COA 378301 IN RE LOX MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2026
10:04 AM
In re LOX, Minors.
No. 378301
Dickinson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-000506-NA
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals by right the trial court’s order of disposition entered after a jury
found statutory grounds for the court to exercise jurisdiction over his four minor children pursuant
to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (substantial risk of harm to child’s mental well-being) and (2) (unfit home
by reason of neglect, cruelty, criminality, or depravity). Finding no errors warranting reversal, we
affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from respondent’s sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, AK, which initiated
the child-protective proceedings at issue. In 2011, respondent married the mother of his four
children.1 Their mother has three other children, including AK. In March 2024, AK disclosed that
respondent sexually abused her when she was between the ages of 13 and 15. The abuse was
alleged to have occurred in the family home. Following AK’s disclosure, her mother reported the
allegations to the police, who then notified petitioner, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS).
On June 13, 2024, petitioner filed a petition alleging that respondent’s sexual abuse of AK
placed his minor children at risk of harm to their emotional and mental well-being. Petitioner
requested the court to authorize the petition, place respondent’s children with their mother, and
1 The children’s mother is not a respondent in the child-protective proceedings.

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take jurisdiction over the children.2 Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the
petition and released the children to their mother under DHHS’s supervision. The trial court also
appointed trial counsel for respondent.
Respondent was eventually charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I),
MCL 750.520b(1)(b) (penetration of a related victim between the ages of 13 and 15), and second-
degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(b) (sexual contact with a related
victim between the ages of 13 and 15), based on his abuse of AK. Petitioner filed an amended
petition, which added allegations of the criminal charges and sought to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. The trial court adjourned the child-protective proceedings pending resolution of
respondent’s criminal trial. On April 16, 2025, respondent was convicted of both charges
following a jury trial.
An adjudication trial to determine the trial court’s jurisdiction over respondent’s minor
children was held before a jury on June 3, 2025. Before the trial commenced, trial counsel
informed the court that respondent no longer wanted his representation, in part because respondent
was “saying he needs special accommodation because of his closed head injury,” and “just
informed [trial counsel] of that, that he thinks he needs special assistance.” Respondent contended
that he informed trial counsel of his need for accommodations under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)3 days before the trial. He explained that he was “not able to keep up with
things” or keep track of details because of his disability. Respondent was also concerned about
the fact that trial counsel did not have any witnesses to present at trial.
When asked by the trial court what accommodations he required, respondent stated that he
wanted a memory aid or recorder so that when there was a break in the proceedings, he could
“listen to things back and get caught up with everybody else.” He explained that when he was in
college, his professors would record their classes and give him a recording so that he could listen
and catch up after the lecture. The trial court denied respondent’s request for new counsel and
declined to adjourn the trial. While the court generally did not have an issue with the use of a
recording device, it noted that it did not “have the ability to simply provide [respondent] with some
accommodations on the fly, when [it was] not even sure what the accommodation is, that is needed,
because the issue has been improperly raised at this point.” However, it stated that it would attempt
to find a recorder after jury selection. Respondent conceded that if trial concluded the same day,
“it won’t even matter” whether he could understand the proceedings as they were ongoing.
The trial proceedings concluded the same day, and the court was unable to procure a
recording device for respondent. The jury primarily heard testimony and evidence establishing
respondent’s criminal convictions, though the specifics of the abuse were not detailed. Trial
counsel did not call any witnesses or present evidence at trial. The jury found statutory grounds
2 Although petitioner only checked the box indicating that the minor children came within the
provisions of MCL 712A.2(b)(2), it also alleged that respondent’s conduct “place[d] his children
at a risk of harm to their emotional and mental well-being,” which forms the basis for jurisdiction
under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
3 42 USC 12101 et seq.

