Maryland Attorney General Opinion 110OAG82

82 [110 Op. Att’y
EXPUNGEMENT
LICENSING RECORDS – WHETHER EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
RECORDS OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AFFECTS
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING DISCIPLINE THAT RELIED ON
THE CONVICTION – WHETHER THE RELATED LICENSING
RECORDS MUST BE EXPUNGED
October 6, 2025

Stephen Conti
Chair, State Board of Massage Therapy Examiners

Winnie D. Moore
Chair, State Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists
Lawrence Franklin
Chair, State Board of Barbers
On behalf of your respective boards, you requested an official
opinion of the Attorney General on how expungement of a criminal
conviction affects earlier professional license discipline that relied
on the conviction. Various professional licensing boards, including
yours, can suspend or revoke a license, or otherwise discipline the
licensee, if the licensee is convicted of specific types of crimes.
Meanwhile, Maryland courts can expunge certain criminal
convictions, usually a specified number of years after completion
of the sentence, including some convictions that might be the basis
of disciplinary action by professional boards. When a conviction
is expunged, certain records of the conviction must either be
destroyed or removed from public access. Would-be employers,
schools, and licensing agencies also may not ask applicants about
expunged convictions.
You asked what happens if a licensee is subject to discipline
based on a criminal conviction (the fact of conviction itself rather
than the conduct underlying the conviction) but the conviction is
later expunged. Specifically, you asked whether “regulatory
boards have any duty to rescind, vacate, or otherwise remove from
public view any disciplinary orders based solely on a crime or
crimes expunged after the issuance of those board orders.”
Gen. 82] 83

In our opinion, expungement of a conviction does not require
a licensing board to rescind or vacate disciplinary action that relied
on the conviction. The expungement statute provides for records
of an expunged conviction to be sealed and prohibits asking about
expunged convictions in certain contexts. But nothing in the statute
suggests that expungement retroactively voids or invalidates the
original criminal conviction itself. And if the conviction remains
in existence, the basis for the licensing board’s order remains in
existence as well.

That said, some specific categories of documents in the record
of a license discipline proceeding arising from a criminal
conviction may be eligible for expungement. Although the
standard expungement order found in the Maryland Rules mentions
only police and court records and does not reach licensing agency
records at all, the text of the expungement statute leaves open the
possibility of expungement of “other records” beyond police and
court records when requested in the expungement petition. Even
then, though, the “other records” in a licensing file eligible for
expungement are likely only those records that originated as police
or court records but have come into the hands of the licensing
agency. Thus, for example, a copy of an indictment in the files of
a licensing board could be expunged, but the administrative order
of a licensing board revoking a license could not be. We recognize,
however, that these conclusions are not free from doubt, so the
General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the scope and
effects of expungement in Maryland.

I
Background

A. Expungement as a Remedy for Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction

A criminal record is a heavy burden. Once someone
convicted of a crime completes their sentence, they have, as it is
commonly said, paid their debt to society. But “collateral
consequences” of the conviction can linger long after the sentence
ends. “Collateral consequences are the penalties, disabilities, or
disadvantages imposed upon a person as a result of a criminal
conviction” as distinguished from the “direct consequences
imposed as part of the court’s judgment at sentencing.” Collateral
Consequences Workgroup, Final Report 1 (Dec. 1, 2016)
(“Collateral Consequences Report”).
84 [110 Op. Att’y

Some of these consequences stem from laws that explicitly
impose the consequence. For example, a criminal conviction can
render someone legally ineligible for certain public housing,
welfare, and healthcare benefits. See, e.g., Mackenzie J. Yee, Note,
Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an
Extraordinary Harm, 25 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 169, 173-
74 (2017). Or, as discussed further below, a criminal conviction
can trigger the denial or revocation of a professional license. Infra
Part I.C. In Maryland, a criminal conviction can affect, among
other things, one’s right to serve on a jury, capacity to serve as
personal representative of an estate, or ability to adopt a child. See
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc (“CJP”) § 8-103(b)(4); Md. Rules
6-122, 9-103(b)(1)(N). The American Bar Association identifies
166 permanent legal consequences that Maryland law may impose
for any conviction, and 324 consequences for a felony conviction.
Am. Bar Ass’n, National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2025) (select “Maryland” for “Jurisdiction,” “Any
misdemeanor” or “Any felony” for “Offense type,” and
“Indefinite” for “Duration”).
But the stigma of a criminal record can weigh even more
heavily than these formal disabilities. See, e.g., Maryland
Equitable Justice Collaborative, Breaking the 71%: A Path Toward
Racial Equity in the Criminal Legal System 54 (2024) (“MEJC
Report”); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88
Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1104-05 (2013). Would-be employers,
landlords, and others can easily look up criminal records from both
official sources and private background check services. See Logan,
supra, at 1107-08; Anna Kessler, Excavating Expungement Law:
A Comprehensive Approach, 87 Temp. L. Rev. 403, 411-12 (2015);
Collateral Consequences Report at 10, 12. That easy access
subjects people with criminal records to discrimination in almost
every facet of life. See, e.g., MEJC Report at 54; Logan, supra, at
1107-09; Yee, supra, at 170-71. “These compounded barriers not
only undermine an individual’s ability to rebuild their life but also
perpetuate cycles of recidivism, which places strain on families,
communities, and the criminal legal system itself.” MEJC Report
at 54. The scope of the problem is vast. By some estimates, one
third of the U.S. adult population has a record of arrest and/or
conviction. Yee, supra, at 171. And the burden falls
disproportionately on communities that are exposed at higher rates
to the criminal justice system. See MEJC Report at 7, 54.

Expungement aims to address this problem. Almost every
state allows expungement of criminal records in at least some
Gen. 82] 85

circumstances. See Restoration of Rights Proj., 50-State
Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief (last
updated July 2024) (“50-State Comparison”), https://ccresourcece
nter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-
expungement-sealing-and-set-aside-2-2/. Expungement typically
shields the official records of a conviction from public access and
also limits access by government and law enforcement agencies.
See Yee, supra, at 182-83; Brian M. Murray, A New Era for
Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the State and
Federal Levels, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 361, 362 (2016).
Typically, too, the beneficiary of expungement (the “expungee”)
may deny the existence of the conviction if asked, for example, on
a job or college application. See Yee, supra, at 182-83. Other
details that vary from state to state include what convictions are
eligible, the procedures required to obtain expungement, and
whether expungement has any further effects, such as eliminating
collateral consequences imposed by law. See 50-State
Comparison.

Expungement does not erase all collateral consequences of a
conviction, however. First, expunged records often are not
destroyed, but may be retained for certain law-enforcement
purposes. E.g., Kessler, supra, at 433. Thus, some commentators
have argued that “sealing” is a more accurate term than
“expungement.” Id. Second, the scope of expungement, meaning
what public records are expunged or sealed and what collateral
consequences are removed, depends on the statute. Legislatures
crafting expungement remedies must strike a balance among the
reduction of collateral consequences, protection of the public, and
preservation of records for law-enforcement and other purposes.
See, e.g., Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 115-16 (1966);
E.A. v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm’n, 208 N.J. Super. 65, 68
(1986); D.A. v. State, 58 N.E.3d 169, 173 (Ind. 2016). This means
some collateral consequences usually remain even after
expungement. Finally, non-governmental records are often
unaffected by expungement. This includes government records
harvested into private databases. See Murray, supra, at 377-78.
Data brokers often fail to update their records to reflect the
expungement of a conviction. Id.

B. Maryland’s Expungement Law

Maryland’s expungement statute is codified at Title 10,
Subtitle 1 of the Criminal Procedure Article (the “Expungement
Law”), with implementing court rules found in Title 4, Chapter 500
of the Maryland Rules. The Expungement Law focuses on
86 [110 Op. Att’y

expungement of “police records” and “court records.” Under the
law, “expunge” means “to remove information from public
inspection in accordance with [the Expungement Law].” Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Proc. (“CP”) § 10-101(e). And “expungement,” as to
a court record or a police record, means:
[R]emoval from public inspection:
(1) by obliteration;
(2) by removal to a separate secure area to
which persons who do not have a legitimate
reason for access are denied access; or
(3) if access to a court record or police record
can be obtained only by reference to another
court record or police record, by the
expungement of it or the part of it that
provides access.

Id. (f); see also Md. Rule 4-502(e).

As noted, the scheme focuses on the expungement of court
records and police records, both of which are defined terms.
“[C]ourt record,” as relevant here, means “an official record of a
court that the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps
about . . . a criminal proceeding,” and includes “an index, docket
entry, charging document, pleading, memorandum, transcription of
proceedings, electronic recording, order, and judgment.” CP
§ 10-101(d); see also Md. Rule 4-502(d). And “police record”
means, in relevant part, “an official record that a law enforcement
unit, booking facility, or the Central Repository maintains about
the arrest and detention of, or further proceeding against, a person
for . . . a criminal charge [or] a suspected violation of a criminal
law.” CP § 10-101(i); see also Md. Rule 4-502(h).
Although the Expungement Law provides for expungement
of records of a variety of cases not resulting in conviction, such as
arrests without charges, cases terminated by dismissal or nolle
prosequi, and acquittals, CP §§ 10-103, 10-103.1, 10-104,
10-105(a), we will focus here on expungement of records of
convictions, as these are most relevant to your question. Records
of a conviction can be expunged in the following circumstances:

• When a person was convicted of only one
criminal act, not a crime of violence, and
received a full and unconditional pardon from
the Governor. CP § 10-105(a)(8).
Gen. 82] 87

• When a person was convicted of certain minor
public-order offenses, including public
urination and loitering. Id. (a)(9).

• When a person was convicted of a crime, but
the underlying act is no longer a crime. Id.
(a)(11).

• When a person was convicted of simple
cannabis possession. Id. (a)(12).

• When a conviction was vacated on the ground
that the defendant was a victim of human
trafficking. Id. (a)(13); CP § 8-302.
• When a person was convicted of one of a
lengthy list of specified misdemeanors. CP
§ 10-110(a)(1).

• When a person was convicted of one of a
shorter list of specified felonies, id. (a)(2),
specifically: Theft under § 7-104 of the
Criminal Law Article; possession with intent
to distribute a controlled dangerous substance
under § 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article; or
burglary (except first degree burglary with
intent to commit a crime of violence) under
§§ 6-202(a), 6-203, or 6-204 of the Criminal
Law Article.
Expungement is available regardless of whether the
conviction resulted from a guilty verdict at trial or a guilty plea,
because the term “convicted” encompasses both scenarios. See
Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 642-43 (1985). Also, if a guilty plea
to an offense not enumerated above leads to probation before
judgment, the record is eligible for expungement, assuming
successful completion of probation. See CP § 10-105(a)(3), (c)(2),
(e)(4).1
1
The Expungement Law does not expressly address cases where a
defendant pleaded nolo contendere. A plea of nolo contendere subjects
the defendant to sentencing but does not result in “conviction” in the
strict sense. E.g., Hinton v. State, 257 Md. App. 562, 582 & n.6 (2023).
However, we doubt the General Assembly intended that a guilty verdict
or guilty plea would be eligible for expungement, whereas a nolo plea to
the same charge would not. Thus, we think that, for purposes of the
88 [110 Op. Att’y

An individual with a qualifying conviction becomes entitled
to expungement after a specified waiting period. The waiting
period usually begins upon completion of the sentence. See CP
§§ 10-105(c), 10-110(c). Once eligible, the individual must file a
petition in the last court to have jurisdiction over the case. See CP
§§ 10-105(b), 10-110(b); see also Md. Rule 4-504(a). Specifically,
an eligible person “may file a petition listing relevant facts for
expungement of a police record, court record, or other record
maintained by the State or a political subdivision of the State.” CP
§§ 10-105(a), 10-110(a).

Unless the State’s Attorney or a law enforcement agency
objects, the court “shall pass an order requiring the expungement
of all police records and court records about the charge.” CP
§§ 10-105(d)(2), 10-110(e)(3); see also Md. Rule 4-507(b). If
there is an objection, the court must hold a hearing, and if it finds
the petitioner entitled to expungement, “shall order the
expungement of all police records and court records about the
charge.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(2); see also Md. Rule
4-508. Before granting expungement, the court must consider the
petitioner’s success at probation, parole, and mandatory
supervision, and whether any court-ordered restitution has been
paid. CP §§ 10-105(e)(5), 10-110(f)(2)(iii)-(iv). Under CP
§ 10-110, which allows expungement of a broader array of
misdemeanors and felonies, the court must also determine that the
petitioner is not a risk to public safety and that expungement would
be in the interest of justice. CP § 10-110(f)(2)(iii), (v). “[E]very
custodian of the police records and court records that are subject to
[an] order of expungement” must certify compliance within sixty
days. CP §§ 10-105(f), 10-110(h); see also Md. Rule 4-510.

Some police records and court records are expressly exempt
from expungement. Court records exempt from expungement
include “the published opinion of a court,” “a cash receipt or
disbursement record that is necessary for audit purposes,” and “a
transcript of court proceedings made by a court reporter in a
multiple defendant case.” CP § 10-102(c)(2)-(4). Police records
exempt from expungement include “an investigatory file” and “a
record of the work product of a law enforcement unit that is used
solely for police investigation.” CP § 10-102(c)(5)-(6).

