State of Maine v. Roscoe, Jr.

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL COURT
CUMBERLAND, SS. PORTLAND
DOCKET NO. CR-2019-1296

STATE OF MAINE

V. ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

WILLIAM ROSCOE, JR.

INTRODUCTION
Before the cou1i for resolution is the Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Statements dated March 25, 2019. Specifically, William Roscoe, Jr. (Roscoe) seeks
to exclude from evidence inculpatory statements he made to his federal probation
officer on June 25, 2018 and in a subsequent interview with a Portland Police
detective on January 5, 2019, on the ground that they were not voluntary.
An evidentiary hearing on the motion was started on January 28, 2020 with
the presentation of testimony from U.S. Probation Officer Michael Barker. That
hearing did not conclude on that day, however, and was scheduled to resume on
March 13, 2020. That hearing was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
hearing was rescheduled for July 6, 2020, but was continued at the request of counsel
for the Defendant, and without objection from the State, because the Defendant
could not be transported to the courthouse from the Cumberland County jail, again
due to COVID-19 public health concerns. The court held a status conference with
counsel on January 7, 2021. See Procedural Order dated January 7,2021.
Ultimately, the evidentiary hearing resumed on April 1, 2021, at which time
the cou1t received additional testimony from Officer Barker and the testimony of
Detective Kelly Gorham. The cou1t also admitted into evidence, without objection.,
State's Exhibits 1-3, being respectively: (1) Judgment in the matter of United States
v. WilliamA!ji~ed Roscoe, Case No. 2-15-CR-00100-001 dated February 5, 2016; (2)
Miranda Warning and Waiver dated January 5, 2019, and; (3) Video disc of
interview with Mr. Roscoe by Det. Gorham on January 5, 2019 at the Cumberland
County Jail. Briefing in this matter was completed on June 11, 2021.
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court makes the following
findings of fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On February 5, 2016, sentence was imposed upon Mr. Roscoe in the United
States District Court for the District of Maine on a single count of Possession of
Child Pornography. Upon his guilty plea, Mr. Roscoe received a sentence of 40
months to be followed by a period of supervised release of 5 years. Among the
conditions of Mr. Roscoe's supervision was standard condition # 3, which states:
"the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and
follow the instructions ofthe probation officer." In addition, Mr. Roscoe was subject
to ce1tain special conditions of supervised release, including special condition# 2,
which states:
Defendant shall submit to periodic random polygraph
examinations as directed by the probation officer to assist in treatment
and/or case planning related to behaviors potentially associated with
sex offense conduct. No violation proceedings will arise solely on the
defendant[ ] failure to pass a polygraph examination, or on the
defendant[ ] refusal to answer polygraph questions based on 5th
amendment grounds. Such an event could, however, generate a
separate investigation. Defendant shall pay/co-pay for such services to
the supervising officer[ J satisfaction.

This condition works in conjunction with special condition # 1that required
Mr. Roscoe to "fully participate in sex offender treatment as directed by the
supervising officer."

2
Roscoe served approximately 34 months of his initial 40-month sentence and
was released from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons in May of 2018. Officer
Barker, a sex offender specialist, was assigned as Roscoe's supervising officer, and
held an "intake" meeting with him on May 23, 2018 at Roscoe's apaiiment in
Portland. At that "intake" meeting, Officer Barker discussed with Roscoe both the
standard and special conditions of his supervised release, and specifically discussed
with him his 5th amendment right not to answer questions put to him, either by Barker
or by a polygraph examiner, that would incriminate him. He also emphasized to
Roscoe that if there were any "hands-on" victims of his, Roscoe should not identify
them by name, but should use some other way to describe them, such as by letter,
initial or number. Officer Barker testified that "one of the standard conditions they
have is that they are required to be truthful within the inquiries that we request of
them, but that does not extend to anything that could be potentially incriminating.
And I would not be asking him any questions that would entail him invoking his
Fifth Amendment rights.'' (April 1, 2021 Transcript at 12). "Specifically, I told him
he' 11 learn more about Fifth Amendment and his right to remain silent during the
polygraph, because they go over that. I made the parallels between what the truthful
condition means on my end that he has to remain truthful with me. However, he
does not have to admit anything that would be potentially incriminating, even if I
direct him to answer those questions." (Id at 54-55).
Following the intake meeting on May 23, 2018, Roscoe was scheduled for a
psycho-sexual evaluation and then his first polygraph examination on June 18, 2018.
According to Officer Barker, it is standard practice that the polygraph examiner
would review with the subject (in this case Mr. Roscoe), his 5th amendment rights
not to incriminate himself and not identify victims by name.
Within several days after the polygraph examination of Mr. Roscoe, Officer
Barker received a copy of the polygraph repo1i, from which he learned that Roscoe

