Maine Human Rights Commission v. D & L Apartments

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-18-49

MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

D & L APARTMENTS and
DARRELL SPROUL,
Defendants

This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants D & L Apartments and Darrell Sproul.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a one count complaint against D & L Apartments (D & L)
and its owner, Darrell Sproul (Sproul), alleging housing discrimination on the basis
of disability. Pl.'s Compl. ~~ 19 - 22.
The controversy arose when Justin Engstrom called Mr. Sproul on June 10,
2016, to inquire about renting an apartment. Mr. Engstrom was a veteran with PTSD
who had recently moved back to Maine after living in Colorado for the prior two
years. (Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts (S.M.F.), ~~15-16, 20, 25.) Although he had
yet to do so, Mr. Engstrom was planning on acquiring an assistance animal, namely
a dog. To that end, he had contacted Dogs 4 Warriors, an Ohio non-profit that
connects veterans with assistance animals, and was expecting to get an assistance
dog as soon as he could find appropriate housing for the dog and himself, having
been on their wait list since before moving back to Maine. S.M.F. ~~ 16-19, 23-24.

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When Mr. Engstrom called Mr. Sproul to inquire about housing, he asked Mr.
Sproul about do gs, at which point Mr. Engstrom states that Mr. Sproul's demeanor
changed - Mr. Sproul was adamant that there be absolutely no dogs, and would not
let Mr. Engstrom get another word in. S.M.F. ~~ 29-35. Part of the controversy in
this case, and the major point where the parties disagree, is what precisely was said
during that brief phone call; although he never mentioned that he suffered from
PTSD or anything specific, Mr. Engstrom believes he may have mentioned that he
was "handicapped.", Engstrom Depo, 58 :21 - 59: 1; 61:20-25. More importantly, the
parties disagree on what precisely was said about assistance animals. Mr. Engstrom
stated that he specified that he wished to have a "therapy dog," and also mentioned
specifically "federally-protected , certified service or therapy dogs." S.M.F. ~~ 31,
33. D & Land Sproul, on the other hand, generally argue that Mr. Engstrom did not
get into specifics, and challenges how much was said about assistance animals. Def's
Reply to Pl.'s Opp. S.M.F. ~~ 30- 35. The phone call ended with Mr. Sproul telling
Mr. Engstrom not to bother filling out an application, since it would be denied.
S.M.F. ~ 36.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is appropriate where 'the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, referred to in the statements required by subdivision (h) show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact set forth in those statements and that any party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Town of Windham v. Christopher A.
Bond, No. CV-16-94, 2016 Me. Super. LEXIS 108, at *2 (July 13, 2016) (citing
M.R. Civ. P. 56(c)) . "In examining the statements of material facts submitted
pursuant to subdivision (h), [a] genuine issue of material fact exists when the

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Both parties agree that it would have be unlawful for Mr . Spro ul to inq uire about whether or not Mr. Engstrom had
a disabili ty. See 5 M.R.S. § 4581-A(l)(A).

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evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth."
Arrow Fastener Co. v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, ~ 15, 917 A.2d 123 (citing
Farrington's Owner's Ass'n v. Conway Lake Resorts, Inc., 2005 ME 93, ~ 9,878
A.2d 504). Even if one party's version of the facts appears significantly more
credible and persuasive, summary judgment is inappropriate "if a genuine factual
dispute exists that is material to the outcome." Arrow Fastener, 2007 ME 34, ~ 17,
917 A.2d 123; see also Emerson v. Sweet, 432 A.2d 784, 787 n.6 (Me. 1981) ("Thus,
the failure of proof, not the relative weight assigned to evidence should control the
Court's disposition of the motion."). Thus, as the Law Court has stated, although
summary judgment "is no longer an extreme remedy, it is not a substitute for trial."
Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ~ 7,784 A.2d 18.
DISCUSSION
Prima Facie Case
The Maine Human Rights Act makes it unlawful housing discrimination:
For any owner, lessee, sublessee, managing agent or other person
having the right to sell or rent or manage a housing accommodation, or
any agent of these, to:

B. Refuse to show or refuse to sell, rent, lease, let or otherwise deny to
or withhold from any person the housing accommodation because of
race or color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability,
religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status;

C. Make, print or publish or cause to be made, printed or published any
notice, statement or advertisement relating to the sale, rental or lease of
the housing accommodation that indicates any preference, limitation or
discrimination based upon race or color, sex, sexual orientation,
physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or
familial status or an intention to make any such preference, limitation
or discrimination;

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5 M.R.S. § 4581-A(l)(B ), (C). Additionally, "physical or mental disability" is
defined as "[a] physical or mental impairment that: (1) Substantially limits one or
more of a person's major life activities; (2) Significantly impairs physical or mental
health; or (3) Requires special education, vocational rehabilitation, or related
services." 5 M.R.S. § 4553-A. The parties do not dispute that Mr. Engstrom is
disabled for the purposes of the MHRA.
Federal law guides the construction of the MHRA. Cookson v. Brewer Sch.
Dep 't, 2009 ME 57, 1f 14, 974 A.2d 276. Accordingly, this court applies the burden­
shifting scheme first developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). See Doyle v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2003
ME 61, 1f 14,824 A.2d 48, 53-54; Dussault v. Rre Coach Lantern Holdings, No CV­
10-347, 2011 Me. Super. LEXIS 226, at *12 (Nov. 9, 2011). First, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the defendant landlord
"[r]efuse[d] to show or refuse[d] to sell, rent, lease, let or otherwise den[ied] ... the
housing accommodation because of ... physical or mental disability." 5 M.R.S. §
4581-A(l); Me. Human Rights Comm'n v. Megunticook Mgmt. & Realty Corp., No.
CV-15-135, 2017 Me. Super. LEXIS 94, at *3 (May 15, 2017). Second, if the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the landlord/defendant must present
evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. See
Dussault v. RRE Coach Holdings, LLC, 2014 ME 8, 1f 22, 86 A.3d 52; Megunticook
Mgmt., 2017 Me. Super. LEXIS 94, at *3. Third, if the defendant presents such
evidence, the plaintiff must then present evidence that the landlord's proffered
reason is pretextual or untrue. See Dussault, 2014 Me 8, 1f 22. This analysis addresses
the parties' burdens of production, not persuasion. Id.; see also St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 521 (1993). Although the plaintiff retains the
ultimate burden of persuasion at all times, the "rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional

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discrimination ." St. Mary 's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511; Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ~
16. Thus, after the defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for refusing to rent, the plaintiff can survive a motion for summary judgment by
presenting sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that
either (1) the circumstances underlying the defendant's articulated reasons are
untrue, or (2) that even if those circumstances are true, they are not the actual cause
of the landlord's decision.' See Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ~ 16; Stanley v. Hancock
Cnty. Comm'rs, 2004 ME 157, ~ 23,864 A.2d 169. Although trial courts should be
cautious when resolving issues of pretext at the summary judgment stage, see
Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ! 17; Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 56 (1st Cir.
2008), "the presence of the issue of motivation or intent does not relieve the plaintiff
of her or his burden of producing evidence sufficient to create a question of fact on
that issue," Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ! 25.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
MHRC makes out a prima facie case of housing discrimination. Mr. Engstrom is
disabled, and Mr. Sproul refused to show or rent any housing to Mr. Engstrom upon
hearing of Mr. Engstrom's interest in owning a service animal. D & L's proffered
reason is that their policy is to not allow pets without written permission, in order to
screen out animals that might pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
tenants, that might result in property damage, or that might interfere with the
reasonable enjoyment of housing accommodations by others .> Given MHRC's
allegation that Mr. Sproul refused to consider Mr. Engstrom for housing as soon as

, As the Law Court in Cookson noted, "[bJecause a demonstration that the circumstances proffered by the employer
were not the actual reason for the employment decision allows the inference at trial that the true reason was
discriminatory animus, the generation of an issue of fact regarding the veracity of the employer's explanation is
sufficient to repel a motion for summary judgment." Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ~ 16 n.3 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). This is of course a different standard than the one required at trial.

· This is of course the language, practically verbatim, from section 4582-A(3) of the Maine Human Rights Act.

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"therapy dogs" and "federally-protected service animals" were mentioned,' and since
Mr. Sproul did not mention any safety or cleanliness concerns when refusing to
further speak to Mr. Engstrom about renting a unit, Mr. Engstrom has put forward
evidence that D & L's proffered reason was pretextual.
The Maine Human Rights Act
The Maine Human Rights Act further provides that it is unlawful housing
discrimination:
For any owner, lessor, sublessor, managing agent or other person
having the right to sell, rent, lease or manage a housing accommodation
or any of their agents to refuse to permit the use ofan assistance animal
or otherwise discriminate against an individual with a physical or
mental disability who uses an assistance animal at the housing
accommodation unless it is shown by defense that the assistance animal
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others or the use of the
assistance animal would result in substantial physical damage to the
property of others or would substantially interfere with the reasonable
enjoyment of the housing accommodation by others.

5 M.R.S. § 4582-A(3)(emphasis added). D & L, using the above language as support,
first argues that the statute requires that any person who claims disability
discrimination must be in actual ownership/possession of a service animal in order
for the statutory prohibition to apply, and that merely hoping to eventually adopt a
service animal is insufficient to fall under the statute. D & Land Sproul argue that,
because Mr. Engstrom did not own a service animal at the time of his phone call
with Mr. Sproul, this case presents little more than a hypothetical scenario, in which
the plaintiff seeks merely an advisory opinion. See In re Faucher, 558 A.2d 705, 706
(Me. 1989); Berry v. Daigle, 322 A.2d 320, 325 (Me. 1974)("A declaratory
judgment action will not be entertained where the questions propounded by the

, As noted above, although the parties disagree about the precise words that were used during their telephone
conversation, D & Land Sproul admit that Engstrom mentioned "therapy dogs" or "federally-protected service
animals."

