COA 378697 IN RE TREFIL/WIGGINS MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2026
9:33 AM
In re TREFIL/WIGGINS, Minors.
No. 378697
Montcalm Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2024-001124-NA
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and YOUNG and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
three minor children, AJT, AMT, and HLW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify
conditions that led to adjudication),1 (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and
(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm to child if returned to parent).2 Respondent argues that the trial
court erred by finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 14, 2024, the Montcalm Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
filed a petition alleging that respondent had recently been arrested and lodged in the Montcalm
County Jail and that the children came under the trial court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
1 Although the trial court did not specify that it was terminating under Subsection (3)(c)(i), the
context of the case and the court’s findings make it clear that this Subsection was one of the
grounds for termination.
2 Respondent is the biological mother to all three children. AJT and AMT are twins; their
biological father was reported deceased as of September 2019. HLW’s biological father was also
named as a respondent in these proceedings. His parental rights were terminated in the same order
as respondent’s, but he is not a party to this appeal.

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and (2). The DHHS requested that the trial court authorize the petition, exercise jurisdiction over
the children, and place them into the DHHS’s care and custody.
At the preliminary hearing, respondent waived probable-cause findings. The trial court
found that respondent had “a serious substance abuse issue,” noting that she had tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamines while the children were in her care and custody. The trial
court also found that respondent failed to meet HLW’s medical needs and that the children faced
a substantial risk of harm if returned to her care. The court authorized the petition, ordered that
the children be removed from respondent’s care, and granted respondent two hours of weekly
parenting time. The DHHS placed all three children with the twins’ paternal grandfather.
At the adjudication hearing, respondent admitted that she had not participated in regular
and consistent meetings with Children’s Protective Services. The trial court found that a
preponderance of the evidence, along with respondent’s probable-cause waiver, established
statutory grounds for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction.
After an initial dispositional hearing in October 2024, the trial court reduced respondent’s
parenting time to one supervised hour a week after it was reported that she was not complying with
the services offered to her and that she was openly hostile toward the service providers and the
lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL). The court ordered that she comply with, and benefit from, the
case service plan and that she submit to random drug screens.
The trial court conducted review hearings in January, April, and July 2025, each time
finding that respondent had failed to make any progress in her case plan, failed to comply with the
case plan, and failed to engage with the services offered to her. Respondent had tested positive
for methamphetamine several times and had not completed several other drug screens. She was
not present for the April hearing because she was in jail on a bond violation for a previous arrest
for possession of methamphetamine. She appeared remotely for the July hearing, and the trial
court surmised that she had decided not to appear in person to avoid being arrested on an
outstanding bench warrant out of Mecosta County.
In October 2025, petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging that the children came
within the trial court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) and seeking termination of
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c), (g), (j).
In November 2025, the trial court conducted a termination hearing. Respondent did not
attend but was represented by counsel. The trial court believed that respondent was “very well
aware that if she appeared here today, she’d get arrested on those outstanding bench warrants and
that probably is why we don’t have her address or her contact information.” According to DHHS
caseworker Shelbie Williams, respondent originally claimed that she would cooperate with
services, but she never followed through. Respondent’s Parent-Agency Treatment Plan noted that
respondent’s barriers included substance abuse, poor parenting skills, unstable housing, emotional
instability, domestic violence, and unstable employment. She had not resolved any of those
barriers. Regarding the children’s best interests, Williams thought that the children deserved
stability, permanency, and parents who could meet their needs. Williams believed that respondent
could not do that, given her inability to follow through with services.

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The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). When it addressed the children’s best interests,
the court reasoned as follows:
I agree with the assessment of the guardian ad litem as well as the testimony from
the caseworker assigned to this case, Ms. Williams, that these children need
stability and permeance. Since the mother was incarcerated—I believe it was in
March of ‘25—that she has not seen the children. She hasn’t filed a motion to
request reinstatement of her parenting time.[3] She has not asked to visit the child—
or children and she’s not making any effort—efforts to support these children
financially, emotionally, or mentally and leaving those aspects of their care to other
people. I can’t help but find that—that the bond would be diminished between the
children and the mother as a result of her failure to connect with those children
since March of ’24 (sic). Um, she hasn’t exhibited any parenting skills to the
satisfaction of this Court and most importantly, is her continued criminal
involvement. She just keeps getting arrested for methamphetamine use on at least
two occasions. She could be arrested any second on any—on this bench warrant
out of Mecosta County.
Mental health issues clearly have not been addressed, all of which she had
an opportunity to do and show to the Court and to her children that she could reunite
successfully with them and provide a stable, steady home for them. And I think it’s
telling really that since she was released from jail, she hasn’t requested any
parenting time with these kids. That just shows a total lack of involvement with
them.
With regards to the fact that the children are—the two—well, all three
children are placed with, um, [AJT and AMT’s paternal grandfather]. I’m also
finding that the fact they’re in a relative placement doesn’t change any of my
findings with regards to the children’s best interests. I again reiterate that the
children need permanence and stability and it appears—and the Court is satisfied
that they have that permanence and stability at this time in the home with the
grandfather, um, and that would include the [HLW] child as well. These—these
children need permanence and they need stability. They need to know where their
next meal is coming from. They need to know who’s going to be taking care of
them. They need to know who’s going to be there for them in the long run and the
long-term. They can’t have a mom running in and out of their life, or not even
being in their life for six, eight, nine months and showing a complete lack of any
love or affection for the children and not trying to reunite with them in any way.
So I considered the fact that they’re with a relative and, um, I still agree that it is in
the best interests of the children to have the mother’s parental rights terminated.
3 Respondent-mother did move to reinstate her parenting time in June 2025, but she later withdrew
the motion without explanation.

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The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the children, and this appeal followed.
II. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that it was in the children’s best
interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Best interests are determined on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence.” In re
LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). A trial court’s dispositional choices,
such as a child’s best interests, are reviewed for clear error. See MCR 3.977(K); In re Atchley,
341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App
286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
B. ANALYSIS
In addition to finding statutory grounds for termination,4 the trial court must also find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before ordering the termination. MCL 712A.19b(5).
The trial court should consider all the evidence when making a best-interest determination,
including “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.”
In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2010). “The focus at the best-interest stage
has always been on the child, not the parent.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). The trial court must also consider a child’s placement with relatives. In re
Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). Placement with a relative
weighs against termination, but that fact is not dispositive given that a trial court “may terminate
parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best
interests.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43.
In making its best-interest determination, the trial court considered that the children shared
a bond with respondent and had expressed a desire to return to her care, but respondent had failed
to participate in parenting classes and Foster Care Supportive Visitation services. See In re White,
303 Mich App at 713. Respondent was also referred to domestic-violence counseling but never
attended. The court found that she had made “no progress” in her mental-health issues, substance-
abuse issues, or parenting skills. When the children were initially removed, substance abuse,
parenting skills, unstable housing, emotional instability, domestic violence, and unstable
employment were identified as respondent’s barriers. Since the children’s removal, the trial court
found that respondent had been arrested twice for possession of methamphetamine, failed to
4 Respondent-mother does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination. We therefore may
presume that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the unchallenged statutory grounds
were established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99;
585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341 (2000).

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complete the necessary paperwork for services, and refused to provide her address to the DHHS
or allow her home to be assessed for appropriateness. The court found that she had failed to
support her children financially, emotionally, and mentally. The trial court also explicitly found
that the children’s relative placement did not affect its best-interest analysis. See In re
Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434. There were some concerns regarding the grandfather’s
ability to care for the children in the long-term, but placement with him was certainly preferable
to placement with respondent, who had not even attempted to see her children for the past several
months.
Although respondent adequately participated in parenting time “for a while,” the trial court
found that respondent quickly became “very inconsistent in her parenting time, causing additional
stress and trauma to the girls when she didn’t appear.” The DHHS reported that the children
recognized that respondent made “poor decisions.” Respondent contends that the trial court should
have allowed her “more time to work services and eliminate barriers,” but it is the children’s best
interests, not respondent’s best interests, that govern whether termination was proper. See In re
Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346. The facts of this case demonstrate that the children’s bond with
respondent was at risk of deteriorating because of respondent’s lack of contact with them, and the
children were still at risk of neglect and physical or emotional harm because of respondent’s
methamphetamine abuse, housing instability, and involvement in relationships troubled by
domestic violence. Taking as a whole, a preponderance of the evidence supports that termination
of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. See In re White, 303 Mich App
at 713.
Respondent argues that the trial court should have considered establishing a guardianship
with the grandfather as an alternative to termination. But this argument contradicts the record; a
guardianship was considered and ruled out as a viable option. When asked if she addressed or
considered guardianship for the children, Williams responded in the affirmative. And when asked
why it was ruled out, Williams responded, “I believe multiple permanency options have been
discussed with the relatives and it is—is currently a work in progress.” Williams then confirmed
that, nevertheless, her recommendation was termination. The LGAL also explained that a
guardianship was not appropriate for this case:
The Court has rightly chose not to entertain a long-term guardianship in this context
recognizing that it would perpetuate this damaging limbo without providing true
permanence to these children. With the reunification demonstrably foreclosed by
the parents’ own choices, termination of parental rights is just not an option, it’s the
only remaining pathway to safeguard these girls’ future and secure their stability
and permanence.
Additionally, in her closing arguments, respondent’s counsel urged the trial court to consider
guardianship given that the children were in the care of relatives. And although the trial court did
not expressly comment on the option for a guardianship in its ruling, it did acknowledge that the
children were placed with their paternal grandparents and nevertheless found that the relative
placement did not change the court’s determination that termination was in the children’s best
interests.

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Furthermore, the trial court was not bound to place the children in a guardianship merely
because they were in a relative placement. See In re Simpson, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2024) (Docket No. 368248); slip op at 6 (“[R]espondent’s argument that a guardianship should
have been established was not persuasive because no one petitioned the trial court for a
guardianship and there is no suggestion in the record that the [caregiver] with whom [the minor
child] was placed would have agreed to that arrangement.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted;
alterations in original). In this case, respondent did not petition the court for a guardianship, and
there was no indication in the record that the grandparents would have agreed to a guardianship
placement. A preponderance of the evidence supported that it was in AJT’s, AMT’s, and HLW’s
best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights, and the trial court did not clearly err by
terminating respondent’s parental rights instead of ordering a guardianship.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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