COA 367915 PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES EDWARD PERRY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/24/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 24, 2026
9:50 AM
v No. 367915
Berrien Circuit Court
CHARLES EDWARD PERRY, also known as
CHARLES EDWARD PERRY IV,
LC No. 2022-003515-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of delivery of 50 grams or more, but
less than 450 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and possession of methamphetamine
with the intent to deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i). Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 17 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the delivery of cocaine charge
and 13 years and four months to 50 years’ imprisonment for the methamphetamine charge. Finding
no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant’s convictions arise from a narcotics investigation that occurred on November
11, 2022, in Benton Harbor, Michigan. On that day, Frank Clay, a parolee, was detained on
suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle. In exchange for lenient treatment, Clay informed officers
that he planned to participate in a drug transaction later that day. In the presence of officers, he
eventually spoke on the telephone with defendant to arrange the drug buy.
After the meeting location changed a number of times, and it appeared defendant was
getting nervous, officers stopped the vehicle defendant was traveling in after the vehicle was
observed violating the traffic laws. Three individuals were present in the vehicle: Rodriguez
Russell (the driver), Robert Russell, and defendant. The vehicle was registered to Jennifer Brady,
who was Rodriguez’s wife. A subsequent search of the vehicle, particularly the windshield wiper
cowl in the engine compartment, revealed the presence of a black bag containing 94.63 grams of

-- 1 of 10 --

-2-
cocaine, 29.23 grams of powdered methamphetamine, a bottle with methamphetamine pills, and
174.14 grams of marijuana. After defendant was convicted, this appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact in a motion to suppress for clear error.
People v Elliot, 494 Mich 292, 300; 833 NW2d 284 (2013). “Clear error exists when the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Chaney,
327 Mich App 586, 587 n 1; 935 NW2d 66 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To
the extent that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law
or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.” Elliot,
494 Mich at 300-301 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Whether a court applied the correct
constitutional standard is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 301.
“[T]he court may order a new trial on any ground that would support appellate reversal of
the conviction or because it believes that the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” MCR
6.431(B). “A trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion” and its “factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” People v Miller, 482 Mich 540,
544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008).
The question whether counsel provided ineffective assistance “is a mixed question of fact
and law.” People v Shaw, 315 Mich App 668, 671; 892 NW2d 15 (2016) (quotations marks and
citation omitted). “When reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court reviews
for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact and reviews de novo questions of law.” Id. at 671-
672. “Because no Ginther[1] hearing was held, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the
record.” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).
A criminal defendant may challenge the proportionality of a sentence and the sentence is
reviewed by this Court for reasonableness. People v Ventour, 349 Mich App 417, 429; 27 NW3d
660 (2023). “[S]entencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion . . . .” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted; alterations in original). “A trial court abuses its discretion if the
imposed sentence is not proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender.” Id. ( quotation marks and citation omitted).
1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). We note that defendant previously
filed with this Court a motion to remand with respect to his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, which this Court denied “without prejudice to a case call panel of this Court determining
that remand is necessary[.]” People v Perry, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
August 12, 2025 (Docket No. 367915). Accordingly, while our review of those claims is for errors
apparent on the record now before us, we are not foreclosed from determining, based upon that
record, that a remand for further development of the claims is necessary. Upon plenary review of
defendant’s claims, however, we continue to see no need for a remand to properly adjudicate them.