Expungement Law, the term “convicted” likely includes a nolo plea, as
is true in some other contexts. See, e.g., Md. Rule 5-609(d); Curry v.
Department of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 102 Md. App. 620, 625
(1994); see also Curry, 102 Md. App. at 627 n.3 (noting that the meaning
of the word “conviction” depends on context).
Gen. 82] 89

But with these limited exceptions, records subject to
expungement must either be destroyed or removed to a limited-
access secured area. CP § 10-101(f); see also Md. Rule 4-512. “A
person may not open or review an expunged record or disclose to
another person any information from that record without a court
order[.]” CP § 10-108(a). Also, an employer or educational
institution may not require an applicant for a job or for admission
to disclose information about expunged convictions. CP
§ 10-109(a)(1)(i), (a)(3)(i). Nor may a State or local government
agency require an applicant for a license, permit, registration, or
government service to disclose information about convictions for
which records have been expunged, or deny an application on the
basis of the person’s refusal to disclose an expunged conviction.
CP § 10-109(a)(1)(ii), (a)(3)(ii). Violation of any of these
restrictions on the use of expunged information is a misdemeanor.
CP §§ 10-108(d)(1), 10-109(b)(1).2

The General Assembly first enacted general expungement
legislation in 1975. 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 260. It did so apparently
in response to the then-Court of Appeals’ decision in Doe v.
Commander, Wheaton Police Dep’t, 273 Md. 262 (1974),
suggesting the possibility of an inherent judicial authority to
expunge in the absence of statutory authority, see Mora v. State,
123 Md. App. 699, 710 (1998), aff’d, 355 Md. 639 (1999). Since
1975, the Legislature has gradually broadened the availability of
the remedy. In particular, it has expanded what dispositions and
what crimes are eligible for expungement. For example, under the
original statute, records of convictions could not be expunged. In
1982, the General Assembly allowed expungement of records of
pardoned convictions. 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. In 2008, it
extended expungement to convictions of certain minor public-order
offenses. 2008 Md. Laws, ch. 616. And in 2016, under the Justice
Reinvestment Act, it extended expungement to a much longer list
of misdemeanor convictions, with a 2018 amendment adding
certain felony convictions. 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515; 2018 Md.
Laws, ch. 143. More recently, the Legislature has focused on
expungement of cannabis-related charges, including automatic
expungement in certain circumstances. See CP § 10-105.1; e.g.,
2021 Md. Laws, ch. 680.

2
A separate statute allows for the “shielding” of certain convictions.
CP § 10-301(f). To “shield” a conviction means to render related court
and police records “inaccessible by members of the public.” Id. (e).
However, access to shielded records is much broader than access to
expunged records. See id. § 10-302. As relevant here, shielded records
are accessible to professional licensing agencies. See id. (b)(2).
90 [110 Op. Att’y

C. Professional License Discipline as a Collateral Consequence

Many occupations and professions in Maryland require
licenses, from physicians to cosmetologists to maritime pilots. Md.
Code Ann., Health Occ. (“HO”) § 14-301; Md. Code Ann., Bus.
Occ. & Prof. (“BO&P”) §§ 5-301, 11-401. And for many of these
occupations and professions, the licensing authority may suspend
or revoke a license for certain criminal convictions.

Relevant here, the Health Occupations Article gives various
health professions boards the authority to suspend or revoke a
license if the licensee is convicted of, or pleads guilty or nolo
contendere to, a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude.3 For
some professionals, like physicians, license revocation is
mandatory upon conviction of (or plea to) a crime of moral
turpitude. HO § 14-404(b).4 Where revocation is not mandatory,
the licensee typically has a right to a hearing on whether the
conviction justifies the proposed discipline. See Oltman v.
Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 162 Md. App. 457, 489 (2005);
see also Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-226(c). “Each health
3
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. (“HO”) §§ 1A-309(7)
(acupuncturists), 9-3A-12(b)(4) (assisted living managers), 2-314(4)
(audiologists, hearing aid dispensers, and speech-language pathologists),
17-6A-19(3) (behavior analysts), 8-6D-10(a)(4) (certified midwives),
3-313(5) (chiropractors), 4-315(c)(13) (dental hygienists), 4-315(a)(4)
(dentists), 5-311(6) (dietician-nutritionists), 8-6C-20(a)(4) (direct-entry
midwives), 8-6B-18(a)(6) (electrologists), 21-312(b)(5) (environmental
health specialists), 6-308(a)(4) (massage therapists), 7-316(a)(4)
(morticians), 7-604(4) (mortuary transport service providers),
2-4A-14(3) (music therapists), 8-316(a)(4) (nurses), 8-6A-10(a)(4)
(nursing assistants), 9-314(b)(4) (nursing home administrators),
10-315(6) (occupational therapists), 11-313(3) (optometrists),
12-313(b)(22) (pharmacists), 12-6B-09(22) (pharmacy technicians),
13-316(6) (physical therapists), 16-311(a)(3) (podiatrists), 17-509(10)
(professional counselors), 18-313(3) (psychologists), 12-6D-11(15)
(registered pharmacy interns), 20-313(b)(4) (residential childcare
program professionals), 19-311(7) (social workers).
4
We need not comprehensively define “moral turpitude” here, but
courts have called the concept “rather broad” in the professional
licensing context. See Oltman v. Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 162
Md. App. 457, 483 (2005). The term can include crimes involving a
serious breach of professional standards and casting doubt on public
confidence in the profession, see Burke v. Maryland Bd. of Physicians,
250 Md. App. 334, 350, 353 (2021) (physician who wrote multiple
prescriptions for non-patients), but can also include crimes not directly
related to professional practice, see Brun v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314 (1937)
(indecent exposure with underage victims).
Gen. 82] 91

occupations board shall post on the board’s Web site each final,
public order for a disciplinary sanction issued to a licensee or
certificate holder.” HO § 1-607.

Meanwhile, the Business Occupations and Professions
Article usually provides for license discipline upon conviction of a
felony or a misdemeanor directly related to the licensee’s fitness to
practice.5 There are some minor variations.6 Under most of these
provisions, the board must consider the specific circumstances of
the crime and its relationship to the licensed activities. See, e.g.,
BO&P § 2-315(b); see also Pautsch v. Maryland Real Estate
Comm’n, 423 Md. 229, 260-62 (2011).

To recap, then, most licenses under the Health Occupations
Article and Business Occupations and Professions Article can be
revoked or suspended if the holder is convicted of a felony. And
most can also be revoked either for a misdemeanor of moral
turpitude, or a misdemeanor related to fitness to practice. Although
you asked about these two Articles in particular, statutes elsewhere
in the Code have similar provisions. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann.,
Agric. § 2-310(3) (veterinarians). In addition, the same underlying
conduct that led to the conviction might serve as the basis for
disciplinary action by licensing agencies on separate grounds, but
we focus here on disciplinary action based solely on the conviction
itself, as that was the premise of your question.

5
See, e.g., BO&P §§ 2-315(a)(1)(iii), (b) (accountants),
16-701.2(a)(3), (c) (appraisal management companies), 3-311(a)(1)(vii),
(b) (architects), 4-314(a)(1)(viii), (b) (barbers), 5-314(a)(1)(vii), (b)
(cosmetologists), 6-316(a)(1)(vi), (c) (electricians), 7-309(a)(1)(iv), (b)
(foresters), 16-701.1(a)(4), (c) (home inspectors), 8-310(a)(1)(iii), (b)
(interior designers), 9-310(a)(1)(iii), (b) (landscape architects),
11-409(a)(3), (e) (maritime pilots), 12-312(a)(1)(v), (b) (plumbers),
14-317(a)(1)(iii), (b) (professional engineers), 15-317(a)(1)(iii), (b)
(professional land surveyors), 16-701(a)(1)(v), (b) (real estate
appraisers), 19-408(a)(4) (security guards), 6.5-314(a)(1)(iii), (b)
(stationary engineers).
6
See BO&P § 17-322(b)(24), (d) (real estate brokers may be
disciplined for a felony, misdemeanor related to fitness to practice, or
crime that constitutes a violation of any provision of the real estate
brokers statute); BO&P § 18-309(4) (security system technicians may be
disciplined for a felony, theft offense, or crime of moral turpitude);
BO&P § 20-314(a)(6) (private home detention monitors may be
disciplined for a felony conviction); BO&P § 21-311(a)(3) (individual
tax preparers may be disciplined for a misdemeanor or felony related to
fitness to practice, as opposed to any felony).
92 [110 Op. Att’y

Some of the crimes for which a licensee could be disciplined
are potentially eligible for expungement under the Expungement
Law. As we have noted, certain felonies are expungeable. CP
§ 10-110(a)(2). Other crimes that are expungeable might,
depending on the facts, be crimes of moral turpitude or relate to
fitness to practice. For example, in Burke v. Maryland Board of
Physicians, a physician pleaded guilty to five misdemeanor counts
of writing prescriptions outside the course of regular professional
duties and in violation of professional standards, under § 5-902 of
the Criminal Law Article. 250 Md. App. at 348-49. The licensing
board determined that this was a crime of moral turpitude and
revoked the physician’s license. Id. at 353-54. A licensing board
thus might impose discipline, such as a license suspension or
revocation, on the basis of a conviction. Then, after the discipline
has become final, a court might expunge the records of the crime
that formed the basis of discipline. That scenario presents the
question you asked, which we will turn to now.
II
Analysis

Your question is: when a licensing board bases a disciplinary
order on a criminal conviction, and the records of the conviction
are later expunged, must the board “rescind” or “vacate” the order,
or otherwise “remove [it] from public view”? That question raises
two related legal issues. First, when a court expunges a conviction,
does that action invalidate or void any discipline that relied on the
conviction? Second, does an expungement order under the
Expungement Law reach the records of a licensing board’s
disciplinary action, such that, even if the discipline itself is not
affected, the records reflecting the disciplinary action must be
destroyed or removed from public access? We consider each
question in turn.

A. Expungement of a Criminal Conviction Does Not
Invalidate Earlier License Discipline that Relied on the
Conviction

To begin, we consider whether expungement invalidates or
voids any discipline that relied on the conviction. For the reasons
explained below, our view is that although expungement seals
certain records of a criminal investigation, arrest, and conviction,
expungement does not retroactively invalidate or void the
conviction itself.
Gen. 82] 93

1. Expungement Does Not Retroactively Invalidate or Void
the Underlying Conviction

Because expungement is a statutory remedy, the effect of
expungement is a question of statutory interpretation. See In re
Cintron, 265 Md. App. 481, 500-01 (2025). At one time,
Maryland’s highest court left open the question whether courts
might have inherent or equitable authority to expunge criminal
records. See Doe, 273 Md. at 275-76. But the enactment of the
Expungement Law “obviated” any “common law right of
expungement” and established the “primary remedial mechanism”
in the area. Reid v. State, 239 Md. App. 1, 15 (2018). The
expungement procedure derived from the Expungement Law is
therefore “exclusive and mandatory” except in juvenile cases. See
Md. Rule 4-501. So, in considering how expungement affects
criminal convictions, the expungement statute controls. We thus
apply the ordinary principles of statutory construction.

“‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and effectuate’ the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it
enacted the statute.” E.g., Zukowski v. Anne Arundel County, 490
Md. 243, 264 (2025) (citation omitted). This search for legislative
intent begins with the statute’s plain language. Id. It also considers
context, looking at the statutory scheme as a whole and the
underlying “purpose, aim or policy” of the legislation. Id. We may
also examine other extrinsic evidence of intent, including
legislative history. E.g., Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113-
14 (2018). But a court “will not read into the statute words that
give it an interpretation that limits or extends its application beyond
the words the Legislature used.” E.g., Allen v. State, 440 Md. 643,
671 (2014) (citation omitted).
In considering the effect of expungement, the natural place to
begin is the language of the statutory provision defining “expunge”
and “expungement.” Expunge means “to remove information from
public inspection in accordance with” the Expungement Law. CP
§ 10-101(e). And the definition of “expungement” elaborates on
that theme, defining the term to mean removal of records from
public inspection, generally by obliteration or removal to a “secure
area.” Id. (f). Expungement, then, concerns the protection and
sealing of certain documents. It is “a form of record-keeping.”
Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 498. Nothing in this language suggests
an intent to go further and invalidate or void the original conviction.
The other provisions of the Expungement Law that deal with
expungement’s effects also suggest that expungement does not
94 [110 Op. Att’y

erase a conviction for all purposes. There are two such provisions.
Section 10-108 governs access to expunged records and imposes
penalties for their misuse, but it deals only with records. Similarly,
§ 10-109 protects information on expunged convictions from being
disclosed, by preventing the expungement beneficiary from being
compelled to disclose it, but only in specified situations. These
provisions are limited in scope, and they would be unnecessary if
expungement in general meant that a person would be treated for
all purposes as though they had never been convicted. Again, the
law protects specified records and information reflecting the
conviction from disclosure. But to conclude that the conviction is
invalidated would require a step further. We see no support in the
law for that further step.

Indeed, the General Assembly has rejected the idea that
expungement requires the State to behave for all purposes as
though the conviction never happened. The Legislature
specifically excluded certain items from expungement’s reach,
including court opinions, some trial transcripts, and police work
product. CP § 10-102(c). As we will discuss further below, its
focus was primarily on police and court records, see infra Part II.B,
perhaps because they are the records that impose the greatest
stigma on individuals or perhaps because an expungement process
limited to police and court records would be more administrable.
And it allowed for the review of even these records on a showing
of good cause. CP § 10-108(b)(1). When the Legislature decided
what expungement does and does not do, we must respect its policy
judgment. See, e.g., Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 502; see also, e.g.,
Ready, 243 Cal. App. 2d at 115-16; E.A., 208 N.J. Super. at 68;
D.A., 58 N.E.3d at 173.

