COA 373766 CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE V TNITHA BARNES Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/23/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE,
doing business as CURE AUTO INSURANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
June 23, 2026
10:05 AM
v No. 373766
Oakland Circuit Court
TNITHA BARNES, LC No. 2023-202069-CK
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ALWAYZ ON TIME TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
TNITHA BARNES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 373770
Oakland Circuit Court
DONALD RIEMAN, C & J PARKING LOT
SWEEPING LLC, and C & J PARKING LOT
SWEEPING, INC.,
LC No. 2022-195729-NI
Defendants,
and
CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and MURRAY and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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In these no-fault actions consolidated below and on appeal,1 plaintiff2 Citizens United
Reciprocal Exchange (CURE) appeals as of right the trial court’s orders denying its motion for
summary disposition asserting entitlement to rescission of defendant3 Tnitha Barnes’s no-fault
policy, and its motion for reconsideration.4 We reverse and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 28, 2022, Barnes applied for car insurance from CURE for coverage on a 2006
Nissan Altima and a 2014 Ford Fusion. The insurance certificate lists both vehicles with a policy
period from January 29, 2022 to July 29, 2022.
On March 13, 2022, Barnes got into an accident while driving the 2014 Fusion. Several
months later, she filed suit claiming personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits against CURE5
related to the accident (LC No. 22-195729-NI). In a separate action for declaratory relief, CURE
alleged that Barnes made material misrepresentations in her insurance application by failing to
identify her child, Karin Barnes, as a member of her household, or as the registrant of the 2006
Altima, and that had it known the truth it would not have issued the policy. Thus, CURE claimed,
it was entitled to a declaration that Barnes’s policy was void ab initio.
The trial court consolidated the cases, and CURE moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing that it is
entitled to a declaration that the CURE Policy is void ab initio as a matter of law
on [Barnes’s] material misrepresentations in procuring the CURE Policy and to
dismissal of [Barnes’s] claims as rescission would nullify all coverages under the
CURE Policy.
1 CURE v Barnes, unpublished order of the Court of Appeal, entered December 23, 2024 (Docket
Nos. 373766; 373770).
2 CURE is the plaintiff in LC No. 23-202069-CK and Docket No. 373766, but the defendant in LC
No. 22-195729-NI and Docket No. 373770.
3 Barnes is a defendant in LC No. 23-202069-CK and Docket No. 373766, but the plaintiff in LC
No. 22-195729-NI and Docket No. 373770.
4 The actual order appealed from is the stipulation for final judgment with retention of appellate
rights, which states that CURE and Barnes
have agreed to dismiss case number 2023-202069-CK and 2022-195729-NI with
prejudice as to No-Fault benefits incurred through November 22, 2024, but this
order is entered expressly reserving the right to appeal as an aggrieved party to
allow CURE to appeal this Court’s [summary disposition] Court Order and the
[motion for reconsideration] Court Order, where this Court ruled that CURE was
not permitted to rescind the CURE Policy . . . .
5 The other defendants in this suit are not parties to this appeal.

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In response, Barnes argued that CURE failed to demonstrate it suffered injury as a result
of any alleged misrepresentation because there was no evidence that ownership of the Altima was
material to any coverage determination made, Karin was not a household member as she had
returned indefinitely to Atlanta for college, and “even if Karin did need to be disclosed to CURE
as a household member, there again would be no injury and no materiality of that disclosure to this
crash as it is undisputed Karin was not involved in the crash . . . .” CURE replied to Barnes’s
arguments, and the court held a hearing at which it denied CURE summary disposition, reasoning
that “material facts are in dispute here as to whether there was a material misrepresentation that
would have resulted in [CURE] denying coverage for the 2014 Fusion as opposed to the 2006
Altima”. Specifically, the court found that the alleged misrepresentations pertained to a vehicle
not involved in the accident, Karin was not involved in the accident or seeking PIP benefits, Karin
was at school at the time of the accident, and the Altima did not appear to have been operable.
The court subsequently denied CURE’s motion for reconsideration, and CURE then
applied for leave to appeal the court’s decisions in this Court, before stipulating to dismiss that
appeal,6 and for entry of final judgment with retention of appellate rights. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
CURE argues that the trial court erred by finding a question of fact regarding the materiality
of Barnes’s misrepresentations and denying summary disposition on that basis.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Given that the court considered evidence beyond the pleadings and found genuine issues
of material fact, it appears the court denied summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We
review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Yopek v Brighton
Airport Ass’n, Inc, 343 Mich App 415, 422; 997 NW2d 481 (2022). A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504
Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).
When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted
by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves
open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted).]
B. MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION
“Insurance policies are contracts and, in the absence of an applicable statute, are subject to
the same contract construction principles that apply to any other species of contract.” Titan Ins
Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547, 554; 817 NW2d 562 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
6 CURE v Barnes, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 28, 2025 (Docket
No. 373246).

