State of Maine v. Tara L. Watson

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2024 ME 24
Docket: SRP-22-293
Argued June 8, 2023
Decided: April 9, 2024

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.*

STATE OF MAINE

v.

TARA L. WATSON

DOUGLAS, J.

[¶1] Tara L. Watson seeks review of a three-year prison sentence

imposed by the trial court (Somerset County, Benson, J.) after Watson pleaded

guilty to unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (cocaine base) (Class C),

17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(B)(3) (2023).1 Watson’s principal contention on

appeal is that the court, in deciding whether to suspend her sentence and

establish a period of probation, abused its discretion by disregarding or

misapplying sentencing principles. We vacate the sentence and remand for the

court to resentence Watson.

* Although Justice Jabar participated in this appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified.

1 Watson also pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors, but the issues raised in this sentence appeal
pertain only to the sentence for felony possession. See 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2023) (providing that only
sentences of imprisonment of one year or more are subject to review by the Supreme Judicial Court).
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On July 14, 2022, Tara L. Watson was charged by indictment with

three crimes alleged to have been committed on or about May 11, 2022:

• Unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (cocaine base) (Class C),
17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(B)(3);2

• Refusing to submit to arrest (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 751-B(1)(A) (2023);
and

• Violation of condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2023).3

The trial court accepted Watson’s guilty plea to all three charges on August 8,

2022.

[¶3] On August 17, 2022, the court held a sentencing hearing. The

leading charge for sentencing purposes was Count 1, unlawful possession of

cocaine base, a Class C crime punishable by up to five years in prison.

See 17-A M.R.S. § 1604(1)(C) (2023).

[¶4] The State began by summarizing the facts underlying the

unlawful-possession charge and Watson’s criminal history. Watson and a

2 The unlawful-possession charge in Count 1 was elevated to a Class C felony because the amount

of cocaine base (a schedule W drug) that Watson possessed was three grams—above the statutory
two-gram limit for the elevation as specified in 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(B)(3) (2023); see 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1102(1)(F) (2023). Possession of two grams or less is a Class D misdemeanor offense. Id.
§§ 1102(1)(F), 1107-A(1)(C).

Before the indictment, Watson had been charged with the crimes in a criminal complaint filed
3

on May 13, 2022.
3

co-defendant were in a vehicle in which three grams of cocaine were found

under the driver’s seat, where the co-defendant was sitting, and drug

paraphernalia was found in the passenger seat, where Watson was sitting.

Watson gave a false name to the officer and ran after getting out of the vehicle.

[¶5] Watson’s criminal history included four bail violations from 2018

and 2019, resulting in sentences ranging from seven to sixty days; a conviction

of possession of cocaine base, resulting in an eighteen-month sentence served

after a failed deferred disposition; and 2021 convictions of refusing to submit

to arrest and escape, resulting in twenty-four-hour sentences. At the time of

the sentencing on the charges at issue in this appeal, Watson was facing

additional misdemeanor charges in Somerset County of violating conditions of

release and unlawful possession of scheduled drugs.4

[¶6] On July 11, 2022, less than one month before the sentencing hearing

in this case, Watson pleaded guilty to unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs

(Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A) (2023), in an unrelated case pending in

another county, and was sentenced by the court (York County, Moskowitz, J.) to

4 We take judicial notice of the docket records in those cases. See Gardner v. Greenlaw, 2022 ME
53, ¶ 3 n.1, 284 A.3d 93.
4

three years of incarceration with all but twenty-one days suspended and two

years of probation.5

[¶7] In this case, the State argued that Watson was not a good candidate

for probation because of her history of possession and use, her previous

violation of conditions of release, and—with respect to the pending charges—

her delivery of a false name and flight from the officer who stopped the vehicle

in which she was a passenger. The State requested a sentence of three years,

none suspended, for the possession charge, and a concurrently running

six-month sentence on each of the other two charges, along with the mandatory

minimum $400 fine. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1126(2) (2023).

[¶8] Pointing to a societal shift from punishment to treatment for

offenders with acute substance use disorders, Watson argued for a probated

sentence so that she could focus on addressing her substance use disorder for

the first time in a highly supervised residential program. Watson emphasized

that she had no history of violence or driving under the influence and that most,

if not all, of her prior convictions were related directly to her untreated

addiction. Although she had not been successful previously on bail and on a

5 The sentencing record does not provide any details about the underlying facts of the trafficking

charge.
5

deferred disposition, she had never been on probation nor seriously addressed

her substance use disorder in a structured, residential program. She had

applied and been accepted to a such a program at the Esther House in Saco,

where she would be regularly drug-tested and where she would be required to

attend meetings, get a sponsor, arrange for counseling and treatment, secure

employment, and follow house rules. A representative from the program

appeared at the sentencing hearing, explained how the program works, and

confirmed that Watson had been accepted.

