COA 373574 IN RE HILSON MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2026
2:24 PM
In re HILSON, Minors.
No. 373574
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2021-000631-NA
Before: RICK, P.J., and YATES and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to the minor
children, AH and MH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue
to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm).
We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 2021, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), received
a complaint alleging medical neglect of MH. A Children’s Protective Services (CPS) investigation
revealed that MH was born ten weeks prematurely. The investigation also indicated that she
suffered from pulmonary hypertension and a congenital heart defect that required surgical
intervention. MH depended on a gastrostomy feeding tube for nutrition. Despite these serious
medical conditions, mother had stopped taking MH to occupational therapy. Additionally, MH
had been without prescribed medications for six months and had not seen any medical providers
for approximately ten months. Based on mother’s apparent failure to provide necessary medical
care, DHHS filed a petition seeking termination of mother’s parental rights to MH and her sibling,
AH, at the initial disposition.
At the preliminary hearing, petition author Steffany Butler testified that DHHS attempted
to address MH’s medical needs while keeping the children in mother’s care. Butler explained that
mother had indicated in a previous investigation that she was having transportation issues. This
prompted Butler to contact mother’s insurance provider and confirm that transportation to medical
appointments was covered. Butler learned that mother’s insurance would pay for transportation

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to all medical appointments. Butler then interviewed mother, who explained that she had been
unable to attend MH’s medical appointments because she could not find child care for AH. Butler
therefore contacted each of MH’s medical providers individually to obtain accommodations
allowing AH to attend MH’s medical appointments. Mother subsequently made a number of
medical appointments for MH, but Butler testified that mother and MH did not appear for those
appointments. Mother was thereafter instructed to bring MH to Detroit Medical Center’s
Children’s Hospital for a wellness examination. Hospital staff discovered that MH’s feeding tube
had been disconnected and that the insertion site had begun to heal. Mother initially claimed that
the tube had come out the night before, but later admitted that it had been dislodged two to three
weeks earlier. Medical personnel also learned that MH had not gained weight in the previous year.
The trial court authorized the petition and found that DHHS had made “active efforts, much
more significant than required by law,” to prevent removal. The trial court also found that
reasonable efforts to reunite respondent with her children would not be required and accepted the
permanency plan suggested by DHHS to have the children adopted.
Trial began on May 2, 2022. Mother acknowledged missing supervised visits. She
admitted she had not seen her children for several months. She conceded that she continued to
miss MH’s medical appointments after DHHS intervened and agreed that doing so could endanger
MH’s life. Mother could not explain why she failed to communicate her difficulties to DHHS.
She also admitted that she delayed seeking medical care after MH’s feeding tube became
dislodged, despite knowing the risk to MH, because she could not find childcare for AH.
Regarding AH, the foster-care caseworker initially assigned to the case, Erica McClure,
testified that AH was “in the one[-]percent range” of severe malnourishment when she came into
DHHS’s care, adding that AH was so weak that she had trouble walking up and down stairs.
McClure further testified that AH was so malnourished that she required two initial well-child
examinations, with each lasting nearly four hours long and resulting in a number of referrals.
When McClure was asked whether AH was exhibiting any signs of food insecurity, McClure
responded that AH did in fact have “pretty serious food insecurities,” limiting her intake to “two
or three foods.”
The trial court found statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
and (2) and statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). However, after
a best-interest hearing, the court declined to terminate mother’s parental rights at that time and
instead ordered mother to adhere to a case-service plan (CSP). Under the CSP, mother was
required to participate in services, including therapy and parenting classes; secure income and
housing; maintain contact with the children; engage with a parent-partner; and learn MH’s feeding-
tube procedures.
After multiple review and permanency planning hearings showing minimal progress,
DHHS filed a supplemental petition for termination on October 3, 2023. Termination proceedings
commenced in March 2024. At the termination hearing, foster-care worker Margaret LeRolland-
Wagner testified that she consistently attempted to communicate with mother and denied failing
to return mother’s calls. By the time of the hearing, LeRolland-Wagner contacted mother monthly
with information about MH’s medical appointments and offered opportunities to attend the

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appointments virtually. She also testified that she provided educational resources about MH’s
feeding tube, including a YouTube instructional video, and offered in-person demonstrations.
LeRolland-Wagner further testified about mother’s psychological evaluation, which
identified cognitive difficulties but deferred a definitive diagnosis pending treatment of depressive
symptoms. LeRolland-Wagner stated that, in light of these considerations, mother’s therapist
supported mother’s participation in the parent-partner program. LeRolland-Wagner testified that
she helped mother apply to Section 8 housing in December 2022 and that, as of December 2023,
she was still on the waiting list. When asked what else LeRolland-Wagner had done to help mother
find suitable housing, LeRolland-Wagner replied that her two parent-partner referrals were a part
of those efforts, noting that “they’re really great about driving people to look at apartments and
helping them with different community resources.” She further added that she called a number of
domestic violence shelters in the area in light of an incident that mother shared with her therapist.
As for LeRolland-Wagner’s efforts to help mother with her transportation issues, LeRolland-
Wagner testified that mother declined a bus pass when offered, saying she did not need one.
Morgan Williams, the successor foster-care worker, testified that LeRolland-Wagner was
diligent in communicating medical information. In light of mother’s failure to make genuine
progress on her treatment plan over the years, Williams thought that mother was not and would
never be prepared to take care of the children. She testified that termination of mother’s parental
rights would be in the children’s best interests.
Johanna Hasselschwert, who had been the children’s foster mother since January 2023,
testified regarding MH’s ongoing medical needs and lifelong feeding challenges. She stated that
mother never contacted her regarding medical appointments and that mother participated in only
three parenting time visits via Zoom. Hasselschwert additionally testified that AH repeatedly
expressed a desire to remain in the foster home. Hasselschwert believed that adoption would be
in the children’s best interests.
Mother testified that LeRolland-Wagner failed to respond to texts, but admitted that she
never attempted to call LeRolland-Wagner to resolve communication issues. According to mother,
her circumstances had recently improved: She had recently begun living in a two-bedroom
townhouse with a basement and had obtained a car and driver’s license. Mother reaffirmed her
desire to have her children returned to her. On cross-examination, mother was unable to articulate
AH’s or MH’s specific needs, misstated MH’s medications, and demonstrated limited
understanding of the children’s educational and medical plans. Hasselschwert corrected mother’s
testimony, clarifying that MH was prescribed Ritalin and that mother attended only one court-
ordered evaluation appointment.
The transcript for these proceedings abruptly ends midway through respondent’s closing
argument. Following an October 31, 2024 order terminating parental rights without articulated
best-interest findings, this Court granted a remand for record supplementation. In re Hilson
Minors, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 28, 2025 (Docket No. 373574).
On remand, Judge Aliyah Sabree entered a stipulated order memorializing Judge Christopher D.
Dingell’s earlier findings. The court considered expert opinions, adoptability, the children’s

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wishes, special needs, time spent in foster care, and brain development. The court found both
children highly adoptable, in critical developmental stages, and in need of stability and
sophisticated medical care beyond mother’s abilities. The court concluded termination was in both
children’s best interests. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. BEST INTERESTS
Mother argues that the trial court erred by finding termination of her parental rights was in
the best interests of her children without first making specific findings of fact or conclusions of
law to support its ruling. We disagree.
Under MCR 3.977(I)(1), a trial court must “state on the record or in writing its findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested
matters are sufficient.” More generally, a trial court’s findings are sufficient “if it appears that the
trial court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law, and where appellate
review would not be facilitated by requiring further explanation.” Ford Motor Co v Dep’t of
Treasury, 313 Mich App 572, 589; 884 NW2d 587 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mother claims that “neither” Judge Dingell nor Judge Sabree “provided brief, definite, and
pertinent findings and conclusions of law on the record or in writing regarding termination.” This
argument is predicated on a mischaracterization of the facts. The entire procedure set forth under
MCR 7.210(B)(2) presumes that a record was in fact made, but is now simply unavailable.1
Indeed, the stipulated order documenting the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law—
which mother’s counsel signed—affirmatively states that “the attorneys of record agree that Judge
Dingell made the following findings.” Thus, mother’s argument that the stipulated order cannot
satisfy MCR 3.977(I)(1)’s requirement that the trial court “state on the record or in writing its
findings of fact and conclusions of law” fails, because the parties manifestly agree, by virtue of
the signed, stipulated order itself, that the court did “state on the record” the court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law.2 Moreover, the stipulated findings adequately addressed the
children’s best interests, including adoptability, developmental needs, medical complexity,
placement stability, and mother’s failure to benefit from services. Further elaboration would not
facilitate appellate review. Accordingly, the trial court satisfied MCR 3.977(I)(1).
1 Specifically, MCR 7.210(B)(2) provides that, when a transcript of the proceedings in the trial
court “cannot be obtained from the court reporter or recorder, the appellant must take the following
steps to settle the record and to cause the filing of a certified settled statement of facts to serve as
a substitute for the transcript.” (Emphasis added.)
2 As for Judge Sabree, we note that the trial court speaks through its orders. See In re Contempt
of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 678; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). Therefore, mother’s claim that
“[a]ttorneys are not judges and do not have authority to make decisions on a case regarding
termination of parental rights” is inapposite.

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B. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Mother next argues that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the
children. She therefore maintains that DHHS could not have established statutory grounds for
termination of her parental rights. We disagree.
“This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate
determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709;
846 NW2d 61 (2014). A trial court’s decision regarding reasonable efforts is likewise reviewed
for clear error. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 258; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). A finding is clearly
erroneous if, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Williams, 286
Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For this Court
to find clear error, a decision must be “more than just maybe or probably wrong.” Id. In applying
this standard of review, deference is given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses who appear before it. In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858
NW2d 143 (2014).
Absent a number of statutory exceptions not applicable here, DHHS is required “to make
reasonable efforts to reunify families and to rectify the conditions that led to the initial removal.”
In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 43; 919 NW2d 427 (2018). See also MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c);
MCL 712A.19a(2). “As part of these reasonable efforts, the Department must create a service plan
outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court
involvement and to achieve reunification.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85-86; 893 NW2d
637 (2017). “The adequacy of the petitioner’s efforts to provide services may bear on whether
there is sufficient evidence to terminate a parent’s rights.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763
NW2d 587 (2009). Conversely, “there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of
respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248. “A
parent’s failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not
be able to provide a child proper care and custody.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 710. “Similarly,
a parent’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence
that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.” Id. at 711.
Here, after initially declining to terminate mother’s parental rights, the trial court ordered
mother to participate in a CSP. DHHS referred mother for therapy, parenting classes, parent-
partner services, housing assistance, visitation, and medical education. Over nearly two years,
mother was terminated from services due to nonparticipation, declined re-referrals, failed to attend
visits and appointments, and did not meaningfully engage in the services ordered. DHHS
additionally accommodated transportation barriers, facilitated virtual medical attendance,
provided educational resources, and transported mother and the children for supervised parenting
time visits. Despite these efforts, mother attended only two of over one hundred medical
appointments and completed only nine parenting time visits in 32 months.
Mother’s failure to participate supported statutory grounds for termination under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). In re White, 303 Mich App at 710-711. Independent of her
noncompliance with the CSP, the original neglect was severe. MH went a year without medical
care, failed to gain weight, and had a dislodged feeding tube. AH was profoundly malnourished.

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As the trial court found, without intervention, the children would have died. Although mother
claimed recent improvements in housing and transportation, those late and unverified efforts do
not outweigh her persistent inability to meet the children’s medical needs. The trial court therefore
did not err in finding that reasonable efforts were made and that statutory grounds for termination
existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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