Sare, Hadarou v. Central Coll. Unit

*This is a per curiam opinion. Under Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the
rule of stare decisis, nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No.: C-24-CV-25-007014
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 2458
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
HADAROU SARE
v.
CENTRAL COLLECTION UNIT, et al.
______________________________________
Graeff,
Ripken,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
PER CURIAM
______________________________________
Filed: October 16, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
Hadarou Sare, appellant, sued various State agencies and entities, appellees, 1 in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging claims related to his expulsion from the
University of Maryland, College Park, the University’s termination of his graduate
fellowship, and the State’s attempts to recover his debt. Sare had previously sued the same
parties in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging claims
based on the same underlying facts. Additionally, the complaint did not plead that Sare had
submitted a claim with the Maryland State Treasurer before filing suit, as required by the
Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). See Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-106(b).
Accordingly, the State moved to dismiss Sare’s complaint as barred by sovereign immunity
and res judicata. Sare opposed. The court granted the State’s motion without a hearing and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. After his motion for reconsideration was denied,
Sare appealed.
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health
Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 350 (2019).
On appeal, Sare does not dispute that his complaint failed to plead compliance with
the MTCA, which is required to state a claim against the State. See Hansen v. City of
Laurel, 420 Md. 670, 684–85 (2011). Instead, he argues that the circuit court should have
granted him leave to amend and allowed him a chance to cure the deficiency. True enough,
1 Appellees are the Central Collection Unit, the Office of the Attorney General, the
Tax Refund Interception Program, and the University of Maryland, College Park. We note
that the Tax Refund Interception Program is not a legal entity, but rather a statutory process
through which the Central Collection Unit can certify a debt to the Comptroller for
collections. See generally Md. Code Ann., Tax Gen. § 13-912 et seq.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
“[a]mendments [should] be freely allowed when justice so permits.” 2 Md. Rule 2-341(c).
We note, however, that Sare could have amended his complaint without leave of court as
soon as he was made aware of the deficiency by the State’s motion. See Md. Rule 2-341(a).
What’s more, Sare has never claimed that he did, in fact, comply with the MTCA. But in
any event, “an amendment should not be allowed if it would result in prejudice to the
2 We suspect that Sare may have used generative AI to assist in drafting his brief.
On page 6, he states: “Maryland courts consistently favor amendment where defects can
be cured: ‘Leave to amend should be freely granted unless amendment would be futile.’
Wheatley v. Wicomico County, 390 Md. 273, 288 (2005).” Although this is generally a
correct statement of Maryland law, the quoted language does not appear in any Maryland
case. As a direct quote, it appears only in opinions from a handful of federal district courts.
See, e.g., In re Cornerstone Propane Partners, L.P., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1094 (N.D. Cal.
2005).
More tellingly, Wheatley v. Wicomico County, 390 Md. 273, 288 (2005), does not
exist. There is no Maryland case with this caption, and the principal cite leads to Motor
Vehicle Admin. v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265 (2005) (an administrative appeal), while the pincite
leads to Att’y. Grievance Comm’n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287 (2005) (an attorney-discipline
case). Neither case discusses pleading amendments. The only case with this caption is
Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., Md., 390 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2004), an appeal in a federal
employment case that also does not discuss pleading amendments.
The 	record 	reveals 	that 	Sare 	also 	relied 	on 	this 	“case” 	in 	his 	motion 	for
reconsideration filed in the circuit court. Yet despite being made aware of its fictitiousness
by the State’s opposition to that motion, he still included it in his brief on appeal.
We recently discussed, in Mezu v. Mezu, 267 Md. App. 354, 367–68 (2025), the
potential dangers of using AI to conduct legal research or generate filings, including the
risk of “hallucinated” citations. Moreover, “[t]he citation of fake cases in a brief or other
pleading filed with a court implicates multiple Maryland Rules.” Id. at 368. Indeed,
attorneys who submit filings containing fake citations may be referred to the Attorney
Grievance Commission depending on the nature and severity of the misconduct. See id. at
374. Although there is no parallel disciplinary action for pro se litigants, at the least, Rule
1-311(c) authorizes us to strike the offending filing. Where, as here, the filing is an
appellant’s principal brief, striking it could result in dismissal under Rule 8-602(c)(5) for
failure to file a brief. See Md. Rule 1-311(c) (“[T]he action may proceed as though the
[struck] pleading or paper had not been filed.”).
Although we have decided not to take further action regarding Sare’s brief and will
address the merits of his appeal, this does not excuse his suspected misconduct. We caution
that future filings submitted to the Court with fake citations may be struck.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
opposing party or undue delay, such as where amendment would be futile because the claim
is flawed irreparably.” RRC N.E., LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 673–74 (2010).
Here, allowing Sare to amend his complaint would have been futile because his claims
were barred by res judicata.
Res judicata prevents a party from relitigating a claim that has already been fully
and fairly decided. Facey v. Facey, 249 Md. App. 584, 608 (2021). Its elements are: (1) the
parties in both cases are the same; (2) the claim presented in both cases is the same; and
(3) there was a final judgment on the merits. Id. “When these three elements are present,
the first claim is merged into the judgment and bars the second claim.” Id. (cleaned up).
This preclusive effect extends not only to what was litigated in the prior case, but
also to what could have been litigated. See Smalls v. Md. State Dep’t of Educ., Off. of Child
Care, 226 Md. App. 224, 232 (2015). “Once a set of facts has been litigated, res judicata
generally prevents the application of a different legal theory to that same set of facts,
assuming that the second theory of liability existed when the first action was litigated.”
Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 111 (2005) (cleaned up). Just so
here.
The parties in this case are the same as in Sare’s federal case, which was dismissed
for failure to state a claim. Sare v. Central Collection Unit, Civil No.: 8:24-cv-03637, 2025
WL 2208173 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2025), aff’d, No. 25-1890, 2025 WL 3707807 (4th Cir. Dec.
22, 2025) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed June 11, 2026. See also Exch. Nat’l Bank of
Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1130–31 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing that
“judgments under Rule 12(b)(6) are on the merits, with res judicata effects”). Although his

‒Unreported Opinion‒
4
claim for tortious interference is the only overlapping claim between the two cases, the
claims Sare added here—negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress—arise
out of the same transaction and could have been litigated in the prior case. Accordingly,
the elements of res judicata were met. Amendment would thus have been futile, and the
circuit court did not err in dismissing Sare’s complaint.
JUDGMENT 	OF 	THE 	CIRCUIT
COURT 	FOR 	BALTIMORE 	CITY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.