Katherine Stovall v. New England Telephone Company

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 47
Docket: WCB-24-163
Argued: March 5, 2025
Decided: June 3, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

KATHERINE STOVALL

v.

NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY et al.

HORTON, J.

[¶1] New England Telephone Company1 and its insurer, Sedgwick Claims

Management Services (collectively New England Telephone), appeal from a

decision entered by the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation

Board in favor of Katherine Stovall on her petition for restoration of benefits

for a 1996 injury. New England Telephone argues that the Appellate Division

erred by vacating a decision of an administrative law judge (D. Pelletier, ALJ)

denying Stovall’s petition as untimely.2 We agree and therefore vacate the

1 The name of New England Telephone Company changed to “Verizon” after the 1996 date of
injury in this case.

2 In addition to contending that Stovall’s petition was untimely, New England Telephone argues
that Stovall’s petition is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata and, in the alternative, that the
Appellate Division should have remanded the matter for the administrative law judge to adjudicate
Stovall’s petition. Our resolution of the appeal on timeliness grounds obviates the need to reach these
arguments.
2

Appellate Division decision and remand for the Appellate Division to affirm the

denial of Stovall’s petition as time-barred.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts and procedure are drawn from the procedural

record and the supported findings of the hearing officer and administrative law

judges (ALJs)3 who issued decisions on Stovall’s petitions for award of benefits,

reinstatement, and restoration of benefits in 2006, 2019, and 2023, and on New

England Telephone’s petition for review in 2011. See Michaud v. Caribou

Ford-Mercury, Inc., 2024 ME 74, ¶ 2, 327 A.3d 38.

A. The Initial and Subsequent Injuries

[¶3] In 1996, while employed at New England Telephone, Stovall began

to experience pain in her right hand, fingers, and wrists due to a work-related

injury. By 1998, the pain had spread to both hands, wrists, and forearms, and

she began receiving treatment. Due to the pain, she took a leave of absence

from work in May 1998. She returned in 1999, took a medically recommended

break for another issue, and then returned to work again in April 2000,

restarting treatment for her hand and wrist pain after that. On her treating

3 The title of the Board’s presiding officers changed from “hearing officer” to “administrative law

judge” in 2015. See P.L. 2015, ch. 297 passim (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 2 M.R.S. § 6-E(6)
(2025) and 39-A M.R.S. chs. 1, 3, 5, 7 (2025)).
3

physician’s recommendation, Stovall ultimately stopped working on June 29,

2001, due to her pain. Stovall notified New England Telephone in a

communication dated August 1, 2001, that “she had sustained a new

injury/aggravation” as of June 29, 2001. The new injury affected the same parts

of her body as were involved in the 1996 injury but caused more severe pain

and other symptoms. After receiving notice of the new injury, New England

Telephone failed to pay workers’ compensation benefits within fourteen days

and did not file a first report of injury, a notice of controversy, or a

memorandum of payment. See 39-A M.R.S.A. § 205(2), (7) (Supp. 1996)

(memorandum of payment and fourteen-day requirement); 39-A M.R.S.A. § 303

(Supp. 1996) (first report of injury); 39-A M.R.S.A. § 313 (Supp. 1996) (notice

of controversy).

[¶4] In 2004, Stovall filed a petition for award of benefits for the 1996

injury, a petition for award of benefits for the 2001 injury, and a petition for

reinstatement regarding the 2001 injury. On May 17, 2005, New England

Telephone filed a memorandum of payment for the 1996 injury and began

paying benefits.
4

B. The 2006 and 2011 Hearing Officer Decrees

[¶5] On February 27, 2006, a Board hearing officer (Smith, HO) held a

hearing on all three of Stovall’s petitions. Before the hearing began, in a

conversation on the record among the hearing officer and counsel for Stovall

and New England Telephone, it was agreed that any award of benefits resulting

from the hearing would be for the 2001 injury only. New England Telephone

contends that Stovall also agreed that New England Telephone did not have to

file a petition for review in order to terminate its payments on the 1996 injury.

Although Stovall denies such an agreement, it is undisputed that at the hearing

she voluntarily withdrew her petition for award on the 1996 injury.