The Appellate Court also has rejected the argument that
expungement means across-the-board “erasure.” Cintron, 265 Md.
App. at 500-01. In Cintron, the Howard County police had
investigated an alleged crime by a Baltimore City police officer and
sent copies of evidence from the police record to the Baltimore City
police. Id. at 487-88. The charge was later expunged. Id. But the
expungement order did not include the Baltimore City police
among the custodians required to expunge police records. Id. The
City police later used its copies of the evidence in a disciplinary
proceeding against the officer. The court held that this use of the
evidence was proper, because the City police were never subject to
an expungement order. Id. at 498-99. In the court’s view, the
“clear and unambiguous” language of the statute reflected a
legislative “balance” between privacy and law-enforcement needs.
Id. at 500-01. And under that clear language, the effect of
Gen. 82] 95

expungement is limited to the terms of an expungement order, even
when that limitation means some public records of a conviction
will remain unexpunged. See id. Cintron indicates that courts, to
respect the legislative balancing of interests, will not expand the
reach of expungement beyond what the statute “clear[ly] and
unambiguous[ly]” provides. Because the statute makes no
reference to expungement invalidating the original conviction, it
would not have that effect.
The probation-before-judgment statute offers an illuminating
contrast. That statute lets the court stay the entry of judgment in a
criminal case and place the defendant on probation. CP § 6-220.
When the defendant fulfills the conditions of probation, “the court
shall discharge” them “without judgment of conviction,” and the
discharge is “not a conviction for the purpose of any
disqualification or disability imposed by law.” Id. § 6-220(i). The
absence of equivalent language in the Expungement Law suggests
that the General Assembly did not similarly intend that an
expunged conviction would no longer be a conviction for any
purpose. And even the probation-before-judgment statute does not
authorize the court to set aside a final conviction once it has been
entered. Rather, the defendant will avoid a “conviction” only in
cases where the court never enters judgment to begin with; that is,
where it stays entry of judgment and then dismisses the charges on
completion of probation. See Hall v. Prince George’s County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 431 Md. 108, 126, 130 (2013).
Courts in other states have also observed that expungement or
sealing of criminal records is not equivalent to voiding or vacating
the conviction. For example, a New York appellate court held that
a statute that “simply create[d] a mechanism for restricting future
access to existing records” of certain drug-related charges did not
“contemplate any alteration of the underlying criminal judgment
reflected in those records.” People v. M.E., 121 A.D.3d 157, 160
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly
explained that expungement “of a conviction merely deletes the
evidence of the underlying conviction from court records” and
“does not invalidate the conviction,” contrasting that concept with
vacatur, which results from legal or factual flaws in the original
proceedings and “invalidates the conviction itself.” State v.
Braunschweig, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 754-56 (2018). And along the
same lines, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals observed that
expungement “casts no doubt on the integrity of the conviction
itself, but denotes a policy judgment to remove the conviction from
a person’s public record.” Hickerson v. United States, 287 A.3d
237, 243 (2023). Although these opinions interpreted different
96 [110 Op. Att’y

statutes with different language, they offer support for the general
proposition that expungement and vacatur of conviction are
different things.

To be clear, we do not address the prospective effects of
expungement. That is, we do not consider what effects
expungement may have on governmental actions taken after a court
grants expungement. We conclude only that expungement does not
actually vacate, retroactively invalidate, or render void ab initio, an
earlier final judgment of conviction. The Expungement Law
defines expungement’s effects. And those effects do not include
invalidating the underlying conviction.

2. Because Expungement Leaves the Underlying
Conviction in Existence, It Does Not Invalidate
Discipline that Relied on an Expunged Conviction

Given our conclusion that expungement does not invalidate
the conviction itself, nothing requires the invalidation of a final
administrative agency action that relied on a later-expunged
conviction (assuming nothing else changed). The factual and legal
basis of the administrative agency’s action remains in existence.7

We reached a similar conclusion decades ago in the related
context of gubernatorial pardons. 37 Opinions of the Attorney
General 188 (1952). In that opinion, the Board of Dental
Examiners had revoked a dentist’s license for a crime of moral
turpitude, but the Governor later pardoned that crime, and the
Board asked about the status of the dentist’s license following the
pardon. Id. at 188-89. We concluded that the pardon did not
restore the dentist’s license, noting that [t]he pardon “contain[ed]
nothing which indicate[d] that the conviction was erroneous.” See
id. at 191-93. So, although the dentist could have potentially
applied for a new license under the standards governing a new

7
We need not decide when an agency may have discretion to revisit
a past disciplinary order on the ground that the underlying conviction
was expunged. See, e.g., Cinque v. Montgomery County Planning Bd.,
173 Md. App. 349, 361 (2007) (discussing the inherent authority of
administrative agencies to reconsider quasi-judicial decisions); 106
Opinions of the Attorney General 38, 48 n.10 (2021) (same). But see
Lawrence N. Brandt, Inc. v. Montgomery County Comm’n on Landlord-
Tenant Affs., 39 Md. App. 147, 160-61 (1978) (holding that authority to
reconsider a quasi-judicial decision ends once petition for judicial review
is filed or time for judicial review expires). We conclude only that an
agency is not required to do so, and that the expungement does not
invalidate the agency action by operation of law.
Gen. 82] 97

application, he was not entitled to his old license back. See id. at
193. The reasoning of our 1952 opinion suggests that if a form of
post-conviction relief does not call the validity of the original
conviction into doubt, it does not invalidate license discipline based
on the conviction.
Out-of-state authority supports the conclusion that
expungement does not bear on the propriety of a license revocation
when the expungement occurred after the licensing board’s action.
See, e.g., Schillerstrom v. State, 180 Ariz. 468, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994); 1993 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 2-192, 1993 WL 486032, at *6,
*8 (Nov. 16, 1993) (“[T]he sealing of a licensee’s criminal
conviction does not affect any prior disciplinary action taken by the
agency against that licensee.”); Or. Op. Att’y Gen. No. OP-2000-
1, 2000 WL 992134, at *11-12 (July 11, 2000) (concluding that
disciplinary board could disclose existence of, and reason for,
disciplinary action even where underlying records were expunged);
1993-1994 Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. 89, 1994 WL 2269, at *3-4 (Jan.
4, 1994) (same); cf. Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Safety,
169 N.H. 32, 37 (2016) (recognizing that although references to
“habitual offender” status on driving record were subject to
expungement under New Hampshire law, the status itself would
not be). As with our opinion on the dentist’s license, other
jurisdictions recognize that where expungement does not call the
validity of the original conviction into question, it does not affect
administrative actions based on the conviction. See Ballard v.
Board of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 452 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that because expungement under Arizona
law did not invalidate the conviction, it did not require restoration
of police officer’s pension, which had been revoked for felony).

We therefore conclude that expungement of the records of a
criminal conviction does not invalidate or vacate, or require the
rescission of, disciplinary action by a licensing board that relied on
the conviction. The General Assembly defined expungement as the
protection and sealing of certain records and information. But we
see no evidence that it intended the underlying convictions
themselves would be vacated or retroactively voided. And that
means administrative agency actions based on the original
conviction, at least those that became final before the expungement
order, retain their foundation.
98 [110 Op. Att’y

B. Although Expungement Typically Reaches Only Police
and Court Records, Some Limited Types of Records from
License Discipline Proceedings May Be Subject to
Expungement

We must also consider whether, even if expungement does
not invalidate license discipline that relied on a conviction,
documents related to that discipline can or must be expunged, i.e.,
destroyed or protected from public disclosure under the
Expungement Law. As we have discussed, expungement deals
primarily with the confidentiality of records. It is thus possible
that, even if expungement does not restore a license, it still requires
the licensing board to destroy (or remove from public access)
records about the revocation of the license.

However, as we will explain, we think only limited types of
records from license discipline proceedings will be subject to
expungement, for two reasons. First, the standard expungement
order issued by Maryland courts only reaches police records and
court records. Licensing boards’ records fall into neither of those
categories. Although the expungement statute also contemplates a
request to expunge “other records” held by the State, an
expungement order will not reach “other records” without a
specific request. Second, even if the petitioner so requests, the term
“other records” likely does not include records generated by a
licensing board itself in the disciplinary process. Instead, it would
likely reach only records that originated as court or police records
and were received by the board. We turn now to flesh out those
two points.

1. An Expungement Order Ordinarily Reaches Only Police
and Court Records

The standard form expungement order found in the Maryland
Rules reaches only police records and court records. “An order for
expungement of records shall be substantially in [this] form . . . as
modified to suit the circumstances of the case.” Md. Rule 4-508(a).
The form order reads:

Having found that [name] of [address] is
entitled to expungement of the police records
pertaining to that individual’s arrest,
detention, or confinement on or about [date],
at [location], Maryland, by a law enforcement
officer of the [law enforcement agency], and
the court records in this action, it is . . .
Gen. 82] 99

ORDERED that the clerk forthwith shall
serve on each custodian of police and court
records designated in this Order and on the
Central Repository a copy of this Order
together with a blank form of Certificate of
Compliance; and it is further
ORDERED that within 60 days after the entry
of this Order or, if this Order is stayed, 30 days
after the stay is lifted, the clerk and the
following custodians of court and police
records and the Central Repository shall (1)
expunge all court and police records
pertaining to this action or proceeding in their
custody (2) file an executed Certificate of
Compliance, and (3) serve a copy of the
Certificate of Compliance on the
applicant/petitioner/defendant[.]
Md. Rule, Form 4-508.1 (emphasis added).

Records held by a licensing board are not “police records” or
“court records” within the meaning of the Expungement Law. The
law defines these records not only in terms of their nature but also
their custodian. Police records are “official record[s] that a law
enforcement unit, booking facility, or the Central Repository
maintains” about a person’s arrest or detention. CP § 10-101(i).
Records not in the custody of a law enforcement unit, booking
facility, or the Central Repository are thus not “police records,” and
licensing boards do not come within any of those categories. Id.
(g). Similarly, court records are “official record[s] of a court that
the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps” about criminal
proceedings. Id. (d). So, again, licensing board records cannot be
“court records” because they are not kept by court personnel. A
standard expungement order conforming to Form 4-508.1 therefore
will not reach the records of a licensing board.
The form’s focus on police and court records is consistent
with the Expungement Law’s focus on those records. The first
provision of the Expungement Law (after the definitions section)
reads: “A police record or a court record is subject to expungement
under this subtitle.” CP § 10-102(a). Similar language recurs
throughout the law’s procedural provisions. Sections 10-105 and
10-110 govern expungement in cases where charges were filed
(other than certain cannabis charges). If a petitioner requests
expungement and the State’s Attorney does not object, “the court
shall pass an order requiring the expungement of all police records
100 [110 Op. Att’y

and court records about the charge.” CP §§ 10-105(d)(2),
10-110(e)(3). If the State’s Attorney does object but the court finds
the petitioner entitled to expungement, the “court shall order the
expungement of all police records and court records about the
charge.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(1). And “every custodian
of the police records and court records that are subject to the order
of expungement” must comply. CP §§ 10-105(f), 10-110(h).
There are no analogous provisions referring to any other category
of records.

The implementing Rules also assume that only police and
court records are subject to expungement. Rule 4-502 defines
“records” to mean “police records” and “court records” only. See
Md. Rule 4-502(j). All of the other provisions of the Rules then
reference expungement of “records.” See, e.g., Md. Rules 4-501,
4-504(a), 4-508(a), 4-510.

Some provisions of the expungement statute do contemplate
expungement of “other records” beyond police and court records.
Section 10-105(a), in particular, states that a person “may file a
petition listing relevant facts for expungement of a police record,
court record, or other record maintained by the State or a political
subdivision.” CP § 10-105(a) (emphasis added); see also CP
§ 10-110(a) (same). But even when such “other records” exist (an
issue we discuss in Part II.B.2, below), an expungement order will
not reach them without a specific request. See Davis v. Magee, 140
Md. App. 635, 654-55 (2001); Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 502. In
Davis, for example, the expungement petitioner argued that a
county had failed to comply with an expungement order because
its social services agencies had maintained records of a child abuse
investigation related to the criminal charges. 140 Md. App. at 641,
652. The court declined to decide whether the child abuse
investigation records were expungeable, because the petitioner had
not asked for them to be expunged. See id. at 655.

Thus, in the bulk of cases where a licensee informs one of
your boards that a conviction has been expunged, the expungement
order will not reach records of your board. The standard form
expungement order only reaches police and court records. And
even to the extent other records are expungeable, an expungement
order will not reach them except upon specific request. We turn
now to the question of what non-police and court records a
petitioner may in theory request to have expunged.
Gen. 82] 101

2. The Provision for Expungement of “Other Records”
Does Not Reach All Records Relating to License
Discipline

As just noted, some provisions of the Expungement Law seem
to contemplate expungement of “other records” beyond police and
court records. CP §§ 10-105(a), 10-110(a). But other provisions
of the statute assume that only police and court records can be
expunged. Supra Part II.B.1. The Expungement Law is thus
ambiguous on the question of whether, and to what extent, it allows
expungement of “other records.” When this type of ambiguity
arises, we try to harmonize the provisions of the statutory scheme
as far as possible. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Robinson, 435
Md. 62, 77 (2013).

For reasons that we will explain below, although not free from
doubt, we think the best way to harmonize the law’s provisions
here, consistent with traditional canons of statutory interpretation,
is to give meaning to the statutory references to “other records” but
read them to mean only records that are the same in substance as
police and court records without technically meeting the statutory
definitions of those terms. On this understanding, “other records”
would mean documents that originated as police or court records
but have come into the hands of other custodians, including
licensing boards.

As a starting point, we do not think the term “other records”
can be read so broadly as to cover all public records that mention
the criminal charge. Although the term may be broad in the
abstract, “the meaning of [even] the plainest language is controlled
by the context in which it appears,” e.g., Adelakun v. Adelakun, 491
Md. 1, 22 (2025) (quoting Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v.
Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 295 (2017)), and the
context here suggests that the meaning is more limited.
For one thing, reading “other records” that broadly would
create conflict with the requirements of other statutes. We have a
mandate to read, where possible, the General Assembly’s
enactments on the same subject as a “consistent and harmonious
body of law.” See, e.g., State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115 (1997)
(quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39 (1992)). The Health
Occupations boards are subject to a statutory requirement to post
disciplinary orders on their websites. HO § 1-607. A reading that
required the expungement of all records mentioning a conviction,
and in particular that required expungement of final disciplinary
orders, would put the Expungement Law in conflict with this
102 [110 Op. Att’y

statutory mandate, and we should avoid such a conflict if we can.
Similarly, the Public Information Act affirmatively requires the
disclosure of “any orders and findings that result from formal
[licensing] disciplinary actions.” Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov.
(“GP”) § 4-333(b)(7).8 Although the Public Information Act defers
to confidentiality mandates found in other law, see GP
§ 4-301(a)(2), a reading that allowed expungement of final
disciplinary orders would create at least some tension with the
apparent legislative intent that such orders be available to the
public.

