COA 376788 VERLIN SCRIBER V CONSUMERS ENERGY CORPORATION Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/19/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
VERLIN SCRIBER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2026
12:06 PM
v No. 376788
Hillsdale Circuit Court
CONSUMERS ENERGY CORPORATION also
known as CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY,
LC No. 24-000448-NZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MALDONADO and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations) and (8) (failure to state a claim). We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of damage to trees on plaintiff’s property allegedly caused by
defendant’s employees. In February 2022, a transformer on an electrical pole maintained by
defendant malfunctioned, causing power outages at several nearby residences. Defendant
dispatched a repair crew that night to restore service. To reach the transformer that was located
on a neighboring property, the crew allegedly drove through plaintiff’s property and damaged
multiple trees.
In July 2024, plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims for trespass and negligence.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were, in substance,
claims for property damage arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. According to defendant, the
claims were therefore governed by the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., including its one-year
statute of limitations, which rendered plaintiff’s complaint untimely under MCL 500.3145(5).
Plaintiff responded that the no-fault act did not apply because the crew’s conduct fell within an

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exception for intentionally caused damage. Plaintiff argued that, at a minimum, his trespass claim1
was thus subject to the general three-year statute of limitations and was therefore timely.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion, concluding that plaintiff had failed to present
sufficient evidence that the repair crew intended to damage the trees. Plaintiff now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s summary-disposition decision de novo. El-Khalil v Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Questions of statutory interpretation
are also reviewed de novo. Kincaid v Cardwell, 300 Mich App 513, 522; 834 NW2d 122 (2013).
“Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate when the undisputed facts
establish that the plaintiff’s claim is barred under the applicable statute of limitations.” Id. “In
determining whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred because of immunity granted by law, the
reviewing court will accept the allegations stated in the plaintiff’s complaint as true unless
contradicted by documentary evidence.” Id. “The reviewing court must review the pleadings and
supporting evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether the
undisputed facts show that the moving party has immunity.” Id. “If there is no factual dispute,
whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred under the applicable statute of limitations is a matter of law
for the court to determine.” Id. at 523. “However, if the parties present evidence that establishes
a question of fact concerning whether the defendant is entitled to immunity as a matter of law,
summary disposition is inappropriate.” Id. “In those cases, the factual dispute must be submitted
to the jury.” Id.
“A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the
factual allegations in the complaint.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 159 (emphasis omitted). “When
considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the
motion on the pleadings alone.” Id. at 160. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be
granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify
recovery.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. We agree.
The no-fault act abolished tort liability for damages arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle, subject to a few limited exceptions. MCL 500.3135(3).2 The relevant exception here
1 Plaintiff conceded his negligence claim failed and the trial court dismissed the count. Plaintiff
does not challenge this action on appeal.
2 Ordinarily, an insurer is liable to pay property protection insurance (PIP) benefits for accidental
damage to most tangible personal property arising out of its insured’s use of a motor vehicle.
MCL 500.3121-3127. In these situations, benefits are owed under MCL 500.3121 without regard

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preserves tort liability for “[i]ntentionally caused harm to persons or property.”
MCL 500.3135(3)(a). If this exception does not apply,3 the no-fault act controls plaintiff’s trespass
claim, and the no-fault act’s one-year statute of limitations controls. MCL 500.3135(3); see also
MCL 500.3121(1). But if this exception applies, plaintiff’s trespass claim is governed by the
general three-year statute of limitation. See Morse v Colitti, 317 Mich App 526, 551; 896 NW2d
15 (2016), citing MCL 600.5805 and MCL 600.5827. Plaintiff filed his complaint after the no-
fault act’s one-year limitations period had expired, but before the three-year limitations period
applicable to trespass claims had run. Accordingly, the dispositive question here is whether the
intentional-damage exception applies to plaintiff’s claim, thereby rendering the suit timely.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). Under both
subrules, the trial court was required to accept as true all the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint
unless, at least for purposes of (C)(7), documentary evidence provided otherwise. El-Khalil, Inc,
504 Mich at 159-160; Kincaid, 300 Mich App at 522.
Plaintiff specifically alleged in his complaint that defendant’s repair crew “intentionally
drove their trucks directly over Plaintiff’s trees . . . to create a new access path to the pole.” At the
summary dispositional stage, the trial court was required to accept that allegation as true unless
defendant provided documentary evidence contradicting it. Defendant presented no such
evidence. Instead, defendant argued that plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient because
they were unsupported by evidence. That argument impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to
plaintiff. At this stage in the proceedings, plaintiff was not required to prove the allegation; the
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint were sufficient. Because plaintiff adequately
pleaded facts that brought the claim within the intentional-harm exception, the trial court erred by
granting summary disposition.4
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
to fault. But if plaintiff were to assert such a claim in this situation, it would be time-barred, which
is why he must demonstrate that an exception exists warranting recovery outside the scope of the
no-fault act.
3 The parties do not argue that any of the other exceptions are applicable in this case.
4 The parties disagree about whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish the repair
crew’s actual intent. We need not address these arguments, because plaintiff was not required to
provide such evidence at this stage of the proceedings. We also decline to address whether
defendant’s crew had a legal right to enter plaintiff’s property because both parties acknowledge
that this issue has no bearing on whether plaintiff’s complaint was factually sufficient to withstand
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

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