COA 369018 CAMBRIDGE REAL ESTATE LLC V THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/13/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CAMBRIDGE REAL ESTATE, LLC, and
MICHAEL HAMAME
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2025
10:31 AM
v No. 369018
Wayne Circuit Court
THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 19-010015-CB
Defendant-Appellant,
and
IAQ MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
CAMBRIDGE REAL ESTATE, LLC, and
MICHAEL HAMAME,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v No.
IAQ MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC, LC No.
Defendant-Appellant,
and
THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
No. 369081
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 19-010015-CB
Before: REDFORD, P.J., and FEENEY and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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In this consolidated appeal, defendants-appellants, the Cincinnati Insurance Company
(“Cincinnati”) and IAQ Management Services, Inc (“IAQ”), appeal by leave granted the trial court
order denying defendants’ various motions for summary disposition.1 Among those motions for
summary disposition, both defendants argued they were entitled to dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the basis of release. We agree. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s
order denying summary disposition in defendants’ favor and remand for entry of an order
dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint.
I. BASIC FACTS
In July 2019, plaintiffs-appellees, Michael Hamame and Cambridge Real Estate, LLC
(“Cambridge”), filed a complaint against defendants, alleging claims of tortious interference with
a contract, tortious interference with a business expectancy, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs’ claims
stem from defendants’ handling of a water-loss insurance claim at a building owned by nonparty
Village Plaza Holdings, LLC (“Village Plaza”).
Village Plaza, a holding company whose sole member is Sam Hamame,2 owned a
commercial property (“the Property”) located in Dearborn, Michigan. The Property consists of a
300,000 square foot commercial high-rise building that was leased out for office and retail tenants.
Village Plaza insured the Property through Cincinnati. The policy included property coverage,
commercial general liability coverage, and an endorsement that provided coverage for business
interruption and extra expense.
Cambridge is a holding company whose sole member is Michael. Cambridge had a
contract with Village Plaza to manage the Property, which included leasing the property, handling
landlord/tenant disputes, and hiring maintenance. Cambridge also had a development agreement
with Village Plaza to redevelop the Property into a mixed-use enterprise.
In January 2018, a water pipe burst and caused significant water damage to the building.
Michael handled the insurance claim on behalf of Village Plaza, which included acting as the point
of contact with Cincinnati, hiring contractors, and hiring a public adjuster to assist in the claim.
Shortly after the water loss occurred, a contractor hired by Michael and Cambridge to mitigate the
water damage cut into wet drywall without testing for the presence of asbestos. Mitigation efforts
ceased, and Cincinnati hired IAQ, an industrial hygienist consulting company, to test for possible
asbestos exposure. IAQ’s initial testing confirmed the presence of asbestos. Thereafter, IAQ was
retained by Cincinnati to conduct further testing and to develop a safety protocol for removing the
asbestos.
1 Cambridge Real Estate, LLC v The Cincinnati Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered January 10, 2024 (Docket No. 369018); Cambridge Real Estate, LLC v The Cincinnati Ins
Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 10, 2024 (Docket No. 369081).
2 Sam Hamame is Michael Hamame’s father. For clarity, we refer to both of these individuals by
their first name throughout this opinion.

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In February 2018, Michael, acting on behalf of Village Plaza, sent letters to the Property’s
tenants informing them that their leases had been terminated. The letter explained that the
building’s heating, cooling, and water system needed to be suspended for at least 120 days to clean
areas affected by asbestos and to avoid the possible spread of asbestos into occupied spaces.
Although Village Plaza terminated the leases, several tenants remained on the premises at least
through May 2018. During this time, mitigation efforts were halted and IAQ did not complete
testing or develop the safety protocol.