3
had "passed" the exam but had made admissions that he had some type of sexual
contact with minors, identified as victim "L" and victim "M." Although Officer
Barker did not know the names of these victims, the court finds that he suspected
that victim "M" was McKenzie. At the outset of Roscoe's supervised release, he
had requested permission to have contact with the children of his former girlfriend,
one of whom was named McKenzie. That request was denied. Moreover, Officer
Barker was monitoring Roscoe's cell phone and was aware that Roscoe had been in
contact with McKenzie's mother and that the phone contained photos of McKenzie
herself.
After rece1vmg the polygraph report, Officer Barker held a so-called
"containment" meeting with Roscoe on June 25, 2018. This meeting also took place
at Roscoe's apa1iment and was quite brief, lasting less than 30 minutes . Officer
Barker testified that he thought the meeting may have lasted as little as 15 minutes.
It was not recorded. Officer Barker described Roscoe as being anxious and sad at
the meeting, and concerned that he would be going to jail because of what he had
admitted during the polygraph examination. While not hyper-ventilating, Roscoe
was breathing heavily and Barker had some concern for his well-being because sex
offenders have a high risk of suicide. Officer Barker asked Roscoe directly if victim
"M" was McKenzie and Roscoe confirmed that she was and, upon further
questioning, acknowledged and described that he had had sexual contact with her
for a period of about 2 Yi years while she was between the ages of 9 and 11. Officer
Barker did not say anything to Roscoe about his 5th amendment right not to answer
incriminating questions that he had discussed previously with him during the May
23, 2018 intake meeting.
Officer Barker is not a mandated rep01ier and did not immediately make a
referral to the Maine Department of Health and Human Services. Moreover, conduct
that pre-dated Roscoe's period of supervised release could not form the basis for a

4
petition to revoke his release. For that reason, Officer Barker's focus in his
"containment" meeting with Roscoe of June 25, 2018 was on whether Roscoe was
having prohibited contact with a minor, particularly a "hands-on,' victim.
Officer Barker did not arrest or threaten to arrest Roscoe at that time, and
although Roscoe was concerned about going to jail, Barker told him that they would
"take things one step at a time,,, but he made it clear to Roscoe that he was to have
no ftuiher contact with McKenzie or any other minor, except his son. By the end of
the meeting, Officer Barker felt that Mr. Roscoe was somewhat less anxious.
As a federal probation officer, Barker had considerable discretion in deciding
whether to seek a petition to revoke Roscoe's supervised release and whether to seek
permission to make a referral to DHHS. A decision to do either of those things also
required the approval of the federal comt. Ultimately, in the late Fall of 2018, or
perhaps the early Winter of that year, Officer Barker was authorized to file a petition
to revoke Roscoe's supervised release and to make a refe1Tal to DHHS of the
disclosures Roscoe had made to him.
On January 2, 2019, Det. Kelly Gorham received the referral from the
Biddeford office of DHHS and contacted Officer Barker the next day. A Child
Advocacy Center (CAC) interview of McKenzie was also set up, which Det. Gorham
attended. McKenzie made no disclosures or allegations against Roscoe during that
first CAC interview. Det. Gorham learned from Officer Barker that Roscoe had
been arrested on January 3, 2019. The petition to revoke was based on allegations
that he continued to have prohibited contact with minors, 1 possession of an
unapproved device and substance use. On January 4, 2019, Officer Barker gave a

' It remains unclear to the cou11, based on its review of the hearing transcripts,
whether Roscoe was revoked, in part, because he continued to have contact with
McKenzie while he was on supervised release, but it is the com1's understanding
that such was, in fact, the case.

5
written statement to Det. Gorham in which he detailed the admissions Roscoe had
made to him on June 25, 2018. On the following day, January 5, 2019, Det. Gorham
went to the Cumberland County Jail to attempt to interview Roscoe. By this time,
Roscoe had already made his initial appearance in federal court on the petition to
revoke his supervised release and he was represented by counsel at that court event.
Det. Gorham did not attempt to reach out to Roscoe's federal attorney and believed
she had no obligation to do so with respect to her investigation of possible state law
offenses.
Det. Gorham met with Roscoe at the jail and recorded the interview on video.
See State's Exhibit 3. She advised Roscoe of his Miranda warnings and asked if he
was willing to answer her questions. He said: "sure," and signed a written waiver.
State's Exhibit 2. Det. Gorham accurately told Roscoe that she had spoken to Officer
Barker, who told her about Roscoe's earlier disclosures/admissions to him, but she
falsely stated that McKenzie had corroborated those disclosures when, in fact, she
had not done so during her first CAC interview.
The interview lasted a little over 20 minutes. Roscoe confirmed that he had
engaged in sexual acts and contact with McKenzie while he lived in her household
and while she was between the ages of 9 to 11, and that this conduct took place over
a 2 Yi year period. Essentially, he told Det. Gorham what he had previously told
Officer Barker. He also admitted that he had had sexual contact on one occasion
with victim "L." Roscoe disclosed to Det. Gorham that he had a brain tumor
removed in 2008 and that he believed it had affected his "impulse control." Roscoe
was clearly concerned that his statements/admissions would subject him to a lengthy
prison sentence. In viewing the video interview, the cou1i found that Mr. Roscoe
was lucid and forthcoming and understood the Miranda warnings given to him by
Det. Gorham and further understood the seriousness of the conduct to which he was