[¶6] Of note, one of the medical records discussed at the hearing was a

physician’s report on the results of a comprehensive examination of Stovall’s

condition conducted in July and August 2005. The report indicated that Stovall

was asymptomatic and pain-free, had achieved maximum medical

improvement, and had not experienced any permanent impairment due to the

2001 injury. During her testimony at the February 2006 hearing, Stovall was

asked about the report and testified that during the examination, “I told [the

examining physician] I wanted to get back to work and I thought I was ready to

work and—and he said he couldn’t see a reason for me not to.”
5

[¶7] In a decision dated August 6, 2006, the hearing officer denied

Stovall’s petition for reinstatement4 but granted her petition for award based

on the 2001 injury. The hearing officer found that Stovall’s 2001 injury was a

“new gradual injury” that was an aggravation of the 1996 injury but that

involved “much more serious symptoms than in the past.” The hearing officer

noted that New England Telephone had violated its legal obligations by failing,

without an adequate excuse, to pay Stovall benefits based on her 2001 average

weekly wage within fourteen days after receiving notice of the injury. The

decision awarded Stovall total compensation benefits from the date of the 2001

injury to the date of the decision5 and ongoing benefits thereafter at the rate of

40% of her previous total compensation. The decision did not mention the

physician’s report about the 2005 comprehensive examination or Stovall’s

assertion that she felt “ready to work.” New England Telephone did not appeal

from the decision. Instead, as of August 6, 2006, it ceased its payments to

4 As reasons for denying the petition for reinstatement, the hearing officer noted that New
England Telephone’s obligation to reinstate had expired and that the only available positions were
unsuitable, particularly given that Stovall’s treating physician had continued to impose work
restrictions in 2004.

5 The hearing officer also awarded Stovall $10,666.56 in fringe benefits.
6

Stovall for the 1996 injury and began paying benefits in connection with only

the 2001 injury.

[¶8] Four years later, on August 30, 2010, New England Telephone filed

a petition for review, asserting that its obligation to pay benefits on the 2001

injury should cease in 2011 in light of the 520-week durational limit on

compensation payments, see 39-A M.R.S. § 213(4) (2010).6 The hearing officer

who had issued the 2006 decision held a hearing on New England Telephone’s

petition for review in June 2011. The parties stipulated that the durational limit

had been reached, but Stovall argued that she was eligible for continued

benefits for permanent impairment, see id. § 213(1-A)(A). On July 6, 2011, the

hearing officer issued a decision granting the petition for review.

[¶9] In the decision, the hearing officer found that Stovall had not

received any treatment for the 2001 injury since 2005. Although Stovall

testified that she was still experiencing chronic pain and depression as a result

of the 2001 injury, the hearing officer commented that “the record paints a

6 We cite the version of 39-A M.R.S. § 213 that was published in the 2010 Maine Revised Statutes

because it was in effect when the petition for review was filed. Section 213 has since been amended.
See, e.g., P.L. 2017, ch. 288, § A-50 (emergency, effective July 15, 2017) (codified at 39-A M.R.S.
§ 213(4) (2025)). Our later citation to 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B), which governs the discontinuation of
payments to an employee, is to the version of the statute in effect on August 6, 2006, when
New England Telephone discontinued its payments to Stovall on the 1996 injury. Section 205(9)(B)
has since been amended. See, e.g., P.L. 2015, ch. 297, § 5 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 39-A
M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2025)).
7

contrary picture.” The hearing officer found that Stovall’s last date of treatment

was in July 2005 and that she underwent an annual physical examination in

August 2005 “without reference to her injury.” The hearing officer did not

credit Stovall’s assertion that she had received a recent prescription for wrist

splints, noting that her testimony and the absence of documentation for the

prescription raised “new issues regarding credibility.”

[¶10] The hearing officer deemed “the most persuasive evidence” in the

record to be the examining physician’s report from 2005 that was briefly

discussed with Stovall at the 2006 hearing. Noting that the medical conclusions

in the report were “not refuted,” the hearing officer adopted the examining

physician’s conclusions that Stovall had achieved “maximum medical

improvement” from the 2001 injury in 2002, that she was asymptomatic and

pain-free, and that she had no permanent impairment, see 39-A M.R.S.

