Pat Doe v. John Costin

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 23
Docket: Yor-24-226
Argued: December 10, 2024
Decided: March 4, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.

PAT DOE

v.

JOHN COSTIN

HORTON, J.

[¶1] John Costin appeals from a modified order for protection from

harassment entered by the District Court (Biddeford, Janelle, A.R.J.) for the

protection of Pat Doe’s two minor children. In addition to modifying the order

to prohibit Costin from entering the minors’ high school when either of them

was on the premises and from having any direct or indirect contact with them,

the court awarded Doe attorney fees. Costin challenges the court’s modification

of the order of protection from harassment and its award of attorney fees. We

do not consider Costin’s appeal from the court’s modified order of protection

because that order has expired and any issues regarding its validity are moot.

We do, however, review the award of attorney fees and vacate that award

because it includes fees for services provided to Doe before the litigation of the
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motion to modify. We remand the matter for the court to reconsider the award

of attorney fees.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The facts are drawn from the procedural record and the court’s

findings of fact, which are supported by competent evidence in the record.

See Allen v. Rae, 2019 ME 53, ¶ 7, 206 A.3d 902. On May 5, 2023, Doe,

individually and on behalf of her two minor children, filed a complaint against

Costin for protection from harassment, alleging that Costin had, in addition to

other volatile behavior, approached the children aggressively in the road while

they were on their way to Kennebunk High School by car and on another

occasion followed them to the school in his car, using his car to block their

egress from their parking space. See 5 M.R.S. § 4653 (2024). The court entered

a temporary order for protection on that date. See 5 M.R.S. § 4654(2) (2024).

On August 7 and 9, 2023, the court held a hearing on the complaint. See id.

§ 4654(1).

[¶3] After the hearing, the court entered an order for protection from

harassment as to the two children, but not Doe herself, on August 16, 2023. The

court ordered as follows:
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 “The defendant is prohibited from harassing, threatening, assaulting,
molesting, attacking, or otherwise abusing the plaintiff and, if applicable,
the plaintiff’s employees.”

 “The defendant is restrained from, repeatedly and without reasonable
cause, following the plaintiff.”

See 5 M.R.S. § 4655(1)(A), (C-1)(1) (2024). Neither party appealed from the

judgment within twenty-one days as permitted by 5 M.R.S. § 4658(1) (2024)

and M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). Nor did either party request an award of attorney

fees within the time set forth in M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(3).

[¶4] On September 12, 2023, Doe moved to modify the order to include

additional protections because she understood that a no-trespass notice that

the school had issued to Costin might expire or be modified or rescinded so that

he would be free to access the school when the children were present. Doe

sought a modified order to prohibit Costin from repeatedly and without

reasonable cause being at or in the vicinity of the children’s home, school, or

place of employment and from having any direct or indirect contact with them.

See 5 M.R.S. § 4655(1)(C-1)(2), (C-2). Costin opposed the motion. He also

argued in a January 2024 letter to the court that the motion should be

summarily denied as frivolous because the parties had known at the time of

hearing in August 2023 that the school’s no-trespass notice would expire by its

terms, as it ultimately did, on November 16, 2023. According to Costin, the
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school did not terminate its notice early. Costin sought court costs and attorney

fees.

[¶5] The court held a hearing on Doe’s motion to modify on

February 12, 2024. At the outset of the hearing, the court indicated, “I had a

brief meeting with counsel in chambers, and my understanding is that we will

be proceeding today by way of offers of proof, followed by a very brief

argument. And then I’ll be issuing a decision in due course . . . .” In keeping with

the court’s understanding, neither party presented any sworn testimony.

Instead, the parties’ counsel summarized events after the court’s August 2023

order, including the expiration of the school’s no-trespass notice, and presented

argument on the motion to modify. After the hearing, the court issued a

modified order in which it ordered as follows:

 “The defendant is restrained from, repeatedly and without reasonable
cause, being at or in the vicinity of the plaintiff’s home, school, business,
or place of employment, except as follows: Defendant may enter
Kennebunk High School to meet with school officials only at such times
as neither plaintiff is on school premises (buildings, fields, parking lot,
and outdoor common areas).”

 “The defendant is prohibited from having any contact, direct or indirect,
with the plaintiff . . . .”

See id. It denied Costin’s request for attorney fees.
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[¶6] Costin moved for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See M.R.