6
admitting and the potential consequences that could result. He also expressed
remorse for what he had done.
On March 7, 2019, Mr. Roscoe was indicted by the Cumberland County
Grand Jury on 3 counts of Gross Sexual Assault (Class A) and 2 counts of Unlawful
Sexual Contact (Class B), presumably committed against McKenzie. He was also
indicted on 1 count of Unlawful Sexual Touching (Class D), presumably committed
against victim "L."
DISCUSSION
Roscoe has made it clear that his challenge to the admissibility of his
statements to P.O. Barker on June 25, 2018 and Det. Gorham on January 5, 2019, is
on the basis that they were not voluntary in accordance with due process as
articulated by the Law Court in State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172, 151 A.3d 911.
In Hunt, the Com1 clarified the "distinction between those statements that
must be excluded pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because they are the product of
compulsion, and those statements that must be excluded because their admission
would otherwise create an injustice." The latter situation employs a due process

analysis and seeks to address the question of whether a defendant's "statements were
free and voluntary or whether, considering the totality of the circumstances under
which the statements were made, their admission would be fundamentally unfair."
Id. The Court reaffirmed its holding in State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 500-01
(Me. 1983) that "[a] confession is voluntary if it results from the free choice of a
rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the
circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair." See also State v.
Williams, 2020 ME 128, ~ 43, 241 A.3d 835, amended, 2020 Me. LEXIS 136.
The court must focus on "the totality of the State's actions in obtaining the
confession." Hunt, 2016 ME 172, if 21; State v. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, 1~ 4, 9,

7
755 A.2d 1075. A number of relevant factors may be considered by the court in
making the voluntariness assessment, including:
the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location
of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was custodial; the
recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers involved; the
persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or
inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant's age, physical
and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct.

State v. George, 2012 ME 64, ~ 21, 52 A.3d 903.

It is the State's burden to demonstrate that a statement is voluntary beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Annis, 2018 ME 15, ,r 13, 178 A.3d 467. State v. Collins,
297 A.2d 620, 626-27 (Me. 1972).
As noted above, the comt must assess the totality of the circumstances in order
to make a judgment as to whether the State has proved the voluntariness of a
defendant's confession beyond a reasonable doubt. No one factor, in isolation,
necessarily controls that determination.
In evaluating Roscoe's claim that his admissions to both P.O. Barker and Det.
Gorham were not voluntary, the comt has also obtained guidance from the United
States Supreme Court opinion in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) and the
more recent decision from the First Circuit in United States v. Rogers, 988 F.3d 106
(1st Cir. 2021). Although these cases may not be directly on point for purposes of
the due process analysis under Hunt, they are helpful because they both involved
individuals who were on probation or supervised release and who sought to suppress
statements made to their probation officers while they were required to participate
in sex offender treatment and, in Rogers, participate in polygraph examinations just
like Roscoe was required to do.
In Murphy, the defendant was on state probation, which included
requirements that he pmticipate in sex offender treatment, rep01t as directed and be

8
truthful to his probation officer "in all matters." During the course of sex offender
treatment, the defendant admitted to a rape and murder in 1974. This disclosure was
conveyed to Murphy's probation officer, who directed Murphy to meet with her. At
that meeting, Murphy again admitted to the rape and murder. He was later indicted
for first degree murder and moved to suppress the statements he made to his
probation officer.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, even though Murphy was not "in
custody" for purpose of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), he should have
been warned ofhis privilege against self-incrimination "[b]ecause ofthe compulsory
nature of the meeting, because [Murphy] was under court order to respond truthfully
to his agent's questions, and because the agent had substantial reason to believe that
[Murphy's] answers were likely to be incriminating." 465 U.S. at 425. The Supreme
Court, applying Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, rejected these reasons and
reversed.
As an initial matter, the Court reaffirmed longstanding law that the right to
refuse to incriminate oneself is not self-executing, and must be invoked or it will be
lost. Moreover, the Court rejected the notion that meetings with probation officers
and answering their questions should be treated similarly to interrogations in police
custody. Finally, the fact that the probation officer consciously sought to elicit
incriminating evidence did not trigger the need for Miranda-like warnings in non­
custodial settings. The Court also rejected the claim that Murphy was threatened
with a "penalty" if he had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to
answer his probation officer's questions, since there was no evidence "that Murphy
confessed because he feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained
silent." Id at 437.
In Rogers, the l81 Circuit considered a case that involved use of statements to
a polygraph examiner and a probation officer that were used to support a revocation