§ 102(16) (2025) (“‘Permanent impairment’ means any anatomic or functional

abnormality or loss existing after the date of maximum medical improvement

that results from the injury.”). Rejecting Stovall’s contention that she was still

experiencing pain, depression, and other symptoms as a result of the 2001

injury, the hearing officer concluded that she had not met her burden of

production to show a genuine issue as to a level of permanent impairment at or
8

above the threshold at which she would be entitled to benefits. Stovall did not

appeal from the hearing officer’s decision.

C. The Petition for Restoration

[¶11] On June 30, 2017, one week short of six years after the July 6, 2011,

hearing officer decision, Stovall filed a petition for restoration of benefits for

her 1996 injury. In connection with the petition, Stovall asserted that she was

entitled to continued benefits because New England Telephone failed to comply

with 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2006) in 2006 when it discontinued payments

on the 1996 injury after she had withdrawn her petition for award of benefits

for the injury. She further asserted that, after crediting the payments she had

received for the 2001 injury, she was entitled to 60% of her total incapacity

benefits from August 6, 2006, to July 6, 2011, and 100% thereafter.

1. The 2019 ALJ Decision and Subsequent Appeal

[¶12] In a decision dated January 17, 2019, the assigned ALJ (McElwee,

ALJ) denied the petition. Based on the hearing officer’s findings in the 2011

decision, the ALJ noted that “the 2001 injury was a significant aggravation, but

an aggravation only, of the 1996 injury,” and concluded that “absent any

evidence whatsoever that the combined effects of the separate injuries could

be divided in any way . . . they became the same condition at the time of the
9

second injury.” Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that New England Telephone’s

“petition for review of incapacity . . . was, in fact, [in] satisfaction of the

requirements of § 205(9)(B)(2) to terminate benefits for both injuries; and that

such benefits were properly terminated by the 7/6/11 decision.”7 The ALJ

denied Stovall’s motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, and

Stovall appealed, see 39-A M.R.S. § 321-B (2025).

[¶13] The Appellate Division vacated the ALJ’s decision in December

2021 on the ground that, in concluding that the 2011 decision terminated

Stovall’s benefits for both injuries, the ALJ had misapplied the doctrines of res

judicata and laches. The Appellate Division ruled that the 2011 decision

terminated benefits for the 2001 injury only, reasoning that “[i]n Workers’

Compensation proceedings, res judicata is read narrowly to preclude only

issues actually litigated.”8

7 The ALJ also concluded that, in the absence of evidence that Stovall’s condition changed between

the 2011 ruling and 2017, when she filed her petition, her claim was barred by laches. On appeal, the
Appellate Division held that laches is inapplicable in a workers’ compensation proceeding.

8 Citing Spencer’s Case, 123 Me. 46, 47, 121 A. 236, 236 (1923), and Wacome v. Paul Mushero
Constr. Co., 498 A.2d 593 (Me. 1985), for its conclusion, the Appellate Division declined to follow our
more recent workers’ compensation decisions incorporating the “might have been litigated”
standard, see Somers v. S.D. Warren Co., 2020 ME 137, ¶ 10, 242 A.3d 1091; Johnson v. Shaw’s Distrib.
Ctr., 2000 ME 191, ¶ 6, 760 A.2d 1057. A concurring member of the panel questioned the majority’s
analysis, suggesting that Spencer’s Case and Wacome are distinguishable from Stovall’s case because
the later claim in both Spencer’s Case and Wacome “involv[ed] a different body part than [the claim]
adjudicated earlier.” See Spencer’s Case, 123 Me. at 47, 121 A. at 236 (new claim for thumb injury not
precluded by previous claim involving injury to fingers); Wacome, 498. A.2d at 593-94 (new claim
10

[¶14] The Appellate Division remanded the matter for a determination

of whether Stovall’s claim “was [actually] litigated and adjudicated by prior

board decisions and therefore barred” from review. The Appellate Division

further instructed that if, on remand, the ALJ concluded that the doctrine of res

judicata did not apply, the ALJ should consider whether Stovall’s petition was

timely and whether New England Telephone was authorized under 39-A M.R.S.

§ 205(9)(B)(2) to discontinue payments for the 1996 injury.

