COA 374065 JAMES ALAN VANHAITSMA V ESTATE OF CLAUDE NATHAN MYERS JR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/24/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JAMES ALAN VANHAITSMA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 24, 2026
9:47 AM
v No. 374065
Missaukee Circuit Court
SCOTT MYERS, SR., Personal Representative of
the ESTATE OF CLAUDE NATHAN MYERS, JR.,
LC No. 24-011042-CZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant1 appeals by right the trial court’s December 2, 2024 order denying his motion
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact) and sua
sponte granting summary disposition in plaintiff’s favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2) (opposing party
entitled to judgment). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and defendant were friends and neighbors for many years. Between December
2016 and March 2022, plaintiff loaned varying amounts of money to defendant on five separate
occasions—twice through written agreements, and three times through oral agreements. First, on
December 9, 2016, pursuant to a written agreement (“promissory note”), plaintiff loaned defendant
1 Claude Nathan Myers, Jr., was originally the named defendant in this case, but he passed away
during the pendency of this appeal. This Court thereafter granted a motion to substitute Scott
Myers, Sr., the personal representative of Claude Myers’s estate, as the defendant-appellant in this
case. Vanhaitsma v Estate of Claude Nathan Myers, Jr., unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered April 30, 2026 (Docket No. 374065). For ease and simplicity, this opinion uses
“defendant” to refer to Claude Myers, with the understanding that Scott Myers as the personal
representative of Claude’s estate has now assumed that party status and Claude’s position on
appeal.

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$52,000. Per the terms of the promissory note, defendant agreed to repay the loan in monthly
installments of $8,000 plus 8% interest per annum, and four parcels of land owned by defendant,
totaling to 39.5 acres, were used to secure the loan. Then, pursuant to two oral agreements made
between December 2017 and January 2018, plaintiff loaned defendant a total of $16,500, which
defendant agreed to repay. The parties thereafter entered into another written agreement (“loan
agreement”) on October 29, 2018, in which plaintiff agreed to loan defendant $90,000 and
defendant agreed to repay the loan in monthly installments of $18,000 plus 8% interest per annum.
The same four parcels used to secure the promissory note were also used to secure the loan
agreement. In both written agreements—i.e., the promissory note and the loan agreement—
defendant agreed to pay costs and attorney fees affiliated with enforcement of those agreements in
the event of default. Finally, on March 8, 2022, pursuant to another oral agreement, plaintiff paid
a total of $6,474.25 in back taxes for the 2020 and 2021 tax years on defendant’s four parcels used
to secure the written agreements and on one other parcel owned by defendant, which defendant
agreed to repay.
On January 16, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging that defendant
breached these agreements by failing to fully repay the various loans as promised. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant paid some money toward the written agreements and the first two oral loans, but he
had not repaid any of the back taxes and, across all five loans, he still owed approximately
$156,000, not including the interest, costs, and attorney fees agreed to in the written agreements.
In response, defendant filed an answer in propria persona, in which he generally denied plaintiff’s
allegations that he had received the loans or had not fully repaid them.
Defendant subsequently retained counsel and filed a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff “acknowledged, in his own writing, that [defendant] did
make payments and provide other items of great value to settle any and all outstanding debt(s),”
so “there simply [wa]s no issue of material fact remaining and no damages [we]re due.”
Specifically, defendant asserted that he paid plaintiff $24,000 in December 2017; conveyed to
plaintiff a 50% ownership interest in an 80-acre parcel he owned, which was worth $100,000; and
paid plaintiff $9,000 in June 2019. Defendant asserted that any remaining amount due was repaid
“in 2020 when [plaintiff] took possession of [his] excavator,” which had been parked on the jointly
owned 80-acre parcel. As evidentiary support, defendant attached to his motion, in relevant part:
(1) signed copies of the promissory note and loan agreement; (2) a handwritten note listing various
amounts of money associated with certain dates; (3) a copy of the quitclaim deed conveying a 50%
ownership interest in the 80-acre parcel to plaintiff in August 2018; and (4) several photos of and
documents pertaining to an excavator.2
In his response, plaintiff argued that defendant, as the moving party, did not put forth
sufficient proofs to demonstrate that he was entitled to summary disposition under MCR
2 Defendant also attached documents regarding liens that plaintiff had previously sought to claim
against certain parcels owned by defendant; according to defendant, these documents showed that
defendant had successfully gotten the claimed liens invalidated because some of the parcels
involved—including his 80-acre parcel—had not been used to secure either the promissory note
or loan agreement.