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for the court to exercise jurisdiction over respondent’s minor children because they were “subject
to a substantial risk of harm to their mental well-being,” and “[t]he home or environment . . . by
reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of [respondent], is an
unfit place for [the children] to live in.” The trial court entered an order taking jurisdiction over
the children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).
The case then proceeded to the initial disposition, where petitioner sought termination of
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent caused sexual abuse of child or
sibling), (b)(ii) (parent failed to prevent sexual abuse of child or sibling), (h) (parent imprisoned
for a period exceeding two years), (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm), (k)(ii) (abuse of child or
sibling involving criminal sexual conduct), (k)(ix) (abuse of child or sibling under MCL 722.622),
and (m)(i) (violation of MCL 750.520b and MCL 750.520c). The trial court heard testimony from
the director of the Dickinson County Veteran Service Office, Denise Formolo, who explained how
terminating respondent’s parental rights could potentially impact the benefits for which his
children were eligible. During her testimony, the issue of accommodations arose again. The trial
court asked whether Formolo could share the reason for respondent’s permanent and total
disability if respondent gave her permission to do so. Respondent did not allow Formolo to answer
the question, and the following exchange ensued:
The Court: So, you want me to accommodate your disability, but you don’t
want to tell me what the disability [is], is that what I’m understanding here
[respondent]?
The Respondent: I’ve talked to zero attorneys for I don’t know, three weeks
now. I don’t feel comfortable saying anything.
The Court: All right. Well, but you’ve told me repeatedly that you have a
disability and you’ve told me that—you’ve told me what the disability is, but I’m
not sure what the disability is, that you want me to accommodate and now we have
the person here that can tell me what the disability is, but you’re saying you don’t
know if you want her to tell me, because you haven’t talked to an attorney. So, I
just want the record to be very clear, that you’re asking me to accommodate your
disability, but I do not know what that disability is to accommodate it.
The court reiterated that while it was not trying to coerce respondent into disclosing his
disability, it “cannot accommodate a disability that is unknown . . . .” The trial court continued
the initial disposition to another date and found that “because [respondent] has been found guilty
of conduct that is [an] aggravated circumstance, the Department is excused from making
reasonable efforts.” At the continued hearing, respondent moved for substitute counsel,
contending that trial counsel made no effort to contact him or prepare his defense. The court
granted respondent’s request, finding a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. It then noted
that because the initial disposition was “being kicked down the road,” it did not want to delay
respondent’s right to an appeal. It therefore appointed appellate counsel for respondent and entered
an order of disposition placing his minor children with their mother and finding that petitioner was

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“not obligated to provide a reunification plan or other services to the respondent father because of
the aggravated circumstances.”4 This appeal ensued.
II. ADA ACCOMMODATIONS
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by failing to provide him with ADA
accommodations and failing to require that petitioner provide him accommodations in connection
with its reasonable efforts toward reunification. We disagree.
“Whether the ADA has any effect on termination of parental rights proceedings . . .
presents a question of law that we review de novo.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 23-24; 610
NW2d 563 (2000). Generally, “[w]e review for clear error a trial court’s decision regarding
reasonable efforts.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 258; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
The ADA prohibits discrimination as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. [42 USC 12132.]
Respondent contends that the trial court “never provided [him] any accommodations in
compliance with the ADA during the jury trial or afterward.” However, this Court held in Terry,
240 Mich App at 25, “that termination of parental rights proceedings do not constitute ‘services,
programs or activities’ within the meaning of 42 USC 12132.” Therefore, respondent “may not
raise violations of the ADA as a defense to termination of parental rights proceedings” with respect
to the trial court. Id. Further, we note that respondent acknowledged during the adjudication trial
that if the proceedings ended the same day, his request for accommodations “won’t even matter.”
Accordingly, respondent’s argument regarding the trial court’s failure to provide accommodations
is meritless.
Respondent also asserts that “DHHS should have provided reasonable efforts, including
modifications for [respondent’s] disability from the adjudication jury trial until July when the trial
court found DHHS was excused from making reasonable efforts” based on aggravated
circumstances. Respondent failed to preserve this issue by challenging the adequacy of his
reunification services in the trial court, so it is subject to plain-error review. See Sanborn, 337
4 We note that respondent’s parental rights are still intact. At the initial disposition hearing,
petitioner contended that it could succeed in establishing statutory grounds based on respondent’s
criminal convictions but had yet to present testimony concerning best interests. At the continued
hearing, no testimony was presented regarding statutory grounds or best interests, and the trial
court granted respondent’s request for new counsel. Therefore, despite petitioner’s request to
terminate at the initial disposition, a full termination hearing to establish statutory grounds and
best interests has yet to occur.

