Andrew M. Landeen v. Ashley Burch

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 5
Docket: Aro-24-108
On Briefs: October 30, 2024
Decided: January 23, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

ANDREW M. LANDEEN

v.

ASHLEY BURCH

CONNORS, J.

[¶1] In February 2024, the District Court (Caribou, Linthicum, J.) entered

a judgment determining the parties’ parental rights and responsibilities

concerning their child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653 (2024).1 Ashley Burch, the

mother, appeals from that part of the judgment granting the request of the

father, Andrew M. Landeen, to change their child’s name. Landeen

cross-appeals, contending that the court’s award of parental rights and

responsibilities constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion. We vacate that

portion of the judgment relating to the requested name change and affirm the

remainder of the judgment.

1 A subsequent technical amendment to the statute, P.L. 2023, ch. 646, § C-5 (emergency, effective

April 22, 2024), has no effect on this appeal.
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The parties, former romantic partners who never married, are the

parents of a two-year-old child. At the time the child was born, paternity had

not been established and the parties were no longer romantically involved.

Burch gave the child her last name.

[¶3] In April 2022, Landeen filed in the District Court a complaint to

determine parental rights and responsibilities, asking, inter alia, that the court

change the child’s last name. The totality of his explanation in his complaint as

to why he sought the name change was as follows:

I would like my son to have my last name. It is how it has always
been done for generations in my family. As a farming family,
Landeen Farms, [child’s first name], if interested can someday take
over the business. Children have always had the Father’s last name.
His name should be [recites the child’s first and middle name]
Landeen.

[¶4] The court held an evidentiary hearing in January 2024. No evidence

was proffered on the name-change issue.

[¶5] In its judgment, the court “allocate[d] parental rights and

responsibilities, including primary physical residence[,] to [Burch], with

visitation to [Landeen].”2 The court changed the child’s last name to “Landeen”

2The court also ordered Landeen to pay a child support arrearage and $3,500 toward Burch’s
attorney fees. Those provisions of the order are not at issue on appeal.
3

without comment and without making any specific findings explaining its

decision. Burch timely appealed, and Landeen cross-appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Except as to the requested name change, the record supports the
court’s allocation of parental rights.

[¶6] “We review [the court’s] factual findings for clear error and the

conclusion regarding the child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.”

Proctor v. Childs, 2023 ME 6, ¶ 6, 288 A.3d 815.

[¶7] The touchstone for the allocation of parental rights is the best

interest of the child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). In reaching its conclusion as to

the appropriate allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, the court here

recited the relevant statutory factors examined in making that best interest

determination, which include, inter alia, the ability of the parents to cooperate

and the emotional and physical safety of the child. Id.

[¶8] Although the court found that it was in the child’s best interest for

visits with Landeen to continue, the court noted:

[Landeen’s] anger at [Burch] is consistent and pervasive and has not
diminished over time. He has shown little capacity or intention to
cooperate or to learn to cooperate with [Burch] in the care of their
child, or to learn methods for resolving disputes with her.
4

This anger was reflected, inter alia, in a “barrage of angry, argumentative, and

demanding emails” Landeen sent to Burch after he began representing himself,

which the court accurately concluded “exceeded the bounds of what was

acceptable and instead fostered a hostile environment.” As the court stated in

response to Landeen’s explanation that his behavior was caused by frustration:

“There is always going to be frustration when co-parenting, but to be an

adequate parent, the parties must be able to manage that frustration

appropriately in the best interest of the child. Plaintiff has not demonstrated

an ability to do that.”3 These findings and conclusions are supported in the

record, and we affirm that allocation.4

3 Landeen’s anger management issues after the child’s birth were presaged pre-birth, as reflected

by the court’s supported findings:

Ashley separated from Andrew after an incident during the summer of 2021 when
she was pregnant. Andrew returned home drunk and very angry. He scared Ashley
by yelling at her, throwing the cat tree, and grabbing [Burch’s] three-year-old [child’s]
plate from him and screaming at them to get out of his house. Andrew apologized the
next day saying that he had too much to drink. After Ashley left and for the next few
months, Andrew inundated Ashley with profane and abusive texts and emails
berating and disparaging her. Sometimes he told her he loved her then he launched
into a tirade about what a horrible human being she is. She asked him to cease but he
continued. As a result, Ashley generally did not involve Andrew in anything related
to [their child’s] birth.

