Eide v. Cumberland County

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO: CV-2020-47

JENEA N. EIDE, )

Plaintiff, )

V. }

CUMBERLAND COUNTY, KEVIN )
J. JOYCE and BRADLEY P.
ROGERS, ) ORDER

Defendants )

This case comes before the Court on Defendant, Bradley P. Rogers', Motion for

Summary Judgment. After consideration', Defendant's Motion is granted.

I. Factual Background

The Defendant Rogers is a Deputy with the Cumberland County Sheriff's

Department and was working a vehicle patrol shift on July 22, 2018. During that shift,

dispatch requested that the Defendant respond to a report of a suicidal woman in Casco,

Maine. Dispatch informed the Defendant that a man was seen running after the woman

yelling for help. The Defendant initiated the flashing blue light bar on his marked patrol

vehicle and began traveling south on Tandberg Trail in Windham. The Defendant did

not initiate his siren.

On this same date, the Plaintiff, Jenea Eide, was also in her vehicle traveling south

on Tandberg Trail. Upon approaching the Plaintiff's vehicle, the Defendant observed

that the Plaintiff was stopped in her lane of traffic. The Defendant thought that the

Plaintiff had stopped in order to allow the Defendant to pass. However, the Plaintiff was

'The court elects to decide the motion without oral argument. See M. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(7).

Page 1 of 7
stopped in the lane of traffic preparing to make a left-hand turn. The Defendant pulled

into the northbound lane of Tandberg Trail in order to overtake the Plaintiff but collided

with the Plaintiff's vehicle when the Plaintiff turned into the path of Defendant's cruiser.

The Plaintiff was injured as a result of the accident.

The Plaintiff filed this suit against multiple defendants, including the Defendant

Deputy in his individual capacity, alleging negligent operation of the police cruiser. The

Defendant has now moved for summary judgment alleging that he is immune from

individual civil liability. Specifically, the Defendant alleges that his response to the report

of a suicidal woman is a discretionary function of his official duties as a Sherri££' s Deputy

and he is therefore entitled to discretionary function immunity under the Maine Tort

Claims Act (MTCA). See 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C).

II. Legal Standard

A party is entitled to summary judgment when review of the parties' statements

of material facts and efle record to which the statements refer, demonstrates that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute. Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106,

<JI 14, 951 A.2d 821; M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A defendant who is the moving party has the

initial burden to establish that there is no genuine dispute of fact and that the undisputed

facts would entitle the defendant to judgement as a matter of law." Oceanic Inn, Inc. v.

Sloan's Cove, LLC, 2016 ME 34, <JI25-<j[26 (quotations marks and citations omitted.) "The

nonmoving plaintiff must then demonstrate that the 111,aterial facts are disputed and must

make out a prima facie case for its claim." (Id.) "Summary judgment may be entered

. when a defendant is immune from tort liability." Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County,

2013 ME 13, 9I 12, 60 A.3d 759.

III. Discussion

Page 2 of 7
"[E]mployees of governmental entities shall be absolutely immune from personal

civil liability for ... performing or failing to perform any discretionary function or duty,

whether or not the discretion is abused[.]" 14 M.R.S. 8111(C). The Law Court has

explicitly recognized that although the legislature has "removed immunity from a

governmental entity for an employee's negligent operation of [a] motor vehicle ... the

Legislature did not ... limit discretionary function immunity for individual officers ..."

Estate of Smith, 2013 ME 13, 'if 13, 60 A.3d 759.

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that because the MTCA does not provide immunity for

governmental entities for injuries that result from the negligent operation of a motor

vehicle, the Defendant likewise has no discretionary function immunity in his individual

capacity. Specifically, the Plaintiff presents the Law Court's decision in Norton v. Hall,

2003 ME 118, 834 A.2d 928 and subsequent legislation passed in response. In Norton, the

Law Court held that the MTCA provided Cumberland County and Cumberland County

Sherri££' s Department, as governmental entities, with discretionary function immunity

for injuries that occurred during a high-speed police pursuit. Norton, 2003 ME 118, 'if 20,

834 A.2d 928. In response, the Maine Legislature amended the Maine Tort Claims Act to

eliminate discretionary function immunity for governmental entities when injuries result

from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See 14 M.R.S. § 8104-B(3); L.D. 936,

Summary (122d Legis. 2005).