-- 2 of 10 --

-3-
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant first argues the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion
for a new trial because the officers’ stop of the vehicle was pretextual and unconstitutional.
Defendant also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the stop of the
vehicle on all possible grounds. We disagree.
“[B]oth the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right
of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Hyde, 285 Mich
App 428, 438; 775 NW2d 833 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “A traffic stop for
a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be
conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v North Carolina, 574 US 54, 60;
135 S Ct 530; 190 L Ed 2d 475 (2014). “In order to effectuate a valid traffic stop, a police officer
must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject
to seizure for a violation of law.” People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610, 612; 601 NW2d 138
(1999).
In Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 808; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996),
plainclothes vice-squad officers in an unmarked car were patrolling a “high drug area” in
Washington, D.C. They observed a sport utility vehicle with temporary license plates and youthful
occupants waiting an unusually long time at a stop sign. Id. When the police did a U-turn to head
back toward the SUV, it turned suddenly without signaling and drove off at an “unreasonable”
speed. Id. The officers followed and stopped the truck, during which they observed plastic bags
of what appeared to be crack cocaine in the hands of the defendant, resulting in arrests and federal
drug charges. Id. at 808-809.
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the defendants argued the stop was not justified by
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of drug-dealing activity and that the officer purportedly
approaching the SUV to warn the driver regarding his traffic violations was pretexual. Id. at 809.
The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the federal appeals court affirmed the
convictions, holding that “a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation.” Id.
On appeal the United States Supreme Court held the temporary detention of a motorist
upon probable cause to believe he has violated traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law
enforcement objective. Id. at 812-813. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be whether a reasonable officer would have made
the stop for the reason given, noting that subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at 814-815. The Court also dismissed the argument that
balancing governmental and individual interests in a traffic stop requires weighing the manner of
enforcement, such as stops by plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles. Id. at 815-816.
The Michigan Supreme Court has expressly adopted Whren. See People v Kazmierczak,
461 Mich 411, 419 n 8; 605 NW2d 667 (2000), overruled on other grounds People v Armstrong,
___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 165233); People v Dunbar, 499 Mich 60, 66-
67; 879 NW2d 229 (2016). Similarly, this Court has recognized the adoption of the rule of law

-- 3 of 10 --

-4-
from Whren. See People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 366; 770 NW2d 68 (2009) (“A police
officer who witnesses a civil infraction may stop and temporarily detain the offender for the
purpose of issuing a written citation.”). While defendant argues that we should disregard Whren
by interpreting Article 1, § 11, of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution differently than the Fourth
Amendment, this Court must follow the decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court. People v
Strickland, 293 Mich App 393, 401; 810 NW2d 660 (2011). Accordingly, we have no authority
to overrule the Michigan Supreme Court and no ability to give defendant the relief he seeks.
Defendant also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the stop
on pretextual grounds. In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must establish that “counsel’s performance fell below objective standards of reasonableness, and
that it is reasonably probable that the results of the proceeding would have been different had it
not been for counsel’s error.” People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007).
“Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and a defendant bears a heavy burden to prove
otherwise.” People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 17; 776 NW2d 314 (2009) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In the trial court, defendant’s counsel moved to suppress on the basis of the stop, but did
not argue that the pretextual nature of the stop was unconstitutional. However, had trial counsel
challenged the stop on pretextual grounds, the trial court would have denied the motion on the
basis of Whren and its progeny. Because the motion would have been futile, defendant’s trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the stop on pretextual grounds. People v Fike,
228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
Next, defendant argues the length of the detention and search of the vehicle were
unconstitutional, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge them. We disagree.
“A traffic stop amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and it is justified if the
officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject
to seizure for a violation of law.” People v Campbell, 329 Mich App 185, 196; 942 NW2d 51
(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Whether a reasonable suspicion justifies a traffic
stop depends on a commonsense view of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “A traffic stop is
reasonable as long as the driver is detained only for the purpose of allowing an officer to ask
reasonable questions concerning the violation of law and its context for a reasonable period.”
People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 315; 696 NW2d 636 (2005).
Defendant relies on Rodriguez v United States, 575 US 348; 135 S Ct 1609; 191 L Ed 2d
492 (2015), to support his position the search was unconstitutional. In Rodriguez, the defendant
was stopped by a K-9 officer after being observed veering slowly onto the shoulder of a highway
for a second or two and then jerking back onto the roadway. Id. at 350-351. Officers detained the
defendant until a second officer could arrive to allow for the dog to investigate the outside of the
vehicle. Id. at 352. The officers discovered methamphetamine, and the defendant was indicted on
federal drug charges. Id.
Although the district court and federal appeals court concluded the length of the stop was
de minimis and constitutional, the United States Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 353-355. The
Court emphasized that a traffic stop becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time