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“[B]ecause insurance policies are contracts common-law defenses may be invoked to avoid
enforcement of an insurance policy, unless those defenses are prohibited by statute.” Id. As the
no-fault act does not provide a fraud defense to PIP coverage, the common-law defense of fraud
in the inducement is available to no-fault insurers. Howard v LM Gen Ins Co, 345 Mich App 166,
172-173; 5 NW3d 46 (2023). Indeed, it “is well settled that an insurer is entitled to rescind a policy
ab initio on the basis of a material misrepresentation made in an application for no-fault insurance.”
Bradley v Westfield Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 365828);
slip op at 5 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
[I]n order to justify rescission of PIP coverage with respect to preprocurement
misrepresentations, the insurer must be able to demonstrate common-law fraud
under equitable principles. It must be shown that: (1) the alleged fraudulent party
made a material misrepresentation; (2) the representation was false; (3) the person
making the representation knew it was false or acted recklessly in making the
statement; (4) the person intended that the opposing party should act upon the
representation; (5) the opposing party acted in reliance upon it; and so (6) suffered
injury. [Howard, 345 Mich App at 173 (citations omitted).]
The evidence produced in support of CURE’s summary disposition motion demonstrates
that Barnes listed herself as the sole owner and registrant of the 2006 Altima in her insurance
application, and declared that the statements made in the application were true. However,
documentation attached to CURE’s motion for summary disposition indicates that Karin owned
and applied for title to the Altima.
Barnes asserted below, and asserts again on appeal:
There is no injury because absent coverage on the 2006 Altima there is no evidence
that CURE would not have issued the policy to just cover the 2014 Fusion.
Similarly, there is no evidence that the ownership of the 2006 Altima was material
to any coverage determination made as to the 2014 Fusion. If anything, providing
CURE with the correct ownership information on the 2006 Altima when applying
for coverage would likely have reduced [Barnes’s] premiums as it would have lead
[sic] into a conversation about the fact that the 2006 Altima was inoperable and
likely did not need to be insured . . . .
“[A] fact or representation in an application is material where communication of it would have had
the effect of substantially increasing the chances of loss insured against so as to bring about a
rejection of the risk or the charging of an increased premium.” Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co
of Mich, 465 Mich 244, 253-254; 632 NW2d 126 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In other words, a misrepresentation is considered material if the insurer would not have issued the
policy, or would have charged a different rate, had it known of the misrepresentation. See Sherman
v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 364393);
slip op at 2-3. And here, in support of its motion for summary disposition, CURE attached the
affidavit of James Sullivan, CURE’s Manager of Underwriting Investigations, in which he attested
that:

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7. Had CURE been aware that the Named Insured was not the titled owner
or registrant of the Altima, CURE would not have issued the CURE Policy to the
Named Insured due to the risk associated with insuring a vehicle that was not titled
or registered to the Named Insured.
8. CURE’s underwriting rules for policies in Michigan do not allow a policy
to bind if the applicant is not the owner of the vehicle(s) to be insured.
See Montgomery v Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins Co, 269 Mich App 126, 129; 713 NW2d 801
(2005) (“Because defendant’s underwriter stated in his affidavit that [the] defendant would not
have issued the policy if it had been aware of the decedent’s smoking habit, the misrepresentation
about the decedent’s smoking habit was material.”); Lash v Allstate Ins Co, 210 Mich App 98,
103-104; 532 NW2d 869 (1995).
In response, Barnes argued the applicability of Howard to deny CURE summary
disposition, and the trial court agreed. In Howard, 345 Mich App at 169, the insured sought PIP
benefits related to an accident involving a vehicle for which she had properly obtained insurance.
However, the insurer denied benefits and rescinded the policy because a few weeks before the
accident, the other named insured on the policy added a vehicle that was not involved in the
accident to the policy, and misrepresented where that vehicle was garaged. Id. at 169-170. This
Court held that the injury element of fraud was missing “because the coverage obtained by the
misrepresentation [was] not at issue. That is, there [was] no claim that the [additional vehicle] was
involved in the accident or that absent coverage on the [additional vehicle], plaintiff would not
have been covered as to the [vehicle involved in the accident].” Id. at 173-174.
Barnes asserts that like in Howard, the alleged misrepresentations pertained to a vehicle—
the Altima—that was not involved in the accident. Thus, Barnes argues, CURE did not suffer any
injury as a result of the misrepresentation regarding ownership of the Altima. CURE produced
evidence that it would not have issued the subject insurance coverage to Barnes had it known she
was not the owner of the Altima, but not necessarily that absent coverage on the Altima, it would
not have covered the Fusion involved in the accident. Indeed, Sullivan stated only that had CURE
known about the true ownership of the Altima, it would not have issued the policy because of the
risk of insuring a vehicle not titled to the insured—specifically, the Altima. Accordingly, CURE
failed to establish the lack of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the injury it suffered as a
result of Barnes’s misrepresentation regarding ownership of the Altima.
Nonetheless, the trial court should have granted summary disposition on the basis that
Barnes’s failure to list Karin as a household member or occasional driver on the insurance
application constituted a material misrepresentation resulting in injury to CURE. In the insurance
application produced by CURE in support of its motion, Barnes failed to list Karin when prompted
to provide the names of “[a]ll household members, including but not limited to spouse(s),
roommate(s), children, and family members,” and “all individuals outside the household and any
drivers to whom the in[s]ured auto(s) is furnished or available for his or her use, even occasionally
and/or infrequently.”
Barnes argues:

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As to Karin, CURE fails to prove with undisputed facts that she even
constituted a “household member” when [Barnes] was applying for insurance as it
is undisputed she had returned indefinitely to Atlanta for college. However, even
if Karin did need to be disclosed to CURE as a household member, there again
would be no injury and no materiality of that disclosure to this crash as it is
undisputed Karin was not involved in the crash and still in Atlanta when this crash
occurred. CURE is being asked to provide coverage for injuries which it
undisputably fully accounted for in assessing its policy premiums on [Barnes] and
the 2014 Fusion. Ancillary issues about Karin and the 2006 Altima are not material
and do not demonstrate an injury to CURE from any alleged fraud.
But Barnes testified in her deposition that Karin owned the Altima, that although Karin was not
using the vehicle at the time and it was inoperable, the hope was that Karin would use it when she
returned from attending school in Atlanta, and that she had only driven the vehicle once or twice.
And Karin testified in her deposition that the Altima was just for her use, and no one else ever used
it. Moreover, both Barnes and Karin testified that although Karin attended college in Atlanta, and
was at school when Barnes completed the insurance application, Karin returned home to Michigan
to live with Barnes in the summers, including in the summer of 2022, a portion of which was
included in the policy coverage period.7 Barnes even testified that in January 2022 (when she
completed the insurance application), the plan was for Karin to return to her home in Michigan at
the completion of the spring semester. And Karin testified that it was always her plan and intention
to return to Barnes’s home during those times school was not in session. Thus, Barnes knew at
the time she completed the application that Karin would be a member of the household during the
policy period, and failed to list her as such.
Additionally, CURE demonstrated injury as a result of Barnes’s misrepresentation. In his
affidavit, Sullivan attested:
10. The Named Insured did not disclose to CURE that Karin Barnes was a
household member at the Policy Address at the time the Application for Insurance
was filled out and executed by the Named Insured.
11. Had CURE been aware that Karin Barnes was a household member at
the time of the Application for the CURE Policy, the premiums for the CURE
Policy would have increased by $263.75.
12. The CURE Policy premiums would have increased due to the increased
risk of insuring another household member and/or driver under the CURE Policy.
In response, Barnes argued below and now on appeal that when Barnes applied for
insurance it was undisputed Karin had returned to school “indefinitely,” but that assertion is belied
7 The policy coverage period was January 29, 2022 to July 29, 2022.

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by the testimony outlined above.8 Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Barnes, there
was no genuine issue of material fact that Karin should have been listed as a household member,
and that CURE suffered injury as a result of that misrepresentation. See Webb v Progressive
Marathon Ins Co, 335 Mich App 503, 510; 967 NW2d 841 (2021) (concluding that failing to
disclose a household member on an insurance application constituted a material
misrepresentation). While true that neither Karin nor the Altima were involved in the accident for
which Barnes claimed PIP benefits, Sullivan’s affidavit indicates that CURE suffered injury
regardless, because it would have charged a higher premium for the policy had it known that Karin
was a household member and therefore a potential driver of either car. Oade, 465 Mich at 253-
254; Sherman, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2-3. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it
failed to grant summary disposition to CURE on this basis.
However, because the trial court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact
whether Barnes misrepresented material information in her insurance application, it did not reach
the next step—balancing the equities and determining whether rescission is an appropriate remedy.
See Sherman v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket
No. 167826); slip op at 12-13 (noting that if a court finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the insured made a material misrepresentation in the application and that
the insurer relied upon that representation, then the trial court, sitting in equity, should determine
whether rescission is the proper remedy). Therefore, it is necessary to remand this matter to the
trial court for such a balancing of the equities. See id. at ___; slip op at 13-14.
The trial court’s order denying CURE’s motion for summary disposition is reversed, and
the matter is remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) regarding whether there was a material misrepresentation, and for a determination of
whether plaintiff is entitled to rescission under Sherman. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Sima G. Patel
8 See Cleveland v Hath, 350 Mich App 320, 331; 32 NW3d 109 (2024) (“Under Michigan law, if
a moving party presents evidence to support a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce evidence to show that
there is a genuine issue of material fact. Where, as here, the opposing party fails to present any
evidence, the motion is properly granted because no genuine issue of material fact exists.”)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).

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