4 Landeen argues that the allocation ordered by the court “effectively order[ed] sole parental
rights to [Burch]” given that the judgment states that “[a]ll parental rights and responsibilities
concerning the child are allocated to [Burch].” As the court explained, its award differed from the
“exclusive” scope of an award of sole parental rights “with respect to all aspects of a child’s welfare,”
see 19-A M.R.S. § 1501(6) (2024), in that Landeen was allocated the right to be notified “in writing of
all major decisions concerning the child” and the right to court-ordered visitation. See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1501(1) (2024) (stating that allocated rights may include “parent-child contact” and that “[a]
5

B. The record does not support the requested name change.

[¶9] Burch challenges that part of the judgment changing the child’s last

name to “Landeen.” The statute governing name changes provides that the

party seeking the name change must show “good cause” for the change.

See 18-C M.R.S. § 1-701(1)(C), (2-B)(B) (2024); see also 19-A M.R.S.

§ 1653(2)(F) (noting that in a proceeding to allocate parental rights and

responsibilities a court may order a minor’s name change pursuant to 18-C

M.R.S. § 1-701). Section 1-701(2-B)(B) provides:

In the event that not all parties agree to the name change, the court
shall consider the following factors to assess whether the request
or petition is in the best interest of the minor:

(1) The minor’s expressed preference, if the minor is of sufficient
age and maturity to articulate a basis for preferring a particular
name;

(2) If the minor is 14 years of age or older, whether the minor
consents or objects to the name change petition;

(3) The extent to which the minor uses a particular name;

(4) Whether the minor’s name is different from any of the
minor’s siblings and the degree to which the minor associates
and identifies with siblings on any side of the minor’s family;

(5) The difficulties, harassment or embarrassment that the
minor may experience by bearing the current or proposed name;
and

parent allocated responsibility for a certain aspect of a child’s welfare may be required to inform the
other parent of major changes in that aspect”).
6

(6) Any other factor the court considers relevant to the minor’s
best interests, including the factors outlined in Title 19-A,
section 1653, subsection 3.

If the court finds that the name change is in the best interest of the
minor by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall change
the minor’s name.

[¶10] None of the factors specified in subsections (1) to (5) support the

requested name change. Id. No evidence regarding any potentially relevant

unspecified factor was submitted to the court.

[¶11] In In re Perry, 2004 ME 46, ¶¶ 1, 3, 845 A.2d 1153, a father

petitioned to change the name of his child, contrary to the mother’s position.

The relevant statute provided that a minor’s “legal custodian” could petition for

the change. Id. ¶ 4; see 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-701(a) (Supp. 2003).5 Affirming the

Probate Court, we ruled that the father could not unilaterally seek the name

change, citing 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1651 (1998), which provided and still provides

that “[n]either parent has any rights paramount to the rights of the other with

reference to any matter affecting their children.” In re Perry, 2004 ME 46, ¶ 5,

845 A.2d 1153. Not only does section 1651 indicate that no parent is given

5 Title 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-701 was repealed and replaced with 18-C M.R.S. § 1-701 by P.L. 2017,

ch. 402, §§ A-1, A-2 (effective Aug. 1, 2018) (codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 1-701 (2024)), and the
replacement statute has since been amended, most recently by P.L. 2023, ch. 560, § A-1 (emergency,
effective March 25, 2024) (codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 1-701 (2024)).
7

preferential naming rights, but the very limited decision-making involvement

given to Landeen here would appear to be a factor weighing against the name

change under 18-C M.R.S. § 1-701(2-B)(B)(6). See 19-A M.R.S. § 1651 (2024).

[¶12] A bare desire of a father—or mother—asserted in a complaint to

change the existing surname of a child, over the objection of the other parent,

is not a factor reflected in the statutory scheme. See 18-C M.R.S.

