COA 371007 NANCY DENTAMARO SEGUNA V CITY OF DETROIT Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/29/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
NANCY DENTAMARO SEGUNA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2026
9:05 AM
v No. 371007
Wayne Circuit Court
CITY OF DETROIT, LC No. 23-015717-NO
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant City of Detroit appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10).1 On appeal, defendant
argues that the 120-day postinjury notice of a highway defect sent by plaintiff Nancy Dentamaro
Seguna under MCL 691.1404(1) was deficient, so it is entitled to governmental immunity from
her claim. We agree. Therefore, we reverse the trial court and remand to that court for entry of
summary disposition in favor of defendant.
I. FACTS
This case arises from an alleged fall sustained by plaintiff in Detroit’s Eastern Market on
June 11, 2022. In December 2023, plaintiff filed her complaint against defendant, alleging, in
relevant part:
¶ 5. Notice was properly provided to the City of Detroit pursuant to MCL
691.1404 detailing the exact location of On [sic] or about June 11, 2022, Plaintiff
1 While defendant identified three subrules as grounds for its motion for summary disposition, the
underlying issue before the trial court and this Court concerns governmental immunity under MCR
2.116(C)(7). Thus, defendant has an appeal by right under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v).

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was an invitee lawfully on the premises located at Alfred Street near Shed 5 of the
Eastern Market in the City of Detroit, County of Wayne, State of Michigan.
* * *
¶ 8. On May 28, 2021, Plaintiff NANCY SEGUNA, while lawfully walking
at Alfred Street near Shed 5 of the Easter [sic] Market in the City of Detroit, was
then and there caused to trip on the deteriorating, cement/concrete portion of the
roadway causing Plaintiff to violently fall to the ground, sustaining severe and
permanent injuries.
* * *
¶ 11. Defendant CITY OF DETROIT herein had a duty to exercise due care
and caution for the health and well-being of persons lawfully traveling along Alfred
Street, within the City of Detroit, including, and more specifically, Plaintiff
NANCY SEGUNA, and further, had the duty to maintain its public
sidewalks/roadways including those along Alfred Street at or near Shed 5 within
the Eastern Market, in the City of Detroit in a safe manner and correct and remove
any dangerous and defective conditions then and there existing to wit: a
deteriorating cement/concrete portion of the roadway rendering the roadway unfit
for public travel, and to obey the common laws of the State of Michigan.
Accordingly, plaintiff sought damages exceeding $25,000 from defendant for her injuries.
In March 2024, defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7),
(C)(8), and (C)(10). In the accompanying brief, defendant explained that on August 16, 2022, it
received a notice from plaintiff “vaguely describing the location of her alleged slip and fall as
occurring ‘at Alfred Street near Shed 5 of the Eastern Market’ and describing the nature of the
defect as an ‘uneven cement/roadway’ . . . No pictures of the alleged defect were provided.”
Defendant further explained that on August 22, 2022, it responded to the notice by “requesting
color photographs of the exact location of the alleged defect . . . to properly investigate the claim.
. . . On September 23, 2022, the City received an Amended Notice from [plaintiff] still vaguely
describing the location of her alleged slip and fall as occurring ‘at Alfred Street near Shed 5 of the
Eastern Market,’ but adding pictures of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries[.]” Finally, defendant
explained, on February 1, 2023, plaintiff “sent six (6) color photos of two (2) different locations
on Alfred/Russell Street across the street from Shed 5 in the Eastern Market. . . . None of the
photos show a highway defect.” Consequently, defendant argued, it was entitled to summary
disposition because plaintiff failed to comply with MCL 691.1404(1), which requires a 120-day
postinjury notice to the governmental entity specifying “the exact location and nature of the
defect.” In this regard, defendant observed that “Alfred Street near Shed 5 of the Eastern Market
is a large geographical area and includes a 3-way intersection,” so “there was simply no way for
the City to determine the exact location of her alleged fall and therefore, investigate the merits of
her claim.”

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Defendant included documentary evidence with its motion and brief that was consistent
with the factual representations therein. Exhibit 2 was a letter from plaintiff’s counsel to defendant
dated August 8, 2022, and titled “Notice of Intent to File Claim,” stating, in relevant part:
This letter is being written on behalf of Nancy Seguna and is to convey her
intention to file a claim against the City of Detroit and/or its agents, resulting from
personal injuries sustained in an injury incident that occurred at Alfred Street near
Shed 5 of the Eastern Market in the City of Detroit, State of Michigan.
The manner of occurrence was as follows:
On June 6, 2022, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Nancy Seguna was walking
across Alfred Street near Shed 5, when suddenly and without warning she was
caused to fall due to uneven cement/roadway.
The City of Detroit, owed a duty of reasonable care to Nancy Seguna and
other members of the public and breached that duty when the City of Detroit and/or
their agents allowed and/or caused a dangerous condition to exist open to the public
and further failed to maintain its roadway so that it was reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel.
The letter was stamped as received by defendant on August 16, 2022.
Exhibit 3 was a letter from defendant to plaintiff’s counsel dated August 22, 2022,
indicating that defendant had received plaintiff’s notice and requesting “[c]olor photos of the exact
location” so it could “properly investigate and expedite this claim.”
Exhibit 4 was a letter from plaintiff’s counsel to defendant dated August 8, 2022, and titled
“AMENDED Notice of Intent to File Claim.” That letter included virtually identical allegations
as the other letter sent by plaintiff’s counsel, but had a footnote stating, “This is an amended Notice
to reflect the correct date of loss: June 11, 2022.” (Emphasis omitted.) The letter includes a faded
stamp apparently indicating that it was received by defendant on September 23, 2022.
Exhibit 5 was a letter from plaintiff’s counsel to defendant dated February 1, 2023,
explaining that it was in response to defendant’s “request for color photographs of the location of
the subject injury incident.” The letter added that “upon information and belief, repairs of the
hazard were made between the time of Ms. Seguna’s fall and the taking of photographs.” The six
photographs sent by plaintiff’s counsel were included with Exhibit 5 as well, and as represented
by defendant in its brief for summary disposition, the photographs reflect at least two different
street locations near Shed 5.
Exhibit 6 was two images from Google Maps of Alfred Street near Shed 5, which
seemingly indicate that plaintiff’s alleged fall could have occurred anywhere over a distance of at
least a few hundred feet.
In response, plaintiff argued that her notice was sufficient because it specifically identified
her alleged fall as occurring on the “roadway,” i.e., not a sidewalk or parking lot, and specifically

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defined the alleged defect as “uneven cement/roadway.” Further, plaintiff argued, the location
was specifically defined as well:
The South Side of Shed 5 of the Eastern Market abuts Alred Street, in between
Russell Street and Riopelle Street. The distance on Alred Street between Russell
and Riopelle Street is approximately 469.2 feet, and the portion of the street
adjacent to the south of Shed 5 is considerably shorter than 469.2 feet.
Plaintiff added that while she “did not provide the address for Shed 5 (2810 Russell St.,
Detroit, MI 48207), anyone who has been to the Eastern Market, knows that the buildings are more
commonly identified by their Shed Numbers, than their actual addresses . . . .”
At the motion hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, reasoning as follows:
All right. Well, I’m going to deny the motion on all the various -- on all the
various grounds. I am going to find that there was substantial compliance with
MCL 691.1404 as well as -- well, there was sufficient information provided
concerning the defect. The shed number was provided. The street Alred, A-1-r-e-
d, between Russell and Riopelle. This is in the Eastern Market District which are
identified by sheds. Both notices were within the 120-day requirement of MCL
691.1404. There was a sufficient description of the defect to comply with MCL
469.2.[2]
So the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance with the notice
requirement and sufficient specificity as to the location and nature of the defect. So
I’m going to deny the motion.
The trial court entered its written order memorializing its decision the following day. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues that the 120-day postinjury notice of a highway defect sent by
plaintiff under MCL 691.1404(1) was deficient, so it is entitled to governmental immunity from
her claim. In particular, defendant argues that plaintiff did not sufficiently identify the “location”
or the “nature” of the alleged defect, contrary to the requirements of MCL 691.1404(1) that the
notice “specify the exact location and nature of the defect . . . .” Plaintiff responds that her notice
was sufficient because it “explicitly indicated that the fall occurred walking across Alfred Street,
eliminating the need to investigate the sidewalks, ramps, buildings, parking lots, parking structures
or any other locations aside from where pedestrians could cross the roadway.” Plaintiff adds that
“Alfred Street adjacent to or near Shed 5 is specific enough for anyone investigating the hazard to
have to walk less than 470 feet, which would take less than two (2) minutes . . . .”
2 The reference to MCL 469.2 presumably was a spoken or typographical error, as that statute was
repealed in 1993 and generally concerned “Railroad Grade Crossings.” Notably, plaintiff asserted
in its response brief that the relevant distance on “Alred” [sic] Street where the injury could have
occurred was 469.2 feet or less.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this case, while defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), the basis of its motion was governmental immunity under (C)(7).
“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” El-Khalil v
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “Summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate if a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law.”
Pike v Northern Mich Univ, 327 Mich App 683, 690; 935 NW2d 86 (2019). “The contents of the
complaint must be accepted as true unless contradicted by the documentary evidence. Any
documentary evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, “[t]he application of governmental immunity
is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Yoches v Dearborn, 320 Mich App 461, 469; 904
NW2d 887 (2017).
III. DISCUSSION
“Under the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., unless one of five
exceptions applies, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability when they are engaged
in a governmental function.” Wigfall v Detroit, 504 Mich 330, 337; 934 NW2d 760 (2019). “One
such exception is the highway exception, MCL 691.1402(1) . . . .” Id. MCL 691.1402(1) provides,
in relevant part:
A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of
failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in
reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover
the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.
However, “[a] claimant seeking recovery under the highway exception must comply with
the notice requirements of MCL 691.1404 . . . .” Wigfall, 504 Mich at 337. MCL 691.1404(1)
provides, in relevant part:
As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any
defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury
occurred, . . . shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of
the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of
the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time
by the claimant.
Under MCL 691.1404(1), “notice of the injuries sustained and of the highway defect must
be served on the governmental agency within 120 days of the injury.” Rowland v Washtenaw Co
Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 200; 731 NW2d 41 (2007). Failure to comply with MCL 691.1404(1)
is a bar to claims filed under the highway exception regardless of actual prejudice to the
governmental agency. Id.
“[A] notice of injury and defect will not be regarded as insufficient because of a failure to
comply literally with all the stated criteria. Substantial compliance will suffice.” Plunkett v Dep’t
of Trans, 286 Mich App 168, 178; 779 NW2d 263 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[T]he description of the nature of the defect may be deemed to substantially comply with the