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2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff conceded that he erroneously included the promissory note in his
complaint, as the parties had previously settled the remaining balance of that loan “by an accord
and satisfaction agreement” when defendant conveyed to him a 50% ownership interest in the 80-
acre parcel. Plaintiff maintained, however, that defendant still owed $87,000 plus interest on the
loan agreement, $10,000 on the first two oral loans, $6,474.25 in back taxes, and interest, costs,
and attorney fees in accordance with the loan agreement. As his own evidentiary support, plaintiff
provided receipts showing that he paid $6,474.25 in back taxes for the 2020 and 2021 tax years on
defendant’s parcels in March 2022; a receipt for a $9,000 wire transfer from plaintiff to defendant
in December 2017; and his own affidavit, in which he detailed how much defendant had repaid for
each of the agreed-upon loan amounts, stated that none of the loans were gifts, and further stated
that, except for the 50% ownership interest that was conveyed to satisfy the promissory note’s
balance, the parties never agreed to any other accord and satisfaction to pay off defendant’s
remaining debts. As to defendant’s offered proofs, plaintiff asserted that defendant had provided
nothing to demonstrate the value of the 80-acre parcel or that the parties intended the conveyance
to act as anything beyond an accord and satisfaction for the promissory note; that the handwritten
note offered by defendant had “no signature, no date, [and] no authentication,” and thus did “not
meet the burden necessary to support Defendant’s position”; and that the photos and documents
related to the excavator did nothing to show that plaintiff took the excavator or that the parties had
ever agreed to use the excavator “as a set off” for defendant’s outstanding loan amounts.
The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion, at which the parties argued
consistently with their briefs. The court spent much of the hearing discussing the deficiencies in
defendant’s offered proofs, but also noted that there was “a lot of sloppiness” by both parties
throughout the case. The court stated that, based on the proofs before it, it appeared that there may
be a genuine issue of material fact as to how much defendant repaid toward the written agreements,
but it also appeared that the court could “award summary disposition in favor of the Plaintiff
because the Defendant [did not] challenge” the first two oral agreements or the back taxes. The
court emphasized, however, that it was “not making this ruling right now” and would subsequently
issue a written opinion and order detailing its final ruling so that it had sufficient time to consider
the parties’ arguments and proofs.
The trial court thereafter issued a written opinion and order granting summary disposition
to plaintiff under MCR 2.116(I)(2). The court found that there was no genuine issue of material
fact regarding the promissory note because defendant admitted to breaching it and the record
reflected no genuine dispute that defendant conveyed a 50% ownership interest in his 80-acre
parcel to plaintiff to repay the remaining balance of that loan. The court also found that there was
no genuine issue regarding the $6,474.25 in back taxes because defendant did not contest that
plaintiff had paid this amount and that defendant had not repaid it. The court further found that
there was no genuine issue regarding the first two oral loans because defendant admitted to
breaching them and did not contest that he still owed $10,000 on them. Finally, the court found
that there was no genuine issue regarding the loan agreement because defendant admitted to
breaching it and did not offer evidence to contest that he still owed $87,000 on it plus interest,
costs, and attorney fees, as plaintiff attested in his affidavit.
In making its findings, the trial court noted the deficiencies in the proofs defendant offered
in support of his motion, particularly when considered with plaintiff’s proofs, stating that
defendant had “not provided any affidavits, depositions, proof of all of his payments to [plaintiff],

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an appraised value of the 80-acre parcel . . . , any evidence of value of the excavator,” any evidence
that the loans were gifts, or any evidence that the parties intended the partial conveyance of the
80-acre parcel to “appl[y] to repayment for other loans[.]” As a result of its findings, the court
awarded plaintiff “$87,000 plus attorney fees and 8% interest [per] annum as agreed to in the loan
agreement,” $10,000 for the first two oral loans, and $6,474.25 for the back taxes, all to be paid
by defendant.3 This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.”
