COA 375797 JOYS MALCOLM KING JR V MEMBERSELECT INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/25/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JOYS MALCOLM KING, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 25, 2026
1:07 PM
v No. 375797
Wayne Circuit Court
MEMBERSELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 22-013145-NI
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JOHN DOE, MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS
PLAN, and MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY,
Defendants.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this no-fault insurance case, plaintiff, Joys Malcolm King, Jr., appeals as of right the
stipulated order dismissing his claims against defendants, MemberSelect Insurance Company
(MemberSelect) and the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF), with
prejudice. In substance, plaintiff seeks reversal of the trial court’s earlier order granting
MemberSelect’s motion for partial summary disposition dismissing Counts 2 and 3 of his amended
complaint, which asserted claims for underinsured motorist (UIM) and uninsured motorist (UM)
coverage under an insurance policy by MemberSelect. Pursuant to Stanley v Farmers Ins Exch,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 374881), we dismiss this appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a motor-vehicle accident that occurred on June 11, 2022, in Detroit,
Michigan. Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk near Joy Road and Rosemont Avenue when he
was struck by a hit-and-run driver. Plaintiff contends that he sustained significant injuries and

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incurred medical expenses and other losses because of the collision. At the time of the accident,
plaintiff did not own a vehicle or have his own no-fault insurance, but his mother did through
MemberSelect.
Following MemberSelect’s denial of plaintiff’s claims for personal injury protection (PIP)
benefits as well as UM and UIM claims, plaintiff filed the underlying action alleging five counts:
a third-party negligence claim against John Doe, the hit-and-run driver (Count 1); third-party UM
and UIM claims against MemberSelect for damages permitted under the policy (Counts 2 and 3);
a first-party claim for PIP benefits against MemberSelect (Count 4); and a first-party claim for PIP
benefits against the MAIPF in the event he was ineligible for benefits from MemberSelect (Count
5). During the lower court proceedings, defendants questioned where plaintiff was domiciled at
the time of the accident to determine whether plaintiff was covered by the MemberSelect policy
issued to plaintiff’s mother and the order of priority for his first-party claims for PIP benefits.
Because there was conflicting evidence about whether plaintiff was domiciled with his mother or
his girlfriend at the time of the accident, the trial court ultimately denied the MAIPF’s and
MemberSelect’s competing motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no
genuine issue of material fact) as to the first-party claims (Counts 4 and 5).
MemberSelect further moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8)
(failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted) and (C)(10) as to plaintiff’s UM and UIM
motorist claims (Counts 2 and 3), arguing that the policy did not cover plaintiff, but that, even if it
did, plaintiff was not entitled to UM or UIM coverage under MemberSelect’s policy because
plaintiff failed to make a “written report” of the hit-and-run accident to “local law enforcement”
within 24 hours or “as soon as it is reasonably possible.” MemberSelect further asserted that this
requirement served to limit fraud. Plaintiff responded that the 911 call and Detroit Fire Department
report authored the day of the accident met the policy’s requirements and satisfied the antifraud
purpose of that policy provision.
Following a hearing, the trial court agreed with MemberSelect and granted partial summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), ruling that plaintiff’s failure to file a police report complying
with MemberSelect’s policy barred plaintiff’s recovery of benefits. The court’s order dismissed
Counts 2 and 3 against MemberSelect with prejudice, and it specified that it was not a final order.
The parties subsequently entered into a stipulated order dismissing the remaining claims against
MemberSelect and the MAIPF with prejudice. That order closed the case, contained no language
preserving any right to appeal prior orders, and constituted the final order from which plaintiff
now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is governed by statute and court rule.” Chen v
Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich App 172, 191; 771 NW2d 820 (2009). The interpretation of statutes
and court rules is a question of law subject to de novo review. Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 578-
579; 751 NW2d 493 (2008). “Hence, whether this Court has jurisdiction is a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo.” Chen, 284 Mich App at 191.