-- 4 of 10 --

-5-
reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation. Id. at 354-355.
The Court also noted that a dog sniff is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop and lacks a
connection to roadway safety. Id. at 355-357. The Court held that conducting a dog sniff without
reasonable suspicion after the completion of the stop is unconstitutional. Id. at 357.
Defendant’s reliance on Rodriguez is misplaced. As an initial matter, obviously, no dog
was employed to locate the drugs in this case. The specific holding of Rodriguez, which relates to
dog sniffs, is inapplicable. However, the general holding of Rodriguez—that a traffic stop
becomes illegal if prolonged unreasonably—does apply to the facts of this case.
Had the only information officers possessed in this case been the observation of the traffic
violation, defendant’s argument would be a strong one. However, officers were not simply
investigating a traffic violation; rather, the officers had information from Clay that the vehicle was
being used to transport drugs. Once the vehicle was stopped, the officers observed a bottle of
tequila on the back floorboard. While defendant contends the bottle was not in plain view such
that it would be obvious if it was open, the presence of the bottle did permit officers to expand the
scope of their investigation.
Defendant’s argument, however, patently fails in the assertion that as parolees, the
occupants of the vehicle were not subject to warrantless search. There is no dispute that each of
the occupants (i.e., the Russell brothers and defendant) of the vehicle were on parole. As parolees,
the occupants of the vehicle were subject to warrantless search. MCL 791.236(19) (“The parole
order must require the parolee to provide written consent to submit to a search of his or her person
or property upon demand by a peace officer or parole officer . . . The prisoner shall sign the written
consent before being released on parole.”); Samson v California, 547 US 843,852, 857; 126 S Ct
2193; 165 L Ed 2d 250 (2006) (stating that “parolees have severely diminished privacy
expectations by virtue of their status alone” and “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police
officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee”). Defendant has no counter to this
authority other than to urge the Court to create a new body of law that rejects both Michigan statute
and caselaw. We reject the suggestion.
We further note that the search of the vehicle is what yielded the fruits of the drug
investigation. To challenge the search, defendant has to show he had a privacy interest in the
vehicle. People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 212-214; 931 NW2d 557 (2019) (“To invoke the Fourth
Amendment’s protections, a defendant must first establish that he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched.”).
There is no dispute defendant did not own the vehicle in question, which was owned by
Brady, the wife of Rodriguez Russell. Because defendant did not own the vehicle, he did not have
standing to challenge the search under traditional principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See Mead, 503 Mich at 213 (“In the usual case, a passenger will not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in someone else’s car.”). Nevertheless, defendant contends this Court should find
defendant had standing as the “target” of the investigation, contending that rather than hold that
the owner of the vehicle is the individual with standing, this Court should conclude the individual
who is the target of the investigation should have standing.

-- 5 of 10 --

-6-
This proposition was explicitly rejected in People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 17-20; 360 NW2d
841 (1984). Instead, the Court held that “before a defendant may attack the propriety of a search
or seizure, that search or seizure must have infringed upon an interest of the defendant which [the
Michigan constitution] was designed to protect.” Id. at 28. In other words, “the court must decide
whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure and
whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. Moreover,
this Court has held that “when the stop of a vehicle is legal, a passenger with no property or
possessory interest in the vehicle does not have standing to contest the search of the vehicle.”
People v Earl, 297 Mich App 104, 108; 822 NW2d 271 (2012), overruled in part on other grounds
People v White, 501 Mich 160, 164 n 2; 905 NW2d 228 (2017).
Defendant contends he had a possessory interest in the vehicle because it was loaned to
him by Brady when she left the country. The trial court did not address this issue. But even if
defendant could show a possessory interest such that he had standing to challenge the search,
defendant is still confined by the fact that as a parolee, he was subject to warrantless search.
Accordingly, defendant’s argument that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the
issue is without merit, because defendant cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different if his counsel raised the issue. Frazier, 478 Mich at 243.
Defendant also argues on appeal that during the trial, officers gave improper drug profile
testimony. According to defendant, the officers gave testimony that went to defendant’s ultimate
guilt, which entitles him to a new trial. We disagree.
Drug profile evidence is defined as an “informal compilation of characteristics often
displayed by those trafficking in drugs.” People v Hubbard, 209 Mich App 234, 239; 530 NW2d
130 (1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[D]rug profile evidence is not admissible as
substantive evidence of guilt.” Id. at 241. “On the other hand, courts generally have allowed
expert testimony to explain the significance of items seized and the circumstances obtaining during
the investigation of criminal activity.” People v Murray, 234 Mich App 46, 53; 593 NW2d 690
(1999). Expert testimony from law enforcement officers may be employed by prosecutors “to aid
the jury in understanding the evidence in controlled substance cases.” Id.
Detective Robert Shepherd was qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations and drug
trafficking. He testified that it was his opinion that the drugs found in the vehicle were for sale
and distribution on the basis of the amount and variety of drugs found, as well as the absence of
drug paraphernalia. Contrary to defendant’s argument, Detective Shepherd did not opine that
defendant was guilty on the basis of his drug profile characteristics. Rather, Detective Shepherd’s
testimony explained to the jury the significance of the items seized and how it related to
defendant’s intent to sell. The testimony did not, however, speak to the ultimate question of
defendant’s guilt. See Murray, 234 Mich App at 53.
As noted, “[t]o prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
establish that counsel’s performance fell below objective standards of reasonableness and that, but
for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have
been different.” Frazier, 478 Mich at 243. “Generally, attorneys are given broad latitude to
determine trial strategy, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was born
from sound strategy.” People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 488; 999 NW2d 490 (2023).

-- 6 of 10 --

-7-
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object or seek a limiting instruction.
Regarding the first prong of an ineffective assistance claim, trial counsel’s performance did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because the testimony from the officers was not
improper drug profile testimony. As noted above, the testimony from Detective Shepherd
explained the significance of the items found in the vehicle. Detective Shepherd opined the items
seized were for sale and distribution because officers found “more than what the average human
could consume.” Detective Shepherd also noted that the drugs were divided up, suggesting they
were for sale and not personal consumption. None of the statements opined on defendant’s guilt.
It was not objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to not object.
Moreover, it appears from a review of the trial record that defense counsel was just as
interested in eliciting the drug profile testimony from officers as the prosecutor. In fact, defense
counsel used the questions to draw a distinction between what the officers believed was a typical
drug profile with what was discovered in this case. For example, defense counsel asked Lieutenant
Marc Hopkins about drug dealers being likely to have packaging materials or large amounts of
cash on their person. When asked by defense counsel, Lieutenant Hopkins denied such items were
found. In addition, during closing argument, defense counsel reiterated the lack of certain
characteristics in the case. It is clear that defense counsel’s strategy was to highlight the difference
between defendant and the “typical” drug dealer. See Yeager, 511 Mich at 488 (“Generally,
attorneys are given broad latitude to determine trial strategy, and there is a strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was born from sound strategy.”).
But even if we were to agree with defendant that trial counsel should have objected to the
officers’ testimony, defendant cannot show that but for the error, it is reasonably probable that the
result of the trial would have been different. Frazier, 478 Mich at 243. In addition to the testimony
from the officers, Clay testified regarding the drug transaction he intended to complete with
defendant concerning 3 ounces of cocaine. Clay’s testimony, when coupled with the evidence
seized and other background information provided by officers, provided ample grounds to convict
defendant. Defendant cannot show a reasonable probability that, absent the testimony, the result
would have been different.
Defendant also challenges the length of his sentence as unreasonable and disproportionate.
According to defendant, the trial court improperly relied on the statements from the prosecutor
relating to drug-related deaths in Berrien County and failed to take into account defendant’s
remorse. We disagree.
[T]he proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is whether the
trial court abused its discretion by violating the “principle of proportionality” set
forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), “which
requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness
of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” [People v Posey
(On Remand), 349 Mich App 199, 204; 27 NW3d 137 (2023) (quotation marks
omitted), quoting People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327
(2017).]
“An appropriate sentence should give consideration to the reformation of the offender, the
protection of society, the discipline of the offender, and the deterrence of others from committing

-- 7 of 10 --

-8-
the same offense.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 183; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). “The key test is
whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter.” Posey (On Remand), 349
Mich App at 204. When a defendant challenges a within-guidelines sentence, there is a
presumption of proportionality “through which the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
that their within-guidelines sentence is unreasonable or disproportionate.” People v Posey, 512
Mich 317, 359; 1 NW3d 101 (2023). “[T]o overcome the presumption that the sentence is
proportionate, a defendant must present unusual circumstances that would render the
presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.” People v Bowling, 299 Mich App 552,
558; 830 NW2d 800 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant first contends the sentences were unreasonable because they were made on the
basis of irrelevant and objectionable information. In response to the prosecutor’s statements
regarding drug deaths in Berrien County, the trial court stated:
The Court agrees this is more than just a crime of possessing the drugs and
delivering the drugs to another people—another person. This affects the safety of
individuals, the safety of our community, the safety of our society in general. It’s
not excused by a drug addiction. It’s not excused by poverty, or mistakes, or
anything else.
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the trial court did not fashion its sentence on the basis
of the alleged drug deaths in Berrien County. The trial court was permitted to consider the interests
of society as a whole, such as the impact on the community, when fashioning a sentence. People
v Rodriguez, 61 Mich App 42, 50; 232 NW2d 293 (1975). Moreover, the statement by the
prosecutor was made in response to defendant’s mitigation package submitted for sentencing, in
which defendant asserted his crime did not involve any violence or direct victims. See People v
Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 16; 260 NW2d 58 (1977) (stating the prosecutor is entitled to respond to the
issues raised by the defendant).
Defendant also contends the trial court did not consider his remorse when fashioning the
sentence. While defendant is correct the court did not specifically mention defendant’s claimed
remorse during sentencing, the court did state that it read defendant’s mitigation package and
remarked that defendant had a “significant background that involves abuse at a young age.” After
taking into consideration defendant’s mitigation, the court stated:
The Court has to consider here, as indicated earlier, the nature of the offense
and the defendant’s background. Now, counsel indicates that he has many people
here in support of him. That’s true, and that is certainly a benefit that you have in
your life that not everybody does. All right?
But it also kind of underscores the fact that you have other options. You
were not in the same desperate place that a lot of people claim to be in when they
made choices such as this. This is a form of repetitive behavior for you. I think
Mr. Engram used the word peaceful, that you were a peaceful person. However,
your prior convictions would indicate otherwise.

-- 8 of 10 --

-9-
As indicated, you just went to prison for the Michigan convictions to which
you pled guilty[. A]ssault with intent to murder[, t]hat would indicate something
other than a peaceful disposition. Carjacking, that would indicate something other
than a peaceful disposition. Armed robbery, same thing. Assault with a dangerous
weapon, and felon in possession of a firearm. Okay?
So a lot has been said. The Court’s taken all of this into consideration. I do
consider the Milbourn case. I’ll consider the Posey case also. The—your criminal
background, the fact that you have—were still on parole at the time these offenses
were committed, and all of this indicates nonetheless a significant sentence be
imposed[.]
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court took into account all of the information
presented during sentencing. Defendant provides no authority for the proposition that the court
must specifically, individually address every point of mitigation raised by him during sentencing.
Here, the court stated it read and considered all of the information presented before sentencing.
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant.
Lastly, in defendant’s Standard 4 brief, he argues the trial court erred when it concluded he
lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. Defendant also argues the trial court erred
when it concluded Clay’s information was sufficient to provide probable cause. We disagree.
We have already addressed defendant’s argument regarding standing. As defendant did
not own the subject vehicle, he did not have standing to challenge its search. But even if he did,
defendant cannot escape the fact that, as a parolee, he was subject to warrantless search.
Turning to defendant’s other Standard 4 brief argument, one exception to the warrant
requirement is a search of an automobile on the basis of probable cause. People v Levine, 461
Mich 172, 179; 600 NW2d 622 (1999). “Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of criminal activity.” People v Nguyen, 305
Mich App 740, 752; 854 NW2d 223 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The existence
of probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “An informant’s
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of his
report, and they can be used to determine whether probable cause exists.” Id. (quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also Levine, 461 Mich at 179-180 (stating that probable cause from an
informant’s tip is evaluated on the basis of the totality of the circumstances).
Clay’s reliability was established through his and the officers’ testimony. Clay admitted
to being a participant in a criminal drug conspiracy which subjected him to criminal liability. Such
statements tended to add to his reliability. See In re Forfeiture of US Currency, 172 Mich App
200, 207; 431 NW2d 437 (1988) (“Statements against penal interest have a high indicia of
reliability.”). Moreover, officers were able to corroborate the statements Clay provided to them.
Clay knew the day and time when defendant would be traveling to Benton Harbor and stated he
would be in a vehicle registered in Flint. Clay also described the meeting locations where the
transaction was to take place. Clay’s information was subsequently confirmed by surveillance
vehicles at the meeting locations.

-- 9 of 10 --

-10-
Assuming for the purposes of argument that Clay was not reliable as an informant and his
tip did not provide probable cause, defendant has not addressed why it would not have been
harmless error to conclude Clay provided probable cause. See MCL 769.26 (“No judgment or
verdict shall be set aside or reversed or a new trial be granted by any court of this state in any
criminal case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or rejection of
evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court,
after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”). As noted above, defendant was on parole when he was
stopped by the officers. As a parolee, defendant was subject to warrantless searches. MCL
791.236(19). Even if Clay’s information was insufficient to provide probable cause, the officers
were entitled to search on the basis of defendant and the other passengers’ parole status.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

-- 10 of 10 --