Bartalsky v Osborn, 337 Mich App 378, 382; 977 NW2d 574 (2021). A motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim, and it is “properly
granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Cantina Enterprises II, Inc v Property-Owners Ins Co, 349 Mich App 682,
689; 28 NW3d 800 (2024). All evidence submitted by the parties must be viewed “in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” id. at 690, and “shall only be considered to the
extent that the content or substance would be admissible as evidence to establish or deny the
grounds stated in the motion,” MCR 2.116(G)(6). A genuine issue of material fact does not exist
unless “the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might disagree.” Green v
Pontiac Pub Library, 350 Mich App 478, 493; 32 NW3d 487 (2024).
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition, the trial court has the authority to grant
summary disposition in the nonmoving party’s favor sua sponte under MCR 2.116(I) if the
pleadings and supporting proofs demonstrate the nonmoving party’s entitlement to that relief. See
Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485; 781 NW2d 853 (2009); MCR 2.116(I)(1)-(2).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant does not dispute that plaintiff made the loans at issue. He also admits
that he breached the written agreements by not repaying the loans provided through them in a
manner consistent with the agreements’ terms. Defendant, however, maintains that he ultimately
repaid all of the loans in full and, because there was no genuine issue of material fact in that regard,
he was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant further argues that,
even if he were not entitled to summary disposition, the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff
was entitled to summary disposition instead, as there were, at minimum, genuine issues of material
fact regarding what amount, if any, defendant still owed to plaintiff for the loans. We disagree.
As discussed, the only evidence defendant offered to demonstrate that the full amount of
each loan had been repaid was a handwritten note, a copy of the quitclaim deed demonstrating his
conveyance of an ownership interest in his 80-acre parcel to plaintiff, and documents and photos
3 Defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s summary-disposition
determination, which the trial court denied in a written opinion and order for failure to
“demonstrate a palpable error” warranting “a different disposition” as required by MCR
2.119(F)(3). In light of the analysis set forth in this opinion, we see no basis to conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration.

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related to his excavator. Plaintiff, meanwhile, offered an affidavit addressing the date and amount
of the loans he had provided to defendant; the amount, if any, defendant had repaid for each loan;
and the outstanding amount, if any, for each loan. Plaintiff, in his briefing, also pointed out the
deficiencies in defendant’s offered proofs.
The trial court in this case correctly concluded that, based on the evidence before it, there
was no genuine issue of material fact that defendant still owed plaintiff the amounts reflected in
the court’s award to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s affidavit clearly and completely attested to these matters,
and defendant’s proofs were inadequate to demonstrate, or even create a genuine factual dispute,
otherwise. As to the excavator, defendant’s proofs, at most, established his ownership of it;
defendant offered nothing to establish the value of the excavator, that plaintiff removed it from the
80-acre parcel as defendant claimed, or—even assuming plaintiff had removed it—that he did so
as a means of offsetting defendant’s outstanding debts. Meanwhile, plaintiff stated in his affidavit
that he never took defendant’s excavator and that, aside from defendant’s conveyance of an
ownership interest in his 80-acre parcel to satisfy the promissory note’s balance, the parties never
agreed to any other accord and satisfaction to pay off defendant’s remaining debts. Similarly, as
to the conveyance of the ownership interest in his 80-acre parcel, defendant’s proofs established
only that the conveyance occurred and that the parcel had not been used as security for the
promissory note or loan agreement; the proofs offered nothing to create a genuine factual dispute
that the conveyance was done to satisfy a debt other than that owed for the promissory note. And,
as the trial court duly recognized, the timing of the conveyance belies any notion that it may have
been intended to apply to the debt owed under the loan agreement, as the conveyance occurred in
August 2018 and the parties did not enter into the loan agreement until October 2018.
Lastly, regarding the handwritten note, it too was inadequate to create a genuine factual
dispute regarding the amounts defendant still owed to plaintiff. For the trial court to properly
consider the note in connection with its summary-disposition determination, defendant was
required to demonstrate that the content or substance of the note was at least plausibly admissible.
See Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 373-374;
775 NW2d 618 (2009); see also MCR 2.116(G)(6). At no point, however, has defendant even
attempted to do so. And although defendant asserts that the note was handwritten by plaintiff and
that it detailed payments he made to plaintiff in relation to the loans at issue, nothing in the record
substantiates this assertion—not even the note itself. The note is not dated or signed by either
party, and does not make any mention of the parties. Nor, for that matter, is it clear from the
substance of the note what amount, if any, was owed to whom, let alone who had paid whom or
what those alleged payments went toward. The note simply lists specific amounts of money
associated with specific dates. None of this is sufficient to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute
regarding the amounts defendant still owed plaintiff, let alone to prove defendant owed nothing
and was entitled to summary disposition.4
4 On appeal, defendant also provides to this Court three affidavits, all apparently created and signed
by plaintiff on February 16, 2022. According to defendant, the substance of these affidavits differs
materially from the affidavit plaintiff provided to the trial court in response to defendant’s motion
for summary disposition, rendering the court’s reliance on that latter affidavit erroneous.

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Resisting this conclusion, defendant highlights the trial court’s statements at the motion
hearing about there being genuine issues of material fact. The court, however, repeatedly made
clear at that hearing that it was not making a final ruling that day. And it is also clear from the
court’s final ruling that the court, after further considering the parties’ arguments and proofs,
ultimately reached a different conclusion than its preliminary assessment at the motion hearing.
For the reasons discussed, there was no error in the trial court doing so based on the arguments
and proofs before it. Similarly, defendant criticizes the trial court for improperly “conduct[ing] its
own research” when rendering its summary-disposition ruling, presumably based on the trial
court’s comment in its written opinion and order that it had viewed publicly available information
regarding the history and status of defendant’s parcels that was “not presented to it by the parties.”
The trial court, however, also emphasized that its ruling did “not take into consideration these
facts” and that it had only referenced them “to simply demonstrate that sloppiness [wa]s the
hallmark of this case from both sides.” Nothing in the trial court’s ruling suggests otherwise.
Defendant has not shown error on this basis, either.5
In sum, we see no error in the trial court’s determination that plaintiff was entitled to the
specific amounts awarded because, on the record before the court, there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the amount of each loan still owed to plaintiff by defendant. We therefore
Defendant, however, did not provide or even mention these prior affidavits to the trial court in
connection with his motion for summary disposition. And while he made some reference to a prior
affidavit in his motion for reconsideration, he did not elaborate on its content or seemingly provide
a copy to the court at that juncture, either. These affidavits thus do not provide a proper basis for
assigning error to the trial court’s summary-disposition ruling. See, e.g., Maiden v Rozwood, 461
Mich 109, 125 n 9; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56;
649 NW2d 783 (2002). Moreover, defendant does not meaningfully explain, and we fail to see,
how the content of these affidavits, when taken together with the other proofs that had been
properly provided to the trial court, would demonstrate that plaintiff was not entitled to summary
disposition.
5 Defendant also asserts that the trial court, through some of its statements, demonstrated a
“personal bias in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant” and that “such bias formed the basis of
its holding.” Specifically, defendant takes issue with the court’s statement at the motion hearing
that plaintiff’s “generosity that [he] gave a friend [wa]s commendable” and was “expect[ed] from
good Christian people living in a nice community like this,” as well as the court’s statement in its
order denying reconsideration that defendant “came to this case and the summary disposition
motion with unclean hands and bad faith” and “continues to do so now.” Defendant, however, has
not meaningfully briefed the merits of this issue, leaving it improperly presented for this Court’s
review. See Traverse City Record-Eagle v Traverse City Area Pub Schs Bd of Educ, 337 Mich
App 281, 296; 975 NW2d 104 (2021); Dunn v Bennett, 303 Mich App 767, 775; 846 NW2d 75
(2013). Furthermore, from what we can glean from the record before us, we do not see in these
comments “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible”
and would be sufficient to overcome the “heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Kern v
Kern-Koskela, 320 Mich App 212, 231-232; 905 NW2d 453 (2017) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).

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see no error in the trial court’s determination that plaintiff, rather than defendant, was entitled to
summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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