The Plaintiff's arguments regarding individual immunity are misplaced. "If the

statute's meaning is clear, [the court does] not look beyond its words unless the result is

illogical or absurd." Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 2007 ME 68, 'if 29, 922 A.2d 484

(quotation marks omitted). The section of the MTCA that applies to individuals(§ 8111)

is unaffected by any .amendment or language found in the sections of the MTCA that

apply to governmental entities. Compare 14 M.R.S. § 8103-8704-B (articulating situations

Page 3 of 7
where governmental entities are liable for damages); with 14 M.R.S. § 8111 (articulating

situations where government employees are individually liable). The statute here is

unambiguous in that it articulates specific instances in which government employees are

"absolutely immune from personal civil liability[.]" 14 M.R.S. § 8111. Nothing in the

statute provides an exemption to individual immunity in the context of vehicle

negligence. Accordingly, the only issue before the court is whether the Defendant's

response to the report of a suicidal woman is considered a discretionary function of his

official duties under 14 M.R.S. § 81ll(l)(C).

A. Discretionary Function

"Defining the scope of an employee's discretionary function immunity begins

with a determination of the employee's duties." Hilderbrand v. Wash. County Comm'rs,

2011 ME 132, <fI 9, 33 A.3d 425. If a statute clearly indicates the duties of an employee,

"the court construe[s] immunity in light of that statute. Id. However, if no statute clearly

indicates an employee's duties, the court applies the following four factor test:

(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision
necessarily .involve a basic governmental policy program or
objective; (2) is the questioned act, omission or decision
essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy,
program, or objective as opposed to one whicli' would not
change th course or direction of the policy, program or
objective; (3) does the act, omission, or decision r quire the
ex rcise of basic policy evaluation, jt1dgm nt, and expertise
on the part of the governmental ag ncy involved; and (4) does
the governmental agency involv d possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do
or make the challenged act, omission, or decision.

See Roberts v. State, 1999 ME 89, <fI 8, 731 A.2d 855. Although not defined by statue, the

Law Court has held that "[t]he response to an emergency by a law enforcement officer

serves the basic governmental objective of public safety" and the "decision to engage in

a high-speed chase is a discretionary decision to which discretionary immunity applies."

Page 4 of 7
Norton, 2003 ME 118, 9[ 7, 834 A.2d 928; citing Shelby v. Cumberland County, 2002 ME 80,

9[9[ 7, 10, 796 A.2d 678.z Indeed, the Law Court routinely finds that an act falls within an

employee's discretionary function immunity if the act required the exercise of judgment

or choice in furtherance of the employee's official duties. See e.g. Lawson v. Willis, 2019

ME 36, 9[ 8-13, 204 A.3d 133; Hilderbrand v. Wash. County Comm'rs, 2011 ME 132, 9[9[ 10-20;

33 A.3d 425; Quintal v. City of Hallowell, 2008 ME 155, 9[9[ 33-36, 956 A.2d 88.

Here, the Defendant's police cruiser collided with the Plaintiff's vehicle while the

Defendant was on duty and actively responding to the report of a suicidal woman.

Responding to the imminent threat of death or bodily injury is certainly within a law

enforcement officer's official duties regarding public safety. Further, the decision of

whether and how to respond to a public safety threat is also an exercise of professional

judgment and falls well within the Defendant's expertise as a law enforcement officer.

Accordingly, the Defendant's response to an emergency situation is a discretionary

function of his law enforcement duties and he is therefore immune from personal civil

liability from accidents that may arise during the exercise of that discretion as a matter of

law. See 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C).

