Webber v. Dubord

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
KENNBEC, SS CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-2020-15

STEPHANIE WEBBER,
Plaintiff

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
V.

JEFFREY DUBORD,
Defendant

The matter before the court is the Defendant's (Jeffrey Dubord's) Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on all claims asserted against him by Plaintiff Stephanie
Webber, except for a cause of action alleging assault.
On December 10, 2019, Webber commenced this action in the District Court
(WATDC Docket No. CV-2019-206) seeking compensation for the "value of the
equity in the home [located at 189 Augusta Road in Rome, Maine] or award [her]
the home, award [her] her personal property, and/or the value of personal property,
award [her] damages and pain and suffering for the assault and resulting injury, and
order attorney's fees, costs of suit and all other damages and awards deemed just and
equitable." Dubord filed his answer on January 28, 2020 and, at the same time, filed
a "Notice of Removal to Superior Court" pursuant to M.R.Civ .P. 76C.
On September 2, 2020, Dubord moved for summary judgment on all claims
except the claim sounding in the tort for assault. Accompanying and in support of
his motion for summary judgment, Dubord filed his Statement of Material Facts as
required by M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(l). Webber's opposing statement of material facts
does not fully comply with the requirements of Rule 56. For example, in many
instances Webber has made denials and has referred to certain paragraphs of her
affidavit. She has not, however, made any assertion of fact in opposition to the fact
asserted by Dubord. In other instances, she has made denials without any record
citation at all. In still others, she has made assertions of fact that are not responsive
to the assertions of fact made by Dubord. The result has been that the court has been
required to search the record to locate the "facts" supposedly asserted in opposition
to the summary judgment motion. Rule 56(h)(4) makes it clear that the court has no
duty or authority to engage in such a search for facts. Lubar v. Connelly, 2014 ME
17, ! 34, 86 A.3d 642. Facts not properly controverted are deemed admitted.
M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(4).
The following facts are taken from the summary judgment record.
FACTS
Ms. Webber and Mr. Dubord cohabitated for approximately 27 years, during
18 years of which they were engaged to be married. The parties, however, never did
marry. The relationship between Webber and Dubord ended in August 2019, when
a domestic dispute occurred between them, as a result of which Ms. Webber sought
and obtained a Protection from Abuse Order against Mr. Dubord. 1 At a hearing on
the PFA complaint, Dubord did not contest Webber's testimony and a finding of
abuse was entered against him.
At the time of the dissolution of their relationship, Webber and Dubord were
living at 189 Augusta Road in Rome, Maine. The property had been purchased in
2000. Mr. Dubord took out a mortgage to pay for the property. Dubord made all of

' Ms. Webber has described the event as an assault during which she sustained physical injuries.
Mr. Dubord has described the event as an argument.

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the mortgage payments on the property and made all payments for insurance and the
taxes on the property. 2 The deed to the property is in Dubord's name only. Webber
and Dubord kept separate bank accounts and each paid for their own motor vehicles
during the time they were together.
Prior to the purchase of the property in Rome at 189 Augusta Road, Webber
and Dubord jointly owned a mobile home. While they jointly owned that property,
they each paid an equal share of the mortgage on it. There were occasions, however,
when Webber was unable to pay her share of the mortgage on the mobile home. On
those occasions, Dubord paid his share and Webber's share of the mortgage. There
is no evidence in the summary judgment record that suggests that upon the sale of
the jointly owned mobile home, Webber's share of the sale price, or any portion of
it, was used to purchase the property at 189 Augusta Road.
With respect to the property at 189 Augusta Road, Dubord refinanced the
mortgage at one point ancl later paid off the mortgage in full in 2014. Both parties
paid for various household expenses while they were living together at the property.
By way of example, Dubord paid for a pellet stove and pellets and also paid for
propane. Webber paid for some propane as well, and also for electricity, the internet,
and groceries. There is a dispute as to who paid for the landline phone. Dubord paid
for Webber's cell phone, which was part of his cell phone plan.