9
of supervised release. In that case, the probationer was subject to one of the very
same conditions of supervised release as was Mr. Roscoe, to wit, special condition
# 2 that he "submit to periodic random polygraph examinations." This special
condition also contained the disclaimer that is applicable to Mr. Roscoe, that "[n]o
violation proceedings will arise solely on the defendant's failure to pass a polygraph
examination, or on the defendant['s] refusal to answer polygraph questions on 5th
amendment grounds," but such "an event could, however, generate a separate
investigation."
Rogers was required to participate in a polygraph examination. During a pre­
polygraph interview he admitted to using an unapproved device to view pornography
on a regular basis for several months. This information was passed along to the
probation officer by the polygraph examiner. In a later conversation, Rogers told
the probation officer that he had used the same device to view pornography. The
probation officer then initiated the process for filing a revocation petition. At the
subsequent evidentiary hearing, the district court revoked Rogers's supervised
release and relied, in part, upon Rogers's admissions to the polygraph examiner and
the probation officer.
After reviewing the applicable law, including the principle that the right
against self-incrimination must be invoked or it is lost, the First Circuit addressed
the argument that requiring a probationer to undergo polygraph examinations is, in
and of itself, a "form of compulsion so severe that it renders any statement made
during such an exam involuntary ...." 988 F.3d at 112. The court rejected that
argument as being without any support in the law.
Next, the court noted that the "penalty" exception to the requirement that the
Fifth Amendment must be invoked, "only applies when the very ability to invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege is penalized." Id. at 113. The court observed that
the condition to submit to polygraph examinations contains a qualifier, as Mr.

10
Roscoe's does, that a probationer could refuse to answer questions on 5111 amendment
grounds and such a refusal could not be the basis for violation proceedings.
In supp011 of his motion to suppress, Roscoe advances a number of claims and
arguments. First:
There are two reasons why Mr. Roscoe identified McKenzie as "M"
to P.O. Barker and Detective Gorham. First, if he did not answer P.O.
Barker's question whether McKenzie was "M" Mr. Roscoe faced either
a "special investigation" or a petition to revoke his supervised release
for not answering his probation officer truthfully. Second, Mr. Roscoe
was informed by P.O. Barker that it was necessary to be truthful and
honest in his sex offender treatment in order to obtain the best result
from the treatment.
Defendant's Briefat ~ 82.
This argument, however, is not supported by the record evidence. In the first
place, there is no direct evidence as to why Mr. Roscoe responded to Officer
Barker's question by confirming that victim "M" was, indeed, McKenzie. What is
clear, however, is that at no time did Mr. Roscoe invoke his privilege against self­
incrimination by refusing to answer the question. The fact that Mr. Roscoe may
have faced a "special investigation'' does not, in the cou1t' s view, render his
statements involuntary. Nothing prevented the commencement of a "special
investigation" by law enforcement if there was a basis for doing so. Moreover, there
is no evidence to suggest that Officer Barker threatened Mr. Roscoe with the
prospect of a "special investigation" if he refused to answer his questions. Indeed,
there is no evidence to suggest that any threats of any kinds were made to Mr. Roscoe
on June 25, 2018 or on January 5, 2019.
Fmthermore, the contention that Mr. Roscoe faced the prospect of a petition
to revoke his supervised release "for not answering probation officer truthfully," is
not supported by the evidence. Indeed, it is contrary to the evidence. Officer Barker
made it clear that Roscoe's obligation to answer questions truthfully as posed by