[¶9] Watson proposed a sentence of three years, fully suspended, and

two years of probation. She asked that the sentence run consecutively to the

three-year, largely suspended sentence that she had received the previous

month. She argued that a lengthy probation (consisting of consecutive

probationary periods in her two cases) with the potential for up to six years of

incarceration would provide a strong incentive for her to succeed at Esther

House. She asked that the court sentence her to thirty days’ incarceration for

each of the misdemeanor counts and agreed that she would owe a $400 fine.

[¶10] The court asked Watson to explain how she proposed the court

apply steps one and two of the requisite three-step sentencing analysis adopted

in our decision in State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1993), and codified in
6

statute,6 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1) (2023). Watson argued for a three-year basic

sentence (to be suspended in the third step of the analysis).7 The State argued

for a basic sentence of two years based on the nature and seriousness of the

offense as committed, with a maximum period of incarceration set at three

years because of Watson’s criminal history, and for no suspension of the

sentence.

[¶11] After allowing Watson to respond, the court began its sentencing

analysis, stating as follows:

Simply by way of introduction I would say that I agree with
absolutely everything that [defense counsel] said in terms of his
description of the shift in approach in drug cases over the last
relatively recent period of time, particularly in connection with the
current [L]egislature. There has been, I think particularly in elite
circles, a profound shift in the perception of drug use and the fact
that some of these cases have not been decriminalized is something

6 “When sentencing a person convicted of a felony in Maine, the sentencing court is bound by the

analysis prescribed in State v. Hewey[, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1993),] and codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602.”
State v. Ringuette, 2022 ME 61, ¶ 9, 288 A.3d 393. The court first determines “a basic term of
imprisonment by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by
the individual.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(A) (2023). It then determines “the maximum term of
imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating
and mitigating, appropriate to the case.” Id. § 1602(1)(B). Finally, the court determines “what
portion, if any, of the maximum term of imprisonment . . . should be suspended and, if a suspension
order is to be entered, determine[s] the appropriate period of probation or administrative release to
accompany that suspension.” Id. § 1602(1)(C). At each step, the sentencing court must consider and
articulate the goals that are served by the sentence, taking into account the general purposes of
sentencing set forth in 17-A M.R.S. § 1501 (2023). See infra ¶¶ 21-22.
7Watson’s counsel stated, “[I]n terms of basic sentence, I think the State and I are somewhat in
agreement with three years being sort of the number.” It is clear from the context that counsel was
referring to the maximum sentence (step two), not the basic sentence (step one).
7

of a shock to me. So I recognize the shift that [defense counsel] is
referring to.

The court continued by referencing its previous experience as a homicide

prosecutor:

I would say 70 to 80 percent of the [nondomestic homicide] cases
that I prosecuted involved the use and abuse, regardless of
whether—whatever the DSM IV or V now may say concerning drug
use, concerned the abuse of substances. People situated like
Ms. Watson who were desperate to get the next fix or were
desperate to become involved in some sort of drug imbroglio, it
seemed to be the inevitable background of every homicide that I
dealt with, and there were probably on average 25 to 30 homicides
in Maine over the course of the average year. And 70 to 80 percent
of them involved these drugs.

So I agree that I’m obliged to accept the law as it’s given to me by
the Maine [L]egislature and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but
I guess based on my own experience, and I bring my life experience
to my current role as a judicial officer, I sometimes question the
wisdom of what appears to be the shift in elite opinion over the last
few years. So I’ll simply say that by way of introduction to my
analysis.

[¶12] Undertaking its sentencing analysis, the court observed that its

task in step one of the Hewey analysis is to determine the basic sentence by

“looking at all the ways in which the offense can be committed” and placing

Watson’s conduct “on that sort of mythical continuum, and deciding how

serious it is on that mythical continuum.” Because the court determined that

the quantity of drugs that Watson possessed (one gram over the two-gram
8

minimum, making the offense a Class C felony) did not place her conduct among

the most serious ways in which this offense could be committed, it set the basic

sentence at two years. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(A).