'In denying these statements of material fact, Webber has asserted that she made contributions to
the household expenses thereby "freeing up" money that allowed Dubord to pay the mortgage,
taxes and insurance on the Rome property. The court does not believe such a response properly
controverts the statement of material fact made by Dubord, as required by Rule 56(h)(4).
Moreover, in response to a statement of material fact that she did not make any "contribution to
the purchase of the real property in Rome," Webber denied it and asserted in her Affidavit that she
had negotiated the sale price of the home. Once again, the court does not consider that such a
response properly controverts the statement of material fact. In any event, the court interprets this
response to mean that Webber admits that she made no direct financial contribution to the purchase
of the property.

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During the time the parties were living together, but at a time not disclosed in
the summary judgment record, Webber asked Dubord to add her name to the
mortgage and deed on the 189 Augusta Road property, but Dubord refused to do so.
It is undisputed that no contract existed between the parties as to what would happen
if their relationship ended. Nevertheless, Webber has stated that it was her belief
that the property at 189 Augusta Road was purchased as a "joint venture," and that
it was her "understanding" that Dubord "purchased the home in his name only so he
could qualify for a Veteran's Administration loan program."
The summary judgment record contains various assertions about contributions
Webber may have made to the purchase of certain items of personal property (e.g.,
Kubota tractor, snow blower, motorcycle, boat and trailer, wood stoves), as well
additions and/or improvements to the real property at 189 Augusta Road (e.g., barn,
shingling of house, metal roofing, woodshed, port by garage, deck, fencing, kennels,
patio, landscaping, hardwood flooring, removal of carpeting, remodeling of walls,
improvements to daylight basement).
Regarding the Kubota tractor purchased in 2001, it is undisputed that Webber
made the initial down payment of approximately $3000-$3200. Moreover, with
respect to the motorcycle purchased in 2014, it is undisputed that Dubord purchased
this and made all of the payments for it. Regarding the boat and trailer purchased in
1996 by Dubord, it appears undisputed that Webber purchased some seats and a
canopy for the boat sometime in the mid-2000s for about $600. With respect to all
of the items of personal property mentioned above, other than the motorcycle,
Webber has asserted that she made contributions to "all household expenses"
thereby "freeing up money" for Dubord to purchase these items, i.e., tractor, snow
blower, boat and trailer and wood stoves. Once again, the court is not convinced
that Webber's responses (denials) comply with Rule 56(h)(4)

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It is undisputed that Webber paid for, and together with Dubord, built a barn
on the property in the early 2000s. She also claims to have made financial
contributions to other improvements to the property (e.g., deck, fencing, kennels,
metal roofing). Furthermore, she appears to agree that Dubord paid for major
improvements to the house, including the installation of solar panels in 2015, a new
asphalt driveway, a living room and bathroom remodel, a new on-demand water
heater and a new foundation. Other than the installation of the solar panels, the
summary judgment record does not provide evidence as to when these improvements
were made. Webber maintains that she assisted in these projects through her labor,
for which she has not been compensated.
Webber disputes that her contributions, m the form of the payment of
household expenses, labor on home improvement projects or materials she
purchased, were gifts to Dubord or were in consideration of the fact that she did not
have to pay rent for living in the house.
In support of his motion for partial summary judgment, Dubord has asserted
that during the years 2013-2019, his income was sufficient to afford both the
purchase of personal property and the improvements to the property. In response,
Webber has asserted denials, with the added response: "This may not be true," and
that "[i]t is possible" that Dubord could not have afforded his "toys" and property
improvements "if it had not been for [Webber's] income." There are no citations to
any record evidence for these denials and statements, and there is no indication as to
the basis for them. Accordingly, the court considers these assertions of fact by
Dubord to be admitted.
After the relationship ended in August 2019, Dubord served Webber with a
30-day eviction notice. Webber subsequently vacated the premises and the matter
never went to court. As noted earlier, Webber comme~ced this action by serving