2. The Proceedings After Remand

[¶15] On remand, a different ALJ (D. Pelletier, ALJ) was assigned. Stovall

contended that her petition should be deemed timely because it was filed

before the expiration of the period during which a petition must be filed when

an employer has paid benefits for an injury. See 39-A M.R.S. § 306(2) (2025) (“If

an employer or insurer pays benefits under this Act, . . . the period during which

an employee or other interested party must file a petition is 6 years from the

date of the most recent payment.”). Although she filed her petition nearly

eleven years after the benefit payments for the 1996 injury had ended, Stovall

contended that the six-year statute had been tolled during the entire time New

for back injury not precluded by previous claim for foot injury). In light of our holding in this case,
we need not decide the extent to which the doctrine of res judicata applies here.
11

England Telephone had been paying her benefits on the 2001 injury pursuant

to the 2006 decision. Her argument relied on our decisions holding that “a

workers’ compensation payment by an employer . . . with notice that the

payment related in part to the first injury does toll the statute of limitations on

first-injury claims against the employer as well as against its insurer at the time

of the first injury.” Klimas v. Great N. Paper Co., 582 A.2d 256, 257 (Me. 1990);

see also Pottle v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 551 A.2d 112, 114-15 (Me. 1988).

Stovall contended that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments

on the 2001 injury were related in part to the 1996 injury.

[¶16] The ALJ denied Stovall’s petition. As to res judicata, the ALJ

followed the Appellate Division’s instruction to consider only whether Stovall’s

claim for the 1996 injury “was actually litigated and adjudicated in 2006 or

2011” and determined that her petition was not barred by the doctrine of res

judicata. However, the ALJ concluded that the petition was time-barred

because it was filed outside the statutory six-year period and Stovall had not

met her burden under Pottle and Klimas to show that the running of the period

was tolled. See 39-A M.R.S. § 306(2).

[¶17] Noting Stovall’s argument that “all payments made by the

employer for the 2001 injury which ended on July 6, 2011 placed the employer
12

on notice that the 1996 injury was continuing to play a role in the employee’s

condition,” the ALJ found that Stovall had not supplied any medical evidence

supporting her argument and that Stovall had not herself placed New England

Telephone on notice.9 The ALJ also noted the findings in the 2011 decision that

Stovall was asymptomatic and pain-free as to the 2001 injury and had not seen

her treating physician for her condition since 2005. The ALJ accordingly

rejected Stovall’s argument that New England Telephone had

contemporaneous notice that its payments on the 2001 injury were in part

related to the 1996 injury.

[¶18] After the decision was issued, the ALJ denied motions from both

parties for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order denying

Stovall’s motion summarized the ALJ’s reasoning as being that, because Stovall

had been asymptomatic since 2002 as to the 2001 injury, “[i]t follows then that

any symptoms related to the 1996 injury, presumably the underlying condition,

ended in 2002 as well.” Stovall appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appellate

Division. See 39-A M.R.S. § 321-B.

9 The ALJ also referred to an exchange of email messages in 2012 between Stovall and
New England Telephone regarding Stovall’s request to be reimbursed for a medical bill that she had
paid in 1998. The ALJ found that New England Telephone issued Stovall a check referring to the 2001
injury and that Stovall requested that the check be reissued “with a 1998 injury date.” New England
Telephone refused, and Stovall never cashed the check. The ALJ noted that there was no payment
that could even arguably have tolled the statutory period.
13

[¶19] On March 28, 2024, the Appellate Division issued a written

decision again vacating the ALJ decision and entered a decision in favor of

Stovall. The Appellate Division again concluded that the doctrine of res judicata

did not bar Stovall’s petition for restoration because “[i]n workers’

compensation proceedings . . . res judicata is read narrowly to preclude the

relitigation of issues actually litigated.”10 The Appellate Division next

concluded that Stovall’s petition for restoration was not untimely under 39-A

M.R.S. § 306(2). The Appellate Division determined that there was sufficient

record evidence, based primarily on the hearing officer’s findings in the 2006

decision, that New England Telephone knew that the 1996 injury “contributed

in some part” to its payments on the 2001 injury and that, therefore, the

limitations period for the 1996 injury was tolled until July 6, 2011—when

payments for the 2001 injury ended. See Pottle, 551 A.2d at 114-15; Klimas,

582 A.2d at 258-59.

[¶20] Rather than remanding the matter for the ALJ to determine

whether Stovall had agreed at the beginning of the 2006 hearing that

New England Telephone could discontinue payments on the 1996 injury, the

10 In its reasoning, the Appellate Division again relied on Spencer’s Case, 123 Me. at 47, 121 A. at
236, and Wacome, 498 A.2d at 593, instead of our more recent decisions, see supra n.8.
14

Appellate Division in effect adjudicated that issue. It ruled that New England

Telephone was not permitted to discontinue payments for the 1996 injury in

2006 because it did not file a petition to cease payments. See 39-A M.R.S.

§ 205(9)(B)(2).11 Based on that conclusion, it awarded Stovall compensation

for the 1996 injury “at the rate established by the 2005 memorandum of

payment, from August 6, 2006, to the present and continuing, with a credit for

benefits paid on Ms. Stovall’s 2001 date of injury.”

[¶21] New England Telephone petitioned for appellate review, see 39-A

M.R.S. § 322 (2025); M.R. App. P. 23, and we granted its petition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶22] “In the workers’ compensation context, . . . our role on appeal, like

the Appellate Division’s role, is limited by statute.” Potter v. Great Falls Ins. Co.,

11Under the statute in effect at the time, 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2006), an employer could
discontinue or reduce payments in two scenarios. First, if no compensation award or scheme had
been established, compensation could be discontinued through a certificate sent by certified mail. Id.
§ 205(9)(B)(1). Second, if a compensation award or scheme had been established, including through
a memorandum of payment, see id. § 205(7), the employer had to follow a formal process requiring
a petition to the Board followed by “the dispute resolution procedures of [the Workers’
Compensation] Act.” Id. § 205(9)(B)(2). Section 205(9)(B) has since been amended, although the
requirements for discontinuation of benefits remain essentially the same. See, e.g., P.L. 2015, ch. 297,
§ 5 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2025)).

Here, in electing to enter a decision for Stovall rather than to remand, the Appellate Division cited
New England Telephone’s failure to comply with section 205(9)(B)(2). We agree that an employer’s
failure to obtain authorization to discontinue the payment of benefits may support a petition for
restoration of benefits, but it has no bearing on whether the petition for restoration is timely.
15

2020 ME 144, ¶ 17, 243 A.3d 1188 (citing 39-A M.R.S. §§ 318, 321-B(2), 322(3)

(2020); M.R. App. P. 23(b)(3)). “We review decisions of the Appellate Division

according to established principles of administrative law, except with regard to

the ALJ’s factual findings.” Michaud, 2024 ME 74, ¶ 12, 327 A.3d 38 (quotation

marks and alteration omitted). By statute, “[t]he administrative law judge’s

decision, in the absence of fraud, on all questions of fact is final; but if the

administrative law judge expressly finds that any party has or has not sustained

the party’s burden of proof, that finding is considered a conclusion of law and

is reviewable . . . .” 39-A M.R.S. § 318 (2025).

[¶23] We focus, as did the Appellate Division, on the ALJ’s determination

after remand that Stovall had failed to meet her burden to show that New

England Telephone was on notice while making payments for the 2001 injury

that the payments were made necessary to some extent by the continued effects

of Stovall’s 1996 injury. Our decisions beginning with Pottle define what

constitutes notice as a matter of law, but as Stovall acknowledges, the issue of

whether New England Telephone was on notice when it made payments for the

2001 injury is at least in part a question of fact. See Boober v. Great N. Paper Co.,

398 A.2d 371, 375 n.10 (Me. 1979); Bradbury v. Inhabitants of Falmouth, 18 Me.

64, 65 (1841) (“[W]hat is, or is not, reasonable notice, has been held to be a
16

question of law”; whether it has been provided is a question of fact). Although

the ALJ’s decision that Stovall did not sustain her burden of proof is subject to

review, see 39-A M.R.S. § 318, neither we nor the Appellate Division may set the

decision aside unless the record compelled the ALJ to decide in Stovall’s favor.

See Leighton v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 111, ¶ 21, 883 A.2d 906; Davidson v.

Bancroft & Martin, 560 A.2d 13, 14 (Me. 1989); St. Pierre v. Morin Brick Co., 427

A.2d 492, 494 (Me. 1981).

B. The Legal Standard

[¶24] The time limits for the filing of workers’ compensation petitions

are governed by the following statutory provisions:

1. Statute of Limitations. Except as provided in this section,
a petition brought under this Act is barred unless filed within 2
years after the date of injury or the date the employee’s employer
files a required first report of injury if required in section 303,
whichever is later.

2. Payment of benefits. If an employer or insurer pays
benefits under this Act, with or without prejudice, within the
period provided in subsection 1, the period during which an
employee or other interested party must file a petition is 6 years
from the date of the most recent payment.

39-A M.R.S § 306(1)-(2).12

Section 306(1) is, as its title indicates, a statute of limitations because the limitations period
12

runs from the accrual of the workers’ compensation claim. Section 306(2) is a statute of repose—the
six-year period runs from when the employer ceases to pay benefits. See State v. Tucci, 2019 ME 51,
17

[¶25] It is the six-year period in section 306(2) that is at issue here.

Stovall’s petition for restoration of benefits for the 1996 injury was filed nearly

eleven years after payments on the 1996 injury ceased. However, we have

recognized that the statutory periods for filing petitions are tolled when an

employer makes benefit payments for a subsequent injury with notice that the

payments are “for treatment that was in part necessitated by the [prior] injury.”

Klimas, 582 A.2d at 258; see also Pottle, 551 A.2d at 114-15; Leighton, 2005 ME

111, ¶ 1, 883 A.2d 906. In Klimas, we said, “Pottle stands for the proposition

that the . . . statute of limitations would be tolled if either [the employer or its

insurer] had notice at the time payments were made that [the employee] was

still being treated for the [prior] injury.” Klimas, 582 A.2d at 258.

[¶26] In Leighton, we explained the allocation of the burden of proof and

the rationale for the allocation:

[T]he employee bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether
the statute of limitations has been tolled. After the employer
submits evidence of a date of latest payment that [would render the
petition untimely], and assuming that the hearing officer is
persuaded by that evidence, if the employee claims that the statute
was tolled, the burden shifts to the employee to establish that the
employer or insurer had contemporaneous notice that payments

¶ 12 n.2, 206 A.3d 891 (“A statute of limitations governs the time within which an action must be
commenced and begins to run when the cause of action accrues, whereas a statute of repose limits
the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of
action.”).
18

made within the limitations period but after a subsequent injury
related in part to the prior injury.

Allocating the burden to the employee on this issue is
supported by reasons of fairness and convenience. The employee
is the party that has or can most readily gain control of the evidence
required to establish that he or she had informed the employer or
insurer that the current incapacity is attributable to both the prior
and more recent injury. The employee can satisfy this burden by,
for example, submitting medical records that attribute the onset of
new symptoms at least in part to the prior injury, along with
evidence that the insurer or employer had been made aware of the
contents of the records at the time payments were made. Or, the
employee could submit proof that he or she had asserted a belief to
the employer at the time payments were being made that the older
injury is at least in part responsible for the later incapacity.

Leighton, 2005 ME 111, ¶¶ 16-17, 883 A.2d 906.

[¶27] Applied here, our tolling jurisprudence required Stovall to prove

that New England Telephone was on notice while paying benefits for her later

injury that its payments related to both injuries because the prior injury still

required treatment or still affected her condition, separately or in combination

with the later injury.

C. The Issue: Whether Stovall’s Petition for Restoration Was Timely

[¶28] We turn to whether the Appellate Division correctly ruled that the

record evidence compelled the ALJ after remand to decide that Stovall had met

her burden. Because Stovall moved for findings after the ALJ’s decision on

remand, we may not infer that the ALJ made any findings beyond those
19

expressly stated in the decision. See Downing v. Dep’t of Transp., 2012 ME 5,

¶ 19, 34 A.3d 1150.

[¶29] The ALJ’s decision after remand included the following findings:

 The 2006 decision described the 2001 injury as a new gradual injury that
caused what Stovall’s treating physician termed a significant aggravation
of Stovall’s condition, with “much more serious symptoms than in the
past.” (Quotation marks and emphasis omitted.)

 “The 2006 decision does not make any findings about whether the 1996
injury continued to play a role in part in [Stovall’s] condition,” and the
issue was not raised.

 “[Stovall] did not supply any medical evidence supporting” her argument
that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments related to
the 1996 injury and did not testify that she had placed New England
Telephone on notice.

 The 2005 examining physician’s report stated that “[Stovall] had no pain.
She has no neck pain, no shoulder pain, no elbow pain. She denies any
wrist pain.” (Quotation marks omitted.)

 The hearing officer’s 2011 decision “found that [Stovall] had last seen her
own doctor for her wrists, arms, elbows and shoulders in 2005.” 13

[¶30] In vacating the ALJ’s decision on remand, the Appellate Division

noted that the 2006 hearing officer decision “found that Ms. Stovall gave notice

to New England Telephone on August 1, 2001, that ‘she had sustained a new

13 The hearing officer’s 2011 finding that Stovall had not received any treatment for the 2001

injury since 2005 does not bear directly on the issue of whether New England Telephone was on
notice while making benefit payments, but it does support an inference that New England Telephone
was never notified while making payments that Stovall was being treated for the 1996 injury.
20

injury/aggravation on June 29, 2001 of her prior injury.’” The Appellate

Division also pointed out that the 2006 decision relied in part on Stovall’s

treating physician’s opinion that Stovall’s 2001 injury was “a significant

aggravation of [Stovall’s] underlying condition.” (Quotation marks omitted.)

[¶31] That the 2001 injury was an aggravation of the 1996 injury did not

necessarily serve to satisfy Stovall’s burden. Stovall’s burden was to show that

while New England Telephone was making payments on the 2001 injury, it was

on notice that the 1996 injury contributed to the necessity for workers’

compensation benefits by requiring continued treatment, contributing to

continuing impairment, or otherwise affecting Stovall’s condition. In Pottle, the

employee incurred successive injuries to his left knee, and after the employer

had finished paying benefits for the later injury, it was established medically

that the earlier injury had contributed to the permanent impairment of the

knee. 551 A.2d at 113-15. We held that the employer was not on notice that its

payments on the later injury related to the earlier injury because the

contributing role of the earlier injury was not established until after the

employer had finished paying benefits for the later injury. Id. at 114-15. In a

sense, this case involves the opposite chronology.
21

[¶32] By virtue of Stovall’s notice of injury in 2001 and the opinion of her

treating physician, New England Telephone was on notice before paying any

benefits on the 2001 injury that the 2001 injury was an aggravation of the 1996

injury. However, as the transcript of the 2006 hearing reveals, before starting

payments on the 2001 injury, New England Telephone was also on notice of

what the hearing officer termed the “persuasive” 2005 physician’s report

indicating that Stovall was asymptomatic, pain-free, and without any

permanent impairment from the 2001 injury. Nothing in the record indicates

that New England Telephone received notice to the contrary while paying

benefits for the 2001 injury. Accordingly, there is little room for Stovall’s

argument that while paying benefits for the 2001 injury between 2006 and

2011, New England Telephone was on notice that the effects of the 1996 injury

continued to require treatment or otherwise affect her condition although the

effects of the more serious aggravating 2001 injury to precisely the same parts

of her body had ended as of no later than 2005.

[¶33] Not only does the record evidence not compel a decision in

Stovall’s favor, it furnishes solid support for the ALJ’s conclusion after remand

that Stovall failed to prove that while making payments related to the 2001

injury New England Telephone was on notice that its payments also related to
22

the 1996 injury. We vacate the decision of the Appellate Division and remand

for entry of a decision affirming the ALJ’s denial of Stovall’s petition for

restoration as time-barred.

The entry is:

Decision vacated. Remanded to the Appellate
Division for entry of a decision affirming the
denial of the petition for restoration of benefits.

Travis C. Rackliffe, Esq. (orally), and Kayla A. Estes, Esq., Tucker Law Group,
Bangor, for appellants New England Telephone Co. et al.

Zachary J. Smith, Esq. (orally), Lawsmith Legal Services, L.L.C., Bangor, for
appellee Katherine Stovall

Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division case number 23-6
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY