COA 371663 NEAL J CAMPBELL V STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/15/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
NEAL J. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2026
1:20 PM
v No. 371663
Clare Circuit Court
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
LC No. 2023-900342-NF
Defendant-Appellant,
and
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
PLACEMENT FACILITY,
Defendant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and WALLACE, JJ.
WALLACE, J. (concurring).
I concur with the decision of the majority only because we are bound by Love v Rudolph,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369895). I write separately because I
believe that Love was wrongly decided and should be overturned by the Michigan Supreme Court.
Specifically, MCL 500.3114(6) indicates that the clause at issue in Love, MCL 500.3109a(2),
provides that other policies in the order of priority cover a person injured while riding a motorcycle
that is involved in an accident with a motor vehicle, when that motor vehicle is insured by a policy
of no-fault insurance containing an exclusion for allowable expenses under § 3109a(2). Section
3114(6) clearly provides the same priority procedure applies to policies “for which the person

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named in the policy has elected to not maintain coverage for personal protection insurance benefits
under section 3107d, or as to which an exclusion under section 3109(2) [sic: 3109a(2)] applies,”
yet this Court in Love mistakenly held that this priority procedure does not apply to a policy as to
which an exclusion under § 3109a(2) applies, unless the injured motorcycle rider is one of the
persons expressly excluded.
The argument made by State Farm in the present case is, essentially, the holding in Love.
As noted in the majority opinion in this case, State Farm argues that:
MCL 500.3114(6)’s pass-through or skipping provision applies to all MCL
500.3107d policies (which policies are not at issue in this case), but as to a policy
where an exclusion under MCL 500.3109(2) has been taken, the pass-through only
applies when the motorcyclist is the person contractually excluded from the
allowable expense coverage. State Farm contends this is the case because while
§ 3107d allows insureds to not maintain PIP coverage at all, § 3109a(2) allows them
to maintain PIP coverage with exclusions.
Again, that is precisely how this Court in Love interpreted § 3114(6).
I disagree with this interpretation of the language of § 3114(6).
We interpret the words in the statute in light of their ordinary meaning and
their context within the statute and read them harmoniously to give effect to the
statute as a whole. Statutory interpretation requires courts to consider the
placement of the critical language in the statutory scheme. In doing so, courts must
give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation
that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. [Johnson v Recca,
492 Mich 169, 177; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (brackets omitted).]
“If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative
intent and judicial construction is not permitted.” Nyman v Thomson Reuters Holdings, Inc, 329
Mich App 539, 544; 942 NW2d 696 (2019) (quotations marks and citation omitted).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the language of § 3114(6), establishes that the pass-
through or skipping of § 3114(5) priority applies broadly to § 3109a(2) policies, not narrowly to
the particular persons covered under such policies, as can be seen by emphasizing the pertinent
statutory language here:
If an applicable insurance policy in an order of priority under subsection (5) is a
policy for which the person named in the policy has elected to not maintain
coverage for personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107d, or as to
which an exclusion under section [3109a(2)] applies, the injured person shall claim
benefits only under other policies, subject to subsection (7), in the same order of
priority for which no such election has been made. If there are no other policies
for which no such election has been made, the injured person shall claim benefits
under the next order of priority or, if there is not a next order of priority, under the

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assigned claims plan under sections 3171 to 3175. [MCL 500.3114(6) (emphasis
added).]
Because the policy of the motor vehicle involved in the accident in Love was one to which an
exclusion under 3109a(2) applied, § 3114(6)’s pass-through or skipping of § 3114(5) priority
should have applied. Likewise, in the present case, because Bauswell’s ACIA policy was one as
to which an exclusion under § 3109a(2) applies, § 3114(6)’s pass-through or skipping of § 3114(5)
priority should apply.
Because the injured motorcyclist will virtually always be a stranger to the owner, registrant
or operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident with them, it will virtually never be the
case that a no-fault policy issued to such owner, registrant or operator of the involved motor vehicle
would list the motorcyclist who was injured as an individual excluded from allowable expense
coverage under the policy. Love’s interpretation of the language of § 3114(6)’s pass-through or
skipping provision renders the inclusion of § 3109a(2) policies essentially extraneous and
nugatory. “[C]ourts must interpret statutes in a way that gives effect to every word, phrase, and
clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage
or nugatory.” Esurance Prop & Cas Co v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, 507 Mich 498, 508-509;
968 NW2d 482 (2021).
As articulated by the trial court in the present case:
Initially, Ms. Bauswell’s insurer (ACIA) would be the higher priority insurer
because she was the owner and operator of the automobile in the accident.
However, because of her [s]ection 3109a(2) exclusion, [p]laintiff “shall claim
benefits only under other policies . . . in the same order of priority for which no
such election has been made.” The only relevant insurers in this case are State
Farm and ACIA. Plaintiff’s State Farm policy is the only policy that is due to pay
benefits based on the “under other policies” language.
Due to the operation of § 3114(6), plaintiff’s PIP claim skipped the priority of the ACIA
policy for the motor vehicle involved in the subject accident (because of the § 3109a(2) exclusion)
and plaintiff’s State Farm motor vehicle policy became the next policy in order of priority, meaning
that State Farm should be liable for plaintiff’s PIP benefits. But, because of Love, ACIA is now
liable for those benefits.
Because this Court in Love misinterpreted MCL 500.3114(6), I believe that the Michigan
Supreme Court should overrule Love and hold as follows: when a person riding a motorcycle is
injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle that is insured by a policy of insurance containing
a valid exclusion under MCL 500.3109a(2), then MCL 500.3114(6) mandates that such injured
person “shall claim benefits only under other policies, subject to subsection (7), in the same order

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of priority for which no such election has been made” and “[i]f there are no other policies for which
no such election has been made, the injured person shall claim benefits under the next order of
priority or, if there is not a next order of priority, under the assigned claims plan under sections
3171 to 3175.”
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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