[¶13] In step two, which focuses on the mitigating and aggravating

factors specific to the defendant, see id. § 1602(1)(B), the court found as a

mitigating factor that Watson had accepted responsibility (though Watson had

given a false name to law enforcement at the time the drugs were discovered)

and as aggravating factors that Watson had multiple bail violations, had a failed

deferred disposition, and, in this case, had refused to submit to arrest. The

court determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating

factors and set the maximum period of incarceration at three years.

[¶14] In step three, to determine what portion of the sentence, if any,

should be suspended to arrive at the final sentence, see id. § 1602(1)(C), the

court considered some of the purposes of sentencing set out in statute,

beginning with the need to restrain individuals:8

For reasons that I’ve already discussed in terms of the profound
interconnection of drugs with homicides, at least in the Court’s
experience, I think the restraint of individuals is, in fact, in the
interest of public safety, even though the prevailing elite consensus
seems to be that we should treat drug addiction as a mental health

8 The court did not find persuasive any of the sentences imposed on other defendants that Watson

identified as potentially comparable, and Watson does not claim any error on this basis.
9

issue as opposed to a public safety issue. That simply is not
consonant with the experience of the Court.

See 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(1) (2023). The court stated that it had to consider other

general sentencing purposes set out in 17-A M.R.S. § 15019 as well and, after

noting that restitution was not relevant, listed without further explanation

minimizing correctional experiences, providing notice of sentences that may be

imposed, encouraging the just individualization of sentences, and

acknowledging the gravity of the offense. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(2)-(4), (6).

The court did not mention or consider section 1501(5), which provides that one

purpose of sentencing is to “[e]liminate inequalities in sentences that are

unrelated to legitimate criminological goals.” Although impressed “with the

amount of work [defense counsel] ha[d] done in terms of trying to line up the

Esther House for Ms. Watson,” ultimately the court rejected probation as an

alternative.

[¶15] Accordingly, on the unlawful-possession charge, Watson was

sentenced to three years’ incarceration, with no time suspended, and a $400

9 Subsection 8(C) of 17-A M.R.S. § 1501 was amended, effective after the sentencing at issue here,

in ways that are not material to this case. See P.L. 2023, ch. 430, § 2 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (to be
codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(8)(C)). We quote the version that was in effect at the time of the
sentencing.
10

fine.10 On each of the other two counts, the court sentenced Watson to six

months in prison, to run concurrently with the three-year sentence on the

possession count. Watson raised no objection to the sentencing.

[¶16] Watson timely applied for review of this sentence as well as the

sentences entered with respect to the other Somerset County misdemeanors of

which Watson was convicted at around the same time. 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2023);

M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20(b). The Clerk of the Law Court dismissed the

application for review of the sentences on the misdemeanors because those

sentences did not include, and could not have included, a term of imprisonment

of one year or more.11 See 15 M.R.S. § 2151; M.R. App. P. 12A(b)(3), 20(a)(1).

The Sentence Review Panel granted the application for review of the sentence

on the unlawful-possession count.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶17] Watson contends that her sentence should be vacated because the

sentencing court erred in all three steps of the sentencing analysis. We find no

error with respect to the court’s analysis in setting the basic and maximum

10Her co-defendant, who had three prior misdemeanor convictions but no prior felony
convictions, also pleaded guilty and received a sentence of two years, with all but sixteen months
suspended and two years of probation.
11 Watson did not seek review of the Clerk’s order. See M.R. App. P. 12A(b).
11

sentences in steps one and two, respectively, and focus on its determination of

the final sentence in step three.12 In that regard, Watson asserts that the

imposition of an unsuspended, three-year prison sentence was not supported

by the sentencing record but rather was improperly based upon the court’s

personal beliefs; was entered in disregard of relevant statutory sentencing

purposes; and was “almost entirely punitive” in that it “deprive[d] [her] of the

opportunity to avail herself of a rehabilitation program into which she had

already been accepted.”

