COA 371069 JILL P MITCHELL V BRYAN J MITCHELL Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 3/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JILL P. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
March 09, 2026
2:36 PM
v No. 371069; 371147
Marquette Circuit Court
Family Division
BRYAN J. MITCHELL, LC No. 2011-048682-DM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 371069, plaintiff appeals as of right an order denying her request to obtain
postjudgment attorney fees from defendant. In Docket No. 371147, plaintiff appeals by leave
granted1 a portion of the same order where the court denied her request for additional spousal
support beyond that contained in the parties’ 2012 judgment of divorce. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married for approximately 23 years and divorced in 2012. The judgment
of divorce incorporated a voluntary separation agreement requiring defendant to pay spousal
support in the amount of $3,000 per month for a period of ten years. The award was expressly
modifiable in amount and duration and terminated upon plaintiff’s remarriage or death. Over the
ten-year term, defendant accumulated substantial arrearages and was subject to contempt findings
and enforcement proceedings. Ultimately, defendant made lump-sum payments that extinguished
the arrearage, including a significant payment in January 2023.
In October 2023, following the expiration of the ten-year support period, plaintiff filed two
postjudgment petitions: one seeking interim spousal support and attorney fees, and another seeking
1 Mitchell v Mitchell, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 7, 2024 (Docket
No. 371147).

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modification of spousal support, additional attorney fees, and other equitable relief. Plaintiff
alleged that defendant had historically failed to comply with support obligations and that she
lacked the ability to pay attorney fees necessary to pursue further litigation. Defendant did not file
written responses but contested plaintiff’s allegations at two hearings held in December 2023 and
February 2024. During the February 2024 hearing, plaintiff made an oral motion for partial
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), (C)(9) (failure to state a
valid defense), and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Plaintiff asserted that defendant
had not filed a written response and had failed to categorically deny her allegations. She argued
that she was therefore entitled to interim support and attorney fees as a matter of law.
The trial court rejected the request, explaining that postjudgment domestic relations
proceedings are not typical civil actions and that defendant’s appearance and participation sufficed
to contest the petitions. The court subsequently entered an order denying plaintiff’s requests for
modification of spousal support, attorney fees, and other equitable relief. Plaintiff moved for
reconsideration. The court denied the motion. These appeals followed.2
II. ANALYSIS
A. DOCKET NO. 371069
1. SUMMARY DISPOSITION ON ATTORNEY FEES
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying her oral motion for summary disposition
regarding attorney fees because defendant did not file written responses to her petitions. We
disagree.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Lockwood
v Twp of Ellington, 323 Mich App 392, 400; 917 NW2d 413 (2018).
The trial court concluded that defendant acted appropriately by showing up for the hearing
on the petitions and defending himself against them. It stated that a “lawsuit” was not at issue and
that the divorce proceedings were one continuous matter. It thus declined to grant plaintiff’s oral
motion for summary disposition. We find no error in the trial court’s decision. MCR 2.116
governs motions for summary disposition and contemplates the disposition of “a claim.”
MCR 2.116(B)(1). Even assuming that plaintiff’s postjudgment petitions may be treated as claims
for purposes of the rule, her reliance on MCR 2.116(C)(8), (9), and (10) was misplaced. Subrule
(C)(8) applies when “the opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”
Defendant did not file a petition and was not stating any claim in this matter. Likewise, subrule
(C)(9) applies when “[t]he opposing party has failed to state a valid defense to the claim asserted
against him or her,” and subrule (C)(10) applies when “except as to the amount of damages, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial
judgment as a matter of law.” Defendant appeared at the hearing and expressly disputed plaintiff’s
2 This Court, on its own motion, consolidated the two appeals. See Mitchell v Mitchell,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 7, 2024 (Docket Nos. 371069;
371147).

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factual allegations. He addressed the claimed arrearages, explained the financial circumstances
surrounding any prior nonpayment, and asserted that he had been financially burdened by the
protracted litigation. Summary disposition is inappropriate where factual issues remain
unresolved. Because defendant contested the factual basis for plaintiff’s petitions, the trial court
properly declined to grant summary disposition.
2. DECLARATORY RELIEF
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant declaratory relief
regarding language in an August 2017 order. We disagree.
Plaintiff’s briefing is not entirely clear,3 but she appears to take issue with the statement in
the 2017 order that the court had “previously determined that the Judgment of Divorce did not
require replacement of the equivalent” value of a Michigan property known as “the Saux Head
property”. She further maintains that the court instead required indemnity in the event that plaintiff
or her trust “became liable for [defendant’s] business debts ordered secured by the property.”
“Questions of law relative to declaratory judgment actions are reviewed de novo, but the
trial court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
Barrow v Detroit Election Comm’n, 305 Mich App 649, 662; 854 NW2d 489 (2014) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
However, this issue is not properly before us in Docket No. 371069. Plaintiff’s appeal as
of right in this matter is limited to the portion of the postjudgment order denying attorney fees.
MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv); MCR 7.203(A)(1). Issues unrelated to the attorney-fee ruling fall outside
this Court’s jurisdiction in this appeal. See Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Michalek, 330 Mich App
138, 143; 946 NW2d 812 (2019). Moreover, the Saux Head property issues were previously
litigated before this Court in Mitchell v Mitchell (Mitchell I), unpublished per curiam opinion of
the Court of Appeals, issued October 15, 2020 (Docket Nos. 346774 and 349209).4 Plaintiff
cannot relitigate matters that were or could have been raised in a prior appeal.
3. ATTORNEY FEES
3 Plaintiff is representing herself on appeal. Although self-represented litigants must abide by the
court rules, Bachor v Detroit, 49 Mich App 507, 512; 212 NW2d 302 (1973), we generally allow
these litigants a measure of leniency not typically afforded to parties proceeding with the assistance
of counsel. Hein v Hein, 337 Mich App 109, 115; 972 NW2d 337 (2021).
4 This Court dismissed the prior appeal because of plaintiff’s failure to provide pertinent
transcripts. Mitchell I, unpub op at 6. This Court also directly addressed the issue plaintiff
currently raises, i.e., that there was a misstatement in the lower court’s August 2017 order. Id.,
unpub op at 12.

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Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant attorney fees. We
disagree.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding attorney fees in a
domestic relations matter. Richards v Richards, 310 Mich App 683, 699; 874 NW2d 704 (2015).
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the result falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id.
Under MCR 3.206(D), attorney fees may be awarded if the requesting party demonstrates
either (1) inability to bear the expense of the action and the other party’s ability to pay, or (2) that
fees were incurred because the opposing party refused to comply with a prior order despite the
ability to do so. See MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) and (b).
Here, plaintiff asserted that defendant’s conduct forced her to incur attorney fees.
However, she did not provide billing statements, affidavits, itemizations, or documentation
identifying the amount of fees incurred or explaining the services rendered in relation to any prior
litigation.5 Nor did she identify with specificity how particular fees were directly attributable to
defendant’s alleged noncompliance. In Stackhouse v Stackhouse, 193 Mich App 437, 445; 484
NW2d 723 (1992), this Court stated:
This Court has . . . held that an award of legal fees is authorized where the
party requesting payment of the fees has been forced to incur them as a result of the
other party’s unreasonable conduct in the course of the litigation. A trial court has
the discretion to award such fees as are necessary and reasonable, and a court’s
determination in this regard will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion. [Citation omitted.]
The court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award attorney fees because plaintiff failed to
make a showing of necessity and reasonableness.
Plaintiff also sought prospective attorney fees to “carry on” the litigation. She argued that
such fees were warranted under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) because she was allegedly impoverished
while defendant was employed. While such awards are permissible in appropriate circumstances,
see Stallworth v Stallworth, 275 Mich App 282, 288; 738 NW2d 264 (2007), plaintiff has not
demonstrated that additional litigation was necessary or that she was unable to retain counsel
without such an award.
Although plaintiff claimed financial hardship, the record reflects that defendant satisfied
his remaining spousal support obligation through a lump-sum payment. Additionally, plaintiff’s
assertion that she was unable to work because she was administering a “modest” estate following
her aunt’s death did not establish a continuing inability to earn income. This is particularly true
given the timing of the petitions, which were filed after her last surviving aunt passed away. Thus,
5 Notably, plaintiff represented herself for the purposes of the petitions at issue.

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for all the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s denial of both lump-sum and ongoing attorney fees
was within the range of principled outcomes.6
B. DOCKET NO. 371147
1. SUMMARY DISPOSITION–SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred with regard to her oral motion for summary
disposition concerning interim spousal support. For the same reasons discussed in Section II(A)(1)
above, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s oral motion for summary disposition
concerning interim spousal support. Defendant’s appearance and opposition to plaintiff’s motion
precluded summary disposition.
2. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Plaintiff claims she was entitled to spousal support, both interim and ongoing, beyond that
ordered in the judgment of divorce. She contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant her
additional spousal support. We disagree.
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding regarding whether spousal support
should be revisited. Ackerman v Ackerman, 197 Mich App 300, 301-302; 495 NW2d 173 (1992).
“A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court, on all the evidence present on the record, is left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 302. A spousal support award
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App 21, 25; 826 NW2d 152
(2012).
Although the judgment expressly permitted modification, plaintiff bore the burden of
demonstrating new facts or changed circumstances arising after entry of the prior order to warrant
modification. Luckow v Luckow, 291 Mich App 417, 424; 805 NW2d 453 (2011). Plaintiff relied
primarily on three asserted changes: defendant’s new employment, prior missed support payments,
and financial consequences related to the Saux Head property. As to defendant’s employment,
plaintiff presented no evidence regarding his expenses, debts, or overall financial condition. A
change in employment alone does not mandate modification; the court must evaluate the totality
of circumstances, including the parties’ respective needs and abilities to pay. See id. at 424;
Ackerman, 197 Mich App at 301. Further, plaintiff did not present evidence to demonstrate that
equity required revisiting the support award. Defendant’s prior missed payments have also been
fully satisfied, and issues concerning the Saux Head property were previously addressed by this
Court. Plaintiff already obtained a substantial judgment related to the Saux Head matter.
6 Plaintiff also briefly contends that the trial court’s order was too brief and failed to include
necessary findings. However, we conclude that the order and the record, read together, are
sufficient for meaningful appellate review.

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Ultimately, the trial court’s determination that plaintiff failed to establish a material change
in circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Its decision to deny modification was therefore not
an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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