11
Barker did not extend to any question that could incriminate him and that he had a
5th amendment privilege to refuse to answer. Had Mr. Roscoe invoked his 5111
amendment privilege and declined to answer Officer Barker's questions on June 25,
2018, his refusal to answer could not have been the basis for a revocation proceeding,
as that would have amounted to the classic penalty for exercising his 5th amendment
right. Minnesota v. Murphy: United States v. Rogers,· United States v. Hood, 920
F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2019).
The fact that Officer Barker encouraged Roscoe to be truthful and honest in
his sex offender treatment in order to get the best result from the treatment, was not
a form of compulsion and did not render Mr. Roscoe's admissions to Officer Barker
or Det. Gorham involuntary.
Mr. Roscoe contends that he "had no choice but to disclose the identity of 'M'
to P.O. Barker." Def's Memorandum at~ 95. But Mr. Roscoe did have a choice not
to answer that question and any other question posed by Officer Barker, that he
feared would incriminate him, by invoking his 5th amendment privilege. Roscoe
appears to be suggesting that Officer Barker made some type of improper
inducement to him when, as he testified, he told Roscoe at the May 23, 2018 intake.
meeting that he "would not be asking him any questions that would entail him
invoking his Fifth Amendment rights." (April I, 2021 Hearing Transcrpt at 12).
Defs Memorandum at ,r,r 90, 93. The court rejects the notion that this testimony
suppo1is an argument that Officer Barker somehow promised Roscoe that he would
not ask any questions of him that might tend to incriminate him. This testimony was
given in the context of Officer Barker's explanation to Roscoe that his obligation to
be truthful did not extend to anything that could be potentially incriminating, and
that Roscoe did not have to admit to anything that was potentially incriminating,
even if Barker directed him to answer. (April 1, 2021 Hearing Transcript at 12, 54­
55).

12
The cou1i finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Roscoe's statements to
Officer Barker and to Det. Gorham were voluntary. In the court's view, the relevant
factors, in the context of the totality of the circumstances whereby the government
obtained the statements, suppmt a finding of voluntariness beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The duration of both interviews was very short - 15 to 30 minutes in Officer
Barker's case and 20 minutes in Det. Gorham's. Officer Barker spoke to Mr. Roscoe
on June 25, 2018 at Mr. Roscoe's apa1iment, while Det. Gorham spoke to him at the
Cumberland County Jail. The "containment" interview by Officer Barker was
clearly non-custodial. Roscoe was incarcerated while at the jail during Det.
Gorham's interview, but she gave him full Miranda warnings and he freely signed a
waiver and agreed to answer her questions. While Officer Barker did not advise
Roscoe of his right to invoke his 5th amendment privilege during the brief
containment meeting, he was under no legal obligation to do so and Mr. Roscoe had
previously been informed of his Fifth Amendment rights by both Officer Barker and
the polygraph examiner. In each case, only one officer was involved, and there was
no police trickery,2 threats, promises or inducements. Finally, Mr. Roscoe's age,
physical and mental health, emotional stability and conduct are relevant
considerations. There is no question that Roscoe was anxious and worried about
going to jail, and this stemmed from his awareness that he had disclosed the fact that
he had "hands-on" victims. Notwithstanding his valid concern about his exposure
to further jail and/or prison time, Mr. Roscoe was lucid and coherent with both

' The only arguable evidence of p oli ce "trickery" was Det. Gorham's false staternen t to
Mr. Roscoe that "M" had confirmed the sexual contact during her initial CAC interview.
In viewing the interview in its entirety, however, the court is satisfied that that this untrue
statement to Mr. Roscoe was not a motivating factor for him when he freely chose to
speak to Det. Gorham. State v. McNaughton, 2017 ME 173, <]19136-37, 168 A.3d 807.

13
Barker and Gorham and neither officer attempted to take advantage of or play upon
any emotional vulnerability on Mr. Roscoe,s pa11.
The court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Roscoe's statements
to both Officer Barker and to Det. Gorham were the product of his rational mind,
were not the result of coercive police conduct and that their admission into evidence,
under all the circumstances, would be fundamentally fair.
CONCLUSION
The entry is:
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

