Louis Cardaropoli v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Longmeadow (February 8, 2001)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD



LOUIS CARDAROPOLI			v. 	BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
							THE TOWN OF LONGMEADOW

Docket No. F257826				Promulgated:
							February 8, 2001


	This is an appeal under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the appellee to abate taxes on certain real estate in the Town of Longmeadow owned by the assessed to the appellant under G.L. c. 59, § 38, for fiscal year 2000.
	Commissioner Egan heard this appeal.  Chairman Burns and Commissioners Scharaffa, Gorton, and Rose joined her in the decision for the appellee.
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.

	Louis Cardaropoli, pro se, for the appellant
	David Martel, Esq., for the appellee

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	On January 1, 1999, Louis Cardaropoli was the assessed owner of a parcel of real estate, improved with a home, located at 650 Wolf Swamp Road, in the Town of Longmeadow.  The Board of Assessors of Longmeadow ("Assessors") valued the property at $433,800, and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $19.08, in the amount of $8,276.90.  The appellant paid the quarterly tax bills without incurring interest.
	On February 1, 2000, the appellant timely filed his application for abatement with the Assessors who subsequently denied it on April 24, 2000.  On July 7, 2000, the appellant seasonably filed his appeal of the denial with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board").  On this basis, the Board found that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal in which the appellant alleged that the value of his property was $330,000 and the Assessors had over-valued it by $103,800.
	At the hearing of this appeal, two witnesses, the appellant and Robert P. Leclair, the Assistant Assessor for Longmeadow, testified.  In addition, the Board admitted several exhibits into evidence, including an appraisal report submitted by the Assessors.  Based on this evidence, the Board made the following findings of fact.
	The appellant purchased the subject property at auction from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") for $311,000 on July 30, 1998.  By the sale's very nature, the Board did not consider it to be arm's-length or representative of the market.  The appellant did not attempt to show otherwise.
	The house is a 3,712 square-foot two-story Colonial-style home with ten rooms and a brick and clapboard exterior.  It was built in 1987 and contains a living room, a kitchen, a dining room, a family room, five bedrooms, a full basement with a large finished area, two fireplaces, two full bathrooms, three one-half bathrooms, an open porch, a patio, and central air conditioning.  There also is an attached three-car garage.
	To support his estimate of the subject property's value as only $330,000 as of January 1, 1999, the appellant briefly described the characteristics of three other properties in Longmeadow that he regarded as comparable to his own, which sold at times reasonably proximate to the assessment date.  His first sale for $325,000, which occurred on the same date as the subject's sale, was an adjacent property.  However, the Board found that this Cape-Cod-style home with two-fewer bedrooms, significantly less living area, and many different amenities was not sufficiently similar to the subject to render a meaningful comparison.  The Board also noted that the sale price for this inferior property exceeded that to the subject further corroborating the Board's finding that the sale of the subject to the appellant at auction was not arm's-length.
	Moreover, the appellant failed to provide the Board with the deed, a photograph, or the relevant property record card for this comparable.  In addition, he did not even attempt to craft any adjustments for the obvious differences between the two properties.  Consequently, the Board found that the evidence regarding this comparable property was insufficient to support the appellant's estimate of the subject property's value.
	His second purportedly comparable sale was a house located at 41 Northfield Road that sold for $359,000 on July 22, 1998.  This property is about the same size, style, and age of the subject, and is located in a neighborhood approximately one mile away.  Once again, the Board found that the appellant failed to establish this property's comparability to the subject and failed to adjust for their differences.  The appellant provided the Board with a cursory description of this property, at best.  He neglected to offer any details specifying this property's finish, condition, systems, amenities, number of bathrooms, or the like.  He did not draw any comparisons between the two property's neighborhoods or make any adjustments in this regard.  Furthermore, the appellant did not introduce the relevant deed or property record card, or even a photograph depicting his limited testimony.  Consequently, the Board found that the evidence regarding this comparable property was insufficient to support the appellant's estimate of the subject property's value.
	Finally, the appellant's third allegedly comparable sale, which is located at 366 Marietta Drive, about one mile from the subject, sold in December 1998 for $338,000.  The appellant's testimony regarding this property was equally sparse.  "This one has a living area of about 3,500 square feet, and the lot size is almost 34,000 square feet.  This one has four bedrooms.  It's pretty similar to my house.  It's on a side street, though."  Yet again, the appellant failed to introduce the relevant deed, the relevant property record card, or any photographs, and failed to meaningfully compare and contrast this property to the subject and then make appropriate adjustments.  Consequently, the Board found that the evidence regarding this comparable property was insufficient to support the appellant's estimate of the subject property's value.  Moreover, the Board further found that, even collectively, the appellant's purportedly comparable properties did not advance or support his estimate of the subject property's value for the fiscal year at issue.
	Mr. Leclair, the Assessors' sole witness, testified to and introduced a comparable sales analysis of three reasonably proximate properties that were essentially equivalent to the subject property in style, square-footage, age, condition, amenities, lot size, and attractiveness.  To the extent that they differed, Mr. Leclair applied appropriate adjustments to their respective sale prices.  All of the Assessors' comparable properties had sold within ten months of the assessment date for prices that ranged from $497,000 to $535,000.  Their adjusted sale prices were $421,600, $434,800, and $456,700.  On this basis, Mr. Leclair placed the value of the subject  as of January 1, 1999 at or slightly above the 
assessment for fiscal year 2000.  In analyzing the sales of  these comparable properties and Mr. Leclair's adjustments to them, the Board agreed with Mr. Leclair's methodology and found that the adjusted sale prices supported the subject property's assessment of $433,800 in fiscal year 2000.
	Therefore, the Board found that the appellant failed to prove that his property was over-valued in fiscal year 2000.  The Board further found that the evidence supported the assessment.  Accordingly, on December 6, 2000, the Board decided this appeal for the appellee.

OPINION
	
	The assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  Generally, real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three approaches to determine the fair cash value of property:  income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).
	"[S]ales of property usually furnish strong evidence of market value, provided they are arm's-length transactions and thus fairly represent what a buyer has been willing to pay for the property to a willing seller." Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 682 (1982).  Actual sales of the subject "are very strong evidence of fair market value, for they represent what a buyer has been willing to pay t a seller for [the] particular property [under appeal]."  New Boston Garden Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 469 (1981), quoting First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 560 (1971).  However, the consideration stated on the deed may not always by the best evidence of a property's fair cash value at any given instance.  See Halstead v. Assessors of Wales, 24 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 122, 125 (1988), and the cases cited therein.
	In this appeal, the Board found and ruled that the sale of the subject property from the FDIC to the appellant was not a market sale and did not represent the property's fair cash value.  Cf. The Westwood Group, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Revere, 391 Mass. 1012, 1013 (1984), citing United-Carr, Inc. v. Cambridge Redevelopment Auth., 362 Mass. 597, 600 (1972); Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. At 682-83.  In addition, the Board found and ruled that the Assessors' comparable-sales analysis that compared the adjusted sale prices of three reasonably comparable properties in Longmeadow to the subject property supported the assessment for fiscal year 2000.
	In reaching its opinion of fair cash value, the Board was not required to believe the testimony of any particular witness or to adopt any particular method of valuation that a witness suggested.  Rather, the Board could accept those portions of the evidence that the Board determined had more convincing weight.  Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. At 683; New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. at 473; New England Oyster House, Inc., 362 Mass. 696, 701-702 (1972).  An owner of property is entitled to express his opinion of its value during the relevant time period if he is experienced in dealing with the property, is familiar with its characteristics, and recognizes its proper uses or potential uses.  Menici v. Orton Crane & Shovel Co., 285 Mass. 499, 503-504 (1934), and the cases cited therein. Accord  Corriea v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 295 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 375 Mass. 360 (1978).  In this appeal, the Board considered the appellant's opinion regarding the value of his property on January 1, 1999, but did not rely on it.  The Board found and ruled that the appellant's reliance on his purchase price for the property, that he bid at an auction and purchased from the FDIC, was misplaced.  The Board also found and ruled that his further reliance on the unadjusted sale prices of three properties that were not shown to be comparable to his own was also misplaced.  Accordingly, and in consideration of the other evidence that he presented, the Board found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that his property was over-valued for fiscal year 2000.
	In evaluating the evidence before it in this appeal the Board selected among the various elements of value and formed its own independent judgment of fair cash value.  See General Electric v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 605 (1984); North American Philips Lighting Corp. v. Assessors of Lynn, 392 Mass. 296, 300 (1984).
	The Board need not specify the exact manner in which it arrived at its valuation.  Jordan Marsh v. Assessors of Malden, 359 Mass. 196, 110 (1971).  The fair cash value of property cannot be proven with "mathematical certainty and must ultimately rest in the realm of opinion, estimate and judgment." Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 72 (1941).  "The credibility of witnesses, the weight of evidence, the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for the [B]oard."  Cummington School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977).
	The burden of proof is upon the appellant to make out his right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax. Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  The appellant must show that the assessed valuation of his property was improper.  See Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 691 (1982).  The assessment is presumed valid until the taxpayer sustains his burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker, 365 Mass. At 245.  With respect to the sale price recited in the deed, the burden of proof that the price was fixed fairly, and not in some other way, rests with the proponent of the sale; but there is a rebuttable presumption that the price was freely established.  See Epstein v. Boston Housing Auth., 317 Mass. 297, 300-01 (1944).  However, a foreclosure sale inherently suggests compulsion to sell.  See DSM Realty, Inc. v. Assessors of Andover, 391 Mass. 1014 (1984) (rescript opinion).  The Board ruled in this appeal that any so-called presumption was successfully rebutted because an auction in these circumstances is not representative of a free market.  Furthermore, circumstances may significantly diminish the evidentiary weight accorded to the sale of the subject.  See Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 682-83.  The Board found and ruled that such circumstances existed with respect to the sale of the subject property in this appeal.
	In appeals before this Board, a taxpayer "may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation."  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. at 600, quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 855.  In the present appeal, the Board ruled that the appellant failed to show that the Assessors' methodology was faulty or that the assessment over-valued his property in fiscal year 2000.







	The Board applied these principles in deciding this appeal for the appellee.


						Appellate Tax Board

					By:___________________________
                           Abigail A. Burns, Chairman


A true copy,

Attest:_____________________
         Clerk of the Board



			   
	
	

 "Adjustments for differences are made to the price of each comparable property to make the comparable equal to the subject on the effective date of the value estimate." Appraisal Institute, The appraisal of Real Estate 403 (11th ed. 1996).  "Physical differences include differences in building size, quality of construction, architectural style, building materials, age, condition, functional utility, site size, attractiveness, and amenities."  Id. at 413.
 See previous footnote.
 See footnote 1.
 See footnote 1.

ATB 2001 - 170