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Mich App at 258 (noting that unpreserved issues in termination of parental rights proceedings are
reviewed under the plain-error standard).
DHHS “has obligations under the ADA that dovetail with its obligations under the Probate
Code.” Id. at 263 (quotation marks and citation omitted). One of these obligations is “an
affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of
parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). In connection with
these reasonable efforts, DHHS must make reasonable modifications necessary to accommodate a
respondent’s disability under the ADA. Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 263-264. However, it is well-
settled that the duty to reunify a family does not exist where “certain aggravating circumstances
exist.” Id. at 259 (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85
n 4 (recognizing that MCL 712A.19a(2) provides exceptions to DHHS’s duty to make reasonable
efforts toward reunification).
In this case, the trial court found that aggravating circumstances existed based on
respondent’s criminal sexual conduct under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii). See MCL 712A.19a(2)(a)
(providing an exception to the reasonable-efforts requirement where there is a judicial
determination of aggravated circumstances under MCL 722.638). While respondent
acknowledges that the aggravated circumstances excused petitioner from making reunification
efforts, he contends that he should have been provided with modified services between the
adjudication trial and the trial court’s finding of aggravated circumstances. However, this Court
has observed that “[t]he time for asserting the need for accommodation in services is when the
court adopts a service plan . . . .” Terry, 240 Mich App at 27. Because petitioner sought
termination based on aggravated circumstances, no case service plan was required and thus
petitioner’s obligation to provide reunification services, along with any reasonable
accommodations, did not arise.
Further, respondent cannot establish that he was prejudiced by any lack of
accommodations. See Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 258 (noting that, under the plain-error standard,
an error affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the proceedings). “When challenging
the services offered, a respondent must establish that he or she would have fared better if other
services had been offered.” Id. at 264. Respondent’s request for accommodations in the trial court
centered on his impaired memory, for which he requested a memory aid or recording device to
review the proceedings independently. The record does not contain any reference to modified
services that DHHS could have provided to accommodate respondent’s disability. Nor is there
any indication that respondent’s request for a recording device would have aided his interactions
with DHHS. Further, when presented with an opportunity to clarify the reason for his disability
and the need for accommodations, respondent declined to allow testimony on the subject. Without
any explanation of what services DHHS should have offered to accommodate respondent’s needs,
he cannot establish plain error on this basis. See id. at 266 (“Without an identification of services
to accommodate mother’s intellectual disability, we are left to speculate what other services the
DHHS could have offered.”).
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Respondent also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the
adjudication trial because trial counsel failed to (1) request ADA accommodations, (2) cross-