Dated: July 23, 2021

Justice, Superior Court

14
ST ATE OF MAINE CRIMINAL DOCKET
VS CUMBERLAND, ss.
WILLIAM A ROSCOE, JR Docket No CUMCD-CR-2019-01296
1 RIVERSIDE ST ROOM 325
PORTLAND ME 04102 DOCKET RECORD
DOB: 09/12/1985
Attorney: PETER CYR State's Attorney: .JONATHAN SAHRBECK
LAW OFFICES OF PETER J CYR
85 BRACKETT STREET
Pro Se. PORTLAND ME 04102
APPOINTED 03/15/2019
Filing Document: INDICTMENT Major Case Type: FELONY (CLASS A,B,C)
Filing Date: 03/07/2019
Charge(s)
l GROSS SEXUAL ASSAULT 01/01/2013 PORTLAND
Seq 10932 17-A 253(l)(C) Class A
GORHAM I POR
2 GROSS SEXUAL ASSAULT 01/01/2013 PORTLAND
Seq 10932 17-A 253(l)(C) Class A
GORHAM I POR
3 GROSS SEXUAL ASSAULT 01/01/2013 PORTLAND
Seq 10932 17-A 253(l)(C) Class A
GORHAM POR
4 UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT 01/01/2013 PORTLAND
Seq 10933 17-A 255-A(l)(E-l) Class B
GORHAM POR
5 UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT 01/01/2013 PORTLAND
Seq 10933 17-A 255-A(I )(E-1) Class B
GORHAM I POR
6 UNLAWFUL SEXUAL TOUCHING 01/01/2013 PORTLAND
Seq 9310 17-A 260(l)(C) Class D
GORHAM I POR
Docket Events:
03/11/2019 FILING DOCUMENT - INDICTMENT FILED ON 03/07/2019

03/ I 1/2019 Charge(s): I ,2,3 ,4,5 ,6
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULE OTHER COURT ON 03/15/2019 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No. I

PORSC
03/11/2019 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ISSUED ON 03/11/2019

CERTIFIED COPY TO SHERIFF DEPT.
03/18/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT HELD ON 03/15/2019
MARIA WOODMAN , JUDGE
DA: WILLIAM BARRY
Defendant Present in Court
DEFENDANT INFORMED OF CHARGES. FTRl
03/18/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
PLEA- NO ANSWER ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 03/15/2019

03/18/2019 BAIL BOND- $50,000.00 CASH BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 03/15/2019
MARIA WOODMAN ,JUDGE
NO THIRD PARTY
03/18/2019 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OFCNSL MADE ORALLY BY DEF ON 03/15/2019

CR-200 Page 1 of7 Printed on: 07/27/2021
WILLIAM A ROSCOE, JR
CUMCD-CR-2019-01296
DOCKET RECORD

03/18/2019 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL GRANTED ON 03/15/2019
MARIA WOODMAN , JUDGE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/18/2019 Party(s): WILLIAM A ROSCOE JR
ATTORNEY - APPOINTED ORDERED ON 03/15/2019

Attorney: PETER CYR
03/18/2019 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 06/19/2019 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 7

03/18/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
TRIAL- JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR 08/12/2019 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 11

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/22/2019 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 03/21/2019

03/22/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL SCHEDULED FOR 03/26/2019 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No.

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/22/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 03/22/2019

03/22/2019 WRIT- HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ISSUED ON 03/22/2019

CERTIFIED COPY TO SHERIFF DEPT. FEDERAL CUSTODY
03/22/2019 WRIT- HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ORDERED ON 03/22/2019
PAUL A FRITZSCHE, JUSTICE
03/26/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL NOT HELD ON 03/26/2019

03/26/2019 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL WITHDRAWN ON 03/26/2019

Attorney: .JAMES GIOIA
04/08/2019 MOTION - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FILED BY STATE ON 04/08/2019

UNOPPOSED.
04/09/2019 MOTION - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER GRANTED ON 04/08/2019
.JED FRENCH , JUDGE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
04/23/2019 MOTION - MOTION FOR DISCOVERY FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/22/2019

06/19/2019 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE HELD ON 06/19/2019
ROLAND A COLE , JUSTICE
Attorney: JAMES GIOIA
DA: GRANT WHELAN
CASE UNRESOLVED. MOTIONS TO BE FILED. OFFER TO BE MADE BEFORE MOTIONS .
06/20/2019 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/19/2019

06/20/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT SCHEDULED FOR 07/02/2019 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No. 1

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
06/24/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY STATE ON 06/20/2019

CR-200 Page 2 of 7 Printed on: 07/27/2021
WILLIAM A ROSCOE, JR
CUMCD-CR-2019-01296
DOCKET RECORD
UNOPPOSED
06/26/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 06/24/2019
DEBORAH CASHMAN , JUDGE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
06/26/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT CONTINUED ON 06/24/2019
DEBORAH CASHMAN , JUDGE
06/26/2019 Charge( s): 1,2 ,3 ,4,5 ,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 08/06/2019 at 01 :00 p.m. in Room No.

