COA 375333 IN RE ALLEN/CAJAR MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 3/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
March 09, 2026
10:08 AM
In re ALLEN/CAJAR, Minors.
No. 375333
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2022-001142-NA
Before: WALLACE, P.J., and GARRETT and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
minor children, AA, ARC, and ACC, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(i) (parent is unidentifiable and
has deserted the child for 28 or more days), (a)(ii) (parent has deserted the child for 91 or more
days), (c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (other conditions
supporting jurisdiction have not been rectified), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), (j)
(reasonable likelihood of harm if children returned to the parent), (k)(i) (abandonment), and (k)(ii)
(criminal sexual conduct involving penetration).1 Because the trial court did not err by determining
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over AA, ARC, and ACC after petitioner, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), filed a petition seeking temporary custody of
the children. DHHS filed the petition after ACC tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and marijuana
at birth. ACC’s older siblings, AA and ARC, also tested positive for substances at birth. AA
tested positive for marijuana and cocaine, and ARC tested positive for amphetamines, cocaine,
and THC. The petition also alleged that respondent abandoned AA and ARC. AA had been
1 Not all the statutory grounds on which the trial court relied were applicable to respondent; it
appears that some of the grounds were applicable only to the children’s fathers. In any event,
respondent does not challenge the statutory grounds on appeal.

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residing with her paternal grandmother, and ARC was residing with his maternal grandfather. AA
and ARC had been with their grandparents since 2019, three years before the petition was filed.
At that time, respondent was incarcerated in prison, but AA and ARC remained in their
grandparents’ care after respondent was released from prison. Respondent pleaded no contest to
the factual allegations establishing jurisdiction. AA and ARC remained with their respective
grandparent, while ACC was placed with AA’s grandmother as fictive kin.
Respondent’s service plan required her to participate in parenting classes, individual
counseling, family counseling, and weekly random drug screens. It also required her to maintain
regular contact with caseworkers, attend all court hearings, and provide proof of her income and
safe and suitable housing. Respondent was permitted supervised parenting time and offered
supportive parenting time. She was diagnosed with cancer during the lower court proceedings,
and her service plan was adjusted to allow for her treatment. Because respondent was not
participating in her service plan, and more than 15 months had passed since the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the children, the court ordered DHHS to file a petition to terminate respondent’s
parental rights.
Following a statutory-grounds hearing, the trial court determined DHHS had established
the statutory bases for termination. During the best-interests hearing, the caseworker testified that
she discussed possible guardianships with the grandparents caring for the children, but the
grandparents wanted to adopt the children to give them permanency and stability. The trial court
determined that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Respondent now appeals, claiming the trial court’s best-interests determination was erroneous.
II. ANALYSIS
We review for clear error a trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is
in a child’s best interests. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). Clear
error exists “if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In
re Miller, 347 Mich App 420, 425; 15 NW3d 287 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The trial court must order the termination of parental rights if the DHHS established a
statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and a preponderance of the
evidence on the whole record demonstrates that termination is in the children’s best interests. In
re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). When considering a child’s best interests,
the focus is on the child rather than the parent. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346. Factors to
consider include “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.”
In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 476; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (citation omitted). “The trial court
may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her
case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in
care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id. (citation omitted).
The trial court did not clearly err by determining that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. Although respondent had a bond with the children, she
was no closer to having them returned to her care at the end of the proceeding than she was at the
beginning of the proceeding. The children had been in care for two years and five months at the

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time of the best-interests hearing, and respondent’s parenting time had not progressed to
unsupervised. In fact, she had not visited any of the children for eight months and failed to attend
the best-interests hearing.
In response to respondent’s claim that she participated in services, the court recognized
that, although respondent “signed up” for some services, she failed to follow through and
participate. The court characterized respondent’s efforts as “minimal” and “lackluster, to say the
least.” Respondent maintained that her cancer treatments prevented her from attending parenting
time, but even after her treatment was completed and she was permitted to set her own parenting-
time schedule, she failed to attend a single parenting-time session. She also failed to consistently
participate in drug screens, and the few drug screens she submitted tested positive.
The trial court explained that the children needed permanency and stability, and the
caseworker believed that the children’s best chance at permanency and stability was to remain in
their current placements. AA had been with her paternal grandmother since before respondent
went to prison in 2019. ARC lived with his maternal grandfather since 2019, and ACC had lived
with AA’s paternal grandmother, as fictive kin, since he was four months old. The children spent
nearly their entire lives with the grandparents, and AA and ARC expressed their preference to
remain with them.
Respondent contends a guardianship, rather than termination, would have been in the
children’s best interests. A child’s placement with relatives generally weighs against termination
of a parent’s parental rights, In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347, and the appointment of a guardian
is generally made to avoid terminating parental rights, In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 705; 859
NW2d 208 (2014). However, “[a] trial court is not required to establish a guardianship in lieu of
termination if it is not in the child’s best interests to do so.” In re Lombard, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367714); slip op at 6.
Initially, AA’s grandmother had guardianship of AA, and ARC’s grandfather had a power
of attorney for ARC, but both eventually lapsed. Although the grandparents preferred
guardianships early in the proceeding and hoped that respondent would at some point be able to
care for the children, at the time of the best-interests hearing, both grandparents preferred to adopt
the children. The trial court recognized at the best-interests hearing that the grandparents no longer
preferred guardianships instead of termination. The court considered guardianships but concluded
that they would not be in the children’s best interests, stating:
Children need permanency and stability, they need permanent families, they need
forever families. They need to know that the people they are living with are there
and are going to be there. The specter of having this Mother who seems to care for
you, but then doesn’t visit for eight months, popping in and out of your life, is
neither permanent nor stable. And that’s exactly the thing that causes the issues
and problems with these children is the lack of stability and permanency, and that
is essential to their growth and maturation.
The record therefore demonstrates that the trial court considered guardianships and determined
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests so that the

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grandparents caring for the children could adopt them. Respondent has failed to establish that the
court’s determination was clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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