COA 373220 DOUGLAS LANCASTER V COSMOPOLITAN HOMES INC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
DOUGLAS LANCASTER and DIANA
LANCASTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
BRIANNA LANCASTER,
Plaintiff,
UNPUBLISHED
September 10, 2026
10:36 AM
v No. 373220
Wayne Circuit Court
COSMOPOLITAN HOMES, INC., and DAN
WICKER,
LC No. 17-003533-CH
Defendants-Appellants,
and
VLADISLAV SAFIR, ALVERS, LLC, CITY
TRENDS REALTY, LLC, and YOUSSEF
DAKROUB,
Defendants.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a remand by this Court,1 defendants, Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc., and Dan Wicker,
appeal as of right the trial court’s order requiring the return of case-evaluation sanctions paid after
1 Lancaster v Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued December 29, 2020 (Docket No. 347678).

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the first trial. Defendants also challenge the court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration and
its refusal to sanction plaintiffs, Douglas and Diana Lancaster. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is the second time this dispute has reached this Court. Plaintiffs purchased a home in
Taylor, Michigan, from Cosmopolitan Homes in February 2016 for use by their granddaughter,
Brianna Lancaster. Before the sale, defendants provided a seller’s disclosure statement stating that
there was no known history of water in the basement. A few months after Brianna moved in, the
basement walls began leaking after a heavy rainfall. Plaintiffs and Brianna later sued
Cosmopolitan Homes, Wicker, and several other defendants, alleging fraud, innocent
misrepresentation, silent fraud, breach of contract, and violations of the Seller’s Disclosure Act
(SDA), MCL 565.951 et seq. Lancaster v Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 29, 2020 (Docket No. 347678), pp 1-2.
Before the first trial, the case was submitted to case evaluation. The panel entered a $6,000
evaluation against Wicker in plaintiffs’ favor. The panel did not enter an evaluation for
Cosmopolitan Homes. Plaintiffs rejected the evaluation.
The first trial ended in a directed verdict for defendants after the trial court denied plaintiffs
a brief adjournment to secure the testimony of Cletis Nichols, a witness who had stated that he
personally informed Wicker about the home’s history of water damage. During plaintiffs’ appeal
from the directed verdict, the trial court awarded defendants $43,911.08 in case-evaluation
sanctions. The parties then entered a stipulated order under which plaintiffs paid $48,000, or 110%
of the sanctions award, to defendants’ counsel. The order provided that the funds were the property
of defendants’ counsel and that plaintiffs had no right to them, except that:
There are no rights of these Plaintiffs in the said monies provided however in the
event the Michigan Court of Appeals (and the Michigan Supreme Court if
applicable) reverse and remand the matter for trial so that these plaintiffs are
deemed the prevailing parties, then plaintiffs shall be entitled to reimbursement of
monies paid.
On appeal, this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs’
requested adjournment and that, had Nichols testified consistently with his affidavit, defendants
would not have been entitled to a directed verdict on plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, innocent
misrepresentation, silent fraud, and violation of the SDA. Lancaster, unpub op at 3-5. We
therefore reversed the directed verdict as to those claims and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 4,
12-13. Our Supreme Court denied defendants’ application for leave to appeal. Lancaster v
Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc, 508 Mich 895 (2021).
The case was retried in October 2023. The jury found that Wicker, but not Cosmopolitan
Homes, committed silent fraud and violated the SDA. It found both defendants liable for innocent
misrepresentation. The jury awarded plaintiffs $4,344 against Cosmopolitan Homes and
$4,344.05 against Wicker, for an aggregate verdict of $8,688.05.
Wicker then moved for case-evaluation sanctions under former MCR 2.403(O). He argued
that the $4,344.05 verdict against him was not more than 10% above the $6,000 case evaluation

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and that defendants were therefore entitled to retain the sanctions paid after the first trial and to
recover additional sanctions for the retrial. Plaintiffs responded that the first sanctions award could
no longer stand after reversal of the directed verdict and that the $8,688.05 aggregate verdict was
more favorable than the $6,000 aggregate evaluation. The trial court denied Wicker’s motion. It
reasoned that the case-evaluation award should be considered together as to Wicker and
Cosmopolitan Homes and that plaintiffs’ total verdict exceeded the evaluation by more than 10%.
Plaintiffs later moved for return of the $48,000 paid under the stipulated order. The court
granted the motion, ordered defendants’ counsel to return the funds, and directed that they be held
in plaintiffs’ counsel’s client trust account pending further order. In doing so, the court concluded
that this Court’s reversal had eliminated the verdict on which the first sanctions award rested and
that plaintiffs had prevailed at the retrial. The court later denied defendants’ motion for
reconsideration. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. CASE-EVALUATION SANCTIONS
Defendants principally argue that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties after the retrial
because the jury awarded only $4,344.05 against Wicker, less than the $6,000 case-evaluation
award. They also argue that plaintiffs’ motion for return of the $48,000 was inadequately briefed
and that defense counsel had no obligation to provide an accounting of those funds. We disagree.
“When MCR 2.403(O) was in effect, a trial court’s decision whether to grant case-
evaluation sanctions under that subrule presented a question of law, which this Court reviews de
novo.” Webster v Osguthorpe, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 166627
and 166628); slip op at 10. Whether the verdict was sufficiently favorable to avoid sanctions is
likewise reviewed de novo. Id. We also review the interpretation and application of court rules
de novo. Dawley v Hall, 501 Mich 166, 169; 905 NW2d 863 (2018).
MCR 2.403 was amended effective January 1, 2022, to eliminate case-evaluation
sanctions. Webster, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 3. Under MCR 1.102, however, a trial court has
discretion to permit a pending action to proceed under the former rules when application of the
amended rules would not be feasible or would work injustice. Id. at ___; slip op at 11-12. Here,
the parties and the trial court proceeded under former MCR 2.403(O), and neither side argues on
appeal that doing so was error. We therefore address the parties’ arguments under the former rule.
We first consider defendants’ contention that plaintiffs’ motion for return of the $48,000
was fatally deficient because the supporting brief cited only MCR 2.403(O). MCR 2.119(A)(2)
provides that a motion presenting an issue of law “must be accompanied by a brief citing the
authority on which it is based.” Defendants are correct that courts are not the parties’ research
assistants. Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 293;
14 NW3d 472 (2023). Briefs should contain the argument, facts, and law necessary to resolve the
dispute. City of Westland v Kodlowski, 298 Mich App 647, 662; 828 NW2d 67 (2012), rev’d in
part on other grounds 495 Mich 871 (2013).
However, plaintiffs did not simply announce a request for $48,000 and leave the court to
invent a theory. Their motion identified the stipulated order, explained that this Court had reversed

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and remanded for retrial, asserted that plaintiffs had prevailed at the retrial, and cited former
MCR 2.403(O) as the governing rule. More importantly, the same case-evaluation question had
already been fully litigated on Wicker’s motion for sanctions, which the trial court denied only
months earlier. The court plainly understood both the issue and plaintiffs’ legal theory.
MCR 2.119(A)(2) did not require the court to disregard an otherwise supported motion merely
because the accompanying brief was short. Defendants have shown no error on this ground.
Turning to the merits, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ verdict was not sufficiently
favorable to preclude case-evaluation sanctions. Former MCR 2.403(O)(1) generally required a
party who rejected a case evaluation to pay the opposing party’s actual costs unless the verdict was
more favorable to the rejecting party than the evaluation. Former MCR 2.403(O)(3) provided that
a verdict was more favorable to a plaintiff if it was more than 10% above the evaluation. The rule
was intended to encourage settlement and shift the costs of continued litigation to a party who
rejected an evaluation and failed to obtain a sufficiently better result. Dessart v Burak, 252 Mich
App 490, 498; 652 NW2d 669 (2002), aff’d 470 Mich 37 (2004).
For cases involving multiple parties, former MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) provided that the court
generally was required to compare “only the amount of the evaluation and verdict as to the
particular pair of parties, rather than the aggregate evaluation or verdict as to all parties.” The rule
then provided, however, that “costs may not be imposed on a plaintiff who obtains an aggregate
verdict more favorable to the plaintiff than the aggregate evaluation.” Thus, a plaintiff who obtains
a sufficiently favorable aggregate verdict is protected from case-evaluation sanctions even when
the pair-by-pair comparison would point the other way.
Consistent with that language, Frank v William A Kibbe & Assoc, Inc, 208 Mich App 346,
354; 527 NW2d 82 (1995), held that an aggregate verdict is “more favorable” for purposes of
MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) only if it exceeds the aggregate evaluation by more than the 10% required by
MCR 2.403(O)(3). Broadway Coney Island, Inc v Commercial Union Ins Cos, 217 Mich App
109, 115-116; 550 NW2d 838 (1996), applied the same rule.
Here, the case-evaluation panel entered a $6,000 evaluation against Wicker but entered no
evaluation as to Cosmopolitan Homes. Thus, the aggregate case evaluation was $6,000. At trial,
however, the jury awarded plaintiffs $4,344 against Cosmopolitan Homes and $4,344.05 against
Wicker, producing an aggregate verdict of $8,688.05. Because $8,688.05 exceeds $6,000 by more
than 10%, plaintiffs obtained an aggregate verdict more favorable than the aggregate evaluation.
Former MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) therefore prohibited the imposition of case-evaluation sanctions.
Frank, 208 Mich App at 354; Broadway Coney Island, 217 Mich App at 115-116.
Defendants emphasize that the jury separately considered Wicker and Cosmopolitan
Homes and separately allocated damages. But that is precisely why the two comparisons produce
different results. Looking only at Wicker, the $4,344.05 verdict was less favorable to plaintiffs
than the $6,000 evaluation. Looking at the case in the aggregate, however, plaintiffs recovered
$8,688.05 against the two defendants on a $6,000 aggregate evaluation. Former
MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) expressly protects a plaintiff who obtains the more favorable aggregate
result.

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Defendants further contend that the aggregate-verdict provision does not apply because the
evaluation panel entered no award as to Cosmopolitan Homes. But defendants identify no
authority imposing such a limitation, and the text of former MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) contains none.
See Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr Managers, LLC,
282 Mich App 410, 413; 766 NW2d 874 (2009) (“An appellant may not merely announce its
position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for its claims, unravel or
elaborate its argument, or search for authority for its position. Insufficiently briefed issues are
deemed abandoned on appeal.”). The absence of an evaluation as to Cosmopolitan Homes
therefore does not alter the aggregate comparison.
The same conclusion resolves defendants’ claim to retain the $48,000 paid after the first
trial. The parties’ stipulated order provided for reimbursement if this Court reversed and remanded
for trial and plaintiffs were thereafter deemed the prevailing parties. Both conditions were
satisfied. This Court reversed the directed verdict and remanded for a new trial, and, for the
reasons already explained, plaintiffs’ aggregate verdict after retrial was sufficiently favorable
under former MCR 2.403(O) to preclude case-evaluation sanctions. Plaintiffs therefore satisfied
the condition for reimbursement, and the trial court did not err by ordering the return of the
$48,000.
Defendants also argue that their counsel had no obligation to provide plaintiffs an
accounting of the $48,000. An accounting is an equitable remedy used to determine what amount
is due to a party. Basinger v Provident Life & Accident Ins Co, 67 Mich App 1, 6-7; 239 NW2d
735 (1976). The trial court did not order an accounting; it ordered the return of a fixed and
undisputed amount, $48,000. Because the trial court imposed no accounting requirement,
defendants’ challenge to such a requirement is moot. See In re Pollack Trust, 309 Mich App 125,
154; 867 NW2d 884 (2015).
B. SANCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
Defendants next argue that plaintiffs should have been sanctioned under MCR 1.109(E)
because their motion for return of the funds was not adequately supported by law. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision regarding sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Legacy
Custom Builders, Inc v Rogers, 345 Mich App 514, 522; 8 NW3d 207 (2023). A court abuses its
discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, and it
necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n,
499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016). The interpretation of a court rule presents a question
of law that we review de novo. Dawley, 501 Mich at 169.
MCR 1.109(E)(5) provides that an attorney’s signature on a filed document certifies,
among other things, that the document is “well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” If a
document is signed in violation of that requirement, MCR 1.109(E)(6) requires the court to impose
an appropriate sanction. The rule principally addresses frivolous court filings. Bradley v Frye-
Chaiken, 514 Mich 679, 705; 22 NW3d 458 (2024).

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There was no violation here. Plaintiffs relied on the stipulated order, this Court’s reversal
and order of remand, and former MCR 2.403(O). As discussed, those authorities supported the
relief plaintiffs requested. The fact that their brief was concise did not render the motion frivolous
or unwarranted by existing law.
Defendants rely on Wolfson v Grech, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued December 19, 2006 (Docket No. 269930), pp 3-4. Unpublished opinions are “not
precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis.” MCR 7.215(C)(1). Wolfson is
distinguishable in any event. There, this Court upheld an award of sanctions when the movant
supplied neither factual nor legal support for the allegations at issue. Wolfson, unpub op at 3-4.
In this matter, plaintiffs cited the governing court rule and sought relief grounded in the stipulated
order and the procedural history of this case. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by
declining to sanction them.2
C. RECONSIDERATION
Finally, defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
reconsideration. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s denial of reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Farm Bureau
Ins Co v TNT Equip, Inc, 328 Mich App 667, 672; 939 NW2d 738 (2019). Under
MCR 2.119(F)(3), the moving party must “demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and
the parties have been misled” and show that correcting the error requires a different disposition.
Sanders v McLaren-Macomb, 323 Mich App 254, 264; 916 NW2d 305 (2018). A palpable error
is one that is plain, obvious, or readily apparent. Luckow Estate v Luckow, 291 Mich App 417,
426; 805 NW2d 453 (2011). Although a trial court has considerable discretion to reconsider an
earlier ruling, including discretion to give a litigant a “second chance” even when nothing new is
presented, it is not required to do so. Sanders, 323 Mich App at 264-265; Yoost v Caspari, 295
Mich App 209, 220; 813 NW2d 783 (2012).
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration reiterated that plaintiffs’ motion for return of the
$48,000 lacked adequate legal support, that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties after retrial, and
that the verdicts against Wicker and Cosmopolitan Homes could not be considered in the
aggregate. We have rejected each of those arguments. Defendants therefore failed to establish a
palpable error requiring a different disposition, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying reconsideration.
Defendants alternatively argue that, even if reimbursement was required, the repayment
obligation belonged to defendants rather than their counsel. Their appellate brief offers no
2 Defendants’ statement of the issues presented on appeal also invokes former MCR 2.114(D)(2),
but their appellate brief does not develop an argument explaining how that former rule
independently requires sanctions. That undeveloped argument is abandoned. Greater Bethesda
Healing Springs Ministry, 282 Mich App at 413.

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authority supporting that proposition, and we need not develop the argument for them. Greater
Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry, 282 Mich App at 413. In any event, the stipulated order
required plaintiffs to pay the $48,000 directly to defendants’ counsel and declared those funds
counsel’s property unless the stated condition occurred. It also provided that plaintiffs would be
entitled to reimbursement if it did. Once that condition occurred, the trial court did not err by
ordering the holder of the funds to return them.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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