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examine witnesses presented by petitioner, (3) present evidence or witnesses, and (4) object to the
jury’s receipt of respondent’s register of actions in the criminal case during deliberations. We
disagree with each contention.
“Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of fact and law.” In re
Lovitt, 351 Mich App 237, 243; 34 NW3d 645 (2024). The trial court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error and questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. “Clear error exists if the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, our review “is
limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record.” People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 125; 695
NW2d 342 (2005).5
“The principles applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the arena of
criminal law also apply by analogy in child protective proceedings; therefore, it must be shown
that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the respondent.” In re Martin,
316 Mich App 73, 85; 896 NW2d 452 (2016). “To establish prejudice, a party claiming ineffective
assistance must show that but for counsel’s deficient performance, a different result would have
been reasonably probable.” Lovitt, 351 Mich App at 251 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and a party claiming ineffective assistance bears
a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Respondent first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request ADA
accommodations during the trial. As discussed above, respondent’s claim that the trial court was
required to provide him with accommodations is meritless because the proceedings did not
constitute services, programs, or activities under the ADA. And again, respondent acknowledged
that his request for accommodations would not matter if the trial concluded the same day, which
it did. Accordingly, he cannot establish ineffective assistance on this basis. See People v Isrow,
339 Mich App 522, 532; 984 NW2d 528 (2021) (“Failure to raise a futile objection or advance a
meritless argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
We note that respondent’s remaining arguments are insufficiently briefed. While he asserts
that several claims of error constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, his analysis is conclusory.
Respondent does not explain why his claimed errors amount to deficient performance resulting in
prejudice, nor does he support his argument with caselaw. Accordingly, while we briefly address
the nature of his arguments below, we deem the issues abandoned on appeal. See In re Rippy, 330
Mich App 350, 362 n 5; 948 NW2d 131 (2019) (noting that insufficiently briefed issues may be
deemed abandoned).
Respondent maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the
children’s mother or the Children’s Protective Services (CPS) case worker. In support, he argues
only that “[d]uring the jury trial, [trial counsel] did not ask [mother] a single question,” and trial
counsel “also did not ask the ongoing CPS worker . . . any questions.” While true that trial counsel
5 Respondent moved to remand for an evidentiary hearing in this Court, which we denied. See In
re Lox, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 22, 2026 (Docket No. 378301).

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did not cross-examine these witnesses, respondent does not identify why the failure to cross-
examine them amounted to deficient performance, what questions trial counsel should have asked,
or how the lack of cross-examination resulted in prejudice.6 Regardless of whether these two
witnesses were cross-examined, the jury would have learned that respondent was convicted of
CSC-I and CSC-II against AK, making it improbable that any cross-examination would have
produced a different result. Without more, respondent cannot overcome the presumption that he
received the effective assistance of counsel. See also People v Putman, 309 Mich App 240, 248;
870 NW2d 593 (2015) (noting that the party claiming ineffective assistance is tasked with
establishing the factual predicate of the claim).
Respondent also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses to
testify on his behalf. Trial counsel did not call any witnesses at the adjudication trial and
respondent contends that he “could have called several witnesses that would have testified about
AK’s allegations and refuted some of her claims in the criminal case, including Trevor and Jeff
who lived with [respondent].”7 Respondent does not provide any further explanation regarding
the content of Trevor and Jeff’s purported testimony, or how the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different if their testimony was presented. Given that a party claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel bears the burden of proving that trial counsel’s performance was deficient,
respondent’s vague reference to allegedly exculpatory testimony is insufficient to rebut the
presumption that trial counsel performed effectively. See Lovitt, 351 Mich App at 251; Putman,
309 Mich App at 248.
Finally, respondent argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “object to sending
in the register of actions of [respondent’s] criminal case to the jury for purposes of jury
deliberations, before the jury had even asked for it.” Respondent does not appear to be challenging
the admissibility of the register of actions itself, instead focusing on the fact that the jury was
permitted to reference it during deliberations. He does not cite any caselaw or further explain why
allowing the jury to reference an admitted exhibit during deliberations constituted deficient
performance that resulted in prejudice. Accordingly, respondent cannot meet his burden of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.
6 We also note that the children’s mother and CPS worker presented limited testimony. Given the
brevity of their testimony, declining to cross-examine them could have been a reasonable strategic
choice to prevent the introduction of damaging testimony against respondent. Notably, the petition
contained allegations that were not introduced at trial, including that respondent had issues with
alcohol abuse and that he physically abused the children’s mother.
7 Respondent does not identify who Trevor and Jeff are in his brief on appeal, but a review of the
lower court record reveals that Trevor is respondent’s brother and Jeff is respondent’s friend.

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Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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