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III. JURISDICTION
Plaintiff appeals from a stipulated order dismissing his remaining claims against
MemberSelect and the MAIPF with prejudice. This Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal
because plaintiff is not an aggrieved party under Stanley.
MCR 7.203(A)(1) provides that this Court’s jurisdiction over an appeal of right is limited
to appeals filed by an aggrieved party from a final judgment or final order. But as explained in
Stanley, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2 (quotation marks and citations omitted):
A party is not aggrieved, however, by an order to which that party has consented.
Indeed, it is well settled that a party may not appeal from a consent judgment or
stipulated order because such an order reflects the parties’ agreement rather than a
judicial determination of contested rights. Consistent with that principle, a party
cannot stipulate a matter and then argue on appeal that the resulting action was
error.
Stipulated orders that are accepted by the trial court are generally construed
under the same rules of construction as contracts, because they are agreements
reached by and between the parties. Accordingly, when a party expressly reserves
the right to appeal a prior ruling in a stipulated dismissal, that reservation may be
enforced. Conversely, where a party agrees to a final dismissal with the same
opposing party and fails to reserve appellate rights, the stipulated dismissal
extinguishes any claim of appeal from earlier rulings involving that party. In that
circumstance, the appellant is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of MCR
7.203(A)(1), and this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.
In accordance with these principles, the Stanley Court examined whether the plaintiff was
barred from challenging a prior order granting partial summary disposition, when the order
appealed from was a stipulated dismissal broadly dismissing the plaintiff’s remaining claims
against the defendant with prejudice and did not “exclude the claims affected by the earlier
summary disposition ruling or otherwise preserve any appellate issue arising from that ruling.” Id.
at ___; slip op at 3. The Court distinguished the matter from Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC, ___
Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 363572), noting that Jaber involved an
appellant seeking review of an earlier order concerning one defendant, despite later entering into
a stipulated order with a different defendant. Stanley, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3. The
Stanley Court clarified that because the Jaber defendant who benefited from the earlier ruling was
not a party to the subsequent stipulated dismissal, that defendant could not require the plaintiff to
preserve appellate rights in an agreement to which it was not party. Id. Stanley, by contrast,
involved a plaintiff who entered into a stipulated dismissal with the same party that obtained the
earlier ruling. Id. Accordingly, this Court reasoned, the plaintiff was required to expressly
preserve any appellate challenge to that ruling in the stipulated dismissal, and because the plaintiff
failed to do so, her “consent to the final dismissal forecloses appellate review, and this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal.” Id.
Much like Stanley, here, plaintiff contests an earlier summary disposition ruling involving
the same party with whom plaintiff subsequently entered into a stipulated dismissal with prejudice,

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i.e., MemberSelect, and the stipulated order omitted language preserving plaintiff’s right to
appellate review of the previous ruling. Plaintiff attempts to differentiate this case from Stanley
by asserting that the claims addressed in the prior summary disposition ruling were distinct from
those resolved by the stipulated dismissal. But Stanley contains no such limitation. Instead, the
Court broadly held that when a plaintiff seeks to challenge a prior interlocutory ruling involving
the same defendant with whom the plaintiff later enters into a stipulated order of dismissal, the
plaintiff must preserve its appellate rights in that stipulated order. Id. Otherwise, the plaintiff is
not an “aggrieved party” entitled to appellate review under MCR 7.203(A)(1). Id. Accordingly,
under Stanley, the dispositive consideration is whether the plaintiff stipulated to the final dismissal
with the same party that obtained the prior interlocutory ruling—not whether the claims addressed
in the prior ruling were identical to those resolved by the stipulated dismissal. Thus, like Stanley,
this Court lacks jurisdiction over the present appeal.1
Dismissed.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
1 Plaintiff argues that this Court should convene a conflict panel under MCR 7.215(J) “to resolve
the friction between Stanley and Jaber and establish a clear and universal precedent as to what is
required to preserve an issue or issues for appeal while resolving other issues in the trial court.”
We decline plaintiff’s request to initiate conflict-panel proceedings.

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