A. Standard of Review

[¶18] We review for an abuse of discretion a challenge to a court’s

determination of the final sentence at step three. State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30,

¶ 23, 991 A.2d 806. Because these issues were not raised to the sentencing

12 Watson argues that the court erred in step one by “misappl[ying] legal principle, in not making

more concrete findings, and musing that the basic sentence phase of the Hewey analysis was
‘mythical.’” Although the court did characterize its task in phase one as placing defendant’s conduct
in this case “on that sort of mythical continuum,” the analysis it then used for determining the basic
sentence was consistent with sentencing principles. In the absence of an objection and given a record
that supports a basic sentence of two years—a sentence that is shorter than the term Watson
requested as a maximum sentence and significantly below the statutory limit of five years,
see 17-A M.R.S. § 1604(1)(C) (2023)—the court did not commit obvious error in the first step of its
sentencing analysis. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(A); State v. Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 19, 852 A.2d 70;
State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13, 782 A.2d 319. Nor did the court commit obvious error in its
balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors to establish a three-year maximum period of
incarceration at step two of the Hewey analysis given that Watson had agreed that a three-year
maximum sentence was appropriate and the court considered Watson’s acceptance of responsibility
in addition to aggravating factors in determining the maximum period of incarceration.
See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B); Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 19, 852 A.2d 70; Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13,
782 A.2d 319.
12

court, we review for obvious error. See State v. Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 19,

852 A.2d 70; State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13, 782 A.2d 319; see also State v.

Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 23, 72 A.3d 503; cf. State v. Butsitsi, 2015 ME 74,

¶¶ 19-23, 118 A.3d 222 (applying obvious error review to claims of judicial bias

in sentencing). Error is obvious “when there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain,

and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these conditions are met, we must also

conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings before we vacate a judgment on the basis of

the error.” Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 23, 72 A.3d 503 (citation and quotation

marks omitted).

B. Sentence Review

1. General Objectives of Appellate Sentence Review

[¶19] The Legislature established the Sentence Review Panel process

nearly thirty-five years ago, in response to an article by then-Justice Daniel E.

Wathen, to authorize appellate review “to govern the exercise of discretion by

the sentencing judge in order to promote uniformity in sentencing.”

Hon. Daniel E. Wathen, Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in

Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate Review, 40 Me. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1988);

see P.L. 1989, ch. 218, § 5 (effective Sept. 30, 1989) (codified as subsequently
13

amended at 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-2157 (2023)); L.D. 44, Statement of Fact (114th

Legis. 1989) (“This bill specifically seeks to implement the proposed changes in

sentence review in Maine as reflected in the recent Maine Law Review article

authored by Supreme Judicial Court Associate Justice Daniel E. Wathen.”). Not

an advocate of rigid sentencing guidelines, Justice Wathen instead proposed a

process of discretionary appellate review of sentences “as an effective means of

articulating and implementing a rational sentencing policy” and providing

guidance to sentencing courts and the public. Wathen at 2-3, 34. This statutory

scheme was enacted effective September 30, 1989, and as subsequently

amended, remains in effect today. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-2157.

[¶20] The statute prescribes the objectives of our discretionary sentence

review as follows:

1. Sentence correction. To provide for the correction of
sentences imposed without due regard for the sentencing factors
set forth in this chapter;

2. Promote respect for law. To promote respect for law by
correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the
fairness of the sentencing process;

3. Rehabilitation. To facilitate the possible rehabilitation of
an offender by reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities
among the sentences of comparable offenders; and
14

4. Sentencing criteria. To promote the development and
application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and
just.

15 M.R.S. § 2154. The statute provides that we must consider (1) the

“propriety” of a sentence, with regard to “the nature of the offense, the

character of the offender, the protection of the public interest, the effect of the

offense on the victim and any other relevant sentencing factors recognized

under law,” and (2) the “manner in which the sentence was imposed, including

the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was based.”

15 M.R.S. § 2155. “In determining whether the sentencing court disregarded

the statutory sentencing factors, abused its sentencing power, permitted a

manifest and unwarranted inequality among sentences of comparable

offenders, or acted irrationally or unjustly in fashioning a sentence, we afford

the trial court considerable discretion.” State v. Hamel, 2013 ME 16, ¶ 5, 60 A.3d

783 (quotation marks omitted).