Ultimately, mitigation efforts at the building remained stalled, and Cincinnati did not adjust
the claim. There was a disagreement regarding the amount of loss sustained. Michael, acting on
behalf of Village Plaza, negotiated a Settlement Agreement and Release with Cincinnati. On
July 12, 2018, Village Plaza and Cincinnati entered into the Settlement Agreement and Release
“to avoid the expense and disruption potentially arising out of their disagreement and to avoid any
possible litigation related to the Claim and Village Plaza’s request for coverage of the Policy.” In
exchange for $8.95 million (in addition to the amount Cincinnati had already paid to Village Plaza
during adjustment of the claim), the parties agreed to enter a release of liability.3
The document provided, in relevant part:
As part of the consideration to Cincinnati for the Settlement Amount,
Village Plaza for itself and each of its officers, directors, owners, partners,
members, stockholders, employees, principals, agents, attorneys, controlling
persons, insurers, reinsurers, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, heirs,
successors, and assigns (collectively hereinafter the “Releasors”) agree to forever
release and discharge Cincinnati and its respective officers, directors, owners,
partners, members, stockholders, employees, principals, agents, attorneys,
controlling persons, insurers, reinsurers, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates,
heirs, successors, and assigns (collectively hereinafter the “Releasees”) from any
and all claims, demands, liabilities, obligations, losses, damages, and causes of
action that the Releasors, or anyone claiming on their behalf, ever had, now have,
or in the future may have, whether fixed or contingent, liquidated or not, known or
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, based on, arising out of, or directly or
indirectly relating to: the Claim; any claims for insurance coverage that Village
Plaza has asserted or could have asserted with respect to the Claim; damage to the
Building, including but not limited to repair costs, asbestos investigation or
asbestos remediation, and claims under the property coverage of the Policy for lost
rental or other income or any expense whatsoever related to the Claim or damage
to the building. The types of claims released herein include, but are not limited to,
claims for: insurance coverage; damages under Michigan statutes and Michigan
common law; injunctive relief; common law and statutory bad faith; attorneys fees;
equitable contribution; equitable subrogation; insurance benefits; unfair trade
practices; and any form or theory of recovery, or cause of action whatsoever based
in tort, contract, or otherwise. It is expressly understood and agreed, however, that
3 The total amount paid to Village Plaza by Cincinnati with the release was $9,965,687.50.

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this Paragraph 2 does not apply to any claims or damages related to the liability
insurance coverage portion of the Policy. [Emphasis added.]
Sam, on behalf of Village Plaza, and Cincinnati signed the Settlement Agreement and Release.
Plaintiffs did not sign it.
Over a year later, after Village Plaza had released all claims on its own behalf, and its
agents, on July 25, 2019, plaintiffs filed this action alleging defendants conspired together to
interfere with Cambridge’s contracts with Village Plaza by misrepresenting that the tenants needed
to be removed to address the asbestos issue. Plaintiffs alleged that Cincinnati, through its adjuster,
threatened to deny Village Plaza coverage if it did not terminate the leases. According to plaintiffs,
Cincinnati insisted on termination of the leases to reduce the amount payable under the insurance
policy and to “squeeze” Village Plaza out of business. Plaintiffs further alleged that IAQ
misrepresented the necessity of evacuation and acquiesced to Cincinnati’s decision to remove the
tenants out of a self-motivated interest to continue its profitable business relationship with
Cincinnati. According to plaintiffs, defendants were aware of plaintiffs’ contracts and
development plans with Village Plaza and interfered with those contracts and business
expectancies.
Defendants answered plaintiffs’ complaint and filed affirmative defenses. Cincinnati
generally denied that its adjuster required Village Plaza to terminate the leases. Instead, Cincinnati
insisted its adjuster only requested the temporary removal of tenants from the premises while the
asbestos issue was ongoing. The parties conducted discovery, which included the deposition of
individuals involved in the ownership and operation of the Property and the individuals involved
in the insurance claim. Thereafter, Cincinnati filed six separate motions for summary disposition.
IAQ filed three motions for summary disposition and concurred in the motions filed by Cincinnati.
As relevant to this appeal, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on
the basis that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the release Village Plaza entered with Cincinnati.
Defendants also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the basis that
plaintiffs were unable to establish the elements of tortious interference with a contract, tortious
interference with a business expectancy, or civil conspiracy against defendants. Plaintiffs opposed
these motions. At a hearing on the motions, the trial court denied each of defendants’ motions
after explaining there was a factual dispute whether defendants told Village Plaza to terminate its
leases. The trial court did not expressly address defendants’ release arguments at the hearing or in
the order denying the motions. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The proper interpretation of a
contract is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547,
553; 817 NW2d 562 (2012).
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) may be granted “because of release.” In Dextrom v Wexford
Co, 287 Mich App 406, 428-429; 789 NW2d 211 (2010), this Court explained:

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When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court must accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff, unless
other evidence contradicts them. If any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence are submitted, the court must consider them to determine
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. If no facts are in dispute, and if
reasonable minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, the
question whether the claim is barred is an issue of law for the court. However, if a
question of fact exists to the extent that factual development could provide a basis
for recovery, dismissal is inappropriate.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue the trial court erred by denying their motions for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the basis that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Settlement Agreement
and Release. We agree.
There is no dispute that Village Plaza and Cincinnati entered the Settlement Agreement
and Release on July 12, 2018, in which Village Plaza broadly released any and all claims the
releasors have or may have related to the insurance claim against Cincinnati and the listed
releasees. However, the parties dispute whether the scope of the release included plaintiffs and
their claims against defendants. Contract law governs disputes involving the scope of a release.
Radu v Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc, 302 Mich App 363, 374; 838 NW2d 720 (2013).
“The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The scope of the release is governed by the intent of the
parties as expressed in the release. Id. If the language of the release is unambiguous, it must be
construed as a whole and according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. A release is not
ambiguous merely because the parties dispute its meaning. Xu v Gay, 257 Mich App 263, 272;
668 NW2d 166 (2003).
The plain language of the release shows that Village Plaza intended plaintiffs and their
claims against defendants to be within its scope. The release was not limited to claims Village
Plaza may have against Cincinnati, but claims “releasors” may have against Cincinnati and the
other listed “releasees.” In relevant part, “releasors” was defined to include Village Plaza’s
“agents.” The release does not define the term “agent.” Therefore, “a dictionary may be used to
determine the ordinary meaning of a word or a phrase.” Greenville Lafayette, LLC v Elgin State
Bank, 296 Mich App 284, 292 n 4; 818 NW2d 460 (2012). Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed)
defines an agent as “[s]omeone who is authorized to act for or in place of another” and the related
term “agency” as “[a] fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a principal) manifests
assent to another (an agent) that the agent will act on the principal’s behalf, subject to the
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents to do so.”
Plaintiffs were Village Plaza’s agents and, therefore, fell under the definition of
“releasors.” The agent and principal relationship between plaintiffs and Village Plaza is made
abundantly clear by the record. Sam Hamame, sole owner of Village Plaza, was uninvolved with
management of the Property. Instead, Village Plaza had a contractual relationship with Cambridge
to manage the Property, and Cambridge was owned solely by Michael. According to Michael’s
own testimony, “Cambridge provided everything to Village Plaza” including management,

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maintenance, and leasing. This sentiment was echoed by Sam’s deposition testimony in which
Sam recalled few details about the operation of the Property his company owned, but explained
that he relied on Michael and Cambridge to lease up the Property, handle tenant issues, hire
accountants and maintenance crew, and even pay themselves.
This agent-principal relationship is further demonstrated by Michael’s extensive
involvement in the insurance claim and settlement. Again, Sam was not personally involved in
the water-loss claim. He relied on Michael to handle all aspects of the insurance claim on behalf
of Village Plaza, including acting as the point of contact with Cincinnati, engaging public adjusters
to assist Village Plaza in the water-loss claim, and requesting advances of payment on behalf of
Village Plaza. Michael also handled the termination of the leases for Village Plaza during the
water-loss claim. He was involved in drafting the letter sent to tenants to terminate their leases
and signed the letter as Village Plaza’s “Building Representative.” Finally, Michael negotiated
the settlement with Cincinnati and had Sam’s complete authority to settle on behalf of Village
Plaza. According to Sam, Michael handled settlement negotiations up until the day Sam signed
the Settlement Agreement and Release.
From this record, it is readily apparent that plaintiffs were Village Plaza’s agents.
However, plaintiffs insist they were not agents of Village Plaza, but “independent contractors.” In
support of their argument, plaintiffs rely on Cambridge’s management contract and development
contract with Village Plaza to assert that they were independent contractors rather than Village
Plaza’s agent. The management contract does identify Cambridge as an “independent contractor”
in at least one paragraph. However, it also identifies Cambridge as Village Plaza’s agent.
Plaintiffs assume that the roles of independent contractor and agent are mutually exclusive. They
are not. “One who contracts to act on behalf of another and subject to the other’s control except
with respect to his physical conduct is an agent and also an independent contractor.” Wiesner v
Washtenaw Co Community Mental Health, 340 Mich App 572, 583; 986 NW2d 629 (2022),
quoting Restatement Agency, 2d, § 14N (1958). Plaintiffs’ management contract obligated
Cambridge to render its services to Village Plaza faithfully and diligently and provided Cambridge
with the authority to enter contracts on Village Plaza’s behalf. The management contract also
supports that plaintiffs are Village Plaza’s agent.
Even in this case, Michael appears to admit that he and Cambridge are Village Plaza’s
agents. In response to defendants’ motions for summary disposition, Michael executed an affidavit
on behalf of himself and Cambridge, in which he averred, “As Village Plaza’s agents, we trusted
defendants to act in Village Plaza’s best interest.” Given the relationship between plaintiffs and
Village Plaza, plaintiffs had the authority to act on behalf of Village Plaza. Plaintiffs were Village
Plaza’s agents and fell under the definition of “releasors.”
Likewise, plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the release. The release broadly applies
to any and all claims, known or unknown; past, present, or future; that a releasor may have directly
or indirectly related to the insurance claim. This includes claims of bad faith or unfair practices
and claims in contract, tort or otherwise. In this case, plaintiffs have sued defendants for tortious
interference and civil conspiracy arising out of their alleged mishandling of the insurance claim.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege Cincinnati and IAQ ordered the removal of tenants from the building
during the investigation of the asbestos issue and conspired to misrepresent to plaintiffs that such
removal was necessary. These claims relate directly to the insurance claim. These claims can

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even be construed as an attempt to reopen the insurance claim that was settled by the release, given
that it involves the same underlying transaction, seeks to litigate any fault Cincinnati and IAQ may
have for the closure of the Property, and measures its damages in terms of damage to the Property
and its development. Consequently, plaintiffs’ complaint also falls within the scope of the release.
There is a single-sentence “carveout” in the July 12, 2018 Settlement Agreement and
Release. It was intended to exclude certain claims from the release of liability. The release states:
“It is expressly understood and agreed, however, that this Paragraph 2 does not apply to any claims
or damages related to the liability insurance coverage portion of the Policy.” The release defined
the “Policy” as the insurance policy Cincinnati issued to Village Plaza. That Policy, in addition to
providing coverage for property insurance claims, provided specified coverage for liability that
could be imposed against the insured. Stated otherwise, the carveout refers to claims that may be
brought against Village Plaza.4 This carveout does not apply to plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs were
not insureds under the Policy, and cannot make a liability claim under the Policy. Moreover, the
allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint do not relate to the liability portion of the Policy. Instead, the
complaint only concerns the property loss claim. Consequently, plaintiffs’ claims were not
excluded from the release.
IAQ was also intended to be included within the scope of the release of liability. The
release included “Cincinnati and its . . . agents” in the definition of “releasees.” The record reflects
that IAQ was Cincinnati’s agent in relation to the water-loss claim. Cincinnati hired IAQ as an
industrial hygienist to conduct testing, assess the scope of the asbestos, and prepare a protocol for
the abatement at the Property. IAQ acted at the direction of Cincinnati and only when authorized.
This included releasing information only when directed by Cincinnati. Therefore, IAQ was
Cincinnati’s “agent” and was intended to fit within the scope of the release.
Plaintiffs also argue that they cannot be bound by the release because they are not
signatories of the Settlement Agreement and Release. As a general principle, “a contract cannot
bind a nonparty.” AFSCME Council 25 v Wayne Co, 292 Mich App 68, 80; 811 NW2d 4 (2011)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a nonsignatory “can still be bound by an
agreement pursuant to ordinary contract-related legal principles, including incorporation by
reference, assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, and estoppel.” Id. at 81. Essentially, there
are exceptions to the privity requirement that may bind a nonparty to a contract.
Plaintiffs are correct that they are nonsignatories of the agreement. However, the unique
circumstance of this case is that plaintiffs negotiated the terms of the Settlement Agreement and
Release on behalf of Village Plaza and were given Sam’s complete authority to settle the claim.
Plaintiffs negotiated a document that plainly included themselves within the scope of the release
4 As context for this carveout, tenants had lawsuits pending against Village Plaza for wrongful
termination at the time the parties negotiated the release. See Cincinnati Ins Co v Village Plaza
Holdings, LLC, unpublished per curiam opinion of the United States District Court for Eastern
District of Michigan, issued July 22, 2020 (Case No. 18-12044).

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and now seek to avoid application of the release. This would render the release’s language defining
who, beyond Village Plaza, qualifies as a “releasor” meaningless.
There is a closeness in proximity between Village Plaza and Cambridge that necessitates
the imposition of a veil-piercing/alter ego theory. Generally, Michigan law respects the corporate
form and our courts recognize and enforce separate corporate entities. Gallagher v Persha, 315
Mich App 647, 653-654; 891 NW2d 505 (2016). However, this legal fiction may be disregarded
to avoid fraud or injustice. Green v Ziegelman, 310 Mich App 436, 451; 873 NW2d 794 (2015).
“There is no single rule delineating when the corporate entity may be disregarded.” Glenn
v TPI Petroleum, Inc, 305 Mich App 698, 716; 854 NW2d 509 (2014) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Rather, an “entire spectrum of relevant fact forms the background for such an
inquiry.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Factors that may be considered by this Court
included “(1) whether the corporation is undercapitalized, (2) whether separate books are kept, (3)
whether there are separate finances for the corporation, (4) whether the corporation is used for
fraud or illegality, (5) whether corporate formalities have been followed, and (6) whether the
corporation is a sham.” Id.
In this case, the Property was owned by Village Plaza, an entity which existed to hold title
to the Property. Village Plaza’s sole member was Sam. Village Plaza had a management contract
with Cambridge to operate the Property. Cambridge, which was also a holding company, had
Michael as its only member. Sam is Michael’s father. Sam bought the Property because Michael
told him about its availability and the possibility of them developing it for profit. Sam’s deposition
testimony showed that he had little knowledge of how his business was run. He was unaware of
who the tenants were at the time of the water loss and was not sure if rental income from the tenants
was the Property’s only source of income.
Sam testified that he was uninvolved with the daily operation of the Property and relied
entirely on Michael and Cambridge to manage Village Plaza. He testified that Michael primarily
controlled the Chase bank account for Village Plaza as an entity. He relied on Michael to prepare
Village Plaza’s accounting books and records for the Property. He even relied on Michael to pay
the monthly management fee to Cambridge and did not know if Village Plaza had paid Cambridge
that fee. In his own deposition testimony, Michael testified that he never took a management fee
while Village Plaza was being developed and he was never paid a management fee. He explained
Cambridge “provided everything to Village Plaza,” which in this case included handling the
insurance claim and settling the claim on Village Plaza’s behalf.
This testimony demonstrates a close proximity between Village Plaza and Cambridge.
These entities did not deal with each other at arm’s length or follow corporate formalities. More
than managing the Property, Michael was responsible for and directly involved in Village Plaza as
an entity. Michael raised the possibility of purchasing the Property and developing it for profit to
Sam. Village Plaza’s only bank account was primarily administered by Michael, and Michael was
responsible for maintaining Village Plaza’s financial records and books. Michael had a level of
dominion and control over Village Plaza as an entity that far surpassed his role as manager of its
Property. This level of control was further corroborated by Michael handling Village Plaza’s
water-loss claim and negotiating the Settlement Agreement and Release.

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Plaintiffs handled the entirety of the water-loss claim and were fully authorized by Sam to
negotiate the settlement. As a product of those negotiations, Cincinnati paid Village Plaza almost
$10 million in exchange for Village Plaza and its agents releasing Cincinnati and its agents from
liability. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs seek to unravel the very settlement they negotiated by pointing
to the separation of the corporate entities that they did not respect in their own dealings with the
Property and Village Plaza. For these reasons, we invoke the corporate veil/alter ego theory to
conclude that plaintiffs are bound by the Settlement Agreement and Release.
Finally, plaintiffs argue a separate Settlement and Release the parties entered in March
2021 contained a “carveout,” which gave plaintiffs the right to pursue their claims against
defendants in this case. This argument is without merit. The Settlement and Release was
negotiated in relation to the tenant lawsuits against Village Plaza, plaintiffs, and Cincinnati. The
“carveout” in that release states “Cincinnati, Cambridge Real Estate, LLC and Michael Hamame
reserve all of their past, present and future rights and defenses with respect to the above identified
claims pending in the Cambridge Lawsuit.” Plaintiffs ignore that the carveout reserves the parties’
rights to pursue their claims and defenses. The Settlement Agreement and Release entered into
between Village Plaza and Cincinnati is one of the defenses that survives the 2021 Settlement.
In conclusion, all parties to this appeal and plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the
Settlement Agreement and Release. Although plaintiffs were not signatories to the release, they
were the agents of Village Plaza and are thus bound by the settlement and release terms.
Additionally, their conduct with Village Plaza demonstrated the necessity of applying a
corporation veil/alter ego theory to bind them to the release. For these reasons, plaintiffs’ claims
are barred by the Settlement Agreement and Release. The trial court erred by denying defendants’
motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).5
5 Because the Settlement Agreement and Release entitled defendants to reversal, we are not
required to address the other arguments defendants raise on appeal. Regardless, we observe the
following: Defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) premised on
plaintiffs’ failure to make out claims for tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference
with a business expectancy, and civil conspiracy. Accepting for purposes of reviewing a motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) that defendants insisted on the termination of the tenant leases, we
conclude plaintiffs cannot establish their tortious-interference claims. Plaintiffs failed to present
evidence of “a per se wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law
for the purpose of invading the contractual rights or business relationship of another.” CMI Int’l,
Inc v Intermet Int’l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 131; 649 NW2d 808 (2002) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the nonmoving
party, the evidence demonstrates that defendants’ conduct in adjusting the insurance claim arose
out of concern of limiting building patrons’ exposure to asbestos and the legitimate business
purpose of preventing liability claims for asbestos exposure against themselves and Village Plaza.
See Hope Network Rehab Servs v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 342 Mich App 236, 246; 994
NW2d 873 (2022). Because plaintiffs’ tortious-interference claims fail, their civil conspiracy
claim predicated on those claims must also fail. Urbain v Beierling, 301 Mich App 114, 132; 835
NW2d 455 (2013).

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Reversed. This case is remanded for entry of an order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with
prejudice. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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