§ 1-701(2-B)(B). Nor does an allusion to tradition support changing a minor’s

name from his mother’s surname to his father’s. See In re Marriage of Schiffman,

620 P.2d 579, 580, 583 (Cal. 1980) (abolishing a common law rule giving the

father, as opposed to the mother, a primary right to have the child bear his

surname, with the sole consideration going forward to be the child’s best

interest); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (“[M]ost

recent court decisions have both rejected the notion that there is a preference

for the paternal name and failed to adopt a preference for custodial parent

choice, preferring to follow the rule that a name change request should be

granted only if the court finds the name change is in the best interests of the

child.” (citing decisions from Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota,

Ohio, and Washington)); Hazel v. Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996)

(stating that “[t]he father has no greater right than the mother to have a child
8

bear his surname” (quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Roe, 604 N.E.2d 45, 47

(Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (“In resolving a dispute as to the surname of a child whose

parents have not married, a court should not attribute greater weight to the

father’s interest in having the child bear the paternal surname than to the

mother’s interest in having the child bear her name.”); Sec’y of the

Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 366 N.E.2d 717, 723 (Mass. 1977) (“Important

changes in popular and legal thinking suggest that ancient canards about the

proper role of wom[e]n have no place in the law.”); State ex rel. Connor H. v.

Blake G., 856 N.W.2d 295, 300–01 (Neb. 2014) (“We conclude that in Nebraska,

there is no preference for a surname—paternal or maternal—in name change

cases; rather, the child’s best interests is the sole consideration.” (footnote

omitted)); Petit v. Adrianzen, 392 P.3d 630, 632 (Nev. 2017) (“Neither parent

should automatically have an advantage in determining a child’s surname at

birth. Rather, the sole concern should be the best interests of the child.”);

Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 857–58 (N.J. 1995) (rejecting the

“presumption” that children must bear their fathers’ surnames); Bobo v. Jewell,

528 N.E.2d 180, 184–85 (Ohio 1988) (“We caution the courts . . . to refrain from

defining the best-interest-of-the-child test as purporting to give primary or

greater weight to the father’s interest in having the child bear the paternal
9

surname. While it may be a custom to name a child after the father, giving

greater weight to the father’s interest fails to consider that, where the parents

have never been married, the mother has at least an equal interest in having the

child bear the maternal surname. In these times of parental equality, arguing

that the child of unmarried parents should bear the paternal surname based on

custom is another way of arguing that it is permissible to discriminate because

the discrimination has endured for many years.” (footnote omitted)); Keegan v.

Gudahl, 525 N.W.2d 695, 699 (S.D. 1994) (holding that the trial court “erred by

deferring to the custom of giving a child the father’s surname” and explaining

that, instead, “the court should have been guided by the best interest of the

child”).

[¶13] In sum, parents share equal rights to name their child; to support

a name change, the parent seeking the change bears the burden of persuasion

to show good cause; and the touchstone is always and exclusively the best

interest of the child. Given this record, where nothing establishes that the court

made a supported, statutorily required “find[ing] that the name change is in the

best interest of the minor by a preponderance of the evidence,” 18-C M.R.S.

§ 1-701(2-B)(B), particularly in the face of evidence supporting a contrary
10

finding, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in changing the child’s

name. See Proctor, 2023 ME 6, ¶ 6, 288 A.3d 815.6

The entry is:

Portion of judgment changing the child’s name
vacated. Judgment otherwise affirmed.

Jefferson T. Ashby, Esq., Ashby Law Office, Presque Isle, for appellant Ashley
Burch

Tyler C. Hadyniak, Esq., Mailloux and Marden, P.A., Belfast, for cross-appellant
Andrew M. Landeen

Caribou District Court docket number FM-2022-15
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

6 The complaint itself might liberally be read as including a claim that the name change was sought

in part based on an economic concern relating to the continuation of and child’s participation in a
family business. While such a basis is not set forth as a relevant specified factor in section 1-701, we
leave for another day whether such an assertion, supported by evidence, could be deemed a relevant
unspecified factor under section 1-701(2-B)(B)(6). Here, however, no evidence was offered to
support the claim.