A reading of “other records” that encompassed all public
records referencing a conviction would also create significant
practical problems. “When seeking legislative intent, we consider
not only the objectives and purpose of the enactment, but
the consequences resulting from one construction rather than
another.” Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 69 (1994). For example,
the law does not contemplate expungement by redaction alone,
except in the narrow case of docket and index entries. See CP
§ 10-101(f); Md. Rules 4-511, 4-512. This would potentially
mean, under a broad reading of “other records,” that the entire
record would have to be destroyed or removed if it contains any
reference to a criminal charge. That requirement could create
serious difficulties both within and outside the context of licensing
discipline records. For example, voter registration files maintained
by State and local boards of elections refer to criminal convictions
because a felony conviction can temporarily suspend the right to
vote. See Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 3-102(b)(1). What happens
if one of those felony convictions is expunged?
Reading “other records” to cover all public records
mentioning a conviction would also leave licensing boards in a
bind when asked about the status of licenses revoked for criminal
conviction. As we have explained, expungement does not
invalidate the license discipline itself. Supra Part II.A. But if all
records mentioning the conviction (which would include the final
disciplinary order and most or all records of the disciplinary
proceedings) were expunged, then, if asked about the licensee’s
status, agency staff could not respond without obtaining a court
order to disclose information from expunged records. See CP
§ 10-108(a).
8
Indeed, under the Public Information Act’s licensing records
exemption, the final disciplinary order will often be the only document
from a disciplinary proceeding that the licensing board may disclose to
the public. See GP § 4-333(a)(1), (b)(7); see also 71 Opinions of the
Attorney General 305, 310-11 (1986).
Gen. 82] 103

Further, without a clear limiting principle, the broad reading
would require expungement, by destruction or removal to a secure
area, of even (for example) emails among licensing agency staff
mentioning a licensee’s conviction. Failure to destroy those
emails, or remove them, would expose agency employees to
criminal penalties and the loss of their jobs. See CP § 10-108(d).
Despite all these potential issues, nothing in the law gives
custodians of “other records” notice or the opportunity to be heard
on the expungement petition. See CP §§ 10-105(d)(1),
10-110(e)(1). We thus do not think that the General Assembly
intended the “other records” language to cover all public records
that mention a conviction, because of the tension among statutes
and the practical problems such a reading would create.

But the provision must cover some records beyond police
records and court records, as we cannot read the phrase “other
records” out of the statute entirely. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Power
Supply Ass’n v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 361 Md. 196, 214-15 (2000)
(stating the rule of interpretation that words in the statute should
not be rendered meaningless). Again, the traditional canons of
statutory interpretation guide our efforts to assign meaning to this
phrase. See, e.g., Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512 (1987).
First, we think the phrase “other records” most likely only
covers records that are closely related to police and court records.
This follows from the principle that we should harmonize the
statute’s provisions to the extent we can. E.g., Robinson, 435 Md.
at 77. As we previously noted, various provisions of the
Expungement Law assume that expungement only applies to police
and court records. Supra Part II.B.1. For example, the statute
provides that if the court, after a hearing, finds the petitioner
entitled to expungement, the “court shall order the expungement of
all police records and court records about the charge,” with no
mention of “other records.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(2).
And the Expungement Law’s scope provision states that “[a] police
record or a court record is subject to expungement under this
subtitle,” again with no mention of “other records.” CP
§ 10-102(a). The best way to reconcile these provisions with the
need to give some meaning to the “other records” language is to
conclude that “other records” must be akin, at least in substance, to
police and court records.

Other textual evidence also supports the view that “other
records” should be closely related to police and court records.
Originally, the “other records” provision applied to “police records,
104 [110 Op. Att’y

court records, and other records . . . pertaining to the charge.” E.g.,
Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 737(a) (1996 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis
added). In the code revision process that created the Criminal
Procedure Article, the phrase “pertaining to the charge” was
eliminated. 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 10 (Revisor’s Note to CP
§ 10-105). But changes in a code revision bill are presumed to be
non-substantive. See, e.g., Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528,
538-39 (2006). Thus, “other records” must still “pertain[] to the
charge” to be expungeable. And under the canon of interpretation
known by the Latin name ejusdem generis, “other records” must
“pertain to the charge” in the same way as “police records” and
“court records.” The ejusdem generis canon construes a term at the
end of a list to include only items “of the same class or general
nature as those specifically mentioned.” See, e.g., In re Wallace
W., 333 Md. 186, 190-91 (1993). We must therefore read “other
records” as covering records that “pertain[] to the charge” in ways
similar to the defined categories of police and court records.
The history of the “other records” provision again supports
this focus on police and court records. The language first appeared
in 1982, when the General Assembly for the first time authorized
expungement of certain conviction records.9 1982 Md. Laws, ch.
872. Among other changes, the 1982 bill amended the language
authorizing a petition for expungement to read: “[A] person . . .
may file a petition setting forth the relevant facts and requesting
expungement of the police records, court records, and other
records maintained by the State of Maryland and its subdivisions,
pertaining to the charge.” Id. (amending Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27,
§ 737(a)(7)) (new language emphasized) (now codified at CP
§ 10-105(a)). But the bill also reenacted, without change, language
that seemed to limit expungement to police and court records. See
id. (Art. 27, § 737(e)) (“If the court finds that the person is entitled
to expungement, it shall enter an order requiring the expungement
of police records and all court records pertaining to the charge.”).
And other aspects of the 1982 bill’s legislative history indicate that
the Legislature was still focused on police and court records. The
title of the bill was: “An Act concerning Police and Court
Records—Expungement.” Id. The bill file, including the bill
request form and written testimony on the bill, also assumes the bill
would deal only with police and court records. See generally Bill
File on H.B. 1074, 1982 Leg., Reg. Sess. There was no discussion

9
Specifically, the 1982 legislation allowed expungement of
convictions the Governor had pardoned. 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. Prior
law had only authorized expungement in the case of a non-conviction
disposition like acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi. See id.
Gen. 82] 105

in the legislative history of what other categories of records might
be expunged.
The General Assembly also is presumed to know that the
Maryland Rules have never contemplated expungement of records
related to convictions, other than police and court records.
Compare Md. Rules 4-501 to 4-512, with Md. Rules 4-501 to 4-512
(1984 Repl. Vol.). “One of the fundamental precepts of statutory
interpretation is that the General Assembly is aware of existing law
when it enacts new legislation.” LeCronier v. United Parcel Serv.,
196 Md. App. 131, 141 (2010). And just as we do when there are
two statutes on the same subject, we must attempt to harmonize a
statute and court rule on the same subject when possible. See, e.g.,
Battley v. Banks, 177 Md. App. 638, 650-51 (2007). Not only the
text of the Rules themselves, but also the longstanding practice
under the rules of limiting expungement to police and court
records, is relevant. See, e.g., 72 Opinions of the Attorney General
81, 85 (1987) (explaining that a “longstanding practice . . .
consistently and publicly followed, is persuasive as to the
legislative intent”). If the General Assembly believed the Rules
were inconsistent with the statute, we would expect it to have said
so more clearly on one of the many occasions it has amended the
Expungement Law in the last forty years.
To sum up, then, we think the best way to reconcile the
available evidence of legislative intent is to conclude that “other
records” are records that are not within the statutory definitions of
“police records” and “court records,” but are similar in nature to
police and court records and “pertain to the charge” in the same
way as those records. The question becomes: what records might
fall into that category?

We can think of only one category of records that is
sufficiently related to “police records” and “court records” (and
that pertains to the charge in the same way) but does not fulfill the
statutory definitions: records that originated as police or court
records but are not held by a court or police department. The
Expungement Law defines police records and court records both
by their nature and by their location. Thus, a record that is a police
or court record by virtue of its content would not fulfill the statutory
definition if found in the hands of a different custodian, like a
licensing board. So, for example, a criminal court docket sheet is
a “court record” only if found in the records of the court itself. See
CP § 10-101(d). And an arrest report is a “police record” only if a
police department holds it. See id. (i). But if one of these records,
like a docket sheet or an arrest report, were to come into the hands
106 [110 Op. Att’y

of another agency, like a licensing board, it would not be
expungeable as a “police record” or “court record.” The most
likely reading, in our view, is that the reference to “other records”
was intended to address that gap. Importantly, these records (that
originated as police and court records but are now found elsewhere)
“pertain to the charge” in the same way as police and court
records—namely, they also originated as part of the criminal
proceedings.
Indeed, at least some other states, when faced with similar
ambiguity in their expungement statutes, have read those statutes
as limited to records originating from the police investigation or
court proceedings. In Oregon, for example, expungement applies
to “the record of conviction and other official records in the case,
including the records of arrest.” Or. Op. Att’y Gen. No.
OP-2000-1, 2000 WL 992134, at *5 (citation omitted). The
Oregon Attorney General interpreted “other official records in the
case” to mean “all records that were generated by law enforcement
or the court in the course of the criminal investigation and judicial
proceeding” but not records of licensing agency disciplinary
proceedings. Id. at *7. Oregon’s language is narrower than
Maryland’s in some ways (“in the case” instead of “pertaining to
the charge”) but broader in others (“in the case” instead of
“pertaining to [just] the charge”). The Oregon Attorney General’s
reading is thus some indication of how a Maryland court might read
Maryland’s “other records” language.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky read the phrase
“records relating to the arrest, charge, or other matters arising out
of the arrest or charge” as applying only to records that were, by
their nature, “criminal records” or “law enforcement records.” See
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro. Gov’t v. Moore, 701 S.W.3d
335, 353-54 (Ky. 2024). This would exclude “internal employment
files” or “personnel files,” even when information in those files was
obtained from police records. See id. at 354-55. Again, this
reading gives meaning to the phrase “other matters” while still
striking a reasonable balance between expungement and
government functioning, and focusing on the records that are the
expungement law’s core concern.

There are also other states that have taken similar approaches.
See, e.g., D.A., 58 N.E.3d at 172 (concluding that the term
“conviction records” did not include records related to a civil
forfeiture); Director of Revenue v. Klenke, 29 S.W.3d 391, 392-93
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (statute authorizing expungement “from all
official records [of] all recordations of [an] arrest, plea, trial or
Gen. 82] 107

conviction” did not reach notation of administrative suspension for
DUI in driving record); 1983 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 2-384, 1983 WL
178761, at *2 (Dec. 21, 1983) (concluding that whether term “all
official records pertaining to the case” includes records of licensing
body would require case-by-case determination based on how
“interconnected” the records are). But see, e.g., Janevicius v.
White, No. 1-13-2423, 2014 WL 2719322, at *6-7 (Ill. App. Ct.
June 12, 2014) (unpublished) (affirming order expunging
information about criminal charge from driving record, under
statute authorizing expungement of “arrests and charges not
initiated by arrest”).

An example will illustrate how our reading works in practice.
Suppose, to use one of the hypotheticals you raised in your opinion
request, a licensed drug counselor were convicted of a drug-related
offense, and the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists
determined the crime to be one of moral turpitude and revoked the
counselor’s license. The files of the board would then likely
contain records that originated as police or court records in the
criminal case, such as a docket sheet, charging documents, a plea
agreement, or the judgment of conviction. See, e.g., Oltman, 162
Md. App. at 468. But it would also contain records that originated
from the board itself, like meeting minutes and the final order of
discipline. Assume the former licensee then petitioned for
expungement and specifically sought expungement of records of
the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists as “other
records.”

Under our interpretation, the former category of documents
(e.g., the criminal charging document) would be subject to
expungement as “other records,” but the latter (e.g., the board’s
minutes) would not. The former, in the hands of the licensing
board, would not be “court records” as defined in CP § 10-101, but
they would be other records pertaining to the charge in the same
way as court records, because they would have originated from the
criminal case itself. On the other hand, the latter would pertain to
the criminal charge only indirectly, and in a different way, because
they would not have originated from the criminal case itself, but a
collateral proceeding. Thus, only the former set of records could
be subject to an expungement order.

In sum, our opinion is that the Expungement Law does not
authorize or require expungement of all records of a license
discipline proceeding arising from a criminal conviction. The most
reasonable reading is that it authorizes expungement only of
records that originated as part of the criminal case and later came
108 [110 Op. Att’y

into the hands of the licensing agency, such as charging documents
or criminal judgments (and even then, only if specifically requested
and ordered by the court). This reading gives effect to the statutory
references to “other records” while acknowledging that court
records and police records are otherwise the statute’s exclusive
focus.

C. Legislative Clarification of the Scope of Expungement May
Be Advisable

We acknowledge that there are policy arguments that could
support a broader scope of expungement. After all, the overall
purpose of expungement is to reduce the stigma borne by
individuals with criminal records. Supra Part I.A. The continued
availability of State records that reference a criminal conviction,
but fall outside the category of “other records,” arguably
undermines that purpose. And even for records that are
expungeable, an expungement petitioner will likely have difficulty
identifying every custodian of expungeable records. See Cintron,
265 Md. App. at 502 (noting this “pragmatic concern[]”).

For these reasons and given the ambiguity in the statutory
scheme, the General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the
law governing the following issues: which records, if any, beyond
police records and court records are subject to expungement under
the Expungement Law; under what circumstances expungement
may affect previously issued license discipline that relied
exclusively on a criminal conviction; and the relationship between
the Expungement Law and statutes that require public posting of
licensing boards’ disciplinary orders.

