Sabattis v. SJSA Housing, LLC

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
KENNEBEC, SS. CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-2021-0004

DANIEL SABATTIS,
Plaintiff
DECISION AND ORDER ON
V. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SJSA HOUSING, LLC,
Defendant

INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is the Defendant SJSA Housing's (SJSA) Motion
for Summary Judgment in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff Daniel Sabattis opposes
the motion.
Sabattis commenced this action on December 17, 2020, with the filing of a
one-count complaint alleging negligence. Slightly more than a year later, on
December 28, 2021, SJSA moved for summary judgment. Sabattis filed his
opposition to the motion on February 28, 2022 and the summary judgment record
was completed on April 14, 2022 with the filing of SJSA's reply memorandum and
response.
FACTS

The following facts are drawn from the parties' statements of material fact,
viewed in the light most favorable to Sabattis as the nonmoving party. Kurtz & Perry,
P.A. v. Emerson, 2010 ME 107, ,I 15, 8 A.3d 677.

SJSA owns rental property at 44 Sheldon Street in Farmingdale and has done
so since 2012. In August 2018, Sabattis entered into a residential lease agreement to
rent apartment 3 at 44 Sheldon Street. It is undisputed that SJSA is responsible for
ice treatment and ice and snow removal at the property, and contracts with an
independent vendor to perform that service. SJSA has made salt and sand buckets
available to all its tenants at the property.

On November 30, 2019, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Sabattis was returning to
his apartment after walking a dog, when he cut across the lawn in front of the building.
Tenants were permitted to walk across the lawn. There was no inclement weather
that day and there was no snow on the ground at the time of the fall. As Sabattis
came to the end of the lawn, he stepped on a small patch of ice on the pavement
adjacent to the lawn and fell, breaking his ankle. Sabattis recalls that when he fell,
his left foot slipped on the ice while his right foot was still on the lawn.

At the time SJSA purchased the property at 44 Sheldon Street, a sump pump
had been installed in the basement of the building. The sump pump was connected
to a PVC pipe that exits the basement through the foundation of the building. The
PVC pipe extends across the front lawn of the building. The sump pump was replaced
in January 2019. The owner and prope1iy manager of SJSA were aware of the sump
pump in the basement and could see the PVC pipe running across the lawn but did
not further investigate either the pump or the pipe.

Prior to his fall, Sabattis was unaware that water would discharge from the pipe,
was not aware that water would pool in the driveway and freeze and did not complain
to anyone about water coming from the pipe. The prope1iy manager never saw water
being discharged from the PVC pipe, and it was never brought to her attention that
water discharged from the pipe.

Sabattis recalled that when he fell, he was close to the lawn and he was able to
identify the location of the patch of ice on the pavement ''exactly," by reference to a
photograph of the location taken by his mother, Tara, on December 2, 2019. Sabattis

2
further testified that the patch or "puddle" of ice where he fell corresponded directly
with the pipe that was coming out of the lawn, and the patch of ice where he fell was
"right next to the lawn"

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, based on the parties' statements of
material fact and the cited record, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Levine
v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ~ 4, 770 A.2d 653. It follows that to survive a
moving paiiy's motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must establish
a prima facie case for each of their claims and set forth specific facts showing there
is a genuine issue of material fact. Key Trust Co. ofMaine v. Nasson College, 1997
ME 145, ~ 10, 697 A.2d 408; see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). As the Law Court has
recently stated: when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the defendant has
the burden of demonstrating "that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the undisputed facts" entitle the defendant to judgment as a matter of law. Toto v.
Knowles, 2021 ME 51, ~ 9. It then becomes the plaintiffs responsibility to make out
a prima facie case and show that there are disputed facts. Id. A fact is material if it
has the potential to affect the outcome of the suit. Id. To be considered "genuine,"
there must be sufficient evidence offered to raise a factual contest requiring a fact
finder to choose between competing versions of the truth. Rainey v. Langden, 2010
ME 56, ~ 23, 998 A.2d 342; Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ~ 6, 750 A.2d 573. Further,
this showing "requires more than effusive rhetoric and optimistic surmise." Hennessy
v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 251 (1st Cir. 1999). The Court must ignore
"conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."
Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir. 2002). "Evidence 'submitted in
opposition to summary judgment[] need not be persuasive at that stage,' but it 'must

3
be sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a factual determination without
speculating."' Toto v. Knowles, 2021 ME 51, ~ 11, citing and quoting Est. ofSmith,
2013 ME 13, ~ 18, 60 A.3d 759.

"Landlord-tenant liability frequently involves an analysis of whether the tenant
took possession of an area, and if so, whether the landlord retained some control over
it." Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 1997 ME 99, ~ 11,694 A.2d 924. "A landlord is generally
not liable for a dangerous condition that comes into being after the lessee takes
exclusive possession and control of the premises." Stewart v. Aldrich, 2002 ME 16,
,i 10, 788 A.2d 603. This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions.' On
the other hand, "[a] landlord also may be found liable in negligence for injuries
caused by defective conditions in common areas of a rental building over which he
is deemed to have control." Nichols v. Marsden, 483 A.2d 341, 343 (Me. 1984 ).

In this case, it appears undisputed that SJSA retained control over the area of
the premises where Sabattis walked and subsequently fell on the paved driveway.
Indeed, there is no dispute that SJSA was expressly responsibile for ice and snow
treatment and removal. Since SJSA exercised control over the area of the premises
where Sabattis fell, the elements that Sabattis must show by prima facia evidence are:

(i) An unsafe or dangerous condition existed on the premises,
(ii) SJSA knew or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known of
the unsafe or dangerous condition,
(iii) SJSA acted negligently to protect Sabattis against the dangerous or
unsafe condition, and

1 Those exceptions are when the landlord: (1) fails to disclose a latent defect which he knows or

should have known existed, and which is not known, or discoverable with reasonable care, by the
tenants; (2) gratuitously undertakes to make repairs and does so negligently, and; (3) expressly
agrees to maintain the premises in good repair. Stewart v. Aldrich, 2007 ME 16, ~ 10. See also
Boles v. White, 2021 ME 49, ~ 7, 260 A.3d 697.

4
(iv) SJSA's negligence was the legal cause of Sabattis's injuries.

SJSA contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Sabattis has
not come forward with sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that it knew or should have known that the PVC discharge pipe posed an unsafe or
dangerous condition, or that its negligence, if any, was causally connected to the
injuries sustained by Sabattis.

In support of its request for summary judgment, SJSA points to several Law
Court cases in which the Court upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
landlord or property owner. See, e.g., Durham v. HTH Corp., 2005 ME 53, 870 A.2d
5 77 (customer tripped on stairs at defendant's restaurant - insufficient evidence that
"metal strip" on stairs was unreasonably safe or that restaurant knew or should have
known it was an unsafe condition); Houde v. Millett, 2001 ME 183, 787 A.2d 757
(tenant failed to present sufficient evidence that soot on kitchen floor, which she
claimed to have cleaned up, caused her slip and fall); Addy v. Jenkins, 2009 ME 46,
969 A.2d 935 (worker fell at construction site - no evidence that fall was connected
to alleged negligent act or omission of defendant). But see 2009 ME 46, ~~ 17-32
(Silver and Levy, JJ., dissenting). See also Estate a/Smith v. Salvesen, 2016 ME 100,
143 A.3d 780 (fall down staircase which had code violations - insufficient evidence
to infer any causal connection between code violations and fall).

For his part, Sabattis points to other cases involving claims of premises liability,
in which the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant was vacated. See,
e.g., Marcoux v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 2005 ME 107, ~~ 19-27,
881 A.2d 113 8 ( evidence was sufficient and not speculative that defendant was on
notice of the hazard and that it was causally connected to injury); Rodrigue v.
Rodrigue, 1997 ME 99, ~~ 14-15 (evidence of causation was sufficient where plaintiff
testified she slipped on debris left on stairs); Zawacki v. Foley, 2015 U.S.Dist.LEXIS

5
104249 (D. Me.) (Nivison, M.J.) (evidence sufficient to raise issue of material fact as
to whether defendant's failure to place guard or railing at top of stairs caused fall).

Whether a landlord knew, or with the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known about an unsafe condition, and whether a defendant's alleged negligence was
causally connected to the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, are generally questions
of fact. See Marcoux, 2005 ME 107, ~ 24; Estate of Smith, 2016 ME 100, ~ 21.
"Causation is ... a question of fact, requiring proof that there is some reasonable
causal connection demonstrated in the record between the act or omission of the
defendant and the damage that the plaintiff has suffered." Id. It is not necessary that
the plaintiff, as the non-moving party, present direct evidence of actual or
constructive knowledge or causation. Rather, such evidence may be circumstantial
and may arise from reasonable inferences, provided such inferences flow "logically
from the facts and [are] not unduly speculative," conjectural or based on guesswork.
Estate of Smith, 2016 ME 100, ~~ 21 & 25; Rodrigue, 1997 ME 99, ~ 14. See also
Tolliver v. Dep 't ofTransp., 2008 ME 83, ~ 42, 948 A.2d 1223 .

In this case, based on the summary judgment record, the com1 is satisfied that
Sabattis has produced sufficient prima facie evidence to generate a genuine issue of
material fact that SJSA either knew or should have known that the PVC pipe
connected to a sump pump in the basement, may have been discharging water onto
the lawn, which seeped or drained onto the adjacent paved driveway and froze during
cold weather.

The record shows that SJSA knew of the existence of the sump pump (it was
replaced in January 2019), and the PVC pipe connected to it and that the pipe crossed
the lawn. It is a question of fact for the jury whether SJSA knew or reasonably should
have known that water would be pumped from the basement through the pipe and
onto the lawn, which the tenants were allowed to walk on to get to the driveway.

6
• I • "

Further, it is a question of fact for the jury whether SJSA should have reasonably
known that water discharged onto the lawn would or might drain onto the driveway,
with the potential that it would freeze in cold weather. The fact that SJSA had not
received any prior complaints about water draining onto the driveway and freezing,
is certainly relevant evidence for the jury to consider as to whether SJSA exercised
due care under all the circumstances, but it does not, in the court's view, entitle SJSA
to summary judgment. Rather, it highlights why there is a genuine issue of fact for
the jury to resolve.

Likewise, the court concludes that Sabattis has generated an issue of fact on
the element of causation. Sabattis has produced evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find that he walked across the lawn, stepped on a patch of ice on the
driveway immediately adjacent to the lawn, and lost his footing, causing him to fall.
A rational factfinder could also infer that the patch of ice on the driveway came from
water that had been pumped from the basement through the pipe and onto the lawn,
from whence it drained onto the driveway and, at some point, froze.

Given the summary judgment record, the court does not believe that those
inferences, if drawn by a jury, would be speculative, conjectural, or based on
guesswork. Sabattis was able to describe where he walked, how he slipped and where
the patch of ice was located, particularly in relation to the placement of the PVC pipe
on the lawn. In short, the court concludes that there are factual disputes that must be
decided by the jury, not by the court on summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
The entry is:

7
. . . "'

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
The clerk is directed to incorporate these orders into the civil docket of this
case by notation reference in accordance with M.R.Civ.P. 79(a).

DATED: May 23, 2022

Entered on the docket 5{2L! p-:02.-2 Justice, Maine Superior Court

8