2. Statutory Sentencing Goals

[¶21] The Legislature has established in Part 6 of Title 17-A of the Maine

Revised Statutes sentencing purposes or goals to “create consistency among

sentences for similar offenses while encouraging individualization of each

sentence based on circumstances specific to the case and the defendant.” State
15

v. Bentley, 2021 ME 39, ¶ 11, 254 A.3d 1171. The sentencing goals are set out

in 17-A M.R.S. § 1501, which states:

The general purposes of the provisions of this Part are to:

1. Prevent crime. Prevent crime through the deterrent
effect of sentences, the rehabilitation of persons and the restraint
of individuals when required in the interest of public safety;

2. Encourage restitution. Encourage restitution in all cases
in which the victim can be compensated and other purposes of
sentencing can be appropriately served;

3. Minimize correctional experiences. Minimize
correctional experiences that serve to promote further criminality;

4. Provide notice of nature of sentences that may be
imposed. Give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may
be imposed on the conviction of a crime;

5. Eliminate inequalities in sentences. Eliminate
inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate
criminological goals;

6. Encourage just individualization of sentences.
Encourage differentiation among persons with a view to a just
individualization of sentences;

7. Elicit cooperation of individuals through correctional
programs. Promote the development of correctional programs
that elicit the cooperation of convicted individuals;

8. Permit sentences based on factors of crime
committed. Permit sentences that do not diminish the gravity of
offenses, with reference to the factors, among others, of:
16

A. The age of the victim, particularly of a victim of an
advanced age or of a young age who has a reduced ability to
self-protect or who suffers more significant harm due to age;

B. The selection by the person of the victim or of the property
that was damaged or otherwise affected by the crime
because of the race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national
origin, physical or mental disability, sexual orientation,
gender identity or homelessness of the victim or of the owner
or occupant of that property; and

C. The discriminatory motive of the person in making a false
public alarm or report in violation of section 509, subsection
1; and

9. Recognize domestic violence and certified domestic
violence intervention programs. Recognize domestic violence as
a serious crime against the individual and society and to recognize
domestic violence intervention programs certified pursuant to
Title 19-A, section 4116 as the most appropriate and effective
community intervention in cases involving domestic violence.

17-A M.R.S. § 1501.

[¶22] The court must consider the sentencing goals at each of the steps

of the sentencing process and “articulate which sentencing goals are served by

the sentence.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶¶ 17, 34, 991 A.2d 806. Depending upon

the facts and circumstances presented in an individual case, some goals may or

may not be relevant, and some may be in tension with others. Id.; Bentley, 2021

ME 39, ¶ 11, 254 A.3d 1171. Because it can be challenging in a given case to

reconcile potentially disparate sentencing goals, the trial court is generally
17

afforded “significant leeway” in determining which factors are considered and

the weight a factor is assigned. Bentley, 2021 ME 39, ¶ 11, 254 A.3d 1171;

see also Hamel, 2013 ME 16, ¶ 8, 60 A.3d 783. At the same time, even though a

sentencing court is not required to consider or discuss every argument or factor

the defendant raises, it must still “articulate which sentencing goals are served

by the sentence” and must not “disregard significant and relevant sentencing

factors.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶¶ 17, 34, 991 A.2d 806.

3. Review of the Final Sentence

[¶23] In its step-three analysis, the court, after indicating that it did

“consider all of the general sentencing provisions, the purposes under

Title 17-A, section 1501,”13 identified what it considered to be the paramount

sentencing goal in this case: the “restraint of individuals when required in the

interest of public safety.” The basis for this conclusion was “the profound

interconnection of drugs with homicides, at least in the Court’s experience,” and

the court’s resulting determination that “the restraint of individuals is, in fact,

in the interest of public safety, even though the prevailing elite consensus

13 The court’s full consideration of the section 1501 sentencing goals consisted of recognizing that

“restitution is really not relevant”; agreeing that “we should consider purpose three, minimizing
correctional experience”; and further agreeing that “we should provide notice of the nature of
sentences that may be imposed and encourage just individuation of sentences, permit sentences
based on factors of the crime committed, one of which the [L]egislature says is that we should permit
sentences that do not diminish the gravity of offenses.”
18

seems to be that we should treat drug addiction as a mental health issue as

opposed to a public safety issue.”

[¶24] Watson contends that the court’s invocation of public safety as the

overriding statutory sentencing goal in this case was unsupported by the

record, and, further, that the court’s ultimate decision to impose a three-year,

unsuspended sentence not only disregarded or marginalized other relevant

sentencing factors but also effectively nullified the probated sentence she had

received less than one month earlier, thereby undermining another stated

sentencing goal, rehabilitation.

[¶25] Although “heightened deference” is afforded to the determination

whether to suspend any portion of the maximum sentence in arriving at a final

sentence, State v. Gordon, 2021 ME 9, ¶ 17, 246 A.3d 170; see also State v.

Prewara, 687 A.2d 951, 953 (Me. 1996), there are, nonetheless, limits that we

have been entrusted to enforce in order to ensure that sentencing both

systemically and in individual cases is proper, fair, and consistent with

legislative purposes. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2154, 2155 (2023). Even apart from the

propriety of a particular sentence, we are tasked with reviewing the manner in

which a sentence was imposed, including “the sufficiency and accuracy of the

information on which it was based.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2155(2). Here, we agree
19

with Watson that the manner in which this sentence was imposed constituted

an abuse of discretion.

[¶26] The court’s primary reliance on the “interconnection of drugs with

homicides” has no basis in the record. The conduct for which Watson was

convicted did not involve violence of any nature or the use or possession of any

weapons. There was no evidence that Watson had ever been violent, or that

the co-defendant in this case, or any other individuals with whom she has

associated, was violent. There was no evidence that Watson presented any

threat to the public by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. At the time

of the incident in question, she was a passenger in the vehicle, not the driver.

Although she does have a history of prior convictions, none involve driving

while intoxicated or violent conduct of any nature; most, if not all, were related

to substance use.

[¶27] Rather, the court’s rationale for placing so much weight on the goal

of restraint for the protection of the public derived from its own prior personal

experience as a homicide prosecutor and an apparent belief that incarcerating

“[p]eople situated like Ms. Watson who were desperate to get the next fix or

were desperate to become involved in some sort of drug imbroglio”—that is,

drug users—is necessary to reduce violent crime. This type of generalization—
20

with no evidence in the record connecting Watson with violence or other

behaviors directly implicating public safety—undermines the sentencing goal

of “differentiation among persons with a view to a just individualization of

sentences.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(6). Cf. State v. Gonzales, 604 A.2d 904, 906-07

(Me. 1992) (stating—before Hewey—that in the absence of evidence of

previous drug dealings or involvement in a Dominican drug ring, it would be

improper to consider the State’s argument that the defendant’s aggravated

trafficking offense was “more serious because the Dominicans dominate the

drug trade in Lewiston”).

[¶28] It is not improper for judges to “use their own knowledge and

experience when considering an appropriate sentence.” State v. Bennett, 2015

ME 46, ¶ 26, 114 A.3d 994.14 However, courts may not adopt a rigid approach

In State v. Bennett, a pawnshop employee who was convicted after trial of the Class D offense
14

of receiving stolen property and sentenced to fourteen days in jail challenged the constitutionality of
his sentence through a direct appeal from the court’s judgment. 2015 ME 46, ¶¶ 1, 11, 114 A.3d 994.
He raised several grounds, including that the trial court had violated his due process rights because
the sentence was “based on factually unreliable information, and he was not given an opportunity to
refute the information relied on at sentencing.” Id. ¶ 21. As relevant here, Bennett focused on
comments by the trial court about the prevalence of drug-related burglaries and pawnshops buying
stolen property. Id. ¶ 10. Addressing the employee at sentencing, the trial court observed that
drug-seekers often “have no legitimate way of making the kind of money they need to support their
addiction, so they steal things,” and “your business and a number of others routinely take stolen
items.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

We rejected Bennett’s due process challenge because the evidence at trial “overwhelmingly
established” that he knew that the property had been stolen, had previously purchased property from
the same seller that he knew to be stolen, and had intended to buy more from the same seller in the
future. Id. ¶ 25. We stated that “[i]t is not improper for judges, who are confronted daily with the
many consequences of drug addiction, including charges of theft, burglary, and other drug-related
21

to sentencing based on their own beliefs or philosophies. See United States v.

Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 527 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that “any kind of mechanical

sentencing that steadfastly ignores individual differences is to be avoided”);15

cf. United States v. Charles, 460 F.2d 1093, 1094-95 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that

the sentencing judge had acted impermissibly when applying an inflexible

standard to those who refused to report for military service when drafted);

State v. Martin, 302 N.W.2d 58, 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that the

sentencing court erred in refusing to consider a probation alternative for a

defendant convicted of delivery of a controlled substance).

crimes, to use their own knowledge and experience when considering an appropriate sentence,” id.
¶ 26, and held that “[t]he [sentencing] court’s understanding of the relationship between drug
addiction and the unlawful taking of property to be sold at pawnshops is not the type of factually
unreliable information that we have determined deprives a defendant of his right to due process,” id.
¶ 27.