III
Conclusion

As the law currently stands, expungement of a criminal
conviction requires the destruction, or removal to a limited-access
area, of certain records but does not invalidate or void the original
conviction. Thus, any professional disciplinary actions that relied
on the criminal conviction also are not invalidated by
expungement. In addition, expungement generally does not require
the destruction or removal of all records related to a license
discipline matter based on a criminal conviction. Rather, the best
reading of current law in our view is that expungement can, at most,
only reach records in the hands of licensing agencies that originated
in the criminal case as police or court records. And even these
Gen. 82] 109

records will not be subject to an expungement order unless the
expungement petitioner makes a specific request.
Anthony G. Brown
Attorney General of Maryland
Thomas S. Chapman
Deputy Chief, Opinions and
Advice

Patrick B. Hughes
Chief Counsel, Opinions and Advice

82 [110 Op. Att’y

EXPUNGEMENT
LICENSING RECORDS – WHETHER EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
RECORDS OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AFFECTS
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING DISCIPLINE THAT RELIED ON
THE CONVICTION – WHETHER THE RELATED LICENSING
RECORDS MUST BE EXPUNGED
October 6, 2025

Stephen Conti, LMT
Chair, State Board of Massage Therapy Examiners

Winnie D. Moore, LCPC
Chair, State Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists

Lawrence Franklin
Chair, State Board of Barbers

On behalf of your respective boards, you requested an official
opinion of the Attorney General on how expungement of a criminal
conviction affects earlier professional license discipline that relied
on the conviction. Various professional licensing boards, including
yours, can suspend or revoke a license, or otherwise discipline the
licensee, if the licensee is convicted of specific types of crimes.
Meanwhile, Maryland courts can expunge certain criminal
convictions, usually a specified number of years after completion
of the sentence, including some convictions that might be the basis
of disciplinary action by professional boards. When a conviction
is expunged, certain records of the conviction must either be
destroyed or removed from public access. Would-be employers,
schools, and licensing agencies also may not ask applicants about
expunged convictions.

You asked what happens if a licensee is subject to discipline
based on a criminal conviction (the fact of conviction itself rather
than the conduct underlying the conviction) but the conviction is
later expunged. Specifically, you asked whether “regulatory
boards have any duty to rescind, vacate, or otherwise remove from
public view any disciplinary orders based solely on a crime or
crimes expunged after the issuance of those board orders.
Gen. 82] 83

In our opinion, expungement of a conviction does not require
a licensing board to rescind or vacate disciplinary action that relied
on the conviction. The expungement statute provides for records
of an expunged conviction to be sealed and prohibits asking about
expunged convictions in certain contexts. But nothing in the statute
suggests that expungement retroactively voids or invalidates the
original criminal conviction itself. And if the conviction remains
in existence, the basis for the licensing board’s order remains in
existence as well.
That said, some specific categories of documents in the record
of a license discipline proceeding arising from a criminal
conviction may be eligible for expungement. Although the
standard expungement order found in the Maryland Rules mentions
only police and court records and does not reach licensing agency
records at all, the text of the expungement statute leaves open the
possibility of expungement of “other records” beyond police and
court records when requested in the expungement petition. Even
then, though, the “other records” in a licensing file eligible for
expungement are likely only those records that originated as police
or court records but have come into the hands of the licensing
agency. Thus, for example, a copy of an indictment in the files of
a licensing board could be expunged, but the administrative order
of a licensing board revoking a license could not be. We recognize,
however, that these conclusions are not free from doubt, so the
General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the scope and
effects of expungement in Maryland.
I
Background

A. Expungement as a Remedy for Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction

A criminal record is a heavy burden. Once someone
convicted of a crime completes their sentence, they have, as it is
commonly said, paid their debt to society. But “collateral
consequences” of the conviction can linger long after the sentence
ends. “Collateral consequences are the penalties, disabilities, or
disadvantages imposed upon a person as a result of a criminal
conviction” as distinguished from the “direct consequences
imposed as part of the court’s judgment at sentencing.” Collateral
Consequences Workgroup, Final Report 1 (Dec. 1, 2016)
(“Collateral Consequences Report”).
84 [110 Op. Att’y

Some of these consequences stem from laws that explicitly
impose the consequence. For example, a criminal conviction can
render someone legally ineligible for certain public housing,
welfare, and healthcare benefits. See, e.g., Mackenzie J. Yee, Note,
Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an
Extraordinary Harm, 25 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 169, 173-
74 (2017). Or, as discussed further below, a criminal conviction
can trigger the denial or revocation of a professional license. Infra
Part I.C. In Maryland, a criminal conviction can affect, among
other things, one’s right to serve on a jury, capacity to serve as
personal representative of an estate, or ability to adopt a child. See
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc (“CJP”) § 8-103(b)(4); Md. Rules
6-122, 9-103(b)(1)(N). The American Bar Association identifies
166 permanent legal consequences that Maryland law may impose
for any conviction, and 324 consequences for a felony conviction.
Am. Bar Ass’n, National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2025) (select “Maryland” for “Jurisdiction,” “Any
misdemeanor” or “Any felony” for “Offense type,” and
“Indefinite” for “Duration”).

But the stigma of a criminal record can weigh even more
heavily than these formal disabilities. See, e.g., Maryland
Equitable Justice Collaborative, Breaking the 71%: A Path Toward
Racial Equity in the Criminal Legal System 54 (2024) (“MEJC
Report”); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88
Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1104-05 (2013). Would-be employers,
landlords, and others can easily look up criminal records from both
official sources and private background check services. See Logan,
supra, at 1107-08; Anna Kessler, Excavating Expungement Law:
A Comprehensive Approach, 87 Temp. L. Rev. 403, 411-12 (2015);
Collateral Consequences Report at 10, 12. That easy access
subjects people with criminal records to discrimination in almost
every facet of life. See, e.g., MEJC Report at 54; Logan, supra, at
1107-09; Yee, supra, at 170-71. “These compounded barriers not
only undermine an individual’s ability to rebuild their life but also
perpetuate cycles of recidivism, which places strain on families,
communities, and the criminal legal system itself.” MEJC Report
at 54. The scope of the problem is vast. By some estimates, one
third of the U.S. adult population has a record of arrest and/or
conviction. Yee, supra, at 171. And the burden falls
disproportionately on communities that are exposed at higher rates
to the criminal justice system. See MEJC Report at 7, 54.

Expungement aims to address this problem. Almost every
state allows expungement of criminal records in at least some
Gen. 82] 85

circumstances. See Restoration of Rights Proj., 50-State
Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief (last
updated July 2024) (“50-State Comparison”), https://ccresourcece
nter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-
expungement-sealing-and-set-aside-2-2/. Expungement typically
shields the official records of a conviction from public access and
also limits access by government and law enforcement agencies.
See Yee, supra, at 182-83; Brian M. Murray, A New Era for
Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the State and
Federal Levels, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 361, 362 (2016).
Typically, too, the beneficiary of expungement (the “expungee”)
may deny the existence of the conviction if asked, for example, on
a job or college application. See Yee, supra, at 182-83. Other
details that vary from state to state include what convictions are
eligible, the procedures required to obtain expungement, and
whether expungement has any further effects, such as eliminating
collateral consequences imposed by law. See 50-State
Comparison.

Expungement does not erase all collateral consequences of a
conviction, however. First, expunged records often are not
destroyed, but may be retained for certain law-enforcement
purposes. E.g., Kessler, supra, at 433. Thus, some commentators
have argued that “sealing” is a more accurate term than
“expungement.” Id. Second, the scope of expungement, meaning
what public records are expunged or sealed and what collateral
consequences are removed, depends on the statute. Legislatures
crafting expungement remedies must strike a balance among the
reduction of collateral consequences, protection of the public, and
preservation of records for law-enforcement and other purposes.
See, e.g., Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 115-16 (1966);
E.A. v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm’n, 208 N.J. Super. 65, 68
(1986); D.A. v. State, 58 N.E.3d 169, 173 (Ind. 2016). This means
some collateral consequences usually remain even after
expungement. Finally, non-governmental records are often
unaffected by expungement. This includes government records
harvested into private databases. See Murray, supra, at 377-78.
Data brokers often fail to update their records to reflect the
expungement of a conviction. Id.

B. Maryland’s Expungement Law

Maryland’s expungement statute is codified at Title 10,
Subtitle 1 of the Criminal Procedure Article (the “Expungement
Law”), with implementing court rules found in Title 4, Chapter 500
of the Maryland Rules. The Expungement Law focuses on
86 [110 Op. Att’y

expungement of “police records” and “court records.” Under the
law, “expunge” means “to remove information from public
inspection in accordance with [the Expungement Law].” Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Proc. (“CP”) § 10-101(e). And “expungement,” as to
a court record or a police record, means:

[R]emoval from public inspection:
(1) by obliteration;
(2) by removal to a separate secure area to
which persons who do not have a legitimate
reason for access are denied access; or
(3) if access to a court record or police record
can be obtained only by reference to another
court record or police record, by the
expungement of it or the part of it that
provides access.

Id. (f); see also Md. Rule 4-502(e).

As noted, the scheme focuses on the expungement of court
records and police records, both of which are defined terms.
“[C]ourt record,” as relevant here, means “an official record of a
court that the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps
about . . . a criminal proceeding,” and includes “an index, docket
entry, charging document, pleading, memorandum, transcription of
proceedings, electronic recording, order, and judgment.” CP
§ 10-101(d); see also Md. Rule 4-502(d). And “police record”
means, in relevant part, “an official record that a law enforcement
unit, booking facility, or the Central Repository maintains about
the arrest and detention of, or further proceeding against, a person
for . . . a criminal charge [or] a suspected violation of a criminal
law.” CP § 10-101(i); see also Md. Rule 4-502(h).

Although the Expungement Law provides for expungement
of records of a variety of cases not resulting in conviction, such as
arrests without charges, cases terminated by dismissal or nolle
prosequi, and acquittals, CP §§ 10-103, 10-103.1, 10-104,
10-105(a), we will focus here on expungement of records of
convictions, as these are most relevant to your question. Records
of a conviction can be expunged in the following circumstances:

• When a person was convicted of only one
criminal act, not a crime of violence, and
received a full and unconditional pardon from
the Governor. CP § 10-105(a)(8).
Gen. 82] 87

• When a person was convicted of certain minor
public-order offenses, including public
urination and loitering. Id. (a)(9).
• When a person was convicted of a crime, but
the underlying act is no longer a crime. Id.
(a)(11).

• When a person was convicted of simple
cannabis possession. Id. (a)(12).

• When a conviction was vacated on the ground
that the defendant was a victim of human
trafficking. Id. (a)(13); CP § 8-302.

• When a person was convicted of one of a
lengthy list of specified misdemeanors. CP
§ 10-110(a)(1).

• When a person was convicted of one of a
shorter list of specified felonies, id. (a)(2),
specifically: Theft under § 7-104 of the
Criminal Law Article; possession with intent
to distribute a controlled dangerous substance
under § 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article; or
burglary (except first degree burglary with
intent to commit a crime of violence) under
§§ 6-202(a), 6-203, or 6-204 of the Criminal
Law Article.

Expungement is available regardless of whether the
conviction resulted from a guilty verdict at trial or a guilty plea,
because the term “convicted” encompasses both scenarios. See
Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 642-43 (1985). Also, if a guilty plea
to an offense not enumerated above leads to probation before
judgment, the record is eligible for expungement, assuming
successful completion of probation. See CP § 10-105(a)(3), (c)(2),
(e)(4).1
1
The Expungement Law does not expressly address cases where a
defendant pleaded nolo contendere. A plea of nolo contendere subjects
the defendant to sentencing but does not result in “conviction” in the
strict sense. E.g., Hinton v. State, 257 Md. App. 562, 582 & n.6 (2023).
However, we doubt the General Assembly intended that a guilty verdict
or guilty plea would be eligible for expungement, whereas a nolo plea to
the same charge would not. Thus, we think that, for purposes of the
88 [110 Op. Att’y

An individual with a qualifying conviction becomes entitled
to expungement after a specified waiting period. The waiting
period usually begins upon completion of the sentence. See CP
§§ 10-105(c), 10-110(c). Once eligible, the individual must file a
petition in the last court to have jurisdiction over the case. See CP
§§ 10-105(b), 10-110(b); see also Md. Rule 4-504(a). Specifically,
an eligible person “may file a petition listing relevant facts for
expungement of a police record, court record, or other record
maintained by the State or a political subdivision of the State.” CP
§§ 10-105(a), 10-110(a).

Unless the State’s Attorney or a law enforcement agency
objects, the court “shall pass an order requiring the expungement
of all police records and court records about the charge.” CP
§§ 10-105(d)(2), 10-110(e)(3); see also Md. Rule 4-507(b). If
there is an objection, the court must hold a hearing, and if it finds
the petitioner entitled to expungement, “shall order the
expungement of all police records and court records about the
charge.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(2); see also Md. Rule
4-508. Before granting expungement, the court must consider the
petitioner’s success at probation, parole, and mandatory
supervision, and whether any court-ordered restitution has been
paid. CP §§ 10-105(e)(5), 10-110(f)(2)(iii)-(iv). Under CP
§ 10-110, which allows expungement of a broader array of
misdemeanors and felonies, the court must also determine that the
petitioner is not a risk to public safety and that expungement would
be in the interest of justice. CP § 10-110(f)(2)(iii), (v). “[E]very
custodian of the police records and court records that are subject to
[an] order of expungement” must certify compliance within sixty
days. CP §§ 10-105(f), 10-110(h); see also Md. Rule 4-510.

Some police records and court records are expressly exempt
from expungement. Court records exempt from expungement
include “the published opinion of a court,” “a cash receipt or
disbursement record that is necessary for audit purposes,” and “a
transcript of court proceedings made by a court reporter in a
multiple defendant case.” CP § 10-102(c)(2)-(4). Police records
exempt from expungement include “an investigatory file” and “a
record of the work product of a law enforcement unit that is used
solely for police investigation.” CP § 10-102(c)(5)-(6).