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Dubord with her complaint and summons on December 10, 2019. The complaint
was filed on December 19, 2019. See M.R.Civ.P. 3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is appropriate where 'the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, referred to in the statements required by subdivision (h) show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact set forth in those statements and that any party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Town of Windham v. Christopher A.
Bond, No. CV-16-94, 2016 Me. Super. LEXIS 108, at *2 (July 13, 2016) (citing
M.R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "In examining the statements of material facts submitted
pursuant to subdivision (h), [a] genuine issue of material fact exists when the
evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth."
Arrow Fastener Co. v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, ! 15, 917 A.2d 123 (citing
Farrington's Owner's Ass'n v. Conway Lake Resorts, Inc., 2005 ME 93, ! 9, 878
A.2d 504). Even if one party's version of the facts appears significantly more
credible and persuasive, summary judgment is inappropriate "if a genuine factual
dispute exists that is material to the outcome." Arrow Fastener, 2007 ME 34, ! 17,
917 A.2d 123; see also Emerson v. Sweet, 432 A.2d 784, 787 n.6 (Me. 1981) ("Thus,
the failure of proof, not the relative weight assigned to evidence should control the
Court's disposition of the motion."). As the Law Court has stated, although
summary judgment "is no longer an extreme remedy, it is not a substitute for trial."
Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ! 7,784 A.2d 18.
DISCUSSION
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Dubord contends that any
claim by Webber to the real property at 189 Augusta Road is barred by the Statute
of Frauds. 33 M.R.S. § 51(4). Webber counters that she is not seeking title to the
real estate. Pl. 's Memo at 7. Rather, she asserts that she wishes "to obtain just

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compensation for all of the financial equity she built with the Defendant [Dubord]
during the nearly three-decades long romantic relationship." Id. at 2. Webber
maintains that her cause of action is not based on any contractual relationship with
Dubord but, rather, on principles of unjust enrichment.
To this, Dubord responds that the general 6-year statute of limitations applies
to Webber's unjust enrichment claims. 14 M.R.S. § 752. Dubord argues that a cause
of action for unjust enrichment accrues when the unjust enrichment occurs, i.e.,
when Webber allegedly conferred the benefit or made the contribution. Webber
agrees that the 6-year statute of limitations applies to her unjust enrichment claims,
but contends that her cause of action did not accrue until August 10, 2019 when her
relationship with Dubord ended and he received the full and sole benefit of her prior
con tri bu ti ons .
Dubord also claims that Webber's unjust enrichment claims fails as a matter
of law because her claim for damages is too speculative or non-existent and/or is not
supported by expert evidence.
Further, Dubord argues that Webber's unjust enrichment claim for her
payment of household expenses fails as a matter of law because it was not
inequitable for him to retain the benefit of Webber's contributions in the form of
groceries and electricity and the like, since Webber herself retained the benefit of
living in Dubord's property without paying rent.
Finally, Dubord seeks summary judgment on Webber's claim for attorney fees
because there is no legal basis for the court to make such an award.
As might be expected in a case involving claims arising after the end of a
long-term relationship, many aspects of the summary judgment record are confusing.
Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below, the court grants Dubord's motion for
partial summary judgment in substantial part.

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I. Owner hip of the Real Property at 189 At1gusta Road and the
Statute of Frauds
Although Webber's complaint appears to have sought an award of the house
located at 189 Augusta Road, she now seems to have disavowed any claim of title
to or legal interest in the.real property. She has acknowledged that she was never
married to Dubord and, therefore, the real property cannot be treated as marital
property. See State v. Patterson, 2004 ME 79, ! 12, 851 A.2d 521. She also
acknowledges that no contract ever existed between her and Dubord as to what
would happen if their relationship ended.
Webber has no legal claim to any interest in the real property, as the Statute
of Frauds requires a writing in order to maintain an action for the transfer of such
property. 33 M.R.S. § 51(4). Moreover, the court agrees with Dubord that Webber
has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact that she could come within an
exception to the Statute of Frauds. See Sullivan v. Porter, 2004 ME 134, ! 10, 861
A.2d 625.
It appears to the court that Webber is not making any claim that she had any
type of agreement with Dubord that she would be treated as a co-owner of the real
property, even though she may have had a subjective belief, based on her relationship
with Dubord, that the purchase of the property by him was a "joint venture," a
concept she never explains except to state her "understanding" that Dubord wanted
the property in his name alone in order to qualify for a Veteran's Administration
loan program. Indeed, it is undisputed that Webber, at one point, asked Dubord to
add her name to the mortgage and deed, a request that Dubord refused.
The court concludes that Dubord is entitled to summary judgment as to any
claim Webber may be making to an interest in the real property at 189 Augusta Road.

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II. Webbers Unjust Enrichment Claims
What does appear to be clear is that Webber's claim for compensation for her
financial and other contributions during her relationship with Dubord are based upon
a theory of unjust enrichment. See Thibeault v. Brackett, 2007 ME 154, 938 A.2d
27. "An unjust enrichment claim is brought to recover 'the value of the benefit
retained when there is no contractual relationship, but when, on the grounds of
fairness and justice, the la:w compels performance of a legal and moral duty to pay."'
Estate of Miller, 2008 ME 176, ~ 29,960 A.2d 1140 (quoting Paffhausen v. Balano,
1998 ME 47, ~ 6, 708 A.2d 269). Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim. To
succeed on her claim, Webber must show that: (1) she conferred a benefit on Dubord;
(2) Dubord had appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; and, (3) the acceptance or
retention of the benefit was under circumstances that make it inequitable for Dubord
to retain the benefit without payment of its value. Estate of Miller, 2008 ME 176, !
29; Me. Eye Care Assocs. v. Gorman, 2008 ME 36, ~ 17,942 A.2d 707.
It is well established, and Webber does not disagree, that the general 6-year
statute of limitations, as set forth in 14 M.R.S. § 752, applies to equitable claims,
including claims of unjust enrichment. United States Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Adams,
2014 ME 113, ~ 4, 102 A.3d 774. Title 14 M.R.S. § 752 provides that "[a]ll civil
actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues and not
afterwards . . . ." It is undisputed that Webber "commenced" this action on
December 10, 2019 by serving Dubord with the summons and complaint.
M.R.Civ.P. 3. What is disputed is when Webber's alleged claims of unjust
enrichment accrued.
In York Cty. v. Propertylnfo Corp., 2019 ME 12, ~ 14,200 A.3d 803, the Law
Court noted that "[s]tatutes of limitations are strictly construed." It further stated
that "[a]n unjust enrichment claim accrues when the alleged unjust enrichment
occurs." Id. at~ 27. In that case, the Court held that the unjust enrichment occurred

9
when York County paid for the delivery of a database, which happened 10 years
prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.
In Me. Mun. Emples. Health Trust v. Maloney, 2004 ME 51, 846 A.2d 336,
the plaintiff brought a subrogation action to recover medical payments it had made
for the defendant, who had been injured in a motor vehicle accident and who had
reached a settlement with the tortfeasor. The settlement occurred in 1995. With the
proceeds of the settlement, the defendant purchased an annuity that paid him
monthly benefits until 2018. The plaintiff commenced suit in 2002 to recover the
medical payments it had ·made on the defendant's behalf. The trial court granted
summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's
unjust enrichment claim. The plaintiff had argued that its cause of action for unjust
enrichment did not accrue until the defendant received the last payment under the
annuity, presumably on the theory that the defendant was conferred a benefit with
each monthly annuity payment he received. The Law Court rejected that argument
and held that "[g]enerally speaking a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff
receives a judicially cognizable injury." Id. at~ 10. Assuming the plaintiff received
such an injury, it occurred when the settlement was made or, at the latest, when a
substantial portion of the settlement was received by the defendant. Because the
plaintiff commenced suit 7 years after the settlement, its unjust enrichment claim
was barred by 14 M.R.S. § 752.
The case of United States Bank Nat'l Ass 'n v. Adams, supra, involved a
defendant and his sister who owned property as joint tenants. In December 2005,
the sister executed a promissory note for approximately $2.3 million and conveyed
a mortgage on her interest in the property to secure the note. Her brother, the
defendant, was not a party to the note or mortgage. The sister used a portion of the
loan proceeds to pay off an earlier loan for which she and the defendant were jointly
liable. Then, in 2008, the sister defaulted on the loan. In May 2012, the Bank