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
06/26/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 06/26/2019

08/05/2019 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 08/05/2019

Attorney: PETER CYR
UNOPPOSED
08/06/2019 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 08/06/2019
ANDREW HORTON , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
08/06/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 08/06/2019

08/06/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT SCHEDULED FOR 01/14/2020 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No. I

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
08/06/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 08/06/2019

08/06/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3 ,4,5 ,6
TRIAL - JURY TRIAL NOT HELD ON 08/06/2019

12/26/2019 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 12/23/2019

12/26/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL SCHEDULED FOR 12/27/2019 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 7

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
12/26/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL NOTICE SENT ELECTRO NICALLY ON 12/26/2019

12/27/2019 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL NOT HELD ON 12/27/2019

12/27/2019 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL WITHDRAWN ON 12/27/2019

0 I/ 13/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT CONTINUED ON O1/13/2020
LINDA LASKO HALL, ASSISTANT CLERK
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
DONE VERBALLY IN FTRl
01/13/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL SCHEDULED FOR 01/28/2020 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No . 1

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
01/14/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 01/10/2020

CR-200 Page 3 of 7 Printed on: 07/27/2021
WILLIAM A ROSCOE, JR
CUMCD-CR-2019-01296
DOCKET RECORD
MOTION HEARING 1-14-20. NO OBJECTION .
01/21/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 01/17/2020

01/21/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL SCHEDULED FOR 01/23/2020 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No.

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
01/21/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 01/21/2020

01/24/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE MOOT ON 01/23/2020

01/24/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 01/28/2020 at 01:00 p.m. in Room No.

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
01/24/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL NOT HELD ON 01/23/2020

01/24/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL HELD ON 01/23/2020 in Room No.
ANDREW HORTON , JUSTICE
Attorney: PETER CYR
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
01/24/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL GRANTED ON 01/23/2020
ANDREW HORTON , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
01/24/2020 BAIL BOND - $5,000.00 CASH BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 01/23/2020
ANDREW HORTON , JUSTICE
Attorney: PETER CYR
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
W/MPTSC
01/24/2020 BAIL BOND- CASH BAIL BOND COMMITMENT ISSUED ON 01/23/2020

01/28/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 01/28/2020
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
Attorney: PETER CYR
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
Defendant Present in Court
FTR CRl. STATE CALLS US PROBATION OFFICER BARKER; STATE'S EXHIBIT #I ADMITTED; REMAINDER OF
HEARING CONTINUED. TO BE SET WITH J STOKES.
01/29/2020 CASE STATUS - CASE FILE LOCATION ON 01/29/2020
DANIELLE MERRILL, ASSISTANT CLERK
FILE WITH .I STOKES OUT FOLDER WITH SARAH FENNESSEY
02/21/2020 Charge(s): 1,2,3 ,4,5 ,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 03/13/2020 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 8
WILLIAM STOKES , .JUSTICE
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
02/21/2020 Charge(s): 1,2,3 ,4,5 ,6
HEARING- MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 02/21/2020

03/04/2020 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5 ,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 03/03/2020
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
03/23/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 03/18/2020

CR-200 Page 4 of 7 Printed on: 07/27/2021
WILLIAM A ROSCOE, JR
CUMCD-CR-2019-01296
DOCKET RECORD
DA: SAMUELJOHNSON
STATE OBJECTS
03/23/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL SCHEDULED FOR 03/25/2020 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No.

NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/25/2020 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL HELD ON 03/25/2020
MARY GAY KENNEDY , JUSTICE
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
Defendant Present in Court
DEF PRESENT VIA POL YCOM
03/25/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL DENIED ON 03/25/2020
MARY GAY KENNEDY , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/27/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 03/25/2020

Attorney: PETER CYR
AT STATE'S EXPENSE
03/27/2020 ORDER - TRANSCRIPT ORDER FILED ON 03/25/2020

Attorney: PETER CYR
03/27/2020 MOTION - MOTION TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT GRANTED ON 03/27/2020
MARY GAY KENNEDY , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
03/31/2020 NOTE - OTHER CASE NOTE ENTERED ON 03/31/2020

TRANSCRIPT AND AUDIO ORDER FORM RECVD 3/27/20. REQUEST FOR PAPER TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS HEARING HELD ON 1/28/20 IN CR#! AND RECORDED VIA FTR (2:21:00P-3:31:21P AND 3:50:44P-4:22:42P),
REQUEST COMPLETED AND FORWARDED TO OTO FOR FURTHER PROCESSING ON THIS DATE.
04/23/2020 OTHER FILING - TRANSCRIPT FILED ON 04/23/2020

06/19/2020 Charge(s): 1,2,3 ,4,5 ,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULE OTHER COURT ON 07/06/2020 at 09:00 a.m. in Room No. 8

PORSC
06/19/2020 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 06/19/2020
JIM PAUL TURCOTTE, ASSISTANT CLERK
07/06/2020 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 07/06/2020 in Room No. 9
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
Attorney: PETER CYR
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN Reporter: TIMOTHY THOMPSON
Defendant Present in Court
01/04/2021 HEARING - CONFERENCE SCHEDULE OTHER COURT ON 01/07/2021 at 01 :00 p.m.
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
PORSC CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL RE: SCHEDULING
01/04/2021 HEARING - CONFERENCE NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 01/04/2021

