Maryland Attorney General Opinion 103OAG49

Gen. 49] 49
JUVENILE CAUSES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FEDERAL ENCLAVES – WHETHER
STATE AUTHORITIES HAVE JURISDICTION OVER JUVENILE
OFFENSES ON ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND

December 26, 2018

The Honorable Joseph I. Cassilly
State’s Attorney for Harford County

You have asked for our opinion on whether Maryland
authorities have jurisdiction over a juvenile who commits a
delinquent act on the Aberdeen Proving Ground (the “Proving
Ground”), a U.S. Army facility located in Harford County. The
Proving Ground, as we understand it, was acquired by the federal
government from Maryland under the Enclave Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and remains under the jurisdiction of the federal
government. See 93 Opinions of the Attorney General 12, 17 & n.4
(2008). According to your request, it has been your view that
Maryland authorities do not have jurisdiction over juvenile
offenses occurring on the Proving Ground, but the military
prosecutor for the Proving Ground has asked you to reconsider that
position.
We conclude that Maryland authorities likely have
jurisdiction over juvenile offenses occurring on the Proving
Ground, so long as the federal government does not certify, under
18 U.S.C. § 5032, that federal jurisdiction is instead warranted.
However, if the State would prefer absolute clarity on that question,
it could ask the U.S. Secretary of the Army to officially retrocede
jurisdiction over juvenile offenses on the Proving Ground. See 10
U.S.C. § 2683. That retrocession would be effective once accepted
by the Governor under § 6-202 of the General Provisions Article
and would preclude any argument that State authorities lack
jurisdiction.
I
Background
Your question requires us to determine the respective
jurisdiction of the United States and Maryland over juvenile justice
issues on the Proving Ground. Such “[q]uestions concerning the
respective rights of the State and federal governments in lands
acquired and being used by the United States are extremely
50 [103 Op. Att’y

complex.” 63 Opinions of the Attorney General 332, 332 (1971).
Indeed, “[t]he ownership and operation by the Federal Government
of areas within the States gives rise to a host of legal problems
largely peculiar to such areas.” Report of the Interdepartmental
Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within
the States 2 (June 1957) (“1957 Report”). That is because the
federal government sometimes “has with respect to such properties
a special jurisdiction which excludes, in varying degrees, the
jurisdiction of the State over them,” but in other instances the
federal government’s jurisdiction is, “to varying exten[t]s,
concurrent with that of the State.” Id. Although it is not necessary
to discuss in detail all the permutations of state authority over
federal property, we will provide in this background section a brief
summary of the relevant principles and examine how those
principles apply to the Proving Ground. Then, as further
background, we will trace the development of the Maryland and
federal laws governing juvenile justice.
A. The Enclave Clause of the U.S. Constitution
Although the federal government may come into possession
of territory within the borders of a state in many different ways, the
focus of this opinion is on territory, like the Proving Ground, that
the federal government acquires under the Enclave Clause in
Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution. The Enclave Clause
authorizes Congress to:
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding
ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of
Congress, become the Seat of the Government
of the United States, and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
other needful Buildings . . . .
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The provision applies where a state
consents to the purchase of property by the federal government for
one of the purposes enumerated therein, but not where the federal
government acquires territory through other means or for other
Gen. 49] 51

purposes. 1 From the earliest days of the Union, many states,
including Maryland, have enacted statutes consenting to federal
acquisition of territory within their borders under the Enclave
Clause. See Roger W. Haines, Federal Enclave Law 16 (2011)
(“Haines”); see also 61 Opinions of the Attorney General 441, 442-
47 (1976) (discussing the history of Maryland’s consent statutes).
For territory acquired under the Enclave Clause, the
Constitution grants Congress the power to “exercise exclusive
Legislation.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). At
first, the term “exclusive” was read literally as excluding the
possibility of any state jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ft. Leavenworth, 114
U.S. at 532-33 (“When the title is acquired [under the Enclave
Clause], the federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all state authority.”);
see also Haines at 14-16 (explaining that early U.S. Attorneys
General believed that states could reserve no jurisdiction over
property under the Enclave Clause other than a right to serve civil
or criminal process). Accordingly, when states first enacted
statutes consenting to federal acquisition of territory, they tended
to consent in broad terms to the federal government’s exclusive
jurisdiction, reserving only the limited right to serve civil and
criminal process within the territory. See 1906 Md. Laws, ch. 743
§§ 1, 2 (providing consent for the United States to acquire “by
purchase, condemnation or otherwise . . . any land in this State
required for sites for . . . arsenals or other public buildings
whatever, or for any other purposes of the government” and
granting the U.S. “exclusive jurisdiction in and over any land so
acquired . . . for all purposes” other than the right to serve civil and
criminal process).

1
For example, before many states came into existence, the federal
government owned vast lands that were ceded from foreign countries or
from the original colonies. See Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114
U.S. 525, 539 (1885). The federal government sometimes reserved
jurisdiction over that land when the surrounding territory became a state,
without obtaining the consent of the state. See id. at 527-32. Similarly,
the federal government may acquire territory through direct purchase of
private property or through the exercise of eminent domain, without the
consent of the state or for purposes other than those named in the Enclave
Clause. See, e.g., Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518,
529-30 (1938). Although a state may still cede all or part of its
jurisdiction over such property to the federal government, without the
state’s cession, the federal government’s interest remains that of a mere
owner. See id. at 527-29. When we refer to “federal enclaves,” we mean
only those areas acquired by the federal government under the Enclave
Clause, not through any of these other means.
52 [103 Op. Att’y

This literal interpretation of the federal government’s
jurisdiction over “exclusive” federal enclaves resulted in the so-
called doctrine of “extraterritoriality,” i.e., that an enclave was
entirely foreign to the state in which it was located. Under that
doctrine, there was “a thorough separation of the land and its
inhabitants from the state.” Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 732
(1926), overruled by Hansford v. District of Columbia, 329 Md.
112 (1993). It was thus generally held that “states cannot take
cognizance of any acts done in the ceded places after the cession”
and that “the inhabitants of these places cease to be inhabitants of
the state and can no longer exercise any civil or political rights
under the laws of the state.” Id. In more recent years, as explained
further below, that extraterritoriality doctrine has been significantly
eroded, if not disavowed entirely. See Part II.A.3, infra. But under
the strict extraterritorial view prevalent for much of our Nation’s
history, state laws simply could not apply on exclusive federal
enclaves. See 1957 Report at 169.
The doctrine of extraterritoriality thus left the residents of
federal enclaves to be governed only by federal law, which often
put those residents in a jurisdictional no-man’s land. See Lowe,
150 Md. at 603 (Bond, J., concurring). In Maryland, for instance,
the Court of Appeals held in 1926 that residents of a federal enclave
were not State residents and, therefore, could not file for divorce in
the State’s courts. Lowe, 150 Md. at 601; see also Royer v. Board
of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561 (1963) (holding that residents
of an exclusive federal enclave were not residents of the State for
purposes of State voter qualifications), overruled by Hansford, 329
Md. at 133; 1957 Report at 214-48 (explaining how the
extraterritoriality doctrine often excluded enclave residents from
the right to vote in local elections, the right to obtain a divorce, and
the right to receive judicial probate relief). Similarly, a 1920
opinion from this Office concluded that children living on the
Proving Ground were not entitled to attend Harford County’s
public schools. 5 Opinions of the Attorney General 129, 130
(1920).
To fill these types of legal voids, courts over the years
recognized various ways in which state law may apply within a
federal enclave or may be enforced by state authorities. Although
we will summarize those doctrines in more detail below, one
important way in which state jurisdiction may apply is if a state
expressly reserves such jurisdiction at the time it consents to
provide territory to the federal government under the Enclave
Clause. Even though most states in the early years of the Republic
broadly consented to federal jurisdiction over federal enclaves, the
Gen. 49] 53