The Plaintiff's arguments regarding the Law Court's decision in Tolliver v. DOT

are also unavailing. 2008 ME 83, 948 A.2d 1223. In Tolliver, the Law Court differentiated
'
between governmental acts that are discretionary versus those which are ministerial/

which are not afforded discretionary function immunity. Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, 9[9[ 16-28,

•Alth ough Norton has been expressly overruled by statute in regard to im.n;\ LU1ity for govem:rnental entities,
the reasoning applied in Norton is still analogies in ~·egards to whether an action is a discretionary function
in fw th eran ce of an officer's duty and ultimately, personal immUJ1ity. See Esttile of Smith, 2013 ME 13, <[ 13,
60 A..3d 759 (The Legisl,atu l.'e did not m).'.le'nd [The MICA] to limit discretionary function immunity for
individ ual officers exercising discretion in deciding whether to pursue a fleeing vehicle").
1
Defined as "those to be carried out by employees, by the order of others or of the la w, with little
person al discretion as to the circumstan ces .in which the act is d one. " To lliver, 2008 ME 83, <J[ 21, 948 A.2d
1223.

Page 5 of 7
948 A.2d 1223. Tolliver does not alter the analysis of whether an act is a discretionary

function of a governmental employee's duties, particularly in regards to whether an act

is one which requires discretionary decision making in order to achieve a uniquely

governmental objective. Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, <[ 20, 948 A.2d 1223; citing Roberts v. State,

1999 ME 89, <[ 10, 731, A.2d 855. Accordingly, Tolliver does not alter the principle that

high-speed police responses to emergency situations are a discretionary function of a

police officer's official duties.

B. Necessary Party

The Plaintiff also argues that Judgment cannot be entered in favor of the Deputy

Defendant here because the Defendant is an essential party to this lawsuit. Maine Rule

of Civil Procedure 19 "requires joinder of all available persons who have an interest in

the litigation so that any judgment will effectively and completely adjudicate the

dispute." Ocwen Fed. Bank v. Gile, 2001 ME 120, <[ 14, 777 A.2d 275. "Joinder is required

in circumstances wher'e the absence of unnamed parties would prevent a judgment from

fully adjudicating the underlying dispute, expose those who are already parties to

multiple or inconsistent obligations, or prejudice the interests of absent parties[.]" Muther

v. Broad Cove Shore Ass'n, 2009 ME 37, <[ 9, 968 A.2d 539. "Whether a party is necessary

to the litigation therefore depends on what elements of proof must be established, based

on the cause of action alleged in that particular litigation." MTGLQ Investors, L.P. v. Alley,

2017 ME 145, <[ 5, 16? A.3d 1002. A necessary element of proof in a vicarious liability

cause of action is proof that an employee was acting within the scope of his or her

employment when an alleged accident occurred. See Canney v. Strathglass Holdings, LLC.,

2017 ME 64, <[ 12, 159 A.3d 330.

Here, the Defendant is not a necessary party for the purposes of Rule 19. For one,

Rule 19 does not alter the unambiguous language ot the MTCA that grants governmental

Page 6 of 7
employees with discretionary function immunity. See 14 M.R.S. § 811l(l)(C); see also

Estate of Smith, 2013 ME 13, 'IT 12, 60 A.3d 759 ("Summary judgment may be entered when

a defendant is immune from tort liability."). Accordingly, the Defendant here does not

have an interest in the lawsuit that will not be fully adjudicated in his absence because

judgment is being entered in his favor here. Moreover, there is nothing that prevents the

Plaintiff from offering evidence that the Defendant was acting within the scope of his

employment if the Defendant is dismissed as a party to this lawsuit. The Defendant may

indeed be called upon to testify or otherwise offer such evidence. However, the

Defendant is nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no

genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he is personally immune from liability

under the MTCA.

IV. Conclusion

Whether the Defendant is immune from personal civil liability is governed solely

by 14 M.R.S. § 8111. Here, the Plaintiff's injuries occurred while the Defendant was

carrying out a discretionary function of his official duties as a law enforcement officer

and he is therefore immune from individual civil liability as a matter of law. See 14 M.R.S.

§ 8111(1)(C).

The entry is:

Defendant, Bradley P. Rogers', Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference

pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a) .

..,;
Date: Marc h~ 2021
Thomas McKeon
Justice, Superior Court

Page7of7