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parties no longer present this Court with an active dispute of real interests between
the litigants."). D & Land Sproul liken this situation to a scenario in which a person,
with no intent of renting any apartment, calls numerous landlords in an area solely
to ask whether or not they allow animals in their apartments, as if conducting a
survey of the area of which landlords allow and do not allow pets in their units. D &
L and Sproul support this argument further with the fact that Mr. Engstrom
ultimately never ended up filing an application for an apartment at D & L.
This court disagrees with both the Defendants' characterization of Mr.
Engstrom's situation, and the correct reading of the statute. Although it is true that
Mr. Engstrom did not own a service animal at the time of his phone conversation
with Mr. Sproul (and still does not), Mr. Engstrom was not merely conducting a
random survey of landlords' pet preferences. Mr. Engstrom was instead an interested
potential tenant, hoping to find suitable housing where he would be able to manage
his PTSD with the assistance of a service animal. Indeed, Mr. Engstrom made clear
in his deposition that his failure to procure a service animal at the time of his phone
call with Mr. Sproul was precisely because he had yet to find suitable housing for a
service animal. Engstrom Depo., 47:4-14. His phone call with Mr. Sproul
discouraged him even further from finding appropriate housing for himself and a
service animal.
More importantly, this court also disagrees with the Defendants' reading of
the statutory language. Although the statute does prohibit any type of discrimination
against a mentally or physically disabled person "who uses an assistance animal at
the housing accommodation . .. ," (emphasis added), it also states that it is unlawful
housing discrimination "to refuse to permit the use of an assistance animal," without
any of the limiting language in the subsequent clause on which D & L and Sproul
rely. See 5 M.R.S. § 4582-A(3). Under the Defendants' reading of the statute, a
landlord would be allowed to prevent a disabled tenant from ever adopting a service

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animal under the justification that that tenant does not yet "use[] an assistance
animal." Id. Such a·result is undoubtedly not one which the Legislature intended to
allow, and this court does not read the statute to be so restrictive.
Finally, that Engstrom ultimately did not apply for housing at D & Lis of little
relevance. Both Maine and Federal courts interpret their respective fair housing acts
broadly, "finding that discrimination in the application process and the denial of the
'opportunity to inspect, or even inquire about' rental housing for discriminatory
reasons constitute 'discriminatory housing practice[s] .'" Megunticook Mgmt, 2017
Me. Super. LEXIS 94, at *3-4 (quoting Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246,
250 (9th Cir. 1997); Cf. Jnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,365
(1977) ("When a person's desire for a job is not translated into a formal application
solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a
victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of submitting an
application."). Given that Mr. Sproul told Mr. Engstrom not to bother filling out an
application because it would be denied, Mr. Engstrom's "unwillingness to engage in
a futile gesture" is reasonable and understandable, and does not affect this court's
decision.
D & L and Sproul further argue that there is no competent evidence that D &
L in any way violated either 5 M.R.S. § 4581-A or § 4582-A.' They argues that
Sproul did not know that Mr. Engstrom was disabled and did not know that Mr.
Engstrom required or was considering adopting a service animal, and as a result,
could not have discriminated against Mr. Engstrom on the basis of his disability. As
they did in their argument above, D & Land Sproul again rely on the fact that Mr.
Engstrom did not own a service animal at the time of his phone conversation with

· Defendant splits this argument into three separate arguments, with each argument header closely following the
language of 5 M.R.S. § 4582-A(3), § 4581-A(])(B), and§ 4581-A(l)(C), respectively. Because all three relate to the
sufficiency of the evidence available and whether or not D & L violated either of the two relevant statutes, this court
treats all three arguments as essentially arguing the same thing.

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Mr. Sproul. As noted above, one of the key factual disputes between the parties is
what precisely was said during the telephone conversation between Mr. Engstrom
and Mr. Sproul. For example, while the parties agree that the availability of service
animals in the units was discussed, they disagree on the depth of the conversation,
what precisely Mr. Sproul refused to consider, and what specific words were used.
It is because of this factual disagreement that this court must reject the
Defendants' argument in this instance, and indeed why this court finds that summary
judgment is inappropriate at this stage. Ultimately, whether or not Mr. Sproul and D
& L engaged in unlawful housing discrimination can be answered only by fully
understanding what Sproul and Engstrom said to one another during their phone
conversation. And fully understanding what Mr. Engstrom and Mr. Sproul said to
one another requires making factual determinations. This determination requires a
finder of fact to "choose between competing versions of the truth." Arrow Fastener,
2007 ME 34, ~ 15. Accordingly, there are genuine issues of material fact relevant to
the determination of whether or not D & L and Mr. Sproul engaged in unlawful
housing discrimination against Mr. Engstrom.
CONCLUSION
The entry is:
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
The clerk is directed to enter this Order on the docket for this case by incorporating
it by reference. M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated: September 27, 2019

Justice,SuperiorCourt

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