “expressly provide for termination or forfeiture, or give the vendor the right to declare a
forfeiture, in consequence of the nonpayment of any moneys required to be paid under the contract
or any other material breach of the contract.”2 MCL 600.5726. On this basis, it is not apparent
from the complaint’s allegations that the matter alleged comes within summary proceedings to
2 Plaintiff admitted at the oral argument on appeal to the circuit court appeal that “[t]here was no
forfeiture clause in this contract.”

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recover possession of premises under the summary proceedings act such that the district court is
without subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter. See Grubb Creek, 218 Mich App at 668; MCL
600.5704.
Plaintiff contends that because defendant did not raise any issue regarding the absence of
a forfeiture clause in the land contract in the district court, he has waived that issue. But this
argument fails because courts, whether upon challenge or sua sponte, are obliged to address the
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction; and further, when there is a defect as to subject-matter
jurisdiction, any actions by the court are “without authority, [and] its judgment is a nullity and is
always subject to collateral attack.”3 Associated Builders, 350 Mich App at 546; Grubb Creek,
218 Mich App at 669 n 2.
Although plaintiff is unable to proceed in the district court under the summary proceedings
act, MCL 600.5701 et seq., other judicial process and remedies are available to her. MCL
600.5750 provides:
The remedy provided by summary proceedings is in addition to, and not exclusive
of, other remedies, either legal, equitable or statutory. A judgment for possession
under this chapter does not merge or bar any other claim for relief, except that a
judgment for possession after forfeiture of an executory contract for the purchase
of premises shall merge and bar any claim for money payments due or in arrears
under the contract at the time of trial and that a judgment for possession after
forfeiture of such an executory contract which results in the issuance of a writ of
restitution shall also bar any claim for money payments which would have become
due under the contract subsequent to the time of issuance of the writ. The plaintiff
obtaining a judgment for possession of any premises under this chapter is entitled
to a civil action against the defendant for damages from the time of forcible entry
or detainer, or trespass, or of the notice of forfeiture, notice to quit or demand for
possession, as the case may be.
We conclude the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the present case under
the summary proceedings act. In light of this ruling, we need not address the other issues raised
on appeal. We accordingly vacate the circuit court order, vacate the district court judgment of
possession after land contract forfeiture and order of eviction, and remand to the district court for
entry of an order dismissing this matter without prejudice. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
3 While the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, we additionally, nonetheless note
that defendant’s answer denied the allegations at ¶¶ 3-4 of the complaint that plaintiff had a right
to recover possession or that “[t]he land contract was forfeited in accordance with the terms of the
land contract.”

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