Civ. P. 52. He proposed findings that counsel for both parties had made credible

offers of proof that the no-trespass notice had expired “in its natural course on

November 16, 2023, exactly as the Court knew it would” from evidence that had

been admitted at the original hearing. He argued that the motion to modify was

frivolous because it was essentially an untimely motion to alter or amend the

judgment. See M.R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall

be filed not later than 14 days after entry of the judgment.”).

[¶7] Doe objected to Costin’s motion, arguing that the additional

provisions in the court’s modified order were supported by the record and no

additional findings were necessary. On February 23, 2024, Doe moved for an

award of attorney fees and filed an affidavit for the court’s in camera review,1

in which her attorney swore to the validity of an attached statement of fees.

The attached statement itemized a total of $7,021 in attorney fees for services

rendered from May 26, 2023, to February 22, 2024.

1 We note that attorney fee affidavits are not ordinarily reviewed in camera, though they may be
redacted to protect any privileged information. See, e.g., M.R. Evid. 502(b) (establishing a client’s
privilege to refuse to disclose the contents of certain confidential lawyer communications). A person
who may be ordered to pay another party’s attorney fees is entitled to be informed of the types of
services that were billed and in relation to what part of the litigation, in case there is any basis for
challenging any of the fees claimed. See Villas by the Sea Owners Ass’n v. Garrity, 2001 ME 93, ¶ 8, 774
A.2d 1115 (describing the many factors that courts consider in deciding whether to award attorney
fees).
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[¶8] Costin replied, disagreeing with Doe’s summary of the facts and

opposing Doe’s motion for attorney fees because (1) Doe “resurrected this

litigation” and Costin “ha[d] already been punished enough,” (2) certain fees

were related to the litigation of the original order and a separate administrative

matter regarding the school’s no-trespass notice, and (3) Costin should not be

penalized for seeking findings of fact.

[¶9] On April 30, 2024, the court entered orders denying Costin’s Rule

52 motion and awarding Doe counsel fees of $6,500, to be paid by June 1, 2024.

Costin timely appealed. See 5 M.R.S. § 4658(1); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1), (2)(B).

Doe moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that (1) any appeal from the

finding of harassment in August 2023 was untimely and (2) the appeal from the

modified order was moot because the modified order had expired in June 2024.

We denied Doe’s motion without precluding the possibility that upon full

consideration, we might dismiss the appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Justiciability of the Appeal

[¶10] Doe contends—as she did in her motion to dismiss—that the

appeal is moot because the modified order expired on June 15, 2024, and no

exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Costin argues that the appeal is not
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moot because his challenge to the award of attorney fees, which flowed from

Doe’s success on the motion to modify, presents a live controversy.

[¶11] A matter is not moot if “there remain sufficient practical effects

flowing from the resolution of [the] litigation to justify the application of limited

judicial resources.” Ten Voters of Biddeford v. City of Biddeford, 2003 ME 59, ¶ 5,

822 A.2d 1196 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the modified order for

protection has expired, making Costin’s appeal moot to the extent that he

challenges the court’s entry of the modified order. See id. He also cannot

challenge the finding of harassment in the initial order of protection because he

did not take a timely appeal from that order. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1)

(establishing a twenty-one day deadline for a party to file a notice of appeal

after the entry of a judgment). The award of attorney fees, however, remains a

controversy in issue.

[¶12] When a defendant challenges an attorney fee award but the appeal

on the merits is moot, however, there are limits on the extent to which an

appellate court will look behind the award of attorney fees to the underlying

judgment on the merits. See J.S. v. Westerly Sch. Dist., 910 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.

2018). In such circumstances, we, like other courts, “look only to what relief

the . . . court granted and not to whether the case was rightly decided.” Id.
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(quotation marks omitted); cf. Ott v. Bos. Edison Co., 602 N.E.2d 566, 568

(Mass. 1992) (“A potential claim for attorneys’ fees standing alone does not

justify deciding a moot case.”). We will not review the merits of a decision when

an appeal on the merits is moot, but we will review whether, given that

decision, the court erred or abused its discretion in its award of attorney fees.

See J.S., 910 F.3d at 10.