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statute when coupled with the specific description of the location, time and nature of injuries.” Id.
(cleaned up). That is, “[n]otice need not be provided in any particular form and is sufficient if it
is timely and contains the requisite information.” McLean v Dearborn, 302 Mich App 68, 74; 836
NW2d 916 (2013). “The required information does not have to be contained within the plaintiff’s
initial notice; it is sufficient if a notice received by the governmental agency within the 120-day
period contains the required elements.” Id. at 74-75. However, information received outside the
120-day period, including photographs, may not be considered by the courts in determining
whether the notice was sufficient. See Thurman v Pontiac, 295 Mich App 381, 386; 819 NW2d
90 (2012) (“The photographs were submitted more than 120 days after plaintiff’s injury, and it
was therefore improper for the circuit court to consider them as part of plaintiff's notice.”).
When notice is required of an average citizen for the benefit of a
governmental entity, it need only be understandable and sufficient to bring the
important facts to the governmental entity’s attention. Thus, a liberal construction
of the notice requirements is favored to avoid penalizing an inexpert layman for
some technical defect. The principal purposes to be served by requiring notice are
simply (1) to provide the governmental agency with an opportunity to investigate
the claim while it is still fresh and (2) to remedy the defect before other persons are
injured.
The requirement should not receive so strict a construction as to make it
difficult for the average citizen to draw a good notice. A notice should not be held
ineffective when in substantial compliance with the law. A plaintiff’s description
of the nature of the defect may be deemed to substantially comply with the statute
when coupled with the specific description of the location, time and nature of
injuries. Some degree of ambiguity in an aspect of a particular notice may be
remedied by the clarity of other aspects. [Madbak v City of Farmington Hills, 349
Mich App 561, 569-570; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (cleaned up).]
To illustrate application of MCL 691.1404(1), in Thurman, 295 Mich App 381, this Court
held that “merely stat[ing] that the alleged defect in the City’s sidewalk was located at ‘35 Huron,
Pontiac, Michigan’ ” was insufficient because the notice “did not specify whether the alleged
defect was located at 35 West Huron Street or 35 East Huron Street, both of which are actual
addresses in the city of Pontiac.” Thurman, 295 Mich App at 386. In addition, the notice did not
“specify whether the alleged defect was located on the north side or south side of Huron Street.”
Id. For these two reasons, the notice did not satisfy the MCL 691.1404(1) requirement that the
notice “ ‘specify the exact location . . . of the defect.’ ” Id., quoting MCL 691.1404(1).
In McLean, in contrast, the notice expressly described a “hazardous and defective city
street,” included color photographs of the alleged defect, and identified a location of “directly
across the street from 1136 Mason, Dearborn, Michigan.” McLean, 302 Mich App at 75-76
(quotation marks omitted). In ruling that the notice was sufficient, this Court acknowledged that
the term “hazardous and defective city street,” by itself, was insufficient to describe the exact
nature of the defect for the purposes of MCL 691.1404(1). Id. However, this Court explained,
that insufficiency was remedied by the other aspects of the notice:

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The pictures show a hole in the concrete surface of the road and provide landmarks,
such as a light post, a large line in the concrete, and the doorway of the building
directly across the street, which would assist defendant’s agents in finding and
repairing the defect. There are also close-up pictures of the defect. Any deficiency
in the written description is therefore remedied by the inclusion of the photographs.
[Id. at 76.]
Turning to the matter before us, the question is whether the two written notices sent by
plaintiff’s counsel to defendant in about August or September 2022 explaining that her injury
occurred “at Alfred Street near Shed 5 of the Eastern Market” while she “was walking across
Alfred Street near Shed 5, when suddenly and without warning she was caused to fall due to uneven
cement/roadway,” satisfied MCL 691.1404(1).3 In light of the above authorities, we conclude that
the notice was insufficient to satisfy the statute’s requirement that “[t]he notice shall specify the
exact location and nature of the defect . . . .”4
Plaintiff described the location of the injury as “at Alfred Street near Shed 5,” on the street
itself. However, the photographs submitted by defendant in support of its motion for summary
disposition visually indicate that the portion of Alfred Street near or adjacent to Shed 5 is at least
a few hundred feet. Indeed, according to plaintiff’s response to that motion, the location of her
injury as specified in her notice was somewhere within a range of 469.2 feet or less. This relatively
substantial range is insufficiently narrow to constitute “the exact location” for the purposes of
MCL 691.1404(1). See Russell v Detroit, 321 Mich App 628, 634; 909 NW2d 507 (2017)
(explaining that “a description of a defect ‘near’ an address, which failed to specify that the defect
was actually 40 yards away on the south side of the road, was insufficient to identify the place of
injury”). This is particularly true in light of the fact that the notice did not include any other details
that would directly aid with identifying the location of the alleged defect, such as referencing a
particular side of the road, cardinal direction, or other landmark such as a streetlight. In other
words, the location of the alleged defect, as stated in the notice, was the entire length and width of
Alfred Street near Shed 5, which itself is a relatively sizable building.5 Therefore, the notice sent
by plaintiff’s counsel to defendant did not specify “the exact location” of her alleged injury for the
purposes of MCL 691.1404(1), and it was legally insufficient as a result. In other words, plaintiff
failed to substantially comply with the statute. See Madbak, 349 Mich App at 569-570.
We acknowledge that MCL 691.1404(1) may be satisfied by considering the notice in its
entirety, not piecemeal. See Russell, 321 Mich App at 635. However, there were no other details
3 The six photographs sent by plaintiff’s counsel to defendant in February 2023 were outside the
120-day notice period and thus cannot be considered by the courts in determining whether plaintiff
satisfied MCL 691.1404(1). See Thurman, 295 Mich App at 386.
4 To be precise, plaintiff sent two notices within the 120-day notice period, both of which may be
considered by the courts. See McLean, 302 Mich App at 74-75. However, because those two
notices essentially were identical, but for identifying the precise date of injury, we will refer to a
singular “notice” unless otherwise appropriate.
5 On appeal, plaintiff describes Shed 5 as “a large structure with a giant ‘Shed 5’ sign on its roof.”

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in the notice that would aid defendant in actually identifying the alleged defect for possible repair.
See Madbak, 349 Mich App at 569-570. The notice merely described the alleged defect as “uneven
cement/roadway” without any accompanying photographs or other details.6 Thus, it is unclear
from the notice whether the alleged defect was a pothole, an inclined part of the highway, a bump
or gap, a divot, or any other non-parallel aspect of the highway that might fairly be considered
“uneven.”7 Consequently, when reviewing the notice as a whole, it was insufficient to satisfy
MCL 691.1404(1) because it did not “specify the exact location . . . of the defect . . . .”
IV. CONCLUSION
Because plaintiff’s notice did not satisfy MCL 691.1404(1), the trial court erred by denying
defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity. Therefore,
we reverse the trial court and remand to that court for entry of an order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
6 We again note that the photographs sent by plaintiff’s counsel to defendant in February 2023
cannot be considered by the courts when determining the sufficiency of the statutory notice. See
Thurman, 295 Mich App at 386. However, according to the February 2023 letter accompanying
those photographs, “upon information and belief, repairs of the hazard were made between the
time of Ms. Seguna’s fall and the taking of photographs.” Thus, even if we could consider those
photographs, they do not reflect the alleged defect in any event.
7 Defendant argues that the description of the alleged defect as “uneven cement/roadway” was
insufficient to constitute “the exact . . . nature of the defect” for the purposes of MCL 691.1404(1).
We need not address this argument in light of our conclusion that the notice’s description of “the
exact location” was insufficient for the purposes of that statute as it was devoid of any meaningful
description of the alleged defect.

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