10
commenced suit against the defendant seeking to place an equitable lien on his
interest in the property on the basis that he had been unjustly enriched by having the
loan proceeds used to pay off a different loan for which he was liable. The trial court
ruled on the merits in favor of the defendant and the Bank appealed. The Law Court
held that the unjust enrichment claim should have been dismissed as time-barred by
the statute of limitations. The Court determined that the unjust enrichment claim
accrued in December 2005 when the sister "signed the contested note and mortgage
... , using some of the proceeds to pay off the earlier mortgage on the property she
and the brother [the defendant] own." 2014 ME 113, ~ 5. Since the action against
the defendant was not filed until May 2012 (more than 6 years later), it was barred
by virtue of 14 M.R.S. § 752.
Finally, in Estate of Miller, supra, the personal representative of the estate
brought suit against the decedent's son for the return of a jointly held savings
account. The evidence before the probate court supported the conclusion that the
savings account was jointly owned by the decedent and her son (the defendant)
beginning around November 1994 when the decedent added her son as a joint owner
of the account. The decedent died in 2004 and in 2005 the personal representative
commenced suit against the son (her brother) seeking to declare that the savings
account was not jointly owned, but was an estate asset. Included in the complaint
was a claim for unjust enrichment. Among other defenses, the son asserted that the
action was time-barred. The Law Court observed that "the statute of limitations
issue turns on when a judicially cognizable injury was sustained." 2008 ME 176, ~
30. The Court held that any "injury" occurred in November 1994 when the son was
added as a joint owner of the savings account. "That is the point at which [the son]
could have accessed the funds in the account if he wished, and that is the point at
which [he] stood to take ownership of the account ahead of the estate upon [the
decedent's] death." Id. The Court rejected the argument that the "benefit" was not

11
I'

conferred until 2004 when the decedent died, "because by then he had held equal
rights to the account for almost ten years ." Id. Because any unjust enrichment claim
accrued more than 6 years before the commencement of the action, the suit was
barred by the statute of limitations.
Dubord takes the position that any claims for unjust enrichment accrued at the
time Webber made whatever contributions she allegedly made and thereby conferred
a benefit on him. Stated otherwise, any contributions allegedly made by Webber
prior to December 10, 2013 that form the basis of an unjust enrichment claim are
time-barred. This would include, by way of example only, Webber's initial payment
of the down payment for the Kubota tractor in 2001, her purchase of seats and a
canopy for the boat in the mid-2000s, and her contributions towards the construction
of the barn in the early 2000s. In other words, any contributions made by Webber
outside the applicable 6-year statute of limitations period, whether they consisted of
direct financial payments, labor and/or materials or the payment of household
expenses, may not be recovered on a theory of unjust enrichment because they are
barred by 14 M.R.S. § 752.
Webber, on the other hand, appears to maintain that she did not sustain a
legally cognizable injury for purposes of any unjust enrichment claim, until August
2019, when the relationship ended and Dubord received "the sudden full benefit of
property ... without further sharing with [her]." Pl.'s Memo at 11. It is important
to note that Webber does not appear to be suggesting that she is a co-owner with
Dubord of items of personal property, such as the Kubota tractor, the boat and trailer,
the snow blower or the motorcycle. Rather, to the extent the court understands her
argument it is based on an unjust enrichment theory that she is entitled to receive the
value of the benefits she conferred on Dubord over the lengthy period of time they
were in a committed, romantic relationship. It is also important to point out that this

12
summary judgment motion is not directed at Webber's tort claim against Dubord for
an alleged assault.
Based on its review of the applicable law, the court concludes that any unjust
enrichment claim asserted by Webber, including any contributions she may have
made prior to December 10, 2013, are time-barred by the 6-year state of limitations.
The court finds that any unjust enrichment claim accrued when the benefit was
conferred on Dubord, which was when the alleged contribution was made. Dubord
is entitled to summary judgment as to any such contributions made prior to
December 10, 2013.
As to any alleged unjust enrichment claims within the applicable statute of
limitations, namely, since December 10, 2013, the motion for summary judgment
will be denied, since there are genuine issues of material fact as to the value of the
benefits allegedly conferred on Dubord and whether it would be inequitable for him
to retain those benefits without payment.
III. Webber's Claim for Attorney Fees
Dubord has moved for summary judgment on Webber's claim for an award
of attorney fees as part of her complaint. In Pollack v. Fournier, 2020 ME 93, ~ 22,
237 A.3d 149, the Law Court stated: "A trial court's authority 'to award attorney
fees may be based on (1) ·a contractual agreement between the parties; (2) a specific
statutory authorization; or (3) the court's inherent authority to sanction serious
misconduct in a judicial proceeding."' (quoting Sebra v. Wentworth, 2010 ME 21, ~
17,990 A.2d 538.
Webber has not claimed an entitlement to an award of attorney fees on the
basis of any contractual agreement with Dubord. Indeed, she has admitted that no
such contractual relationship with Dubord existed. Moreover, Webber has not
pointed the court to any statutory provision that would authorize an award of attorney
fees.