The question presented in this appeal is different from that in Bennett. Here, we are considering
the propriety of a sentence under 15 M.R.S. §§ 2154-2155 (2023). The issue here is whether reliance
on its own personal experiences and beliefs constrained the court from properly individualizing the
sentence, from taking into account “all of the information necessary and appropriate to the exercise
of its discretion,” State v. Stanislaw, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 15, 21 A.3d 91 (quotation marks omitted), and
from balancing and articulating the relevant sentencing goals.
15 In United States v. Foss, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in reviewing the

legality as opposed to propriety of a sentence prior to the adoption of federal guidelines, upheld—
noting that it “d[id] not say by much”—a severe sentence for cocaine possession despite the
sentencing judge’s remarks that “[a]nyone who facilitates the transactions in the hard narcotics . . .
has to be made a lesson of, to cut down on the traffic, to cut down on relatively innocent persons like
yourselves, who got caught up in the drug subculture . . . . [I]t is a question of the welfare of young
people in this community . . . .” 501 F.2d 522, 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1974) (quotation marks omitted).
22

[¶29] The court’s references to the “elite consensus,” “elite circles,” and

“elite opinion” concerning “the shift in approach in drug cases” reinforce a

perception that the sentence imposed here was based on preconceived beliefs

or philosophies rather than an individualized assessment of the circumstances

presented, and these references furthered no legitimate criminological goal.

Characterizing rehabilitation efforts through mental health and substance use

treatment as “elite” theories16 undermines to an extent several legislatively

16The vast weight of research and evidence-based authority supports—as an alternative to
incarceration—the use of mental health or medical care, or both, to treat the substance use disorders
of those convicted of nonviolent crimes arising from their drug use. “We have known for decades
that addiction is a medical condition—a treatable brain disorder—not a character flaw or a form of
social deviance.” Nora D. Volkow, Addiction Should Be Treated, Not Penalized, 46
Neuropsychopharmacology 2048, 2048 (Aug. 2021). A study published in 2018 found that “higher
rates of drug imprisonment did not translate into lower rates of drug use, arrests, or overdose
deaths.” The Pew Charitable Trusts, Issue Brief, More Imprisonment Does Not Reduce State Drug
Problems, at 5 (Mar. 2018). Drug court programs that incorporate treatment reduce recidivism,
significantly decrease substance use among participants, and improve participants’ quality of life.
Kristen DeVall et al., Nat’l Drug Ct. Res. Ctr., Painting the Current Picture: A National Report on
Treatment Courts in the United States, at 42-43 (2022). In Maine, the Legislature has authorized the
Judicial Branch to “establish substance use disorder treatment programs in the Superior Courts and
District Courts” in order to reduce substance use and dependency, criminal recidivism, and
overcrowding in prisons. 4 M.R.S. § 421(1), (2) (2023). The Judicial Branch reported in 2023 that
“[d]uring the past twenty-one years of continuous operation, Maine’s Treatment Courts have
continued to offer a successful, evidence-based approach to the challenge of substance use and crime
in the State of Maine.” Amanda J. Doherty, State of Maine Judicial Branch, Report to the Joint Standing
Committee on Judiciary: 2022 Annual Report on Maine’s Drug Treatment Courts, at 19 (Feb. 15,
2023), https://legislature.maine.gov/doc/10024 [https://perma.cc/KPZ6-MGAP]. Internationally,
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Health Organization have said,
“[I]ncarceration has severe negative consequences for people with drug use disorders, their families
and their communities, and incarceration can worsen the underlying health and social conditions
associated with drug use. . . . When a person with a drug use disorder comes into contact with the
criminal justice system, it provides an opportunity to encourage that person to receive appropriate
treatment.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Health Organization, Treatment
and Care for People with Drug Use Disorders in Contact with the Criminal Justice System: Alternatives
to Conviction or Punishment, at 2 (2019), https://syntheticdrugs.unodc.org/uploads/
syntheticdrugs/res/library/treatment_html/Alternatives_to_Conviction_or_Punishment_treatment_
23

established goals of sentencing implicated here, including “[p]revent[ing] crime

through . . . the rehabilitation of persons,” “[m]inimiz[ing] correctional

experiences that serve to promote further criminality,” and “[e]ncourag[ing]

differentiation among persons with a view to a just individualization of

sentences.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(1), (3), (6).

