COA 375578 MT V TPF Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/18/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
MT,
Petitioner-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 18, 2026
11:17 AM
v No. 375578
St. Clair Circuit Court
TPF, LC No. 24-002588-PP
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MALDONADO and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, TPF, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to terminate an ex parte
personal protection order (PPO) entered by the trial court pursuant to MCL 600.2950. On appeal,
respondent presents the following six issues: (1) that petitioner’s evidence did not meet the
requisite burden of proof, (2) that the trial court failed to question petitioner about mental health
and drug use, (3) that the court ignored petitioner’s use of a racial slur, (4) that the court “always
cut off the testimony from [respondent],” (5) that it dismissed evidence offered by respondent, and
(6) that it minimized “parental rights for [respondent].” In his brief, respondent cites to no legal
authority in support of any of these positions, with the sole exception of MCR 3.709, which in
pertinent part indicates that a respondent has an appeal of right when a trial court denies their first
motion to rescind an ex parte PPO. Likewise, respondent’s brief on appeal contains no legal
analysis whatsoever; and instead only contains a series of conclusory statements. Finding no error
in the entry of the lower court’s order, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 2, 2024, MT filed a petition for an ex parte PPO alleging that respondent
entered her home using a key she had previously given to him, just after noon on November 28,
2024 (Thanksgiving), after which he rushed into their infant’s bedroom and started yelling at
petitioner to give him back a piece of clothing he had gifted her the previous holiday. She told
him where to locate the item, he retrieved it, after which he started making loud violent threats to
her, including suggesting that he was going to get her “head cracked,” she was going to get
“knocked upside [her] head,” and he was going to “hurt and destroy [her].” He was also alleged

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to have made threats about causing her to lose her healthcare license. Petitioner alleged that
respondent had recently exhibited similar escalating behavior and that she was in fear of her life,
as well as in fear for the life of her infant child. When petitioner asked respondent to give her back
the keys to her home, he refused and said that she would have to change the locks, which she did.
The petition included a police report regarding the altercation on Thanksgiving (the altercation)
and what the petitioner claimed to be a transcript of an audio recording of the altercation.
On December 4, 2024, without holding a hearing, the trial court entered an ex parte PPO
prohibiting respondent from the following: entering onto the property where petitioner lives;
assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting or wounding petitioner or the minor child; stalking as
defined by MCL 750.411h and 411i; threatening to kill or physically injured petitioner or the minor
child; interfering with petitioner’s place of employment; having access to information in records
concerning petitioner or the minor child that will reveal their address, telephone number or
petitioner’s employment address; purchasing or possessing a firearm; and posting a message
through the use of any medium of communication without consent pursuant to MCL 750.411s.
Respondent moved to terminate the PPO and a hearing was conducted on January 23, 2025.
After being sworn, respondent testified that he did not return petitioner’s house key when asked.
When the court inquired asked why he refused to give her the key, respondent testified that he had
the key in order to stop by to check on their infant child, and respondent wanted her key returned
so that he could not check up on the baby. Respondent then began reading alleged text messages
from petitioner that respondent said would show that they had a “ninety percent” healthy
relationship before the birth of their child. He indicated that she complained to police about him
on the previous Thanksgiving and that the police report only presented petitioner’s version of the
events regarding respondent having threatened her. As respondent’s testimony veered even more
off-topic, the court cut him off and told him to answer the last question, which was: why didn’t he
return the key when asked. Petitioner responded that he was angry.
The court then turned to the issue of why respondent let himself into petitioner’s home that
day and then refused to leave. Respondent testified that he had been going there periodically to
check on their infant child; petitioner had not asked him to leave; and this case was not about
petitioner fearing him, but was instead about custody of their child.
Counsel for petitioner then indicated that respondent recently filed a custody complaint
and petitioner had not yet been served with it. The court then noted that a hearing on the child
custody matter was scheduled to take place before a Friend of the Court referee on February 11,
2025.
The court indicated that it would schedule an evidentiary hearing regarding respondent’s
motion to terminate the PPO, but instructed respondent that he must continue to abide by the PPO
because it would remain in effect (pending the evidentiary hearing). Respondent then said: “Your
honor, I tried to break up with [her] three times. I love this PPO.”
On May 1, 2025, the trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing regarding respondent’s
motion to terminate the PPO. The only witnesses who testified at the hearing were the parties,
each of whom were represented by counsel. Upon the direct examination of respondent, counsel
for petitioner indicated that he had the audio recording of respondent’s interaction with petitioner

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at the time of the altercation and that, if respondent disagreed with any of the purported transcript
of that recording, it could be played for respondent at the hearing. Respondent admitted to calling
respondent several very derogatory names, making demeaning sexual comments about her, and
saying that he was going to “fry her for her job” as a healthcare worker. Respondent denied that
any of his comments would have given respondent reason to be fearful of him.
Petitioner was then called to the stand and testified that respondent’s behavior towards her,
which had initially been kind and considerate, changed almost immediately after she told him she
was pregnant. She said she became fearful because respondent starting to be more controlling,
and because she found his behavior to be aggressive and violent. She said she was hoping he
would change during the first month after their child was born, but he kept coming over
unannounced, was acting bizarre, was accusing her of cheating, and calling her derogatory names.
Regarding the altercation, she testified that: she asked for him to return her house key over and
over, she knew that respondent carries a gun on his hip, he was very aggressive, and the recording
of his behavior that day was representative of his recent behavior. She testified that the names he
called her and the threats to “fry” her and interfere with her employment, caused her to fear for her
safety, especially when he said he was going to hurt and destroy her. Likewise, she testified she
was fearful for the safety of her child. She testified that she felt threatened by having respondent
scream at her when he was wearing a gun on his hip, and that his behavior was aggressive and
volatile. She related another incident that occurred inside a car a couple of months before the birth
of her child, at the location of her baby shower. She testified she felt that she could not leave the
car while respondent yelled directly in her face, saying that he did not want her to have the baby
and that he wanted her mother to die.
During cross-examination and redirect, petitioner admitted to using a racial slur to describe
respondent once in a text message, and disagreed with respondent’s counsel’s assertion that she
should never use that word, indicating that she used a slang version of the word that she believed
was “okay to say,” and that respondent had replied with a text of his own indicating that he liked
her text. When asked if petitioner ever raised his hands towards her, respondent said he had done
so during the incident at the baby shower, but that he had never hit her.
Respondent was recalled as a witness and testified that, on the morning of the altercation,
petitioner called him a derogatory racial slur in the presence of their infant child, which upset him,
and led to his calling petitioner the derogatory terms referenced in his earlier testimony. He
testified she had called him that slur before, but that was the first time she had used that term in
front of one of his children. He said he never raised his hand at her, never charged at her, never
threw anything at her, and never did anything threatening to her at the time of the Thanksgiving
altercation. He said he did not deny anything in the transcript, indicated that the threats he made
were threats regarding her employment, but also indicated that he never actually went to her place
of employment or called her employer. He acknowledged that he told petitioner that he wanted to
“ban” her healthcare license, but when questioned about stating that he would hurt and destroy
petitioner, respondent again indicated that he made those comments about her employment
situation.
On the record, the trial court noted the conflicting testimony between the parties about
whether petitioner called respondent a racial slur on the date of the altercation; but it found that,
even if the court accepted respondent’s version, his reaction was extreme and beyond the bounds

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of what the court would anticipate. The court accepted that respondent could be fairly expected to
respond to such an epithet by likewise calling petitioner some hurtful names, but the court indicated
that respondent had also exhibited threatening behavior. As a result, the court stated that it was
denying the motion to terminate the PPO, stated that the terms of the PPO would remain in effect
until its expiration, and entered a written order to that effect.
Respondent then filed a timely claim for appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Following the filing of a petition, the trial court’s entry of a PPO is “within the discretion
of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” SP v BEK, 339
Mich App 171, 176; 981 NW2d 500 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also
Hayford v Hayford, 279 Mich App 324, 325; 769 NW2d 324 (2008) (“We review for an abuse of
discretion a trial court’s determination whether to issue a PPO because it is an injunctive order.”).
Likewise, a trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sherry v E
Suburban Football League, 292 Mich App 23, 32; 807 NW2d 859 (2011). “An abuse of discretion
occurs when the decision resulted in an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.”
SP, 339 Mich App at 176 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A court necessarily abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.” TT v KL, 334 Mich App 413, 438; 965 NW2d 101
(2020).
We review a trial court’s findings of fact, including such findings as they pertain to a PPO,
for clear error. Hayford, 279 Mich App at 325. Under the clear-error standard, we give deference
to the lower court and hold that the court clearly erred only if we are “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Jonkers v Summit Twp, 278 Mich App 263, 265;
747 NW2d 901 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the
application of this principle, regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” MCR 2.613(C).The trier of fact is
in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of each witness in weighing the credibility of their
respective testimonies. See SP, 339 Mich App at 176.
III. ANALYSIS
A. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO BRIEF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
As previously noted, respondent’s brief on appeal cites no legal authority for the relief
requested and provides no analysis applying the facts of the case to the applicable law. Instead,
his brief on appeal contains only a series of conclusory statements taking the form of a one-page
“Statement of Facts” and a one-page “Statement of Questions.” As this Court has stated
repeatedly, “[a] party may not simply announce a position and leave it to this Court to make the
party’s arguments and search for authority to support the party’s position,” and in such a
circumstance, the issue is deemed abandoned or waived on appeal. Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich
App 514, 519-520; 934 NW2d 64 (2019). See also Hoffman Machinery Corp v Reid Machinery
Inc, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 368468); slip op at 11; American

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Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc, 239 Mich App 695, 705; 609 NW2d 607 (2000).
For this reason alone, we would affirm the trial court’s order.
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
Regardless, the record demonstrates that there is no merit to any of respondent’s
contentions, i.e., the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to terminate the
PPO.1
The subject PPO was entered pursuant to MCL 600.2950, subsection (1) of which states
the following in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (26) and (27), by
commencing an independent action to obtain relief under this section, by joining a
claim to an action, or by filing a motion in an action in which the petitioner and the
individual to be restrained or enjoined are parties, an individual may petition the
family division of circuit court to enter a personal protection order to restrain or
enjoin a spouse, a former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had a child
in common, an individual with whom he or she has or has had a dating relationship,
or an individual residing or having resided in the same household as the petitioner
from doing 1 or more of the following:
(a) Entering onto premises.
(b) Assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding a named
individual.
(c) Threatening to kill or physically injure a named individual.
(d) Removing minor children from the individual having legal custody of
the children, except as otherwise authorized by a custody or parenting time order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(e) Purchasing or possessing a firearm.
(f) Interfering with petitioner’s efforts to remove petitioner’s children or
personal property from premises that are solely owned or leased by the individual
to be restrained or enjoined.
(g) Interfering with petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or
education or engaging in conduct that impairs petitioner’s employment or
educational relationship or environment.
1 To be clear, respondent does not challenge the issuance of the ex parte PPO under MCL
600.2950; rather, he challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to terminate the PPO.

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* * *
(l) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with
personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.
Regarding the proof required for the issuance of a PPO, MCL 600.2950(4) states the
following:
The court shall issue a personal protection order under this section if the
court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be
restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1). In
determining whether reasonable cause exists, the court shall consider all of the
following:
(a) Testimony, documents, or other evidence offered in support of the
request for a personal protection order.
(b) Whether the individual to be restrained or enjoined has previously
committed or threatened to commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1).
Respondent first claims that the evidence presented by petitioner did not meet the requisite
burden of proof. We disagree.
The petitioner has the burden of proof to demonstrate reasonable cause for a PPO to issue.
Hayford, 279 Mich App at 326.
When making that determination, the circuit court is not limited to the four corners
of the petition itself; rather, it must consider the testimony, documents, and other
evidence proffered to determine whether a respondent engaged in harassing
conduct. Nothing in the statute or court rule suggests that the circuit court is limited
to considering the incidents alleged in the PPO petition. Instead, our court rules
specifically require the circuit court to go beyond the PPO petition and either
interview the petitioner or provide an evidentiary hearing. [Lamkin v Engram, 295
Mich App 701, 711; 815 NW2d 793 (2012) (citation omitted).]
In the instant case, petitioner provided a transcript of an audio recording of respondent at
the time of the altercation, the contents of which were authenticated by respondent, which
included, inter alia, threats by respondent that petitioner would get her “head cracked” and that he
would “hurt and destroy” her. Those threats were made after respondent let himself into
petitioner’s home uninvited, refused to give her back the key he used to gain entry, and while
respondent was verbally abusing respondent and openly carrying a firearm. At a minimum, that
evidence constituted reasonable cause regarding petitioner’s apprehension of violence, i.e.,
reasonable cause to believe that respondent would be violent towards petitioner consistent with
MCL 600.2950(1)(l).
Next, respondent essentially argues that the court failed to allow evidence at the evidentiary
hearing pertaining to petitioner’s alleged mental health and drug use. However, respondent fails

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to even attempt to explain how this issue is relevant to the issue whether evidence of his behavior
constituted reasonable proof for the issuance of a PPO.
Respondent also argues that the trial court ignored petitioner’s use of a racial slur, but that
assertion is not supported by the record, as detailed above. In making its determination in this
matter, the trial court accepted respondent’s testimony as it pertained to that issue, but also found
that his reaction, which included the threats of violence described above, was extreme and out of
proportion.
As for the respondent’s assertion that the trial court “always cut off the testimony from
[respondent],” that claim is also contradicted by the hearing transcript. While it is true that the
trial court interrupted respondent multiple times, those interruptions occurred when respondent
failed to answer questions posed to him at the hearing or when he attempted to insert inadmissible
evidence, including matters that were not relevant to the issues before the court.
Respondent also argues that the trial court dismissed evidence offered by respondent,
consisting of a picture allegedly showing respondent sleeping in bed with his and petitioner’s
infant child, and another depicting old friends of respondent babysitting the child. However,
because respondent offers no argument whatsoever as to how such evidence would have been
admissible or how it would have countered the evidence of his threatening aggressive behavior
towards respondent, we can find no error here.
Regarding respondent’s final issue, that the trial court minimized his parental rights,
respondent fails to actually explain his position. To the extent that he is suggesting that the trial
court should have taken into account the extent to which a PPO would affect his parenting time
with his infant child, he offers no authority for such a proposition.
For all of these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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