COA 376781 IN RE K A M OGLETREE MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/11/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2025
1:40 PM
In re K. A. M. OGLETREE, Minor.
No. 376781
Calhoun Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2023-002145-NA
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist),
(3)(c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), and (3)(j) (child will be harmed if returned to parent).
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
This matter began when the minor child was taken into protective custody in August 2023
after the child’s mother was admitted to a psychiatric hospital. At the time, respondent was
incarcerated in federal prison, and his potential outdate was not scheduled until 2027. Following
the recommendation of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the trial court
ordered respondent to comply with, and benefit from, the Case Service Plan (CSP); receive
substance-abuse treatment; receive psychological treatment; attend parenting-skills classes; attend
training for special needs children; and, were respondent to be released, obtain housing and
employment. Throughout the duration of the proceedings, the DHHS attempted to verify whether
respondent had accessed services through the federal prison by mailing respondent monthly
packets and attempting to contact the prison. Respondent was on a waitlist for parenting and other
classes. At one point, respondent was on a waitlist to become a full participant in a drug-
rehabilitation program, which would allow respondent access to additional services in prison. At
the termination hearing, respondent testified that he had completed six months of the nine-month,
drug-rehabilitation program.
Eventually, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition requesting the termination of
respondent’s parental rights because of his lack of compliance and benefit from the services

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offered. At the termination hearing, the trial court found that respondent failed to complete various
psychological, substance abuse, and parenting services. Respondent’s outdate was in debate,
ranging from October 2025 to 2027. Regardless, the court found that even if respondent were to
be released from prison, it would take over a year from the time of the termination hearing to
demonstrate that he could provide an appropriate environment for the child. The court, therefore,
found that the statutory grounds under Subsections (3)(c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j) existed and that
termination was in the child’s best interests. The trial court subsequently issued its order
terminating respondent’s parental rights. Respondent now appeals.
II. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by finding that the DHHS made reasonable
efforts toward reunification.
In general, issues that are raised in the trial court are preserved for appeal. In re TK, 306
Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). However, a respondent should raise the argument
that the DHHS failed to make reasonable family reunification efforts when the DHHS adopts the
CSP or soon after. See In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). But “even if a
parent does not object or otherwise indicate that the services provided were inadequate when the
initial case services plan is adopted, such an objection or challenge may also be timely if raised
later during the proceedings.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 337; 990 NW2d 685 (2022).
Though respondent did not object or indicate that the DHHS’s recommendations were inadequate,
respondent challenged the communication issues with the DHHS and the limited availability of
services in prison. These challenges are “sufficient to ‘otherwise indicate’ that the services
provided were inadequate,” thus preserving the issue. See id. at 338.
When preserved, we review a trial court’s decision regarding reasonable efforts, as well as
its factual findings in a termination hearing, for clear error. See MCR 3.977(K); In re
Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 430; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). A finding is clearly
erroneous if we are “left with [a] definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re
Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The trial court committed clear error by concluding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts
to reunify respondent and his child because the record demonstrates that the DHHS failed to
provide or even facilitate the services necessary for reunification. Consequently, the trial court
clearly erred by terminating respondent’s parental rights for failure to comply with the service plan
when the DHHS failed to provide the necessary services for reunification.
Absent the exceptions in MCL 712A.19a(2), none of which are relevant here, “the [DHHS]
has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination
of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85, 85 n 4; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). When a
child is placed outside the home, the DHHS has a statutory duty to create and update a CSP.
MCL 712A.13a(10)(a); MCL 712A.18f(5). A CSP must include a “[s]chedule of services to be
provided to the parent . . . to facilitate the child’s return to his or her home . . . .”
MCL 712A.18f(3)(d) (emphasis added). As part of its duty to make reasonable efforts, “the
[DHHS] must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify
the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500

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Mich at 85-86 (emphasis added). “The [DHHS] is not relieved of its duties to engage an absent
parent merely because that parent is incarcerated.” In re Mason, 486 Mich at 152.
In In re Mason, the DHHS “abandoned its statutory duties to involve [the incarcerated
respondent] in the reunification process and to provide services necessary for him to be reunified
with his children.” Id. at 146. Thus, in In re Mason, it was clear error to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights “in part because of his failure to comply with the service plan” when the DHHS
failed to provide services and evaluate the respondent. Id. at 159.
Here, there is no record evidence that the DHHS even attempted to facilitate or coordinate
services with the federal prison. See id. at 157. First, though no Michigan case requires the DHHS
to provide services directly to respondent, failure to provide direct services is evidence that the
DHHS did not make reasonable efforts. See In re Smith, 291 Mich App 621, 622; 805 NW2d 234
(2011). At no point in the record did the DHHS provide services directly to respondent. In fact,
a DHHS foster-care specialist affirmed that she did not send respondent workbooks, supplements,
or packets regarding parenting skills because of her belief that respondent was not eligible for
additional services until he was a full participant in the drug-related program offered by the prison.
Second, the DHHS did not outline what services would be “provided” to respondent, see
MCL 712A.18f(3)(d), or what steps the DHHS would take to facilitate reunification in either the
Parent Agency Treatment Plans (PATPs) or CSPs, see In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86. In
its PATPs, the DHHS at first listed no actions that it would take to facilitate respondent’s
substance-abuse treatment, parenting-skills classes, or psychological services. Later, the DHHS
stated that it would verify what services were available to respondent and in what services
respondent participated. In its CSPs, the DHHS claimed that it took reasonable efforts to reunify
the family through “[s]ubstance abuse services, safety planning, psychological services, and
parenting services” and that respondent was offered random drug screens, counseling services,
parent education, housing resources, psychological evaluation, and parenting time, among other
services. Though it may be true that the child’s mother received such services, nothing in the
record shows that respondent received the extent of the services claimed by the DHHS. Instead,
respondent was waitlisted by the federal prison staff for full participation in the drug program that
would allow him access to additional services provided by the federal prison. The DHHS may not
focus its efforts “exclusively on the custodial mother and essentially ignore[] the [incarcerated]
father.” In re Mason, 486 Mich at 152.
Third, in practice, the DHHS did not “provide services necessary for [respondent] to be
reunified with his child[].” Id. at 146. To the DHHS’s credit, at respondent’s initial facility, it
appeared that the DHHS would not be able to obtain information on services until respondent
signed a communication request, which respondent did not return. At that point, the DHHS had
done everything within its power to communicate with respondent’s initial facility. However,
respondent then moved to his current facility in January 2024. There, the DHHS contacted
respondent’s prison case manager by phone, and the prison case manager spoke freely about
respondent. However, even in those phone contacts, the DHHS showed no effort to coordinate
services. See id. at 157. Instead, the DHHS called only to verify what respondent had been able
to accomplish.

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As in In re Mason, 486 Mich at 166, the record is “largely undeveloped” because of the
DHHS’s failure to provide respondent with the services necessary to achieve reunification. It
therefore remains unclear how respondent was expected to achieve the steps necessary for
reunification while waitlisted for federal prison services and when provided no additional services
by the DHHS. See id. Nor does it appear that the DHHS adjusted respondent’s requirements or
its own actions to facilitate reunification. See MCL 712A.18f(5).
Because the DHHS did not provide the respondent with the services necessary for
reunification, it did not fulfill its statutory duty. See In re Mason, 486 Mich at 146. Therefore,
the trial court committed clear error by concluding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to
reunify respondent and his child, and terminating respondent’s parental rights for failure to comply
with the service plan when the DHHS failed to provide the necessary services for reunification.
See In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85; In re Mason, 486 Mich at 146, 166.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order terminating respondent’s parental rights
to the child and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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