[¶30] Directed, as we are, “[t]o facilitate the possible rehabilitation of an

offender by reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities among the

sentences of comparable offenders,” 15 M.R.S. § 2154(3), we must scrutinize

closely a determination that imposes a substantial period of incarceration

despite an almost entirely probated sentence imposed less than a month prior

by another judge on the same defendant for similar conduct. And this

implicates a further concern about the manner in which the court arrived at the

final sentence.

[¶31] The court did not adequately address a sentencing goal that

prominently overshadowed the hearing in this case—the “[e]liminat[ion of]

inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate criminological

and_care_for_people_with_drug_use_disorders_in_contact_with_the_criminal_justice_system_joint_U
NODC-WHO.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSC9-XVJP]. Effective drug dependence treatment is therefore
endorsed by these international organizations as an appropriate intervention, including as an
alternative to incarceration. Id. at 4-12.
24

goals,”17 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(5), and it gave virtually no consideration beyond

mere mention to the closely related goal of minimizing correctional

experiences, id. § 1501(3). As noted, this same defendant had received (and

was about to begin) a probated sentence. See State v. Nolan, 2000 ME 165, ¶ 9,

759 A.2d 721 (describing probation as “a device designed to assist individuals

in reintegrating into society” that “may be premised on reasonable conditions

that are tailored to a particular probationer’s needs”). Without addressing the

specific circumstances that justified the stark disparity between the sentences

imposed on this defendant, the court imposed a three-year term of

incarceration without probation, effectively nullifying the previously imposed

sentence.

[¶32] The failure to reconcile the two sentences casts doubt upon

whether the court “considered all of the information necessary and appropriate

While recognizing Watson’s acceptance into a program designed to address her substance use
17

disorder and help her succeed on probation, the court credited her attorney—not Watson—for that
effort and further acknowledged Esther House’s “good will and good faith in working with
Ms. Watson.” Although the court stated that it “d[id] not believe, given Ms. Watson’s record, that
placing her on probation [was] going to be an effective correctional alternative,” it provided no
further explanation as to what “legitimate criminological goal[]” was served by incarcerating her for
the duration of the probated sentence ordered weeks earlier by another court. 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(5)
(2023). Although restraint of an individual may be a legitimate goal, see id. § 1501(1), the court’s
prefatory statements concerning the suitability of treatment as an alternative to incarceration
suggest that the court’s rationale for diverging from, and nullifying, the earlier sentence may have
been rooted in generalized notions about the proper response to substance use disorders rather than
a more individualized assessment of the particular circumstances here.
25

to the exercise of its discretion.” State v. Stanislaw, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 15, 21 A.3d

91 (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 10, 745

A.2d 368 (providing that “while addressing the many goals of sentencing, the

court must endeavor to create consistency among sentences for similar crimes

and must, at the same time, tailor the sentence to the individual defendant”).

[¶33] Thus, by failing to address the “manifest inequality” between the

two sentences imposed on Watson delivered within weeks of each other; by

elevating above all other sentencing purposes the need for restraint in the

interest of public safety based upon personal beliefs and not the sentencing

record; and by not giving due consideration to, and sufficiently explaining,

either the effect on the probated sentence just entered by another court or the

inadvisability of a viable rehabilitative treatment option as an alternative to

incarceration, the court abused its discretion in the manner in which this

sentence was imposed. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2154(3), 2155(2); cf. State v.

MacDonald, 1998 ME 212, ¶¶ 19-20, 718 A.2d 195 (vacating a sentence when

the court disregarded the mitigating factor of the defendant’s actions in pulling

a person out of harm’s way and warning others about the fire after committing

arson).
26

[¶34] This constitutes error that is plain and that affects Watson’s

substantial rights, Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 23, 72 A.3d 503. Because of the

importance of the liberty interest at stake in this matter and the need to ensure

that due consideration is given to all relevant and proper sentencing factors—

and no improper factors—when determining a sentence, we further conclude

that “the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” Id. ¶ 23 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶35] Having concluded that the court committed obvious error, we

vacate and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

The entry is:

Sentence vacated. Remanded for resentencing
consistent with this opinion.

Neil J. Prendergast, Esq. (orally), Fort Kent, for appellant Tara L. Watson

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, Francis J. Grifmin, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), and Sarah Gracie, Stud. Atty., Ofmice of the District Attorney,
Skowhegan, for appellee State of Maine

Somerset County Unipied Criminal Docket docket number CR-2022-509
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY