COA 376903 IN RE CARTER MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/30/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
April 30, 2026
11:00 AM
In re CARTER, Minors.
No. 376903
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 22-138114-NA
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and REDFORD and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
two minor children, NC and IC, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication
continue to exist), (c)(ii) (other conditions exist), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned
to parent).1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2022, Children’s Protective Services (CPS) received a complaint for concerns of
medical neglect and delay of treatment for both children. The children’s paternal grandmother
noticed that the children were sick and having difficulty breathing. The grandmother convinced
the father that the children needed to be taken to the hospital.2 The children were admitted into
pediatric intensive care for treatment for severe respiratory illnesses. NC was in acute respiratory
failure and required three hours of resuscitation. Medical staff reported that NC likely would have
died if he had not received medical intervention. When hospital staff spoke to respondent about
the children’s conditions, she stated that the children only had coughs and runny noses when she
dropped them off with the father approximately 24 hours before they were taken to the hospital.
1 The children’s father’s parental rights were terminated in a separate order, but he is not a party
to this appeal. Accordingly, “respondent” refers to respondent-mother only. Respondent-father is
referred to as “the father.”
2 The children arrived at the hospital with the father and paternal grandmother, but the father
reportedly left the hospital immediately after signing in the children.

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Respondent was upset that the grandmother had taken the children to the hospital and did not
appear to understand the severity of the situation. Through interviews with CPS investigators,
respondent stated that NC had been sick on and off for nearly 1½ years and neither child had been
taken for medical treatment in several months. In addition, the children were not being fed foods
appropriate for their ages.
In May 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition
seeking removal of both children on the basis of medical neglect, improper supervision, and
physical neglect. The petition was authorized, and the children were placed with a fictive-kin
caregiver.3 In June 2022, respondent pleaded no contest to allegations in the petition, and the trial
court took jurisdiction over the children.4 Respondent was ordered to obtain and maintain suitable
housing and income, participate in parenting classes, and maintain communication with agency
personnel. In addition, respondent was ordered to complete a psychological evaluation and follow
all recommendations. The trial court granted the DHHS with discretion to manage and supervise
respondent’s parenting time.
Respondent initially struggled to find stable housing but eventually secured suitable
housing. However, respondent never secured a stable source of income. Respondent also missed
32 of 52 scheduled parenting-time visits. As a result, her parenting time was suspended in
September 2023. Before respondent’s parenting time was suspended, she engaged in supportive
parenting visitation services and parent-partner services. But both of these services were
terminated by the providers because of respondent’s noncompliance and attendance issues.
Respondent maintained the absences were the result of transportation issues. The caseworker
testified that respondent was provided bus passes and gas cards to facilitate her attendance.
Respondent also failed to complete parenting classes. She enrolled in a seven-week
parenting course seven times but never completed the course. Each time, respondent was removed
from the course because of too many missed classes. Respondent cited transportation issues. She
was provided bus passes to facilitate attendance but continued to miss classes. Online parenting
classes were set up for respondent to alleviate transportation issues. However, the classes were
converted back to in-person because respondent had issues with her phone and could not attend
the classes online. Despite being provided transportation assistance, including direct
transportation from the caseworker, respondent did not successfully complete the course.
The DHHS made multiple referrals for respondent to undergo a psychological evaluation,
but respondent repeatedly failed to follow through. The evaluation was eventually completed in
September 2023, which was over a year after it was ordered by the trial court. The psychologist
reported that respondent did not possess adequate parenting skills and listed several possible
mental-health diagnoses. Testing also revealed that respondent had a below-average reading level,
which indicated that she was “mentally deficient.” The psychologist recommended further
psychiatric and neurological evaluations. The caseworker made multiple referrals for the
psychiatric and neurological evaluations, but respondent repeatedly missed her appointments.
3 See MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(ii).
4 Respondent entered a no-contest plea to the allegation of “unsuitable housing.”