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Rather, Webber points only to the court's inherent authority to sanction
serious misconduct occurring in a judicial proceeding and argues: "The fact that the
Defendant assaulted the Plaintiff resulting in his claim to all of the real property and
over 61 % of the personal property from their relationship is the serious misconduct
cited by the court." Pl. 's Memo at 21.
The allegation that Dubord assaulted Webber states a cause of action, but it
does not constitute the type of serious misconduct in a judicial proceeding that would
authorize the court to make an award of attorney fees. The alleged assault occurred
outside the context of a judicial proceeding. Dubord's motion for summary
judgment will be granted as to Webber's claim for attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
The entry is:
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART.
Plaintiff's claim to an interest in the real property located at 189 Augusta Road in
Rome, Maine is barred by the statute of frauds, and summary judgment in favor of
the Defendant is granted on that claim. The Plaintiff' s claims of unjust enrichment
that accrued prior to December 10, 2013 are barred by the statute of limitations and
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant is granted on those claims. Plaintiff's
claim for an award of attorney fees is not authorized and summary judgment on that
claim is entered in favor of the Defendant.
The clerk is directed to enter this Order on the docket for this case by
incorporating it by reference. M.R. Civ. P. 79(a) .

Dated: December 15, 2020

Entered on the docket l'J/r?t° (a©P
Justice, Superior Court

14
STEPHANIE WEBBER - PLAINTIFF SUPERIOR COURT lL\l')/~U
860 PLAINS ROAD KENNEBEC, ss.
MOUNT VERNON ME 04352 Docket No AUGSC-CV-2020-00015
Attorney for: STEPHANIE WEBBER
KEVIN P SULLIVAN - RETAINED
SULLIVAN LAW PC DOCKET RECORD
218 WATER STREET
GARDINER ME 04345

vs
JEFFREY DUBORD - DEFENDANT
189 AUGUSTA RD
ROME ME 04963
Attorney for: JEFFREY DUBORD
HEIDI JEDDY - RETAINED
RICHARDSON WHITMAN LARGE & BADGER
PO BOX 9545
PORTLAND ME 04112-9545

Attorney for: JEFFREY DUBORD
ELIZABETH STOUDER - RETAINED
RICHARDSON WHITMAN LARGE & BADGER
PO BOX 9545
PORTLAND ME 04112-9545

Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: OTHER CIVIL
Filing Date: 12/19/2019

Docket Events:
01/29/2020 TRANSFER - REMOVAL TO SUPERIOR COURT EDI ON 01/29/2020 at 04:34 p . m.
TRANSFERRED CASE: SENDING COURT CASEID WATDCCV201900206

FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 12/19/2019

01/29/2020 ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 12/19/2019

Party(s): JEFFREY DUBORD
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS FILED ON 12/19/2019

Party(s): JEFFREY DUBORD
SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS SERVED ON 12/10/2019

ORDER - SCHEDULING ORDER ENTERED ON 01/07/2020
CHARLES DOW I JUDGE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL

DISCOVERY FILING - DISCOVERY DEADLINE ENTERED ON 03/01/2020

TRIAL - BENCH SCHEDULED FOR 03/20/2020 at 01:00 p . m. in Room No. 1

TRIAL - BENCH NOT HELD ON 01/29/2020

Party(s): JEFFREY DUBORD
Page 1 of 5 Printed on: 12/21/2020