Expungement Law, the term “convicted” likely includes a nolo plea, as
is true in some other contexts. See, e.g., Md. Rule 5-609(d); Curry v.
Department of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 102 Md. App. 620, 625
(1994); see also Curry, 102 Md. App. at 627 n.3 (noting that the meaning
of the word “conviction” depends on context).
Gen. 82] 89

But with these limited exceptions, records subject to
expungement must either be destroyed or removed to a limited-
access secured area. CP § 10-101(f); see also Md. Rule 4-512. “A
person may not open or review an expunged record or disclose to
another person any information from that record without a court
order[.]” CP § 10-108(a). Also, an employer or educational
institution may not require an applicant for a job or for admission
to disclose information about expunged convictions. CP
§ 10-109(a)(1)(i), (a)(3)(i). Nor may a State or local government
agency require an applicant for a license, permit, registration, or
government service to disclose information about convictions for
which records have been expunged, or deny an application on the
basis of the person’s refusal to disclose an expunged conviction.
CP § 10-109(a)(1)(ii), (a)(3)(ii). Violation of any of these
restrictions on the use of expunged information is a misdemeanor.
CP §§ 10-108(d)(1), 10-109(b)(1).2

The General Assembly first enacted general expungement
legislation in 1975. 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 260. It did so apparently
in response to the then-Court of Appeals’ decision in Doe v.
Commander, Wheaton Police Dep’t, 273 Md. 262 (1974),
suggesting the possibility of an inherent judicial authority to
expunge in the absence of statutory authority, see Mora v. State,
123 Md. App. 699, 710 (1998), aff’d, 355 Md. 639 (1999). Since
1975, the Legislature has gradually broadened the availability of
the remedy. In particular, it has expanded what dispositions and
what crimes are eligible for expungement. For example, under the
original statute, records of convictions could not be expunged. In
1982, the General Assembly allowed expungement of records of
pardoned convictions. 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. In 2008, it
extended expungement to convictions of certain minor public-order
offenses. 2008 Md. Laws, ch. 616. And in 2016, under the Justice
Reinvestment Act, it extended expungement to a much longer list
of misdemeanor convictions, with a 2018 amendment adding
certain felony convictions. 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515; 2018 Md.
Laws, ch. 143. More recently, the Legislature has focused on
expungement of cannabis-related charges, including automatic
expungement in certain circumstances. See CP § 10-105.1; e.g.,
2021 Md. Laws, ch. 680.

2
A separate statute allows for the “shielding” of certain convictions.
CP § 10-301(f). To “shield” a conviction means to render related court
and police records “inaccessible by members of the public.” Id. (e).
However, access to shielded records is much broader than access to
expunged records. See id. § 10-302. As relevant here, shielded records
are accessible to professional licensing agencies. See id. (b)(2).
90 [110 Op. Att’y

C. Professional License Discipline as a Collateral Consequence

Many occupations and professions in Maryland require
licenses, from physicians to cosmetologists to maritime pilots. Md.
Code Ann., Health Occ. (“HO”) § 14-301; Md. Code Ann., Bus.
Occ. & Prof. (“BO&P”) §§ 5-301, 11-401. And for many of these
occupations and professions, the licensing authority may suspend
or revoke a license for certain criminal convictions.

Relevant here, the Health Occupations Article gives various
health professions boards the authority to suspend or revoke a
license if the licensee is convicted of, or pleads guilty or nolo
contendere to, a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude.3 For
some professionals, like physicians, license revocation is
mandatory upon conviction of (or plea to) a crime of moral
turpitude. HO § 14-404(b).4 Where revocation is not mandatory,
the licensee typically has a right to a hearing on whether the
conviction justifies the proposed discipline. See Oltman v.
Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 162 Md. App. 457, 489 (2005);
see also Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-226(c). “Each health
3
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. (“HO”) §§ 1A-309(7)
(acupuncturists), 9-3A-12(b)(4) (assisted living managers), 2-314(4)
(audiologists, hearing aid dispensers, and speech-language pathologists),
17-6A-19(3) (behavior analysts), 8-6D-10(a)(4) (certified midwives),
3-313(5) (chiropractors), 4-315(c)(13) (dental hygienists), 4-315(a)(4)
(dentists), 5-311(6) (dietician-nutritionists), 8-6C-20(a)(4) (direct-entry
midwives), 8-6B-18(a)(6) (electrologists), 21-312(b)(5) (environmental
health specialists), 6-308(a)(4) (massage therapists), 7-316(a)(4)
(morticians), 7-604(4) (mortuary transport service providers),
2-4A-14(3) (music therapists), 8-316(a)(4) (nurses), 8-6A-10(a)(4)
(nursing assistants), 9-314(b)(4) (nursing home administrators),
10-315(6) (occupational therapists), 11-313(3) (optometrists),
12-313(b)(22) (pharmacists), 12-6B-09(22) (pharmacy technicians),
13-316(6) (physical therapists), 16-311(a)(3) (podiatrists), 17-509(10)
(professional counselors), 18-313(3) (psychologists), 12-6D-11(15)
(registered pharmacy interns), 20-313(b)(4) (residential childcare
program professionals), 19-311(7) (social workers).
4
We need not comprehensively define “moral turpitude” here, but
courts have called the concept “rather broad” in the professional
licensing context. See Oltman v. Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 162
Md. App. 457, 483 (2005). The term can include crimes involving a
serious breach of professional standards and casting doubt on public
confidence in the profession, see Burke v. Maryland Bd. of Physicians,
250 Md. App. 334, 350, 353 (2021) (physician who wrote multiple
prescriptions for non-patients), but can also include crimes not directly
related to professional practice, see Brun v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314 (1937)
(indecent exposure with underage victims).
Gen. 82] 91

occupations board shall post on the board’s Web site each final,
public order for a disciplinary sanction issued to a licensee or
certificate holder.” HO § 1-607.
Meanwhile, the Business Occupations and Professions
Article usually provides for license discipline upon conviction of a
felony or a misdemeanor directly related to the licensee’s fitness to
practice.5 There are some minor variations.6 Under most of these
provisions, the board must consider the specific circumstances of
the crime and its relationship to the licensed activities. See, e.g.,
BO&P § 2-315(b); see also Pautsch v. Maryland Real Estate
Comm’n, 423 Md. 229, 260-62 (2011).

To recap, then, most licenses under the Health Occupations
Article and Business Occupations and Professions Article can be
revoked or suspended if the holder is convicted of a felony. And
most can also be revoked either for a misdemeanor of moral
turpitude, or a misdemeanor related to fitness to practice. Although
you asked about these two Articles in particular, statutes elsewhere
in the Code have similar provisions. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann.,
Agric. § 2-310(3) (veterinarians). In addition, the same underlying
conduct that led to the conviction might serve as the basis for
disciplinary action by licensing agencies on separate grounds, but
we focus here on disciplinary action based solely on the conviction
itself, as that was the premise of your question.

5
See, e.g., BO&P §§ 2-315(a)(1)(iii), (b) (accountants),
16-701.2(a)(3), (c) (appraisal management companies), 3-311(a)(1)(vii),
(b) (architects), 4-314(a)(1)(viii), (b) (barbers), 5-314(a)(1)(vii), (b)
(cosmetologists), 6-316(a)(1)(vi), (c) (electricians), 7-309(a)(1)(iv), (b)
(foresters), 16-701.1(a)(4), (c) (home inspectors), 8-310(a)(1)(iii), (b)
(interior designers), 9-310(a)(1)(iii), (b) (landscape architects),
11-409(a)(3), (e) (maritime pilots), 12-312(a)(1)(v), (b) (plumbers),
14-317(a)(1)(iii), (b) (professional engineers), 15-317(a)(1)(iii), (b)
(professional land surveyors), 16-701(a)(1)(v), (b) (real estate
appraisers), 19-408(a)(4) (security guards), 6.5-314(a)(1)(iii), (b)
(stationary engineers).
6
See BO&P § 17-322(b)(24), (d) (real estate brokers may be
disciplined for a felony, misdemeanor related to fitness to practice, or
crime that constitutes a violation of any provision of the real estate
brokers statute); BO&P § 18-309(4) (security system technicians may be
disciplined for a felony, theft offense, or crime of moral turpitude);
BO&P § 20-314(a)(6) (private home detention monitors may be
disciplined for a felony conviction); BO&P § 21-311(a)(3) (individual
tax preparers may be disciplined for a misdemeanor or felony related to
fitness to practice, as opposed to any felony).
92 [110 Op. Att’y

Some of the crimes for which a licensee could be disciplined
are potentially eligible for expungement under the Expungement
Law. As we have noted, certain felonies are expungeable. CP
§ 10-110(a)(2). Other crimes that are expungeable might,
depending on the facts, be crimes of moral turpitude or relate to
fitness to practice. For example, in Burke v. Maryland Board of
Physicians, a physician pleaded guilty to five misdemeanor counts
of writing prescriptions outside the course of regular professional
duties and in violation of professional standards, under § 5-902 of
the Criminal Law Article. 250 Md. App. at 348-49. The licensing
board determined that this was a crime of moral turpitude and
revoked the physician’s license. Id. at 353-54. A licensing board
thus might impose discipline, such as a license suspension or
revocation, on the basis of a conviction. Then, after the discipline
has become final, a court might expunge the records of the crime
that formed the basis of discipline. That scenario presents the
question you asked, which we will turn to now.

II
Analysis

Your question is: when a licensing board bases a disciplinary
order on a criminal conviction, and the records of the conviction
are later expunged, must the board “rescind” or “vacate” the order,
or otherwise “remove [it] from public view”? That question raises
two related legal issues. First, when a court expunges a conviction,
does that action invalidate or void any discipline that relied on the
conviction? Second, does an expungement order under the
Expungement Law reach the records of a licensing board’s
disciplinary action, such that, even if the discipline itself is not
affected, the records reflecting the disciplinary action must be
destroyed or removed from public access? We consider each
question in turn.

A. Expungement of a Criminal Conviction Does Not Invalidate
Earlier License Discipline that Relied on the Conviction

To begin, we consider whether expungement invalidates or
voids any discipline that relied on the conviction. For the reasons
explained below, our view is that although expungement seals
certain records of a criminal investigation, arrest, and conviction,
expungement does not retroactively invalidate or void the
conviction itself.
Gen. 82] 93

1. Expungement Does Not Retroactively Invalidate or Void
the Underlying Conviction

Because expungement is a statutory remedy, the effect of
expungement is a question of statutory interpretation. See In re
Cintron, 265 Md. App. 481, 500-01 (2025). At one time,
Maryland’s highest court left open the question whether courts
might have inherent or equitable authority to expunge criminal
records. See Doe, 273 Md. at 275-76. But the enactment of the
Expungement Law “obviated” any “common law right of
expungement” and established the “primary remedial mechanism”
in the area. Reid v. State, 239 Md. App. 1, 15 (2018). The
expungement procedure derived from the Expungement Law is
therefore “exclusive and mandatory” except in juvenile cases. See
Md. Rule 4-501. So, in considering how expungement affects
criminal convictions, the expungement statute controls. We thus
apply the ordinary principles of statutory construction.

“‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and effectuate’ the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it
enacted the statute.” E.g., Zukowski v. Anne Arundel County, 490
Md. 243, 264 (2025) (citation omitted). This search for legislative
intent begins with the statute’s plain language. Id. It also considers
context, looking at the statutory scheme as a whole and the
underlying “purpose, aim or policy” of the legislation. Id. We may
also examine other extrinsic evidence of intent, including
legislative history. E.g., Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113-
14 (2018). But a court “will not read into the statute words that
give it an interpretation that limits or extends its application beyond
the words the Legislature used.” E.g., Allen v. State, 440 Md. 643,
671 (2014) (citation omitted).

In considering the effect of expungement, the natural place to
begin is the language of the statutory provision defining “expunge”
and “expungement.” Expunge means “to remove information from
public inspection in accordance with” the Expungement Law. CP
§ 10-101(e). And the definition of “expungement” elaborates on
that theme, defining the term to mean removal of records from
public inspection, generally by obliteration or removal to a “secure
area.” Id. (f). Expungement, then, concerns the protection and
sealing of certain documents. It is “a form of record-keeping.”
Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 498. Nothing in this language suggests
an intent to go further and invalidate or void the original conviction.

The other provisions of the Expungement Law that deal with
expungement’s effects also suggest that expungement does not
94 [110 Op. Att’y

erase a conviction for all purposes. There are two such provisions.
Section 10-108 governs access to expunged records and imposes
penalties for their misuse, but it deals only with records. Similarly,
§ 10-109 protects information on expunged convictions from being
disclosed, by preventing the expungement beneficiary from being
compelled to disclose it, but only in specified situations. These
provisions are limited in scope, and they would be unnecessary if
expungement in general meant that a person would be treated for
all purposes as though they had never been convicted. Again, the
law protects specified records and information reflecting the
conviction from disclosure. But to conclude that the conviction is
invalidated would require a step further. We see no support in the
law for that further step.

Indeed, the General Assembly has rejected the idea that
expungement requires the State to behave for all purposes as
though the conviction never happened. The Legislature
specifically excluded certain items from expungement’s reach,
including court opinions, some trial transcripts, and police work
product. CP § 10-102(c). As we will discuss further below, its
focus was primarily on police and court records, see infra Part II.B,
perhaps because they are the records that impose the greatest
stigma on individuals or perhaps because an expungement process
limited to police and court records would be more administrable.
And it allowed for the review of even these records on a showing
of good cause. CP § 10-108(b)(1). When the Legislature decided
what expungement does and does not do, we must respect its policy
judgment. See, e.g., Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 502; see also, e.g.,
Ready, 243 Cal. App. 2d at 115-16; E.A., 208 N.J. Super. at 68;
D.A., 58 N.E.3d at 173.

The Appellate Court also has rejected the argument that
expungement means across-the-board “erasure.” Cintron, 265 Md.
App. at 500-01. In Cintron, the Howard County police had
investigated an alleged crime by a Baltimore City police officer and
sent copies of evidence from the police record to the Baltimore City
police. Id. at 487-88. The charge was later expunged. Id. But the
expungement order did not include the Baltimore City police
among the custodians required to expunge police records. Id. The
City police later used its copies of the evidence in a disciplinary
proceeding against the officer. The court held that this use of the
evidence was proper, because the City police were never subject to
an expungement order. Id. at 498-99. In the court’s view, the
“clear and unambiguous” language of the statute reflected a
legislative “balance” between privacy and law-enforcement needs.
Id. at 500-01. And under that clear language, the effect of
Gen. 82] 95

expungement is limited to the terms of an expungement order, even
when that limitation means some public records of a conviction
will remain unexpunged. See id. Cintron indicates that courts, to
respect the legislative balancing of interests, will not expand the
reach of expungement beyond what the statute “clear[ly] and
unambiguous[ly]” provides. Because the statute makes no
reference to expungement invalidating the original conviction, it
would not have that effect.

The probation-before-judgment statute offers an illuminating
contrast. That statute lets the court stay the entry of judgment in a
criminal case and place the defendant on probation. CP § 6-220.
When the defendant fulfills the conditions of probation, “the court
shall discharge” them “without judgment of conviction,” and the
discharge is “not a conviction for the purpose of any
disqualification or disability imposed by law.” Id. § 6-220(i). The
absence of equivalent language in the Expungement Law suggests
that the General Assembly did not similarly intend that an
expunged conviction would no longer be a conviction for any
purpose. And even the probation-before-judgment statute does not
authorize the court to set aside a final conviction once it has been
entered. Rather, the defendant will avoid a “conviction” only in
cases where the court never enters judgment to begin with; that is,
where it stays entry of judgment and then dismisses the charges on
completion of probation. See Hall v. Prince George’s County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 431 Md. 108, 126, 130 (2013).

Courts in other states have also observed that expungement or
sealing of criminal records is not equivalent to voiding or vacating
the conviction. For example, a New York appellate court held that
a statute that “simply create[d] a mechanism for restricting future
access to existing records” of certain drug-related charges did not
“contemplate any alteration of the underlying criminal judgment
reflected in those records.” People v. M.E., 121 A.D.3d 157, 160
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly
explained that expungement “of a conviction merely deletes the
evidence of the underlying conviction from court records” and
“does not invalidate the conviction,” contrasting that concept with
vacatur, which results from legal or factual flaws in the original
proceedings and “invalidates the conviction itself.” State v.
Braunschweig, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 754-56 (2018). And along the
same lines, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals observed that
expungement “casts no doubt on the integrity of the conviction
itself, but denotes a policy judgment to remove the conviction from
a person’s public record.” Hickerson v. United States, 287 A.3d
237, 243 (2023). Although these opinions interpreted different
96 [110 Op. Att’y

statutes with different language, they offer support for the general
proposition that expungement and vacatur of conviction are
different things.
To be clear, we do not address the prospective effects of
expungement. That is, we do not consider what effects
expungement may have on governmental actions taken after a court
grants expungement. We conclude only that expungement does not
actually vacate, retroactively invalidate, or render void ab initio, an
earlier final judgment of conviction. The Expungement Law
defines expungement’s effects. And those effects do not include
invalidating the underlying conviction.

2. Because Expungement Leaves the Underlying
Conviction in Existence, It Does Not Invalidate
Discipline that Relied on an Expunged Conviction

Given our conclusion that expungement does not invalidate
the conviction itself, nothing requires the invalidation of a final
administrative agency action that relied on a later-expunged
conviction (assuming nothing else changed). The factual and legal
basis of the administrative agency’s action remains in existence.7
We reached a similar conclusion decades ago in the related
context of gubernatorial pardons. 37 Opinions of the Attorney
General 188 (1952). In that opinion, the Board of Dental
Examiners had revoked a dentist’s license for a crime of moral
turpitude, but the Governor later pardoned that crime, and the
Board asked about the status of the dentist’s license following the
pardon. Id. at 188-89. We concluded that the pardon did not
restore the dentist’s license, noting that [t]he pardon “contain[ed]
nothing which indicate[d] that the conviction was erroneous.” See
id. at 191-93. So, although the dentist could have potentially
applied for a new license under the standards governing a new

7
We need not decide when an agency may have discretion to revisit
a past disciplinary order on the ground that the underlying conviction
was expunged. See, e.g., Cinque v. Montgomery County Planning Bd.,
173 Md. App. 349, 361 (2007) (discussing the inherent authority of
administrative agencies to reconsider quasi-judicial decisions); 106
Opinions of the Attorney General 38, 48 n.10 (2021) (same). But see
Lawrence N. Brandt, Inc. v. Montgomery County Comm’n on Landlord-
Tenant Affs., 39 Md. App. 147, 160-61 (1978) (holding that authority to
reconsider a quasi-judicial decision ends once petition for judicial review
is filed or time for judicial review expires). We conclude only that an
agency is not required to do so, and that the expungement does not
invalidate the agency action by operation of law.
Gen. 82] 97

application, he was not entitled to his old license back. See id. at
193. The reasoning of our 1952 opinion suggests that if a form of
post-conviction relief does not call the validity of the original
conviction into doubt, it does not invalidate license discipline based
on the conviction.

Out-of-state authority supports the conclusion that
expungement does not bear on the propriety of a license revocation
when the expungement occurred after the licensing board’s action.
See, e.g., Schillerstrom v. State, 180 Ariz. 468, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994); 1993 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 2-192, 1993 WL 486032, at *6,
*8 (Nov. 16, 1993) (“[T]he sealing of a licensee’s criminal
conviction does not affect any prior disciplinary action taken by the
agency against that licensee.”); Or. Op. Att’y Gen. No. OP-2000-
1, 2000 WL 992134, at *11-12 (July 11, 2000) (concluding that
disciplinary board could disclose existence of, and reason for,
disciplinary action even where underlying records were expunged);
1993-1994 Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. 89, 1994 WL 2269, at *3-4 (Jan.
4, 1994) (same); cf. Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Safety,
169 N.H. 32, 37 (2016) (recognizing that although references to
“habitual offender” status on driving record were subject to
expungement under New Hampshire law, the status itself would
not be). As with our opinion on the dentist’s license, other
jurisdictions recognize that where expungement does not call the
validity of the original conviction into question, it does not affect
administrative actions based on the conviction. See Ballard v.
Board of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 452 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that because expungement under Arizona
law did not invalidate the conviction, it did not require restoration
of police officer’s pension, which had been revoked for felony).

We therefore conclude that expungement of the records of a
criminal conviction does not invalidate or vacate, or require the
rescission of, disciplinary action by a licensing board that relied on
the conviction. The General Assembly defined expungement as the
protection and sealing of certain records and information. But we
see no evidence that it intended the underlying convictions
themselves would be vacated or retroactively voided. And that
means administrative agency actions based on the original
conviction, at least those that became final before the expungement
order, retain their foundation.
98 [110 Op. Att’y

B. Although Expungement Typically Reaches Only Police and
Court Records, Some Limited Types of Records from
License Discipline Proceedings May Be Subject to
Expungement

We must also consider whether, even if expungement does
not invalidate license discipline that relied on a conviction,
documents related to that discipline can or must be expunged, i.e.,
destroyed or protected from public disclosure under the
Expungement Law. As we have discussed, expungement deals
primarily with the confidentiality of records. It is thus possible
that, even if expungement does not restore a license, it still requires
the licensing board to destroy (or remove from public access)
records about the revocation of the license.

However, as we will explain, we think only limited types of
records from license discipline proceedings will be subject to
expungement, for two reasons. First, the standard expungement
order issued by Maryland courts only reaches police records and
court records. Licensing boards’ records fall into neither of those
categories. Although the expungement statute also contemplates a
request to expunge “other records” held by the State, an
expungement order will not reach “other records” without a
specific request. Second, even if the petitioner so requests, the term
“other records” likely does not include records generated by a
licensing board itself in the disciplinary process. Instead, it would
likely reach only records that originated as court or police records
and were received by the board. We turn now to flesh out those
two points.

1. An Expungement Order Ordinarily Reaches Only Police
and Court Records

The standard form expungement order found in the Maryland
Rules reaches only police records and court records. “An order for
expungement of records shall be substantially in [this] form . . . as
modified to suit the circumstances of the case.” Md. Rule 4-508(a).
The form order reads:

Having found that [name] of [address] is
entitled to expungement of the police records
pertaining to that individual’s arrest,
detention, or confinement on or about [date],
at [location], Maryland, by a law enforcement
officer of the [law enforcement agency], and
the court records in this action, it is . . .
Gen. 82] 99

ORDERED that the clerk forthwith shall
serve on each custodian of police and court
records designated in this Order and on the
Central Repository a copy of this Order
together with a blank form of Certificate of
Compliance; and it is further
ORDERED that within 60 days after the entry
of this Order or, if this Order is stayed, 30 days
after the stay is lifted, the clerk and the
following custodians of court and police
records and the Central Repository shall (1)
expunge all court and police records
pertaining to this action or proceeding in their
custody (2) file an executed Certificate of
Compliance, and (3) serve a copy of the
Certificate of Compliance on the
applicant/petitioner/defendant[.]

Md. Rule, Form 4-508.1 (emphasis added).

Records held by a licensing board are not “police records” or
“court records” within the meaning of the Expungement Law. The
law defines these records not only in terms of their nature but also
their custodian. Police records are “official record[s] that a law
enforcement unit, booking facility, or the Central Repository
maintains” about a person’s arrest or detention. CP § 10-101(i).
Records not in the custody of a law enforcement unit, booking
facility, or the Central Repository are thus not “police records,” and
licensing boards do not come within any of those categories. Id.
(g). Similarly, court records are “official record[s] of a court that
the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps” about criminal
proceedings. Id. (d). So, again, licensing board records cannot be
“court records” because they are not kept by court personnel. A
standard expungement order conforming to Form 4-508.1 therefore
will not reach the records of a licensing board.

The form’s focus on police and court records is consistent
with the Expungement Law’s focus on those records. The first
provision of the Expungement Law (after the definitions section)
reads: “A police record or a court record is subject to expungement
under this subtitle.” CP § 10-102(a). Similar language recurs
throughout the law’s procedural provisions. Sections 10-105 and
10-110 govern expungement in cases where charges were filed
(other than certain cannabis charges). If a petitioner requests
expungement and the State’s Attorney does not object, “the court
shall pass an order requiring the expungement of all police records
100 [110 Op. Att’y

and court records about the charge.” CP §§ 10-105(d)(2),
10-110(e)(3). If the State’s Attorney does object but the court finds
the petitioner entitled to expungement, the “court shall order the
expungement of all police records and court records about the
charge.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(1). And “every custodian
of the police records and court records that are subject to the order
of expungement” must comply. CP §§ 10-105(f), 10-110(h).
There are no analogous provisions referring to any other category
of records.
The implementing Rules also assume that only police and
court records are subject to expungement. Rule 4-502 defines
“records” to mean “police records” and “court records” only. See
Md. Rule 4-502(j). All of the other provisions of the Rules then
reference expungement of “records.” See, e.g., Md. Rules 4-501,
4-504(a), 4-508(a), 4-510.

Some provisions of the expungement statute do contemplate
expungement of “other records” beyond police and court records.
Section 10-105(a), in particular, states that a person “may file a
petition listing relevant facts for expungement of a police record,
court record, or other record maintained by the State or a political
subdivision.” CP § 10-105(a) (emphasis added); see also CP
§ 10-110(a) (same). But even when such “other records” exist (an
issue we discuss in Part II.B.2, below), an expungement order will
not reach them without a specific request. See Davis v. Magee, 140
Md. App. 635, 654-55 (2001); Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 502. In
Davis, for example, the expungement petitioner argued that a
county had failed to comply with an expungement order because
its social services agencies had maintained records of a child abuse
investigation related to the criminal charges. 140 Md. App. at 641,
652. The court declined to decide whether the child abuse
investigation records were expungeable, because the petitioner had
not asked for them to be expunged. See id. at 655.
Thus, in the bulk of cases where a licensee informs one of
your boards that a conviction has been expunged, the expungement
order will not reach records of your board. The standard form
expungement order only reaches police and court records. And
even to the extent other records are expungeable, an expungement
order will not reach them except upon specific request. We turn
now to the question of what non-police and court records a
petitioner may in theory request to have expunged.
Gen. 82] 101

2. The Provision for Expungement of “Other Records”
Does Not Reach All Records Relating to License
Discipline

As just noted, some provisions of the Expungement Law seem
to contemplate expungement of “other records” beyond police and
court records. CP §§ 10-105(a), 10-110(a). But other provisions
of the statute assume that only police and court records can be
expunged. Supra Part II.B.1. The Expungement Law is thus
ambiguous on the question of whether, and to what extent, it allows
expungement of “other records.” When this type of ambiguity
arises, we try to harmonize the provisions of the statutory scheme
as far as possible. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Robinson, 435
Md. 62, 77 (2013).

For reasons that we will explain below, although not free from
doubt, we think the best way to harmonize the law’s provisions
here, consistent with traditional canons of statutory interpretation,
is to give meaning to the statutory references to “other records” but
read them to mean only records that are the same in substance as
police and court records without technically meeting the statutory
definitions of those terms. On this understanding, “other records”
would mean documents that originated as police or court records
but have come into the hands of other custodians, including
licensing boards.

As a starting point, we do not think the term “other records”
can be read so broadly as to cover all public records that mention
the criminal charge. Although the term may be broad in the
abstract, “the meaning of [even] the plainest language is controlled
by the context in which it appears,” e.g., Adelakun v. Adelakun, 491
Md. 1, 22 (2025) (quoting Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v.
Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 295 (2017)), and the
context here suggests that the meaning is more limited.
For one thing, reading “other records” that broadly would
create conflict with the requirements of other statutes. We have a
mandate to read, where possible, the General Assembly’s
enactments on the same subject as a “consistent and harmonious
body of law.” See, e.g., State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115 (1997)
(quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39 (1992)). The Health
Occupations boards are subject to a statutory requirement to post
disciplinary orders on their websites. HO § 1-607. A reading that
required the expungement of all records mentioning a conviction,
and in particular that required expungement of final disciplinary
orders, would put the Expungement Law in conflict with this
102 [110 Op. Att’y

statutory mandate, and we should avoid such a conflict if we can.
Similarly, the Public Information Act affirmatively requires the
disclosure of “any orders and findings that result from formal
[licensing] disciplinary actions.” Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov.
(“GP”) § 4-333(b)(7). 8 Although the Public Information Act defers
to confidentiality mandates found in other law, see GP
§ 4-301(a)(2), a reading that allowed expungement of final
disciplinary orders would create at least some tension with the
apparent legislative intent that such orders be available to the
public.

A reading of “other records” that encompassed all public
records referencing a conviction would also create significant
practical problems. “When seeking legislative intent, we consider
not only the objectives and purpose of the enactment, but
the consequences resulting from one construction rather than
another.” Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 69 (1994). For example,
the law does not contemplate expungement by redaction alone,
except in the narrow case of docket and index entries. See CP
§ 10-101(f); Md. Rules 4-511, 4-512. This would potentially
mean, under a broad reading of “other records,” that the entire
record would have to be destroyed or removed if it contains any
reference to a criminal charge. That requirement could create
serious difficulties both within and outside the context of licensing
discipline records. For example, voter registration files maintained
by State and local boards of elections refer to criminal convictions
because a felony conviction can temporarily suspend the right to
vote. See Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 3-102(b)(1). What happens
if one of those felony convictions is expunged?

Reading “other records” to cover all public records
mentioning a conviction would also leave licensing boards in a
bind when asked about the status of licenses revoked for criminal
conviction. As we have explained, expungement does not
invalidate the license discipline itself. Supra Part II.A. But if all
records mentioning the conviction (which would include the final
disciplinary order and most or all records of the disciplinary
proceedings) were expunged, then, if asked about the licensee’s
status, agency staff could not respond without obtaining a court
order to disclose information from expunged records. See CP
§ 10-108(a).
8
Indeed, under the Public Information Act’s licensing records
exemption, the final disciplinary order will often be the only document
from a disciplinary proceeding that the licensing board may disclose to
the public. See GP § 4-333(a)(1), (b)(7); see also 71 Opinions of the
Attorney General 305, 310-11 (1986).
Gen. 82] 103

Further, without a clear limiting principle, the broad reading
would require expungement, by destruction or removal to a secure
area, of even (for example) emails among licensing agency staff
mentioning a licensee’s conviction. Failure to destroy those
emails, or remove them, would expose agency employees to
criminal penalties and the loss of their jobs. See CP § 10-108(d).
Despite all these potential issues, nothing in the law gives
custodians of “other records” notice or the opportunity to be heard
on the expungement petition. See CP §§ 10-105(d)(1),
10-110(e)(1). We thus do not think that the General Assembly
intended the “other records” language to cover all public records
that mention a conviction, because of the tension among statutes
and the practical problems such a reading would create.

But the provision must cover some records beyond police
records and court records, as we cannot read the phrase “other
records” out of the statute entirely. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Power
Supply Ass’n v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 361 Md. 196, 214-15 (2000)
(stating the rule of interpretation that words in the statute should
not be rendered meaningless). Again, the traditional canons of
statutory interpretation guide our efforts to assign meaning to this
phrase. See, e.g., Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512 (1987).

First, we think the phrase “other records” most likely only
covers records that are closely related to police and court records.
This follows from the principle that we should harmonize the
statute’s provisions to the extent we can. E.g., Robinson, 435 Md.
at 77. As we previously noted, various provisions of the
Expungement Law assume that expungement only applies to police
and court records. Supra Part II.B.1. For example, the statute
provides that if the court, after a hearing, finds the petitioner
entitled to expungement, the “court shall order the expungement of
all police records and court records about the charge,” with no
mention of “other records.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(2).
And the Expungement Law’s scope provision states that “[a] police
record or a court record is subject to expungement under this
subtitle,” again with no mention of “other records.” CP
§ 10-102(a). The best way to reconcile these provisions with the
need to give some meaning to the “other records” language is to
conclude that “other records” must be akin, at least in substance, to
police and court records.

Other textual evidence also supports the view that “other
records” should be closely related to police and court records.
Originally, the “other records” provision applied to “police records,
104 [110 Op. Att’y

court records, and other records . . . pertaining to the charge.” E.g.,
Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 737(a) (1996 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis
added). In the code revision process that created the Criminal
Procedure Article, the phrase “pertaining to the charge” was
eliminated. 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 10 (Revisor’s Note to CP
§ 10-105). But changes in a code revision bill are presumed to be
non-substantive. See, e.g., Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528,
538-39 (2006). Thus, “other records” must still “pertain[] to the
charge” to be expungeable. And under the canon of interpretation
known by the Latin name ejusdem generis, “other records” must
“pertain to the charge” in the same way as “police records” and
“court records.” The ejusdem generis canon construes a term at the
end of a list to include only items “of the same class or general
nature as those specifically mentioned.” See, e.g., In re Wallace
W., 333 Md. 186, 190-91 (1993). We must therefore read “other
records” as covering records that “pertain[] to the charge” in ways
similar to the defined categories of police and court records.

The history of the “other records” provision again supports
this focus on police and court records. The language first appeared
in 1982, when the General Assembly for the first time authorized
expungement of certain conviction records. 9 1982 Md. Laws, ch.
872. Among other changes, the 1982 bill amended the language
authorizing a petition for expungement to read: “[A] person . . .
may file a petition setting forth the relevant facts and requesting
expungement of the police records, court records, and other
records maintained by the State of Maryland and its subdivisions,
pertaining to the charge.” Id. (amending Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27,
§ 737(a)(7)) (new language emphasized) (now codified at CP
§ 10-105(a)). But the bill also reenacted, without change, language
that seemed to limit expungement to police and court records. See
id. (Art. 27, § 737(e)) (“If the court finds that the person is entitled
to expungement, it shall enter an order requiring the expungement
of police records and all court records pertaining to the charge.”).
And other aspects of the 1982 bill’s legislative history indicate that
the Legislature was still focused on police and court records. The
title of the bill was: “An Act concerning Police and Court
Records—Expungement.” Id. The bill file, including the bill
request form and written testimony on the bill, also assumes the bill
would deal only with police and court records. See generally Bill
File on H.B. 1074, 1982 Leg., Reg. Sess. There was no discussion

9
Specifically, the 1982 legislation allowed expungement of
convictions the Governor had pardoned. 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. Prior
law had only authorized expungement in the case of a non-conviction
disposition like acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi. See id.
Gen. 82] 105

in the legislative history of what other categories of records might
be expunged.

The General Assembly also is presumed to know that the
Maryland Rules have never contemplated expungement of records
related to convictions, other than police and court records.
Compare Md. Rules 4-501 to 4-512, with Md. Rules 4-501 to 4-512
(1984 Repl. Vol.). “One of the fundamental precepts of statutory
interpretation is that the General Assembly is aware of existing law
when it enacts new legislation.” LeCronier v. United Parcel Serv.,
196 Md. App. 131, 141 (2010). And just as we do when there are
two statutes on the same subject, we must attempt to harmonize a
statute and court rule on the same subject when possible. See, e.g.,
Battley v. Banks, 177 Md. App. 638, 650-51 (2007). Not only the
text of the Rules themselves, but also the longstanding practice
under the rules of limiting expungement to police and court
records, is relevant. See, e.g., 72 Opinions of the Attorney General
81, 85 (1987) (explaining that a “longstanding practice . . .
consistently and publicly followed, is persuasive as to the
legislative intent”). If the General Assembly believed the Rules
were inconsistent with the statute, we would expect it to have said
so more clearly on one of the many occasions it has amended the
Expungement Law in the last forty years.

To sum up, then, we think the best way to reconcile the
available evidence of legislative intent is to conclude that “other
records” are records that are not within the statutory definitions of
“police records” and “court records,” but are similar in nature to
police and court records and “pertain to the charge” in the same
way as those records. The question becomes: what records might
fall into that category?

We can think of only one category of records that is
sufficiently related to “police records” and “court records” (and
that pertains to the charge in the same way) but does not fulfill the
statutory definitions: records that originated as police or court
records but are not held by a court or police department. The
Expungement Law defines police records and court records both
by their nature and by their location. Thus, a record that is a police
or court record by virtue of its content would not fulfill the statutory
definition if found in the hands of a different custodian, like a
licensing board. So, for example, a criminal court docket sheet is
a “court record” only if found in the records of the court itself. See
CP § 10-101(d). And an arrest report is a “police record” only if a
police department holds it. See id. (i). But if one of these records,
like a docket sheet or an arrest report, were to come into the hands
106 [110 Op. Att’y

of another agency, like a licensing board, it would not be
expungeable as a “police record” or “court record.” The most
likely reading, in our view, is that the reference to “other records”
was intended to address that gap. Importantly, these records (that
originated as police and court records but are now found elsewhere)
“pertain to the charge” in the same way as police and court
records—namely, they also originated as part of the criminal
proceedings.

Indeed, at least some other states, when faced with similar
ambiguity in their expungement statutes, have read those statutes
as limited to records originating from the police investigation or
court proceedings. In Oregon, for example, expungement applies
to “the record of conviction and other official records in the case,
including the records of arrest.” Or. Op. Att’y Gen. No.
OP-2000-1, 2000 WL 992134, at *5 (citation omitted). The
Oregon Attorney General interpreted “other official records in the
case” to mean “all records that were generated by law enforcement
or the court in the course of the criminal investigation and judicial
proceeding” but not records of licensing agency disciplinary
proceedings. Id. at *7. Oregon’s language is narrower than
Maryland’s in some ways (“in the case” instead of “pertaining to
the charge”) but broader in others (“in the case” instead of
“pertaining to [just] the charge”). The Oregon Attorney General’s
reading is thus some indication of how a Maryland court might read
Maryland’s “other records” language.

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky read the phrase
“records relating to the arrest, charge, or other matters arising out
of the arrest or charge” as applying only to records that were, by
their nature, “criminal records” or “law enforcement records.” See
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro. Gov’t v. Moore, 701 S.W.3d
335, 353-54 (Ky. 2024). This would exclude “internal employment
files” or “personnel files,” even when information in those files was
obtained from police records. See id. at 354-55. Again, this
reading gives meaning to the phrase “other matters” while still
striking a reasonable balance between expungement and
government functioning, and focusing on the records that are the
expungement law’s core concern.
There are also other states that have taken similar approaches.
See, e.g., D.A., 58 N.E.3d at 172 (concluding that the term
“conviction records” did not include records related to a civil
forfeiture); Director of Revenue v. Klenke, 29 S.W.3d 391, 392-93
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (statute authorizing expungement “from all
official records [of] all recordations of [an] arrest, plea, trial or
Gen. 82] 107

conviction” did not reach notation of administrative suspension for
DUI in driving record); 1983 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 2-384, 1983 WL
178761, at *2 (Dec. 21, 1983) (concluding that whether term “all
official records pertaining to the case” includes records of licensing
body would require case-by-case determination based on how
“interconnected” the records are). But see, e.g., Janevicius v.
White, No. 1-13-2423, 2014 WL 2719322, at *6-7 (Ill. App. Ct.
June 12, 2014) (unpublished) (affirming order expunging
information about criminal charge from driving record, under
statute authorizing expungement of “arrests and charges not
initiated by arrest”).
An example will illustrate how our reading works in practice.
Suppose, to use one of the hypotheticals you raised in your opinion
request, a licensed drug counselor were convicted of a drug-related
offense, and the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists
determined the crime to be one of moral turpitude and revoked the
counselor’s license. The files of the board would then likely
contain records that originated as police or court records in the
criminal case, such as a docket sheet, charging documents, a plea
agreement, or the judgment of conviction. See, e.g., Oltman, 162
Md. App. at 468. But it would also contain records that originated
from the board itself, like meeting minutes and the final order of
discipline. Assume the former licensee then petitioned for
expungement and specifically sought expungement of records of
the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists as “other
records.”
Under our interpretation, the former category of documents
(e.g., the criminal charging document) would be subject to
expungement as “other records,” but the latter (e.g., the board’s
minutes) would not. The former, in the hands of the licensing
board, would not be “court records” as defined in CP § 10-101, but
they would be other records pertaining to the charge in the same
way as court records, because they would have originated from the
criminal case itself. On the other hand, the latter would pertain to
the criminal charge only indirectly, and in a different way, because
they would not have originated from the criminal case itself, but a
collateral proceeding. Thus, only the former set of records could
be subject to an expungement order.
In sum, our opinion is that the Expungement Law does not
authorize or require expungement of all records of a license
discipline proceeding arising from a criminal conviction. The most
reasonable reading is that it authorizes expungement only of
records that originated as part of the criminal case and later came
108 [110 Op. Att’y

into the hands of the licensing agency, such as charging documents
or criminal judgments (and even then, only if specifically requested
and ordered by the court). This reading gives effect to the statutory
references to “other records” while acknowledging that court
records and police records are otherwise the statute’s exclusive
focus.

C. Legislative Clarification of the Scope of Expungement May
Be Advisable

We acknowledge that there are policy arguments that could
support a broader scope of expungement. After all, the overall
purpose of expungement is to reduce the stigma borne by
individuals with criminal records. Supra Part I.A. The continued
availability of State records that reference a criminal conviction,
but fall outside the category of “other records,” arguably
undermines that purpose. And even for records that are
expungeable, an expungement petitioner will likely have difficulty
identifying every custodian of expungeable records. See Cintron,
265 Md. App. at 502 (noting this “pragmatic concern[]”).

For these reasons and given the ambiguity in the statutory
scheme, the General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the
law governing the following issues: which records, if any, beyond
police records and court records are subject to expungement under
the Expungement Law; under what circumstances expungement
may affect previously issued license discipline that relied
exclusively on a criminal conviction; and the relationship between
the Expungement Law and statutes that require public posting of
licensing boards’ disciplinary orders.

III
Conclusion

As the law currently stands, expungement of a criminal
conviction requires the destruction, or removal to a limited-access
area, of certain records but does not invalidate or void the original
conviction. Thus, any professional disciplinary actions that relied
on the criminal conviction also are not invalidated by
expungement. In addition, expungement generally does not require
the destruction or removal of all records related to a license
discipline matter based on a criminal conviction. Rather, the best
reading of current law in our view is that expungement can, at most,
only reach records in the hands of licensing agencies that originated
in the criminal case as police or court records. And even these
Gen. 82] 109

records will not be subject to an expungement order unless the
expungement petitioner makes a specific request.

Anthony G. Brown
Attorney General of Maryland

Thomas S. Chapman
Deputy Chief,
Opinions & Advice
Patrick B. Hughes
Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice