Turner, David Phillip v. Duncan

Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No. C-10-FM-24-001610
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 161
September Term, 2026
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DAVID PHILLIP TURNER
v.
D AVID DUNCAN , ET AL.
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Nazarian,
Arthur,
Leahy,
JJ.
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Opinion by Arthur, J.
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Filed: October 16, 2026
*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the
rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms
to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

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This case concerns the custody and visitation rights of a father who is currently
jailed while awaiting trial on charges that he murdered the mother of his three children
and her new husband. After conducting a full evidentiary hearing in which the father had
no opportunity to participate, the Circuit Court for Frederick County purported to enter
both summary judgment and a default judgment against the father and in favor of the
third parties who have had custody of the children since shortly after their mother’s
death.
The father appealed. We vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 25, 2024, Crimea Baker and Sean Lange were killed in their house in
Frederick County. Crimea Baker’s former husband, appellant David Turner, has been
charged with murdering her and Mr. Lange. Mr. Turner is currently awaiting trial on
federal charges of interstate travel to commit domestic violence resulting in death and use
and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence.
At the time of the killings, four children were living with Ms. Baker and Mr.
Lange. Ms. Baker was the mother of all four. David Turner was the father of three. This
case concerns custody of the three children of Ms. Baker and Mr. Turner.
On August 26, 2024, the day after the killings, the Frederick County Sheriff placed
all four of the children with Ms. Baker’s friend, Jennifer Duncan. Immediately
thereafter, Jennifer Duncan moved in with her parents, appellees Valerie and David

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Duncan, to whom we shall refer as “the Duncans.”
In the aftermath of the killings, a number of persons asserted claims of custody to
the children. They included: the Duncans; Crimea Baker’s mother; and Mr. Turner’s
mother, who asked that she and Mr. Turner be awarded custody of Mr. Turner’s three
children. Each of these parties filed complaints that named Mr. Turner as a defendant.
On August 30, 2024, the Circuit Court for Frederick County entered an ex parte,
emergency order in which it granted temporary custody of all four children to Jennifer
Duncan and her parents, the Duncans. In the same order, the court consolidated the case
brought by Mr. Turner’s mother, the case brought by Ms. Baker’s mother, and the case
brought by the Duncans. The court designated the case brought by Mr. Turner’s mother
as the “lead case.”
On December 19, 2024, the Duncans filed what they called a “counterclaim,” in
which they asserted that they, and not Mr. Turner, his mother, or Ms. Baker’s mother
should have custody of the three children of Ms. Baker and Mr. Turner.
On February 28, 2025, the Duncans served their counterclaim on Mr. Turner at the
Frederick County Detention Center. On April 10, 2025, a little more than a week after
the deadline for Mr. Turner’s answer had passed, the Duncans requested an order of
default.
On April 21, 2025, the court entered an order of default. On the same day, the
court notified Mr. Turner that it had entered the order of default and that he could move
to vacate the order within 30 days after its entry.
On May 16, 2025, Mr. Turner, representing himself, filed what he called a motion

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to vacate a default “judgment” (though the court had not yet entered any such judgment).
On June 10, 2025, the court denied the motion to vacate a default “judgment.”
Although Mr. Turner never formally answered the Duncans’ pleading, he made it
abundantly clear that he opposed their claim to the custody of his children. In a paper
dated April 2, 2025, but not docketed until April 17, 2025, Mr. Turner moved to vacate
the custody “judgment.” On May 16, 2025, he moved to “dismiss” the Duncans from the
case. On June 27, 2025, he filed a counterclaim for custody. On November 4, 2025, he
filed another motion to vacate the custody “judgments” in the Duncans’ favor.
On January 15, 2026, the Duncans filed what they called a “motion for appropriate
relief.” By the time of that motion, Mr. Turner was the only person who still actively
contested the Duncans’ right to custody of his three children.
In their “motion for appropriate relief,” the Duncans requested, among other
things, that the circuit court grant summary judgment in their favor and against Mr.
Turner or, alternatively, that the court enter a default judgment against him. The
Duncans requested that the court grant them sole legal and physical custody of all four of
Ms. Baker’s children, including the three children of Mr. Turner and Ms. Baker. Mr.
Turner did not file a timely response to the “motion for appropriate relief.”
On February 3, 2026, the circuit court held a hearing on the “motion for
appropriate relief.” Mr. Turner, who was apparently in federal custody in Baltimore at
the time, was unable to attend the hearing. The court appears to have made no
accommodation to allow Mr. Turner to participate remotely via Zoom or some similar

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web-based platform. The court’s docket entries describe the hearing as “uncontested.”
At the ex parte hearing on February 3, 2026, the court heard testimony and
received exhibits. A hearing sheet recites that the court “found” “exceptional
circumstances” sufficient to allow the Duncans to overcome Mr. Turner’s rights as a
biological parent of his three children. See generally Burak v. Burak, 455 Md. 564, 624
(2017); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191 (1977). The hearing sheet also recites that
the court intended to grant summary judgment in the Duncans’ favor and to enter a
default judgment against Mr. Duncan. 1
After the ex parte hearing, but before the court formally embodied its decision in
an order, Mr. Turner filed an opposition to the “motion for appropriate relief.” In his
opposition, Mr. Turner asked that the court grant him custody of his three children but to
place them with his mother.
On February 18, 2026, the court entered an order in which it granted the “motion
for appropriate relief.” In that order the court stated that it had “found” “exceptional
circumstances” to overcome Mr. Turner’s rights as a biological parent and that it had
“considered” the “best interests of the children,” including the statutory factors
enumerated in § 9-201 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code. The court
1 The hearing sheet contains the term “de facto,” which presumably is a reference
to de facto parenthood. The court could not have found that the Duncans were de facto
parents. Under Maryland law, a person can qualify as a de facto parent only if “‘the
biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the [putative de facto parent’s]
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child[.]’” Conover v.
Conover, 450 Md. 51, 74 (2016) (quoting In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,
435 (Wis. 1995)). Mr. Turner, however, has neither consented to nor fostered the
establishment of a parent-like relationship between the Duncans and his children.

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directed the entry of summary judgment in the Duncans’ favor and against Mr. Turner.
“[I]n the alternative,” the court ordered a default judgment against Mr. Turner. The court
awarded sole legal and physical custody of all four children to the Duncans.
On March 18, 2026, Mr. Turner noted a timely appeal.
Q UESTION PRESENTED
In his handwritten, informal brief, Mr. Turner, representing himself, raises three
questions, which we quote:
1. 	Did the Duncan’s [sic] unlawfully hold my children 8/25/24 to 8/30/24?
2. 	Is it lawful to grant custody to someone who unlawfully took the
children and and or [sic] unlawfully recieved [sic] the children?
3. 	Were any of the subsequent custody rulings unlawful?
The first question is moot. The circuit court has now entered a final order granting
sole legal and physical custody of Mr. Turner’s children to the Duncans. And even
before the court entered that final order, the court, on August 30, 2024, had entered an
interlocutory order granting custody of Mr. Turner’s children to the Duncans. Thus, even
if the Duncans could somehow be said to have “unlawfully” held the children in the five
days after their mother’s death, when the Frederick County Sheriff put the children into
the care of the Duncans’ daughter, we “‘can no longer fashion an effective remedy’” for
that alleged wrong. D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 351-52
(2019) (quoting In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 452 (2006)). We decline to decide this
moot question.
We interpret the second and third questions as a challenge to the validity of the

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final order that granted sole legal and physical custody of Mr. Turner’s three children to
the Duncans. We rephrase that question as follows: Did the court err or abuse its
discretion in granting summary judgment against Mr. Turner on the issue of custody or,
in the alternative, in entering a default judgment against him?
S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
“A moving party is entitled to summary judgment ‘if the motion and response
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and that the moving party
‘is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Moore v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 270 Md.
App. 123, 143-44 (2026) (quoting Md. Rule 2-501(f)). “In making this determination,
the court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving
party.” Id. at 144. “‘[I]f those facts are susceptible to inferences supporting the position
of the party opposing summary judgment, then a grant of summary judgment is
improper.’” RDC Melanie Drive, LLC v. Eppard, 474 Md. 547, 564 (2021) (quoting
Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 79 (1995)); accord Moore v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 270 Md.
App. at 144.
In general, we review issues pertaining to default judgments for abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Wells v. Wells, 168 Md. App. 382, 392 (2006); Das v. Das, 133 Md.
App. 1, 15 (2000). As the Duncans themselves concede in their brief, however, a
“default judgment cannot substitute for a full evidentiary hearing when the court must
determine the best interests of the child,” as it must do in custody cases. See, e.g., Wells
v. Wells, 168 Md. App. at 395; Flynn v. May, 157 Md. App. 389, 407 (2004).

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DISCUSSION
In substance, the circuit court found that Mr. Turner had no right to custody or
visitation after an evidentiary hearing in which he had no opportunity to participate.
Whether the court characterized its ruling as the grant of summary judgment or the grant
of a default judgment, it was wrong. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.
Rarely, if ever, can a court properly grant summary judgment in a child custody
case. Ordinarily, the determination of custody is a fact-intensive exercise in which a
court makes a discretionary decision after weighing up to 16 statutory factors, the last of
which is “any other factor that the court considers appropriate in determining how best to
serve the physical, developmental, and emotional needs of the child.” See Md. Code
(1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 9-201(a)(16) of the Family Law Article. In addition, in a case
like this, which involves a dispute between a biological parent and a third party, a court
must find whether the parent is unfit or whether exceptional circumstances are present.
See, e.g., Burak v. Burak, 455 Md. 564, 624 (2017); McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md.
320, 374 (2005); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178-79 (1977). A finding of
“exceptional circumstances” requires, in turn, the evaluation of an open-ended list of
factors, which “include”:
“the [1] length of time the child has been away from the biological parent,
[2] the age of the child when care was assumed by the third party, [3] the
possible emotional effect on the child of a change of custody, [4] the period
of time which elapsed before the parent sought to reclaim the child, [5] the
nature and strength of the ties between the child and the third party
custodian, [6] the intensity and genuineness of the parent’s desire to have
the child, [7] the stability and certainty as to the child’s future in the
custody of the parent.”

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McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. at 419 (quoting Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191);
accord Augustin v. Duncan, 269 Md. App. 656, 675 (2026).
In general, a court must enter summary judgment in favor of the moving party “if
the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Md. Rule 2-501(f). In view of the multitude of factors that bear on a custody
determination and the exercise of subjective judgment and discretion in evaluating and
weighing those factors, it is difficult to imagine any case in which the admissible
evidence, including the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, would
generate no genuine disputes of material fact. It is equally difficult to imagine a custody
case in which the court could, as a matter of law, draw one and only one conclusion.
Thus, it is difficult to imagine any custody case in which a court could properly grant a
motion for summary judgment.
But even if a court could grant a motion for summary judgment in a custody case,
that is obviously not what the court did in this case. Although the Duncans asked for
summary judgment in their “motion for appropriate relief,” they made no attempt to
establish the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact—a necessary condition for
summary judgment. Moreover, even though their motion was based on facts not
contained in the record, the Duncans failed to comply with their obligation under Rule 2-
501(a) to support their motion by affidavit. The motion did not satisfy the most basic
requirements of a motion for summary judgment.
Nor did the court treat the Duncans’ motion as a motion for summary judgment.

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The court did not entertain pure legal argument on the question of whether the motion
and any supporting materials demonstrated that there was no genuine dispute of material
fact and that the Duncans were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Instead, the court
heard testimony, received exhibits, made factual findings, and drew legal conclusions on
the basis of those findings. In other words, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of custody in the biological father’s absence and decided, based on the evidence
that it heard, to award custody to the Duncans. The Duncans themselves agree that the
court “conducted an evidentiary hearing, during which, testimony and exhibits were
received and considered.” Thus, notwithstanding the court’s characterization of its
ruling, it did not grant, and on this record could not have granted, a motion for summary
judgment.
We turn to the question of whether the court properly entered a default judgment
against Mr. Turner. It did not.
As the Duncans recognize, default judgments are almost singularly inappropriate
in custody disputes. “[I]t is impossible for us to conjure up a hypothetical in which a
judgment by default might ever be properly entered in a case of disputed child custody.”
Flynn v. May, 157 Md. App. at 411; accord Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett,
Maryland Rules Commentary 861 (6th ed. 2024). A “default judgment cannot substitute
for a full evidentiary hearing when a court, in order to determine custody, must first
determine the best interest of the child.” Flynn v. May, 157 Md. App. at 407; accord
Wells v. Wells, 168 Md. App. at 397. Mr. Turner’s children have “an indefeasible right to
have any custody determination concerning [them] made, after a full evidentiary hearing,

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in [their] best interest.” Flynn v. May, 157 Md. App. at 410; accord Wells v. Wells, 168
Md. App. at 397. The children “did not lose that right when” their father “failed to file a
proper responsive pleading” to the Duncans’ counterclaim. Flynn v. May, 157 Md. App.
at 410. The court abused its discretion in entering a default judgment against Mr. Turner.
In defense of the ex parte hearing at which the court purported to adjudicate Mr.
Turner’s rights to custody and visitation, the Duncans contend that Mr. Turner did not
have what they call an “absolute” right to be transported from Baltimore to Frederick.
They cite In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, 131 Md. App. 187, 192-99 (2000),
in which this Court held that due process did not require a court to permit an incarcerated
parent to listen in by telephone in a hearing regarding the termination of parental rights.
In that case, however, the parent had a considerably greater opportunity to participate
than Mr. Turner had here. As this Court explained:
In this case, appellant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to defend
while represented by able counsel. Appellant was given the opportunity to
appear by deposition, and did so. Certified copies of audiotapes of the trial
were made, provided to appellant, and appellant was given sixty days to
review the tapes and to prepare a written statement. Moreover, appellant
does not claim that any specific portion of the trial was affected by his
absence or that his inability to testify via telephone hampered any specific
portion of trial preparation or strategy.
Id. at 199.
Unlike the parent in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, Mr. Turner did
not have counsel, able or otherwise. He did not have the opportunity to present his
account to the court by means of a deposition. Nor did he receive a recording of the
evidentiary hearing or have two months to review the recording and submit a written

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statement in response. In short, In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001 does not
justify what happened here: the complete exclusion of a jailed parent from a hearing
concerning the custody of his children. 2
Whether required by due process or not, it should not have posed a major
challenge, in 2026, for the circuit court to do what it undoubtedly does in many other
cases and to facilitate Mr. Turner’s remote participation. In this regard, we note that, in
his criminal case, in which he has exercised his constitutional right to represent himself,
the federal court has successfully conducted remote video-conferences with Mr. Turner.
The Duncans observe, in passing, that Mr. Turner did not request a hearing on
their motion. From this premise, the Duncans seem to insinuate that Mr. Turner had no
right to participate in the hearing when the court actually convened one. It is unnecessary
to take an advanced class in logic to grasp that the Duncans’ conclusion does not follow
from its premises.
In any event, the Duncans themselves requested a hearing on their “motion for
appropriate relief.” Because that motion was dispositive of Mr. Turner’s defenses,
Maryland Rule 2-311(f) required the court to conduct a hearing before it granted the
motion. All parties—including Mr. Turner, who was not yet subject to a judgment of
2 In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001 may be in tension with In re K.B.,
496 Md. 1, 35 (2026), in which the Court held that children who are “capable of
understanding what is occurring in a courtroom proceeding to some extent” are generally
entitled to attend a CINA proceeding “if they desire to do so.” If children are generally
entitled to attend proceedings that bear on their relationship with their parents, why aren’t
the parents also generally entitled to attend?

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default at the time when the hearing commenced—were entitled to participate in that
hearing. See Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary,
supra, 859-60 (stating “[i]n any hearing held before the entry of judgment, the defendant
may appear to present evidence on the issue of damages but ordinarily may not offer
evidence on liability”). 3
The Duncans argue, at some length, that the ex parte hearing in this case was the
equivalent of the kind of hearing that a court may conduct under Rule 2-613(f), when “it
is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the
truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any matter,” before
entering a default judgment. Yet the court did not enter a default judgment against Mr.
Turner until 15 days after the ex parte hearing. Mr. Turner had a right to participate in
the hearing that was designed to determine whether the court should enter a default
judgment against him and, if so, what the substance of that order should be. See Paul V.
Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary, supra, 859-60.
If the criminal charges against him prove to be true, then Mr. Turner is a uniquely
unappealing claimant. Still, he is entitled to his day in court before a court may divest
him of his rights to custody and visitation. Once Mr. Turner has had his day in court, the
court may well reach the same conclusion as it did before. But the court cannot reach
3 The Duncans assert that Rule 2-501(f)—the summary judgment rule—“does not
require a hearing to be conducted prior to the disposition of a motion for summary
judgment.” (Emphasis in original.) Their assertion is correct as far it goes. The Duncans
fail to note, however, that once they requested a hearing the court could not grant their
motion for summary judgment without conducting a hearing. Md. Rule 2-311(f).

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that conclusion on the basis of the ex parte presentation, such as the one on which it
based the decision in this appeal.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY VACATED.
CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEES.