COA 373683 BRENEE JONES V CITY OF FLAT ROCK Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/31/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
BRENEE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 31, 2026
11:43 AM
V No. 373683
Wayne Circuit Court
CITY OF FLAT ROCK, LC No. 23-005572-CD
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
LIEVENSE, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with Part IV of the majority opinion to affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s hostile
work environment claim because she has not shown that she is a member of a protected class under
the CRA, MCL 37.2101 et seq.
I concur in part and dissent in part, however, with Part III of the majority opinion that
affirms the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s retaliation claims on the grounds that she failed to
establish causation for a prima facie claim under the WPA, MCL 15.361 et seq., and the CRA.
The majority focuses its analysis on the WPA and CRA’s requirements that, to establish a
prima facie case, plaintiff must show a causal connection between her protected activity and the
adverse employment actions. Thus, the majority appears to assume without deciding that plaintiff
engaged in protected activity under the acts. For both retaliation claims, I believe plaintiff
proffered evidence that she engaged in protected activity. In April 2022, when plaintiff was
employed by the Flat Rock Community Center, she filed a complaint with her superiors that City
Councilmember Bergeron made racially charged statements to her during a meeting at the
Community Center. The complaint prompted an investigation that Bergeron knew about.
Next, in the analysis, the majority appears to again assume without deciding that plaintiff
experienced adverse employment actions under the acts. I agree. Plaintiff identified two
categories of alleged retaliatory adverse actions: (1) Bergeron’s votes against the Flat Rock
Community Center’s interests and (2) her suspension and termination in late March/early April
2023. More specifically as to the first category, Bergeron voted against plaintiff’s promotion at
the Community Center (first in September 2022 and then in February 2023) and voted against the

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Community Center’s interests in other ways over several months. Also, as for the second category,
after she was promoted in late February 2023 when the city council no longer could stop her
promotion, her supervisor suspended and then terminated her in late March/early April 2023.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under both the WPA and CRA, however,
plaintiff also had to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse
actions. Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 320; 831 NW2d 223 (2013); El-Khalil v
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 161; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). I agree with the majority
opinion that plaintiff has failed to provide evidence creating a genuine issue of material of fact of
a causal connection between her protected activity and her suspension and termination. After
months of the Community Center attempting to promote plaintiff, in February 2023 the
Community Center received the authority to promote her without the City Council and Bergeron’s
approval, and plaintiff’s supervisor did so. Some weeks later, plaintiff’s supervisor terminated her
employment. Plaintiff has not proffered evidence of a causal connection between her protected
activity in April 2022 and her suspension or termination in late March/early April 2023. Plaintiff
argues that defendant’s purported legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating her
employment are pretextual, but under the applicable burden-shifting analysis we do not consider
possible pretext until after plaintiff establishes a prima facia case, which I agree with the majority
she has not done. Debano-Griffin v Lake Co, 493 Mich 167, 176, 828 NW2d 634, 639 (2013).
However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as required, id
at 175, I have a different opinion regarding Bergeron’s votes, especially his votes against plaintiff’s
promotion. I believe genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether there is a causal connection
between plaintiff’s protected activity and Bergeron’s votes, and that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether defendant’s proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for Bergeron’s
votes are pretextual. The majority opinion suggests that plaintiff relies on the timing of Bergeron’s
votes as evidence of causation. But the record reveals other circumstantial evidence from which,
if proven, a factfinder could reasonably infer causation, including:
• Bergeron did not participate in the spring 2022 investigation of plaintiff’s
complaint;
• In May 2022, Bergeron reportedly felt that he could not go to the Community
Center without an escort, and a city employee raised with defendant’s legal counsel
a concern that Bergeron should recuse himself from council votes about the
Community Center due to a concern that he could not vote on such matters without
bias, but Bergeron did not recuse himself from votes about the Community Center
or plaintiff;
• Bergeron regularly cast the deciding vote regarding the Community Center,
meaning his recusal or change in vote would have led to the opposite result,
including on the two votes to approve plaintiff’s promotion, which both failed by a
vote of 3-3;
• On August 1, 2022, Bergeron cast the deciding vote (3-4) against convening a
closed session to discuss the report summarizing the investigation of the incident;

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• Bergeron then participated in the council’s August 1, 2022 vote “to accept the
Police and City Attorney findings regarding the City Attorney’s legal opinion [that]
no further action [was] required” following the investigation into his alleged
statements;
• Bergeron’s reasons for his votes and decision not to recuse himself are not known
because he did not appear for a deposition; and
• The deposition testimony of then-Community Center employee and plaintiff’s
coworker Heather Beitler, who explained how the Community Center operated and
about Bergeron’s hostility toward the Community Center and Jones in 2022-23 that
she believed was in part connected to plaintiff’s complaint, including her belief that
Bergeron attempted to fire plaintiff after she made the complaint.
Next, the majority opinion relies on the fact that the Community Center had preexisting
financial troubles and that Bergeron voted against the Community Center’s requests before
plaintiff’s protected activity, and so his subsequent votes to deny plaintiff a promotion and other
votes cannot be connected to plaintiff’s protected activity and therefore are not pretextual.
Respectfully, I disagree and believe that, based on the circumstantial evidence outlined above,
genuine issues of material fact exist as to pretext such that I would reverse in part the trial court’s
decision to grant summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s retaliation claims with
respect to Bergeron’s votes. See Rymal v Baergen, 262 Mich App 274, 303; 686 NW2d 241 (2004)
(“A causal connection can be established through circumstantial evidence, such as close temporal
proximity between the protected activity and adverse actions, as long as the evidence would enable
a reasonable fact-finder to infer that an action had a discriminatory or retaliatory basis.”).
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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