[¶13] Because Costin’s appeal is moot apart from the issue of attorney

fees, we do not consider Costin’s arguments that the motion to modify should

have been denied (1) as an untimely filed motion to alter or amend the original

judgment, (2) as a frivolous motion because the no-trespass order had a known

expiration date when the court entered the original order, or (3) as seeking an

order that violated Costin’s due process or First Amendment rights.2 We do,

2 Even if we were to address these issues, we would affirm the court’s modified order because
(1) a court may modify an order of protection from harassment “from time to time as circumstances
require,” 5 M.R.S. § 4655(2) (2024); (2) Doe offered proof that although she had been informed that
the school would extend its no-trespass notice, the school did not do so after Costin exerted pressure
following the entry of the original order of protection; and (3) there was no constitutional violation
because Costin was afforded notice and the opportunity to be heard, see In re Weapons Restriction of
J., 2022 ME 34, ¶ 20, 276 A.3d 510, and the First Amendment does not insulate an individual from the
consequences of harassing behavior, see Childs v. Ballou, 2016 ME 142, ¶ 24, 148 A.3d 291; see also
State v. Labbe, 2024 ME 15, ¶ 56, 314 A.3d 162; cf. State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065, 1067-68 (Me. 1983)
(holding that, when a person is justifiably excluded from religious worship otherwise open to the
general public, the right to free exercise of religion is not infringed). Although Costin also urges us to
vacate the judgment because Doe failed to present new testimonial evidence on the motion to modify,
the parties explicitly agreed to the court’s consideration of the motion on the parties’ offers of proof,
and in any event, the issue has been waived because Costin has raised it only in his reply brief,
see Lincoln v. Burbank, 2016 ME 138, ¶ 41, 147 A.3d 1165.
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however, consider whether the court had the authority to award attorney fees

and whether the court’s award, grounded on Doe’s attorney fee affidavit,

impermissibly allowed recovery for fees that accrued with respect to both the

initial order of protection and the 2024 modified order.

B. Review of the Award of Attorney Fees

[¶14] We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to

award attorney fees under 5 M.R.S. § 4655(1)(E) when entering an order for

protection from harassment. See Jefts v. Dennis, 2007 ME 129, ¶ 9, 931 A.2d

1055. “Review for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three questions:

(1) are factual findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear

error standard; (2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise

of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was

the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of

reasonableness.” Haskell v. Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶ 12, 160 A.3d 1176

(quotation marks omitted).

[¶15] “The court, after a hearing and upon finding that the defendant has

committed the harassment alleged, may grant any protection order or approve

any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of harassment, which may

include . . . [o]rdering the defendant to pay court costs or reasonable attorney’s
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fees.” 5 M.R.S. § 4655(1)(E). “When final judgment has been entered on all

claims except a claim for attorney fees, an application for the award of attorney

fees shall be filed within 60 days after entry of judgment if no appeal has been

filed.” M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(3).3 Doe is not entitled to an award of attorney fees

she incurred to obtain the initial order of protection because there was no

appeal and she did not file an application for attorney fees within the sixty-day

period for doing so. See id. She did file a timely motion seeking attorney fees in

connection with the motion to modify, however, and the court granted her

motion simultaneously with its denial of Costin’s Rule 52 motion. See M.R.

Civ. P. 54(b)(3) (“If an appeal has been filed, the application may be filed and

acted upon in the trial court at any time after entry of the judgment appealed

from and in any case shall be filed not later than 30 days after final disposition

of the action.”); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1), (2)(B).

[¶16] Upon finding in Doe’s favor and entering the modified order, the

court had the authority to award Doe attorney fees incurred in connection with

the motion to modify. See 5 M.R.S. § 4655(1)(E). It did not, however, have the

authority to award attorney fees incurred to obtain the initial order of

protection. See id.; see also M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(3); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1), (2)(B).

3A “judgment” for purposes of this rule includes “any order from which an appeal lies.”
M.R. Civ. P. 54(a).
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The itemized statement attached to the affidavit offered in support of Doe’s

motion for attorney fees includes fees incurred from May 2023 to February

2024, and it indicates that Doe incurred a much lower amount in attorney fees

to obtain the modification of the order than the $6,500 that the court ordered

Costin to pay. We therefore vacate the attorney fee award and remand the

matter to the trial court for it to make an award of Doe’s reasonable attorney

fees attributable to the motion to modify.

The entry is:

Appeal from judgment modifying the order of
protection from harassment dismissed as moot.
Order awarding attorney fees vacated.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Scott D. Dolan, Esq. (orally), Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for
appellant John Costin

Brittany M.R. Sawyer, Esq. (orally), Holmes Legal Group, LLC, Wells, for
appellee Pat Doe

Biddeford District Court docket number PA-2023-175
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY