State of Maine v. Clough

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STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL COURT
KENNEBEC, SS. AUGUSTA
DOCKET NO. CR-2020-169

STATE OF MAINE

V. ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

BOBBI-JO CLOUGH

Before the court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the indictment against
her on the basis of collateral estoppel. Argument on the motion was held on March
5, 2021.
The Defendant has been indicted for one count of Theft by Deception (Class
B) and one count of Theft by Deception (Class C). Count I alleges that the Defendant
committed theft of benefits from the following programs: Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF);
Maine Care, and/or; Emergency Assistance Program. In Count 2, the Defendant is
charged with committing theft by obtaining benefits from the Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). Both counts of the indictment allege that
the Defendant committed theft by intentionally creating or reinforcing the false
impressions that her husband was not living with her and/or was not contributing
financially to the household. Count 2 also alleges that the Defendant intentionally
created the false impression that she was not working until January 2012. The
conduct that is the basis for Count 1 is alleged to have occurred between November
1, 2011 and April 30, 2014. As for Count 2, the conduct is alleged to have taken
place from December 19, 2012 to February 28, 2014.
The basis of the Defendant's collateral estoppel claim is a Decision dated July
29, 2014 from an Administrative Hearing Officer, who conducted a "TANF and
Food Supplement Program Disqualification" hearing on July 7, 2014. In that written
decision, the Hearing Officer found that the Department of Health and Human
Services (OFI) had failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the Defendant had intentionally violated the program rules governing
TANForFSP.
The issue before the court is whether an administrative decision in a
disqualification hearing can act to collaterally estop a later criminal prosecution. It
does not appear that the Maine Law Court has addressed this issue .1 Courts in other
states have.
The weight of authority appears to be that an administrative decision does not
collaterally estop a subsequent criminal prosecution. See State v. Williams, 937 P.2d
1052, 1057-58 (Wn. 1997) (defendant convicted of welfare fraud - criminal
prosecution was not barred on collateral estoppel grounds by administrative decision
finding that she had not acted intentionally); Malloy v. State, 744 S.E.2d 778, 785
(Ga. 2013) (defendant convicted of Medicaid fraud - criminal prosecution not
collaterally estopped by administrative ruling that he had not acted willfully). See
also Cook v. State, 921 So.2d 631 (Fla. App., 2d Dist., 2005) (administrative
decision by teacher disciplinary commission did not collaterally estop later criminal
prosecution) (collecting cases); State v. Alvey, 678 P.2d 5 (Ha. 1984) (administrative
finding by prison disciplinary committee did not collaterally estop criminal
prosecution).

'State v. McLean, 560 A.2d 1088, 1090 (Me. 1989) did not address collateral
estoppel, but was based on a statute making it clear that determination of facts by
the Secretary of State in a license suspension hearing is independent of the same or
similar facts in any civil or criminal proceeding.

2
There is some contrary authority. See People v. Sims, 21 Cal. 3d 468, 651
P.2d 321 (1982) (criminal prosecution in welfare fraud case was collaterally
estopped by administrative fair hearing based on California's "unique statutory
scheme" for prosecuting welfare fraud cases) superseded by statute as noted in Gikas
v. Zolin, 6 Cal. 4~ 841,851,863 P.2d 745 (1993); People v. Watt, 320 N.W. 2d 333
(Mich. App., 1982) (defendant convicted of welfare fraud - collateral estoppel
applied to bar prosecution). 2
The court finds the decisions in Williams, Malloy and Cook and the dissenting
opinion in People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 490-95 (Kaus, J.) to be persuasive. As
recognized by those courts, the purposes underlying an administrative hearing and a
criminal trial are "wholly distinct." Williams, 937 P .2d at 1057. Moreover, allowing
an administrative agency decision to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution would
undermine the very nature of administrative proceedings and would tend to convert
them into full-blown criminal prosecutions. Finally, the court is concerned that
applying principles of collateral estoppel to preclude a criminal prosecution based
on an administrative ruling might "subvert" the executive authority of prosec · ·al
officials. Malloy, 744 S.E.2d at 784.
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For these reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIE
Dated: March 10, 2021
A true cop)
ATTEST:

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Justice, Superior Court

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Clerk of Cuu: 1·.

2
A recent case that is not on point because it was decided on federal preemption
grounds, is Gonzalez v. State, 207 A.3d 147 (Del. 2019), where the court held that
federal law prohibits the State from bringing a civil action against a SNAP recipient
after already bringing a successful administrative action against that recipient for the
same intentional program: violation.

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