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Respondent reported issues with transportation and remembering appointment dates. Respondent
was provided transportation assistance and reminders of her scheduled appointments but continued
to miss her appointments.
In February 2025, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition for termination of respondent’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (abandonment for 91 days), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g)
(failure to proper care and custody), and (j).5 A termination hearing was held in July 2025. At the
time of the termination trial, respondent had re-enrolled in parenting classes for the eighth time.
Respondent had not completed a psychiatric or neurological evaluation as of the date of the
termination hearing. The caseworker testified that she provided various accommodations for
respondent including scheduling appointments, reminding her of appointments, and direct
transportation to and from respondent’s appointments. The caseworker testified that direct
transportation was not a “normal” service and considered it a special accommodation for
respondent specifically. The caseworker also met with respondent on a monthly basis to discuss
her progress in services, upcoming scheduled appointments, and any services or accommodations
that she may need. The caseworker explained that respondent’s communication issues hindered
the caseworker’s ability to provide direct transportation at times. The caseworker testified that
respondent had not requested any services or accommodations that were denied. At the time of
the termination hearing, respondent had not met with the children for approximately two years.
The children lived with their fictive-kin caregiver throughout the case, and their caregiver was
willing to adopt both children.
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental
rights as described above and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the termination of her
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent now appeals.
III. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that the DHHS made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. We disagree.
We generally review for clear error a trial court’s decision regarding reasonable
reunification efforts. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). But a
respondent must object to the services at the time they are offered to preserve an argument about
reasonable efforts for family reunification. Id. at 336. “The time for asserting the need for
accommodation in services is when the court adopts a service plan” or “soon afterward.” Id.
(cleaned up). “[E]ven if a parent does not object or otherwise indicate that the services were
inadequate when the initial case services plan is adopted, such an objection or challenge may also
be timely if raised during the proceedings.” Id. at 337.
Throughout the lower court proceedings, respondent’s counsel argued that respondent was
making progress and benefiting from the services provided. Respondent did not object or
5 At the termination hearing, the DHHS argued that there were grounds to terminate respondent’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3) (c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j), but did not raise MCL
712A.19b(a)(ii) or (g).

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otherwise indicate that the services were inadequate. At the termination hearing, respondent’s
counsel argued that she was demonstrating progress and requested more time to allow her to
complete the psychiatric and neurological evaluations to explore whether additional services were
needed. But she did not object to the adequacy of services that were provided. Because respondent
did not raise this issue in the trial court in a timely manner, it is unpreserved. Id. at 336-337.
Accordingly, our review is for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich
App 252, 258; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or
obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. at 258 (cleaned up). “Generally,
an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the
proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). “The party asserting plain error bears the burden of persuasion
with respect to prejudice.” In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 48; 27 NW3d 122 (2023).
Generally, DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family
before seeking termination of parental rights.” Id., quoting In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85;
893 NW2d 637 (2017). “As part of these reasonable efforts, [DHHS] must create a service plan
outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court
involvement and to achieve reunification.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86, quoting MCL
712A.18f(3)(d). In addition, DHHS also “has obligations under the ADA [Americans with
Disabilities Act] that dovetail with its obligations under the Probate Code.” Id. at 86. Once a
disability is known, DHHS cannot be “passive in [its] approach . . . as far as the provision of
accommodations is concerned.” Id. at 88 (cleaned up). “Absent reasonable modifications, efforts
at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code if the [DHHS] has failed to modify
its standard procedures in ways that are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under
the ADA.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 264 (cleaned up).
“While the petitioner has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services
to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to
participate in the services that are offered. This means a respondent-parent must both participate
in services and demonstrate that they sufficiently benefited from the services provided.” In re
Atchley, 341 Mich App at 339 (cleaned up). “When challenging the services offered, a respondent
must establish that he or she would have fared better if other services had been offered.” In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 264.
Respondent fails to demonstrate that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that the
DHHS satisfied its burden to make reasonable efforts at reunification, with or without necessary
accommodations. The caseworker testified that the DHHS offered additional accommodations
specifically tailored for respondent, including monthly meetings to evaluate what services were
being provided and direct transportation for her to and from appointments. The DHHS followed
the recommendations of the medical provider and scheduled multiple appointments for further
psychiatric and neurological evaluations. But respondent failed to follow through despite being
provided transportation assistance and reminders of her scheduled appointments.
On appeal, respondent has not articulated what additional services or accommodation may
have helped her during the three-years the case was pending and has not provide evidence that she
would have been able to show enough progress to properly care for her children if additional time
or different services had been offered. Respondent simply makes a general allegation that the

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DHHS did not ensure she completed a psychiatric and neurological assessment to determine what
services and accommodations would be appropriate. “Without an identification of services to
accommodate mother’s . . . disability, we are left to speculate what other services the DHHS could
have offered.” Id. at 266. Viewing the record as a whole, the trial court’s determination that the
DHHS made reasonable efforts at reunification was not clearly erroneous and thus respondent has
failed to establish any plain error.
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent further argues there was insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights.
We disagree.
We review a trial court’s factual findings regarding statutory grounds for termination of
parental rights and the decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re
White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if
the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving
due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Sanborn, 337
Mich App at 276 (cleaned up). “To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or
probably wrong.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). “We give deference
to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” In re HRC, 286
Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32. Evidence is clear and convincing if it “produces in the mind of
the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established,
evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a
clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Martin, 450
Mich 204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995) (cleaned up; alteration in original). If at least one statutory
ground for termination is established, “we need not consider whether the other grounds cited by
the trial court also supported the termination decision.” In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 633; 776
NW2d 415 (2009).
A trial court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if
“182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order” and “[t]he
conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that
the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” Termination
of parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when “the totality of the evidence amply
supports that [the respondent] ha[s] not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions”
that led to the adjudication, In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009),
“despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services[,]” In
re White, 303 Mich App at 710 (cleaned up). What constitutes a “reasonable time” requires
consideration of how long the parent will take to improve the conditions and how long the child
can wait for the improvements to occur. See In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 648; 468 NW2d
315 (1991). “Even if conditions improved in the months before the termination hearing, a trial
court may look to the totality of the evidence to determine whether a parent accomplished
meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication.” In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340

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Mich App 326, 334, 985 NW2d 912 (2022). A respondent’s failure to participate in and benefit
from the services aimed at addressing the conditions that led to adjudication can necessitate the
termination of the respondent’s parental rights. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
It is undisputed that, at the time of termination, more than 182 days had elapsed since the
initial disposition order was entered. As the trial court recognized, the condition that led to
adjudication was respondent’s medical neglect of the children that led to their hospitalization for
issues that could have been resolved with regular medical visits. Throughout the proceedings, the
DHHS made referrals for supportive parenting visitation services, parent-partner services,
parenting classes, psychiatric evaluation, and a neurological evaluation. Respondent participated
in and benefited from some of the services the DHHS provided but ultimately failed to demonstrate
substantial compliance with or benefit from the services despite the accommodations provided to
respondent by the DHHS. The trial court noted that respondent had been given three years to
demonstrate progress and take advantage of a variety of services that were available. On this basis,
the trial court concluded that conditions would not improve despite respondent’s arguments that
more time was needed for her to demonstrate positive growth. The trial court determined that
respondent’s inability to maintain her own schedule for medical appointments demonstrated an
inability to manage medical appointments for the children.
The totality of the evidence amply supports that respondent did not accomplish any
meaningful change in the conditions that existed at the time of the adjudication, and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering
the children’s ages. Accordingly, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial
court clearly erred by terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Because we have concluded that at least one statutory ground was established by clear and
convincing evidence, we need not address the other statutory grounds at issue in this case. In re
Foster, 285 Mich App at 633.
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent further argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her
parental rights was in the children’s best interest because she had a strong bond with both children.
We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision that termination is in a child’s best interests for clear
error. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346.
“If a trial court finds that a statutory basis for terminating parental rights exists by clear
and convincing evidence, it is required to terminate parental rights if it finds from a preponderance
of evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best interests.” In re
Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 637; 853 NW2d 459 (2014) (cleaned up);
see also MCL 712A.19b(5). The focus of the best-interest determination is on the child, not the
parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 88; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “[A]t the best-interest stage,
the child’s interest in a normal family home is superior to any interest the parent has.” Id. at 89.
“The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests,” and it should consider a variety of factors, including “the child’s bond to the parent, the

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parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713 (cleaned
up). Other relevant factors include “a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s
compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the
children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id. at 714. Other
considerations include the length of time the child was in foster care or placed with relatives,
whether it is likely that a child could be returned to the parent’s home “within the foreseeable
future, if at all[,]” and whether the parent can provide a permanent, safe, and stable home. In re
Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249. Additionally, because a child’s placement with a relative
militates against termination, see MCL 712A.19a(8)(a), “the fact that a child is living with relatives
when the case proceeds to termination is a factor to be considered in determining whether
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823
NW2d 144 (2012). But “the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with
relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests[.]” Id.
Respondent argues that termination was not in the children’s best interests because she held
a close bond with her children before her parenting time was suspended, had suitable housing for
the children, and the children were placed with fictive kin. At the time the termination hearing
occurred, the children had placed with their fictive-kin caregiver for approximately three years.
IC had been with the caregiver for the vast majority of her life. NC had special needs and exhibited
substantial behavioral issues. The caseworker testified that the sound of respondent’s voice was
enough to trigger severe emotional responses from NC. NC had made significant developmental
improvements in the three years since he had been placed with the caregiver. IC was meeting all
her developmental milestones as well. Perhaps most importantly, the caregiver had demonstrated
the ability to ensure that the children were keeping regular appointments with medical providers.
The caseworker testified that both children were bonded with the caregiver and an older child who
was already living in the caregiver’s home. The caregiver expressed her desire to adopt the
children and demonstrated an ability to provide for each child’s individual needs.
The trial court determined that the children were flourishing in their fictive-kin placement.
The trial court rejected the possibility of guardianship because it found more compelling the
children’s needs for stability, permanency, and finality. The trial court determined that the length
of time that the children had been in their fictive-kin placement, their bond with the caregiver, the
substantial progress that the children had made while with the caregiver, and the children’s need
for stability weighed in favor of termination. We conclude that a preponderance of the evidence
supports the trial court’s determination that termination of respondent’s parental rights to the
children was in the children’s best interests, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction
that the trial court made a mistake.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Sima G. Patel

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