01/07/2021 HEARING - CONFERENCE HELD ON 01/07/2021 at 01 :00 p.m.
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
Attorney: CAROL SIPPERLY

CR-200 Page 5 of 7 Printed on: 07/27/2021
WILLIAM A ROSCOE, JR
CUMCD-CR-2019-01296
DOCKET RECORD
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE. STATE TO DETERMINE WHEN WITNESS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE AGAIN IN LATE
MARCH AND NOTIFY COURT. HEARING TO BE HELD VIA ZOOM IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER (UNLESS IN­
PERSON HEARINGS ARE ALLOWED AGAIN) .
Ol/07/2021 ORDER - COURT ORDER FILED ON 01/07/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
PROCEDURAL ORDER: THE COURT WILL WORK WITH THE UCO CLERK AND THE PARTIES TO FIND A DAY IN
EARLY APRIL TO CONCLUDE THE HEARING ON THE MOTION. ATTY CYR IS DIRECTED TO CONSULT WITH HIS
CLIENT AND BRIEF HIM ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATUS CONFERENCE AS EMBODIED IN THIS
PROCEDURAL ORDER.
01/29/2021 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULE OTHER COURT ON 04/01/2021 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 9
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
PORSC
01/29/2021 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 01/29/2021
JIM PAUL TURCOTTE, ASSISTANT CLERK
04/01/2021 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 04/01/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
Attorney: PETER CYR
DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
DAY 2 OF TESTIMONY. TESTIMONY OF OFFICE MICHAEL BARKER COMPLETED, WITNESS EXCUSED. ST ATE
CALLS DETECTIVE KELLY GORHAM. STATE'S EXHIBIT 2&3 OFFERED AND ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION.
04/01/2021 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 04/01/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
DEFENSE BRIEF DUE 4/30/2021. STATE'S BRIEF DUE 5/14/2021. DEFENSE RESPONSE DUE BY 5/28/2021 .
04/08/2021 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5,6
MOTION - MOTION TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/07/2021

Attorney: PETER CYR
AT STATE'S EXPENSE WffRANSCRIPT AUDIO ORDER FORM
04/09/2021 Charge(s): 1,2,3 ,4,5 ,6
MOTION - MOTION TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT GRANTED ON 04/08/2021
HAROLD STEWART , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
04/12/2021 NOTE - OTHER CASE NOTE ENTERED ON 04/12/2021

TRANSCRIPT ORDER RECVD 4/9/21. REQUEST FOR PAPER TRANSCRIPT OF A MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING
HELD ON 4/1/21 IN CR#9 VIA ZOOM AND RECORDED VIA FTR (8:59:31A-12:17:50P), REQUEST COMPLETED AND
FORWARDED TO OTO FOR FURTHER PROCESSING ON THIS DATE.
04/27/2021 OTHER FILING - TRANSCRIPT FILED ON 04/26/2021

TRANSCRIPT MAILED TO JUSTICE STOKES @ CJC ON 5-28-2021
04/27/2021 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OFTIME FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/23/2021

Attorney: PETER CYR
NO OBJECTION BY STATE
04/27/2021 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 04/27/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL DEADLINE EXTENDED TO MAY 7
05/11/2021 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 05/10/2021

DEFENDANTS 2ND UNOPPOSED MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME
05/18/2021 BRIEF - PETITIONERS BRIEF FILED ON 05/18/2021

CR-200 Page 6 of 7 Printed on: 07/27/2021
WILLIAM A ROSCOE, JR
CUMCD-CR-2019-01296
DOCKET RECORD
Attorney: PETER CYR
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS
05/18/2021 OTHER FILING - OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 05/18/2021

Attorney: PETER CYR
05/18/2021 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 05/12/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
05/28/2021 MOTION - OTHER MOTION FILED BY STATE ON 05/26/2021

DA: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE
05/28/2021 MOTION - OTHER MOTION GRANTED ON 05/27/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE
06/15/2021 OTHER FILING - MEMORANDUM OF LAW FILED ON 06/11/2021

Attorney: JENNIFER ACKERMAN
07/27/2021 ORDER - COURT ORDER FILED ON 07/27/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
07/27/2021 ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 07/27/2021

07/27/2021 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT DENIED ON 07/27/2021
WILLIAM STOKES , JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL

A TRUE COPY • l).,v-
~
ATTEST: ~ ~

CR-200 Page 7 of 7 Printed on: 07/27/2021