Supreme Court ruled in 1937 that the Enclave Clause “contains no
express stipulation that the consent of the state must be without
reservations.” James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,
148-49 (1937). Therefore, the Court ruled, a state could reserve for
itself concurrent jurisdiction along with the federal government
over federal enclaves, so long as the reservation of rights did not
interfere with federal functions. Id.; see also 40 U.S.C. § 3112
(providing, after James, that the federal government “is not
required . . . [to] obtain exclusive jurisdiction . . . over land or an
interest in land it acquires,” and that federal jurisdiction over such
land does not exist unless expressly accepted by the federal
government).
After James, many states amended their consent statutes to
reserve concurrent jurisdiction over territory thereafter acquired by
the federal government under the Enclave Clause. See 1957 Report
at 11. Maryland followed suit, adopting a consent statute in 1943
that explicitly reserved for the State “jurisdiction and authority to
the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States
and not inconsistent with the governmental uses, purposes, and
functions for which the land was acquired or is used.” 61 Opinions
of the Attorney General at 446 & n.4 (quoting Md. Code Ann., Art.
96 § 47 (1957), now codified, with minor changes, at Md. Code
Ann., General Provisions (“GP”) § 6-201)). 2 Enclaves acquired by
the federal government under that type of consent statute, in which
a state has broadly reserved jurisdiction over the territory, are
generally referred to as “concurrent” federal enclaves to distinguish
them from “exclusive” federal enclaves. 3 See, e.g., 1957 Report at
11-12; Haines at 32-33. 4

2
Maryland’s current consent statute is not retroactive. It “does not
affect the jurisdiction and authority of the State over land, or persons,
property, and transactions on the land, that the United States . . . acquired
on or before May 31, 1943, to the extent that the State ceded jurisdiction
under” one of various pre-1943 consent statutes that did not reserve
concurrent jurisdiction. See GP § 6-201(b).
3
Enclaves in which a state reserves some, but not all, of its jurisdiction
have sometimes been referred to as “partial jurisdiction” enclaves. See
Haines at 5-6; 1957 Report at 12. But that term can lead to confusion,
because states will often have partial jurisdiction over certain matters
even on exclusive enclaves. To avoid confusion, we will refer in this
opinion only to exclusive and concurrent enclaves.
4
When the state has not given consent to federal acquisition under
the Enclave Clause, a different analysis applies as to whether the federal
54 [103 Op. Att’y

B. Aberdeen Proving Ground as an Exclusive Federal Enclave
The changing nature of state consent statutes over the years
has, along with other factors, “created an almost infinite number of
jurisdictional situations” on federal enclaves. 1957 Report at 11.
For example, a state’s authority in a concurrent federal enclave may
differ significantly from a state’s authority in an exclusive federal
enclave. Therefore, to determine the extent of Maryland’s
jurisdiction over the Proving Ground, we must first consider the
terms of the consent statute in place at the time the territory was
acquired by the federal government.
The Proving Ground is a U.S. Army installation for the testing
of military equipment that comprises approximately 113 square
miles in Harford County, Maryland. The federal government
acquired much of the Proving Ground in 1917, during World War
I. See 93 Opinions of the Attorney General at 17 & n.4. Earlier
that year, Congress had authorized the President “to take over for
the United States the immediate possession and title of any land
selected by him . . . for a proving grounds.” United States v.
Holmes, 414 F. Supp. 831, 839 (D. Md. 1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Consistent with that authorization, President
Wilson issued a Proclamation that condemned for immediate
possession and title by the United States much of the Maryland land
that would become the Proving Ground. Id.
At the time, Maryland had in place a statute that, pursuant to
the Enclave Clause, gave broad consent for the United States to
acquire “by purchase, condemnation or otherwise . . . any land in
this State required for sites for . . . arsenals or other public buildings
whatever, or for any other purposes of the government.” 1906 Md.
Laws, ch. 743 § 1. That statute expressly granted to the federal
government “exclusive jurisdiction in and over any land so
acquired . . . for all purposes except the service upon such sites of
all civil and criminal process of the courts of this State.” Id., § 2;
see also 61 Opinions of the Attorney General at 442. Under that
statute, therefore, the territory acquired for the Proving Ground in
1917 qualified as an “exclusive” federal enclave. 93 Opinions of
the Attorney General at 17 n.4.

government has “exclusive” jurisdiction over the territory or whether,
instead, the state maintains concurrent or partial jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 142 (1930); 1957 Report at 4. It
is beyond the scope of this opinion to discuss those separate analyses.
Gen. 49] 55

Although Maryland amended its consent statute in 1943 to
reserve concurrent jurisdiction over territory thereafter acquired by
the federal government, it is our understanding that the federal
government acquired most of the Proving Ground before 1943. See
id. at 17 & n.4. We will thus focus our analysis on the question of
State juvenile jurisdiction over Proving Ground territory acquired
prior to 1943, i.e., the territory under exclusive federal jurisdiction.
C. Juvenile Delinquency Laws
1. State Juvenile Laws
Like the laws governing federal enclaves, the laws governing
juvenile justice have evolved significantly over the past century.
Until the early twentieth century, Maryland and most other states
did not distinguish between adults who committed crimes and
minors who committed crimes:
At common law, . . . [c]hildren under the age
of seven, it was held, were incapable of
criminal intent and therefore could not be
prosecuted for offenses. Children above that
age were treated as adults. They were given
the same legal protections and the same
punishments as adults.
In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 521 (1969) (internal quotations
omitted). Beginning around 1900, however, progressive social
reform movements highlighted the plight of children in jail and
focused on the need to rehabilitate, not punish, youthful offenders.
See id. at 522. In Maryland, for example, the General Assembly in
1902 authorized Baltimore City to appoint a “Magistrate for
Juvenile Causes” to have “exclusive jurisdiction of all cases of trial,
or commitment for trial, or of commitment to any reformatory or
other institution, of all minors under sixteen years of age.” Id. at
522-23 (quoting 1902 Md. Laws, ch. 611). Still, these procedural
changes did not alter the underlying criminal nature of the
proceedings; minors in Maryland continued to be charged with the
commission of crimes. Indeed, the statutory definition of
“delinquency” at the time depended upon that assumption, defining
a “delinquent child” as a person less than eighteen years of age
“who has violated any criminal law of this State or any ordinance
or regulation of a subdivision of the State.” 1941 Md. Laws, ch.
526.
56 [103 Op. Att’y

In 1943, the Legislature began to make sweeping changes to
the juvenile justice system. That year, the Legislature granted the
Baltimore City Circuit Court jurisdiction over all “juvenile causes,”
and, for purposes of that jurisdiction, defined “delinquent child” as
a child who commits an offense “which, if committed by an adult,
would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment.”
1943 Md. Laws, ch. 818 (emphasis added). Two years later, the
Legislature granted most county circuit courts that same
jurisdiction, and explicitly directed that a delinquent child “shall
not be charged with the commission of any crime.” 1945 Md.
Laws, ch. 797.
Under current Maryland law, a “delinquent child” is an
individual under the age of eighteen who has committed a
“delinquent act,” which, in relevant part, means “an act which
would be a crime if committed by an adult.” Md. Code Ann.,
Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJP”), § 3-8A-01(l), (m) (2013,
2017 supp.). The circuit courts sitting as juvenile courts generally
have exclusive original jurisdiction over a delinquent child with a
few exceptions, such as where the child is at least 14 years old and
alleged to have committed a crime punishable by life
imprisonment, or is at least 16 years old and alleged to have
committed certain serious crimes. CJP § 3-8A-03(a), (d). 5
Until the middle of the last century, then, cases involving
juvenile offenders were criminal in nature, even if social attitudes
about juvenile crime and punishment were shifting. Thereafter,
delinquency cases assumed many characteristics of civil
proceedings. Delinquency proceedings today “are special hybrid
creatures in the law,” bearing civil and criminal aspects, but they
appear to be more civil than criminal in nature. Lopez-Sanchez v.
State, 155 Md. App. 580, 598 (2004). As the Court of Special
Appeals has explained,
[t]he Maryland appellate courts frequently
have observed that juvenile delinquency
proceedings are civil in nature. The
observation often is made by way of contrast,
to emphasize that a distinction exists between
delinquency proceedings involving juvenile
offenders and criminal proceedings involving
adults in the criminal justice arena, even

5
In these situations, the child is proceeded against as an adult in
criminal court, unless the criminal court transfers the case to the juvenile
court. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 4-202.
Gen. 49] 57

though the conduct underlying a delinquent
act and a crime may be the same. . . .
“The raison d’etre of the Juvenile Causes Act
is that a child does not commit a crime when
he commits a delinquent act and therefore is
not a criminal. He is not to be punished but
afforded supervision and treatment to be made
aware of what is right and what is wrong so as
to be amenable to the criminal laws.”
Id. at 598-99 (quoting In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 695 (1988)
(other internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
In Maryland, the Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”)
has first-line authority for processing alleged juvenile delinquents.
The process begins when a DJS intake officer receives a complaint
“from a person or agency having knowledge of facts which may
cause a person to be subject to the jurisdiction of the [juvenile]
court.” CJP § 3-8A-10(b)(1). After investigating the complaint,
the intake officer may take a variety of actions, including
authorizing the appropriate State’s Attorney to file a delinquency
petition in State court. CJP § 3-8A-10(c)(3)(i). The intake officer
may also authorize the filing of a peace order by the State’s
Attorney, may propose an informal adjustment of the matter, or
may refuse to authorize the filing of a petition or peace order. CJP
§ 3-8A-10(c)(3)(i), (ii), (iii). If the intake officer refuses to
authorize the filing of a delinquency petition or peace order, and if
the underlying offense would be a felony if it had been committed
by an adult, the officer must forward the complaint to the local
State’s Attorney who may, in his or her discretion, file a
delinquency petition or peace order. CJP § 3-8A-10(c)(4).
2. Federal Juvenile Laws
Motivated by the same concerns as the states, the federal
government began to distinguish between adult and juvenile
criminal offenders as part of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
of 1938. See 52 Stat. 764 (1938). The Act defined “juvenile
delinquency” as the violation of a federal law, by a person under
18 years of age, which was not punishable by death or life
imprisonment. Id. The Act’s essential purpose was to keep
juveniles separate from adult criminals. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice’s
Criminal Resource Manual § 116 (“DOJ Crim. Res. Manual”).
In 1974, Congress adopted major amendments to this scheme,
with two changes relevant here. See Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
58 [103 Op. Att’y

1109 (1974). First, the statute no longer defined juvenile offenses
as crimes; instead, much like Maryland’s law, the statute defined
“juvenile delinquency” as a violation of federal law committed by
a person under the age of 18 which would have been a crime if
committed by an adult. Id., § 501 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5031).
Second, Congress mandated a preference for state jurisdiction over
all but the most violent federal juvenile delinquents. See id., § 502
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031, 5032); see also DOJ Crim. Res.
Manual § 116. In other words, Congress decided to provide for the
state-level handling of federal juvenile delinquents, so long as the
relevant state authorities were willing and able to assume
jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Today, the statute, as amended,
provides in pertinent part:
A juvenile alleged to have committed an act
of juvenile delinquency, other than a violation
of law committed within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
for which the maximum authorized term of
imprisonment does not exceed six months,
shall not be proceeded against in any court of
the United States unless the Attorney General,
after investigation, certifies to the appropriate
district court of the United States that (1) the
juvenile court or other appropriate court of a
State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to
assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with
respect to such alleged act of juvenile
delinquency, (2) the State does not have
available programs and services adequate for
the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense
charged is a crime of violence that is a felony
or an offense described in [a number of federal
drug laws], and that there is a substantial
Federal interest in the case or the offense to
warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.
If the Attorney General does not so certify,
such juvenile shall be surrendered to the
appropriate legal authorities of such State.
Id.
Thus, the federal government generally must turn a juvenile
over to state authorities, with only three limited exceptions: where
the Attorney General certifies that (1) the relevant state court does
not have or refuses to exercise jurisdiction; (2) that the relevant
Gen. 49] 59

state does not have adequate services for the juvenile; or (3) that
the offense is a felony of violence or specified drug-related offense,
and there is substantial federal interest to warrant federal
jurisdiction. The certification is a jurisdictional requirement,
absent which the federal government does not obtain jurisdiction
over a juvenile delinquent. See United States v. Wellington, 102
F.3d 499, 503 (11th Cir. 1996).
II
Analysis
You ask whether Maryland authorities have jurisdiction over
a juvenile who commits an offense on the Proving Ground. In
answering that question, we focus on the portions of the Proving
Ground acquired before 1943—i.e., the territory under “exclusive”
federal jurisdiction. 6 We shall determine, first, whether federal law
permits Maryland authorities to exercise jurisdiction over juvenile
offenses on the Proving Ground and, second, if so, whether
Maryland law grants that jurisdiction to its own authorities. As to
the first part of that analysis, we will provide a summary of the
doctrines under which states might have jurisdiction on an
exclusive enclave and then consider whether Maryland’s juvenile
delinquency laws fall within any of those doctrines. As to the
second part of the analysis, we consider whether Maryland’s
juvenile delinquency laws themselves can apply to acts committed
on exclusive federal enclaves.
A. A General Summary of the Doctrines Under Which a State
May Have Jurisdiction Within an Exclusive Federal
Enclave
Although the Enclave Clause provides Congress with
exclusive jurisdiction over federal enclaves, there are at least four
ways in which state laws may apply, or in which a state may
maintain some kind of jurisdiction, within an exclusive federal
enclave: (1) congressional authorization, (2) the so-called
“international law rule,” (3) the “friction, not fiction” test from
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of City of Louisville,

6
With respect to offenses committed on those portions of the Proving
Ground that were acquired by the federal government after 1943,
Maryland unquestionably has juvenile jurisdiction, so long as Maryland
does not interfere with federal functions or violate the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, because the State expressly reserved concurrent
jurisdiction over that territory. See Part I.B, supra.
60 [103 Op. Att’y

344 U.S. 624 (1953), and (4) the retrocession of jurisdiction by the
federal government. In this section, we provide a general summary
of each doctrine.
1. Congressional Authorization
Congress has, on a piecemeal basis, authorized a range of state
laws to apply on exclusive federal enclaves. To take one example,
an aggrieved individual may bring a state-law wrongful death or
personal injury lawsuit for acts arising on exclusive federal
enclaves. See 28 U.S.C. § 5001; see also, e.g., Louisiana United
Bus. Ass’n Cas. Ins. Co. v. J & J Maint., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 3d 852,
864 (W.D. La. 2015) (explaining that Louisiana’s substantive law
governed the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death occurring on an
exclusive federal enclave, and observing that “concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction is created when federal law allows for the
application of state law within a federal enclave”). Other examples
include federal statutes authorizing the levy of state fuel taxes, 4
U.S.C. § 104; state sales, use, and income taxes, 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-
106; and state unemployment compensation laws, 26 U.S.C.
§ 3305(d).
In the criminal law context, Congress has similarly adopted
state criminal laws for application on exclusive federal enclaves
through legislation called the Assimilative Crimes Act. See 18
U.S.C. § 13(a) (“Whoever within or upon [a federal enclave] is
guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable
by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed
or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such
place is situated, by the laws thereof at the time of such act or
omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like
punishment.”). The Assimilative Crimes Act essentially
“borrow[s] state law to fill gaps in the federal criminal law that
applies on federal enclaves.” Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155,
160 (1998).
Technically, unlike in the civil law context, state criminal
laws adopted through the Assimilative Crimes Act lose their status
as state laws and become federal laws. See Stokes v. Adair, 265
F.2d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 1959). Given that, criminal offenses
occurring on exclusive federal enclaves are generally subject to
prosecution only by the federal, not state, government. See 56
Opinions of the Attorney General 347, 350 (1971) (explaining that
“only federal authorities may prosecute, and only federal courts
hear, cases involving crimes committed within federal enclaves,”
even though the crimes “may be defined by the criminal law of”
the state); see also Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425 n.5 (1970)
Gen. 49] 61

(recognizing that “[p]erhaps the most real of the differences
[between Maryland residents who live on an exclusive federal
enclave and those who do not] is that crimes committed on
[enclave] grounds . . . while defined by state law, may only be
prosecuted in federal court by federal authorities”); DOJ Crim. Res.
Manual § 664 (explaining that the United States exercises “plenary
criminal jurisdiction” over territory under exclusive federal
jurisdiction). 7
2. The International Law Rule
The next way that state law may apply in an exclusive federal
enclave is by operation of a judicially created rule often referred to
as the “international law rule.” To help fill the legal void that
existed in exclusive federal enclaves before states began to reserve
concurrent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that all of a state’s
civil laws in effect when the federal government acquires an
enclave remain in effect, so long as those laws are not abrogated or
changed by Congress and are not otherwise inconsistent with
federal law. See Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S.
542, 546-47 (1885); see also 93 Opinions of the Attorney General
at 28. In doing so, the Court analogized the federal government’s
acquisition of an exclusive enclave within a state to its acquisition
of territory from a foreign sovereign:
It is a general rule of public law . . . that
whenever political jurisdiction and legislative
power over any territory are transferred from
one nation or sovereign to another, the
municipal laws of the country—that is, laws
which are intended for the protection of
private rights—continue in force until
abrogated or changed by the new government
or sovereign. . . . As a matter of course, all
laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict
with the political character, institutions, and
constitution of the new government are at
once displaced. . . . But with respect to other
laws affecting the possession, use, and
transfer of property, and designed to secure

7
Although crimes committed on exclusive federal enclaves generally
may only be prosecuted by federal authorities, delinquent acts are not
crimes under either Maryland law or federal law. See Part I.C, supra.
Thus, this limitation does not apply to potential State jurisdiction over
juvenile offenses on federal enclaves.
62 [103 Op. Att’y

good order and peace in the community, and
promote its health and prosperity . . . a change
of government leaves them in force until, by
direct action of the new government, they are
altered or repealed.
McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546-47. This rule “filled a vacuum which
would otherwise exist in the absence of Federal legislation,” and
furnished a code of civil law for Federal enclaves. 1957 Report at
158-59; see also James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94,
100 (1940).
One practical problem with the rule, however, was that it
“froze[]” the content of state laws as of the time of acquisition,
Haines at 21, preventing the application of new state laws absent
authorization by Congress. The Supreme Court partially addressed
that problem by holding that the international law rule extends to
later-enacted state laws, so long as the “basic state law” out of
which the new law evolved was in effect at the time of the enclave’s
creation. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963). But that
rule, often called the Paul rule, does not allow for the application
of an entirely new statutory regime to an exclusive federal enclave
where that regime was not created until after the enclave was
acquired by the federal government.
3. The Possible Extension of Jurisdiction Under the
Doctrine of “Friction, Not Fiction”
A third way in which states might have jurisdiction in an
exclusive federal enclave is through something called the “friction,
not fiction” doctrine. This doctrine stems from Howard v.
Commissioners of Sinking Fund of City of Louisville, the Supreme
Court decision that began to erode the principle of strict
extraterritoriality, under which exclusive enclaves were entirely
separate from the states surrounding them.
In Howard, the Court held that Louisville had the power,
based on authorization from a federal statute, to collect certain
taxes from employees on an exclusive federal enclave. 344 U.S. at
629 (citing 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-106). But more importantly, in the
course of doing so, the Court also determined that Louisville had
not violated the Enclave Clause by including the enclave within its
municipal borders. Id. at 626-27. The Court explained that, when
the federal government acquired the enclave in question, “the
property did not cease to be a part of Kentucky” and could thus be
annexed by Louisville under Kentucky law. Id. The Court
explained that “[t]he fiction of a state within a state can have no
Gen. 49] 63

validity to prevent the state from exercising its power over the
federal area within its boundaries, so long as there is no interference
with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.” Id. at
627. As the Court put it, “[t]he sovereign rights in this dual
relationship are not antagonistic. Accommodation and cooperation
are their aim. It is friction, not fiction, to which we must give
heed.” Id. (emphasis added).
Howard signaled an important shift, because it “seem[ed] to
make untenable the premise of extraterritoriality upon which most
of the decisions denying civil political rights and privileges [to
exclusive federal enclave residents were] squarely based.” 1957
Report at 243-44. Indeed, in 1970, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its rejection of strict extraterritoriality, holding that residents of an
exclusive federal enclave within Maryland could not be denied the
right to vote in State elections. Evans, 398 U.S. at 419-20. The
Court explained that Maryland could exclude enclave residents
from its elections “only if the [enclave] grounds ceased to be a part
of Maryland when the enclave was created.” Id. at 421. But, the
Court held, that precise “‘fiction of a state within a state’ [had been]
specifically rejected by this Court in [Howard], and it cannot be
resurrected here to deny appellees the right to vote.” Id. at 421-22.
It is not yet clear whether, or to what extent, this doctrine is
an independent ground that can justify the extension of state
jurisdiction to an exclusive federal enclave. After Howard and
Evans, many state courts have concluded that, under “[t]he modern
view” expressed in those Supreme Court decisions, the Enclave
Clause no longer prevents the application of a state law to federal
enclaves unless the law actually undermines federal sovereignty.
In re Terry Y, 101 Cal. App. 3d 178, 181-82 (1980) (citing Board
of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County v. McCorkle, 98 N.J.
Super 451 (1968)); see also State v. Debbie F., 120 N.M. 665, 667-
68 (1995) (stating that the “recent trend is to examine the state law
to be applied to determine whether it interferes with federal
sovereignty”); Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 25 (1989) (“Since the
Howard case, State courts have recognized that State law may
apply in a federal reservation provided that the State does not
interfere with the primary jurisdiction of the Federal
government.”). Indeed, although the Maryland Court of Appeals
has not yet expressly adopted that view, it relied heavily on Howard
and Evans in overturning some of its prior decisions that had
64 [103 Op. Att’y

upheld the doctrine of extraterritoriality. See Hansford, 329 Md. at
133 (quoting Evans, 398 U.S. at 424). 8
However, as best as we can tell, the federal courts have not
yet adopted the same expansive view of the “friction, not fiction”
doctrine. See, e.g., Allison v. Boeing Laser Tech. Servs., 689 F.3d
1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to read Howard and Evans
to mean “that all state laws that do not conflict with federal law or
policy are applicable on federal enclaves”); Kasperzyk v. Shetler
Security Servs., Inc., No. C-13-3383, 2014 WL 31434, *8-11 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (same); see also David E. Engdahl, State and
Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 283, 332-
36, 376-82 (1976). In fact, in most contexts where state courts have
extended state laws to enclave residents, those decisions have
partially relied on, or are at least consistent with, the international
law rule, because the “same basic scheme,” Paul, 371 U.S. at 269,
was in force at the time the territory was acquired by the federal
government. See, e.g., Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464,
468 (1936) (explaining that Kansas’s divorce statutes pre-existed
the state’s cession of the enclave at issue); Kasperzyk, 2014 WL
31434 at *10-11 (noting that Evans and similar cases can “easily
be reconciled with” the international law rule).
Still, under Howard and Evans, many states have approved
the extension of state laws to exclusive federal enclaves without
examining whether the state’s statutory scheme pre-existed the
acquisition. That has been particularly true when deciding whether
to extend state benefits and services to enclave residents. See, e.g.,
In re Terry Y, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 181-82 (upholding state court
jurisdiction to protect an abused child residing on an exclusive
enclave, because “in the area of the rights of federal enclave
residents to state benefits, there has been a trend in state courts to
hold that the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress does not deprive
enclave residents of benefits which would otherwise be theirs”);
Debbie F., 120 N.M. at 667-68 (ruling that state protections for
abused and neglected children on an exclusive enclave do not

8
The Court in Hansford ruled that Maryland courts had jurisdiction
over a wrongful death action arising from allegedly negligent acts that
occurred on an exclusive federal enclave within the State and that,
pursuant to Congress’s authorization in what is now 28 U.S.C. § 5001,
the State’s substantive law would apply to that action. 329 Md. at 131.
Although the Court relied upon Howard and Evans in rejecting the
doctrine of strict extraterritoriality, it did not have occasion to directly
consider whether those cases would permit the application of Maryland’s
substantive law in the absence of congressional authorization.
Gen. 49] 65

interfere with federal jurisdiction); Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 81-14
(1981) (same). We need not resolve here the extent to which
Howard and Evans function as an independent ground on which
state laws can apply in an exclusive federal enclave. It is enough
for our purposes to say that the “friction, not fiction” doctrine
means, at the very least, that a state is no longer precluded from
extending important protections to individuals within its borders
solely because those individuals reside on an exclusive federal
enclave.
4. Federal Retrocession or Relinquishment of Jurisdiction
State jurisdiction also may extend to exclusive federal
enclaves pursuant to federal statutes that allow certain federal
officials to retrocede to a state all or part of the federal
government’s exclusive jurisdiction over territory under the
official’s control. See Haines at 53-54. For example, in 1970,
Congress authorized the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, respectively, to “relinquish to a State . . . all or part of the
legislative jurisdiction of the United States over lands or interests
under [the Secretary’s] control in the State” by filing a “notice of
relinquishment” with the “Governor” of the State. 10 U.S.C.
§ 2683(a). Generally, under such statutes, the federal government
decides to relinquish only its exclusive jurisdiction, thereby
allowing the state to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the
enclave while permitting the United States to continue to exercise
its own jurisdiction. See Haines at 53-54.
A relinquishment under § 2683 takes effect upon acceptance
of the relevant state’s governor or as otherwise provided for in the
state’s laws. See 10 U.S.C. § 2683(a). In Maryland, the Governor
may accept the federal government’s relinquishment under GP § 6-
202, which provides that “the Governor may enter into an
agreement with the United States to establish full or partial
concurrent jurisdiction of the State and the United States over any
land in the State held by the United States.” 9 This mechanism
effectively permits a state to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
certain matters (or, if the federal government so chooses, all
matters) in all or part of a territory that would otherwise have been
an exclusive federal enclave.

9
It is our understanding that, traditionally, these agreements have then
been submitted to the Board of Public Works (“BPW”) for its approval.
It is not clear to us whether State law in fact requires these agreements
to be approved by the BPW, but there is no need for us to decide that
question here.
66 [103 Op. Att’y

B. The Doctrines Applied: Does Federal Law Permit Maryland
Authorities to Exercise Jurisdiction over Juvenile Offenses
on the Proving Ground?
We next consider whether any of the doctrines discussed in
the previous section permit Maryland to exercise jurisdiction over
juvenile offenses that occur on the areas of the Proving Ground
over which the federal government has “exclusive” jurisdiction.
We first examine whether Congress has authorized the states to
assert jurisdiction over matters of juvenile delinquency in exclusive
enclaves. Although Congress has not expressly granted
jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents to the states in precisely those
terms, we conclude that Congress has, by clear implication,
authorized the states to exercise such jurisdiction on exclusive
federal enclaves through 18 U.S.C. § 5032 of the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act.
Section 5032 provides that federal authorities “shall” turn a
juvenile over to state authorities unless the U.S. Attorney General
certifies that: (1) the relevant state court does not have, or refuses
to exercise, jurisdiction; (2) the relevant state does not have
adequate services for the juvenile; or (3) the offense is a felony of
violence or specified drug-related offense, and there is substantial
federal interest in the case to warrant federal jurisdiction. 18
U.S.C. § 5032. If the Attorney General does not so certify,
therefore, the statute effectively mandates that the federal
government defer to state authorities to handle juvenile offenses.
Although the statute does not explicitly say that § 5032’s
requirement to defer to state jurisdiction applies to juvenile
offenses committed on exclusive federal enclaves, that appears to
be the intent. See Haines at 90. Indeed, Congress confirmed that
intent in 1984 when it amended the law to exempt from the
certification process (and thus to allow the United States to
maintain jurisdiction over a juvenile without going through that
process) a small category of juvenile offenses “committed within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States,” Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2149 (1984)—a term that
explicitly includes exclusive federal enclaves. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)
(defining “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” to include,
among other things, “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use
Gen. 49] 67

of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction thereof”). 10
That decision to exempt only some offenses in the federal
government’s “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” from
the certification procedure suggests that federal authorities must
refer all other juvenile offenses committed within that special
jurisdiction—including those on exclusive enclaves—to the states,
unless the U.S. Attorney General certifies otherwise. After all, if
Congress did not intend for state juvenile jurisdiction to extend to
exclusive federal enclaves, there presumably would have been no
need to distinguish between offenses in exclusive enclaves that
require certification in order to assert federal jurisdiction and those
that do not, because the federal government’s jurisdiction would be
exclusive regardless of the offense. In other words, given that
§ 5032 contemplates deference to state authorities over juvenile
offenses on exclusive enclaves except in very limited
circumstances, the statute implies that Congress intended for state
jurisdiction to extend to juvenile offenses on such enclaves.
We recognize an argument could be made that Congress
meant only to defer to state jurisdiction in concurrent enclaves,
where states reserved their jurisdiction, rather than to affirmatively
authorize states to exercise jurisdiction over juvenile offenses in
exclusive enclaves. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (providing that the
Attorney General can decline to turn a juvenile over to state
authorities where the state lacks jurisdiction); see also George R.
Lavine III, Protect Our Military Children: Congress Must Rectify
Jurisdiction on Military Installations to Address Juvenile-on-
Juvenile Sexual Assault, 18 Wyo. L. Rev. 115, 120-21 (2018)
(arguing that § 5032 does not authorize state jurisdiction in
exclusive enclaves). But we think it unlikely Congress would have
referenced a statutory category—“special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States”—that expressly includes
exclusive federal enclaves if it did not intend the provision to apply

10
More specifically, the statute exempts from the certification
requirement offenses “committed within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States for which the maximum
authorized term of imprisonment does not exceed six months.” 18
U.S.C. § 5032. That allows the federal government to maintain
jurisdiction over petty offenses without going through the cumbersome
certification process. But the legislative history of the exception makes
clear that, even under those circumstances, “diversion to State authorities
is still preferred where possible.” Senate Report No. 97-307 at 1178-79
(Dec. 22, 1981).
68 [103 Op. Att’y

to exclusive enclaves. The better reading, in our view, is that
§ 5032 imposes a general rule, subject only to express exceptions,
that the states have authority over juvenile offenses committed
within federal enclaves.
In fact, our interpretation that state jurisdiction extends to
juvenile offenses on exclusive federal enclaves comports with that
of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Department, in its Criminal
Resource Manual for United States Attorneys, clarifies that “[a]
release to state authorities of juveniles who are alleged to have
committed an act of juvenile delinquency on a United States
military base or other federal enclave is not precluded by the fact
of the enclave’s ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ status.” DOJ Crim. Res.
Manual § 41. The Manual goes on to explain that:
When a juvenile is charged with committing a
violation of federal law on an exclusive
jurisdiction enclave, the United States
Attorney should determine whether the state
is willing to assume jurisdiction over the
juvenile and has adequate juvenile programs
available. Such a determination may be made
on a case-by-case basis after consultation with
the local prosecutor, or it may be based on a
general understanding reached with the local
prosecutor regarding the state’s willingness to
assume jurisdiction over juveniles who
commit offenses on federal enclaves.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in our opinion, § 5032 authorizes state
authorities to handle juvenile offenses that occur on exclusive
federal enclaves.
That interpretation is also consistent with the decisions of
most of the courts that have considered the issue. Although
Maryland courts have not yet weighed in, courts in other states have
concluded that § 5032 authorizes state jurisdiction over juvenile
offenses on exclusive enclaves. For instance, in State in Interest of
D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371 (1975), a juvenile challenged the New
Jersey juvenile court’s jurisdiction over him. The New Jersey
courts adjudicated the juvenile as delinquent based on his acts of
breaking-and-entering and larceny within the exclusive federal
military enclave of Fort Dix, and held that § 5032 “establishes that
Congress intended to subject a juvenile to the jurisdiction of a state
court” whenever possible. Id. at 373, 374-75. Similarly, a New
York court held that it had jurisdiction over a juvenile’s delinquent
acts committed on the exclusive federal enclave of West Point,
Gen. 49] 69

because Congress had “expressed an intent” in § 5032 to
“specifically defer[] to the states in cases of juvenile offenders.” In
re Charles B., 196 Misc. 2d 374, 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2003); see
also M.R.S. v. State, 745 So. 2d 1139, 1140-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that a Florida court had jurisdiction under § 5032
over a juvenile’s acts of delinquency on exclusive federal enclave
of Eglin Air Force Base). Based in part on these opinions, the
Georgia Office of the Attorney General, addressing a question
similar to yours, also concluded that § 5032 provides authority for
Georgia courts to assume jurisdiction over juvenile offenses
occurring on exclusive federal enclaves. See 2012 Ga. Unofficial
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2012-2, 2012 WL 6128487 (June 14, 2012). 11

11
Although we have found some cases concluding that state
authorities lacked jurisdiction over juvenile offenses on exclusive
enclaves, we think those cases are either distinguishable or do not
directly address the issue in question, i.e., whether § 5032 allows a state
to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of a federal certification. In United
States v. Juvenile Male, 939 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1991), for example, the
Sixth Circuit found that Kentucky’s cession of exclusive jurisdiction
over Fort Knox was a complete bar to the State’s juvenile jurisdiction.
In its ruling, the court relied on old authority, citing the extraterritoriality
doctrine for the proposition that “persons on the Fort Knox Military
Reservation are not within the jurisdiction of the Kentucky courts” and
that “Kentucky cannot exercise any jurisdiction over Fort Knox and its
residents.” 939 F.2d at 323 (alteration omitted). However, because the
decision rested upon the extraterritoriality doctrine, which the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected in Evans and Howard, and did not carefully
parse § 5032, the decision’s precedential value is limited at best.
Moreover, the court in Juvenile Male was faced with a situation in which
the federal government had asserted jurisdiction. Under those
circumstances, as the Georgia Office of the Attorney General has pointed
out, courts “generally have upheld the jurisdictional authority asserted”
because they are loathe to second-guess the federal government’s
certification under § 5032. Ga. Op. Att’y Gen, 2012 WL 6128487 at *5-
6; see also United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2014)
(declining to look behind the certification that the State did not have
jurisdiction over a juvenile who committed a delinquent act on a federal
enclave). It is not clear that those courts would have reached the same
conclusion about state jurisdiction if the federal government had not
itself asserted jurisdiction over the juvenile.
Similarly, although the North Carolina Supreme Court held in one
case that the State courts did not have jurisdiction over a defendant being
tried as an adult for murders he allegedly committed as a juvenile on an
exclusive federal enclave, see State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 161, 169 (1991),
that decision does not conflict with our conclusion here. There, the
70 [103 Op. Att’y

Moreover, allowing states to exercise juvenile jurisdiction
over exclusive federal enclaves furthers the clear purpose of
§ 5032. As one federal court has explained, “[t]he certification
procedure in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act encompasses a
recognition of the general policy of federal abstention”—a policy
that is necessary because “[t]he federal courts and federal
correctional system have never been properly equipped to handle
large numbers of juveniles with the result that federal juvenile
delinquents are frequently transferred away from their home
communities for treatment.” United States v. Sechrist, 640 F.2d
81, 84 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 25162 (1974)); see
also DOJ Crim. Res. Manual § 116 (“The intent of federal laws
concerning juveniles is to help ensure that state and local
authorities would deal with juvenile offenders whenever possible,
keeping juveniles away from the less appropriate federal channels
. . . .”). Thus, we conclude that § 5032 authorizes states to exercise
juvenile jurisdiction over offenses that occur on exclusive federal
enclaves, so long as the assertion of state jurisdiction does not
interfere with federal functions, and the U.S. Attorney General
does not certify that federal jurisdiction is instead warranted. 12
We note that our conclusion is also consistent with the trend
recognized by many state courts allowing for the broad application
of state benefits, services, and protections to residents of federal

federal government had certified under § 5032 that the State courts did
not have jurisdiction over the defendant. See id. at 167. The court felt
bound under federal law to accept that determination as final, so did not
decide whether § 5032 would otherwise have allowed the State to assume
jurisdiction. Id. at 167-68 (citing United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d
1378 (2d Cir. 1975)). Moreover, the State authorities in that case were
attempting to prosecute the defendant as an adult in a criminal
proceeding, rather than in a juvenile proceeding. Id. at 165-69. Because
the federal government generally has exclusive criminal jurisdiction in
exclusive federal enclaves, the North Carolina courts had to defer to the
federal government for that reason too. Id.
12
One area in which the assertion of State jurisdiction over a juvenile
offender might interfere with federal functions is when the juvenile is a
member of the military. In fact, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(and thus § 5032) “is inapplicable to courts-martial or to any juveniles
who are members of the military and who are charged with acts of
delinquency or with crimes.” See Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. 2012 WL 6128487
at *3 n.2 (citing United States v. Thieman, 34 C.M.R. 106 (1963); United
States v. Baker, 34 C.M.R. 91 (1963); United States v. West, 7 M.J. 570
(1979)). Thus, it may be that State authorities would lack jurisdiction to
handle a juvenile offender who is a member of the military.
Gen. 49] 71

enclaves “provided that the State does not interfere with the
primary jurisdiction of the Federal government.” Cobb, 406 Mass.
at 25; see also, e.g., Debbie F., 120 N.M. at 667-68; In re Terry Y,
101 Cal. App. 3d at 181-82. After all, Maryland’s juvenile
delinquency laws are no longer criminal in nature, but instead
resemble in many ways the other kinds of state services and
protections that courts have concluded are unlikely to interfere with
federal sovereignty. See, e.g., In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 90-91
(1994) (explaining that state juvenile courts operate “[u]nder an
extension of the doctrine of parens patriae, [viewing] juvenile
offenders to be in need of protection and rehabilitation rather than
punishment.”).
As in those other contexts, the federal government has not
routinely offered services or facilities for handling the needs of
juvenile offenders. See, e.g., Sechrist, 640 F.2d at 84. And in the
absence of such federal action, there is an argument that states
should be able to fulfill their obligations, as parens patriae, “to
protect and rehabilitate a juvenile . . . who, although housed on
land ceded to the Federal Government, is a member of the social
community of” that state. State in Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J.
Super. at 375. Thus, although we need not rest our conclusion on
the “friction, not fiction” doctrine, Maryland’s assertion of
jurisdiction over juvenile offenses on the Proving Ground seems
entirely consistent with that doctrine. 13
In sum, federal law likely permits Maryland authorities to
exercise jurisdiction over juvenile offenses on the Proving Ground.
However, if State authorities would prefer absolute certainty on
that point, Maryland could ask the Secretary of the Army to
expressly “relinquish” jurisdiction over juvenile offenses on the
Proving Ground. See 10 U.S.C. § 2683(a); see also Lavine, supra,
at 129-31 (arguing that the Department of Defense should utilize
its retrocession power to ensure that states can assert jurisdiction

13
Because Congress enacted § 5032, we need not decide whether the
international law rule could have been invoked to justify the application
of Maryland’s juvenile justice scheme to the areas of the Proving Ground
under exclusive federal jurisdiction. We note, however, that the analysis
would likely turn on whether today’s juvenile justice laws could be
considered part of the “same basic scheme,” Paul, 371 U.S. at 269, as
those in existence before 1943, even though the State’s juvenile justice
laws then were criminal in nature.
72 [103 Op. Att’y

over juvenile offenses on federal enclaves). 14 Once accepted by
the Governor under GP § 6-202, that retrocession would
unquestionably allow State authorities to handle juvenile offenses
on the Proving Ground. To be clear, we are not saying that
retrocession is required for State authorities to exercise jurisdiction
over juvenile offenses on the Proving Ground. But the State should
give that approach serious consideration, because it could clarify
the extent of the State’s jurisdiction and, thus, could preclude any
possibility that a juvenile delinquent might contest the State’s
jurisdiction.
C. Does Maryland Law Itself Permit State Authorities to
Handle Juvenile Offenses on Exclusive Federal Enclaves?
Although we conclude that § 5032 authorizes states to
exercise juvenile jurisdiction over offenses on exclusive federal
enclaves, that statute also requires us to consider the State of
Maryland’s ability and willingness to assert that jurisdiction. See
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (permitting federal jurisdiction if the relevant
state court does not have or refuses to exercise jurisdiction). Thus,
as the final piece of our analysis, we address whether Maryland’s
juvenile justice scheme itself can encompass offenses that occur on
exclusive federal enclaves like the Proving Ground. In our view,
Maryland law permits State authorities and the State courts to
assume jurisdiction over juveniles who commit offenses in
exclusive federal enclaves.
As an initial matter, from a procedural perspective, the State’s
statutes governing the processing of juvenile offenders can
accommodate—and, as we understand it, have in the past
accommodated—such offenders. That process begins when an
intake officer with DJS receives a complaint “from a person or
agency having knowledge of facts which may cause a person to be

14
In fact, at least two small portions of the Proving Ground have been
the subject of retrocession agreements in the past. In 1991, the State
accepted concurrent jurisdiction over approximately 128 acres of the
Proving Ground near Atkinson Dam, apparently so local law
enforcement officials could patrol the area. See Board of Public Works
Meeting Agenda and Minutes, Oct. 16, 1991. Similarly, in 1977, the
State accepted concurrent jurisdiction over less than an acre of the
Proving Ground so the State could widen the entrance to the Chapel Hill
Water Treatment Plant. See Board of Public Works Meeting Agenda,
Apr. 6, 1977. In those two areas, State authorities may unquestionably
handle juvenile offenses.
Gen. 49] 73

subject to the jurisdiction of the [juvenile] court.” CJP § 3-8A-
10(b)(1). Given that the statute does not define “person” or
“agency” so as to exclude federal personnel or federal agencies, the
federal government could presumably file a complaint with DJS
about a juvenile who has committed an offense on an exclusive
federal enclave within the State. Indeed, the U.S. Military Police
Corps has apparently filed complaints with DJS in at least a few
instances involving juveniles on federal enclaves, and the juvenile
offenders in those cases were turned over to State authorities. 15
Moreover, if a State’s Attorney files a delinquency petition in
such a circumstance, the State courts likely have jurisdiction under
State law to hear that petition. The circuit courts, sitting as juvenile
courts, have jurisdiction over any juvenile who has committed a
“delinquent act,” see CJP §§ 3-8A-01(m) and 3-8A-03(a)(1), which
is defined broadly as “an act which would be a crime if committed
by an adult,” CJP § 3-8A-01(l). That broad definition does not
purport to exclude acts by juveniles on property under federal
jurisdiction. Therefore, as long as the juvenile’s act would
constitute a crime if it had been committed by an adult, the statute
appears to give the juvenile court jurisdiction over the proceeding,
regardless of whether the act occurred on an exclusive federal
enclave. Although the Court of Special Appeals has held that
juvenile courts do not have territorial jurisdiction over delinquent
acts that occur outside of Maryland, see In re Antonette H., 200
Md. App. 341, 344 n.1, 353-54 (2011), the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Howard and Evans make clear that the Proving

15
According to DJS, the federal enclaves involved in these instances
were Andrews Air Force Base, Patuxent Naval Air Station, and the Naval
Ordnance Station at Indian Head. Although these cases came to the
State’s attention through such referrals, it is not clear that § 5032 would
require federal authorities to affirmatively refer the matter to the State
before the State may assert jurisdiction. But, in any event, we think it
would be prudent for State authorities to cooperate closely with federal
authorities on these matters to ensure that the State is not interfering with
federal jurisdiction or federal functions. Indeed, the U.S. Department of
Justice recognizes that such consultation is important, suggesting that its
prosecutor either consult on a “case-by-case basis . . . with the local
prosecutor” or enter into a “general understanding . . . with the local
prosecutor regarding the state’s willingness to assume jurisdiction over
juveniles who commit offenses on federal enclaves.” DOJ Crim. Res.
Manual § 41. Of course, if the State and the Secretary of the Army
decide to enter into a retrocession agreement, that would also clarify any
remaining ambiguities about the governments’ respective roles.
74 [103 Op. Att’y

Ground is part of Maryland, even though much of it is under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. 16 See Part II.A.3, supra. Thus,
Maryland’s juvenile justice scheme—from DJS’s intake process
through the filing of a delinquency petition by a State’s Attorney—
is likely broad enough to permit State authorities to exercise
jurisdiction over a juvenile who commits a delinquent act on an
exclusive federal enclave such as the Proving Ground. 17
III
Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that Maryland State authorities likely
have jurisdiction over a juvenile who commits an act of
delinquency within the Aberdeen Proving Ground, subject to the
federal government’s ability to assert its jurisdiction through the
limited certification procedures in 18 U.S.C. § 5032. However,
Maryland authorities may wish to consider seeking from the
Secretary of the Army an official retrocession of jurisdiction over
juvenile offenses so as to preclude any argument to the contrary
and to clarify the respective roles of the State and federal
government as to juvenile delinquents on the enclave.
Brian E. Frosh
Attorney General of Maryland
Jeffrey P. Hochstetler
Assistant Attorney General
Patrick B. Hughes
Chief Counsel, Opinions and Advice

16
For purposes of personal jurisdiction, venue, and service of process,
too, state court jurisdiction extends to “any federal enclave, reservation,
or land within the geographical limits” of the State. See CJP § 6-
101(a)(2), (4); see also Hansford, 329 Md. at 127-28.
17
We do not mean to suggest, however, that State or local police may
patrol the areas of the Proving Ground within the federal government’s
exclusive jurisdiction so as to arrest juveniles who commit delinquent
acts there. For those areas, the police would likely require the
retrocession of jurisdiction by the Secretary of the Army before they may
exercise their law enforcement powers. See 56 Opinions of the Attorney
General at 349-50 (explaining that exclusive federal jurisdiction in an
enclave generally acts to “deny to the State any [criminal] law
enforcement power whatsoever within the boundaries” of that enclave,
unless Congress has “returned any of its exclusive criminal jurisdiction”
in the enclave to the State).
Gen. 49] 75

Editor’s Note:
After issuance of this opinion, our Office clarified in later
letters of advice that the historic practice of submitting to the Board
of Public Works at least certain kinds of requests from the federal
government to retrocede concurrent jurisdiction to Maryland over
exclusive federal enclaves was based in part on the prior opinion of
our Office in 63 Opinions of the Attorney General 332 (1978). See
Letter from Patrick B. Hughes, Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice,
to Gavin Patashnick, Deputy State’s Attorney for Harford County
(Mar. 12, 2020); Letter from Jeremy McCoy, Assistant Attorney
General, to Del. Geraldine Valentino-Smith (Feb. 3, 2022). As
those later advice letters make clear, this opinion did not decide the
circumstances, if any, under which the Board of Public Works
might need to approve retrocession of jurisdiction by the United
States or under which the procedures outlined in 63 Opinions of the
Attorney General 332 might still apply after the enactment of § 6-
202 of the General Provisions Article.