John W. Meachen, Jr. & Another v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Sudbury (March 21, 2001)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD




JOHN W. MEACHEN, JR.          v.      BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF
     & Another				    	    THE TOWN OF SUDBURY

Docket Nos. F238959 & F238960		   Promulgated:
							   March 21, 2001


	Docket No. F238959 is an appeal under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 61A, § 19, from the refusal of the appellee to modify or abate a determination of the amount of roll-back tax due under G.L. c. 61A, § 13, for fiscal year 1996, on a 12.10-acre portion of a 49.10-acre parcel of real estate in the Town of Sudbury owned by and assessed to the appellants.  Docket No. F238960 is an appeal under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the appellee to abate property taxes, for fiscal year 1996, on the remaining part of the same parcel of real estate in the Town of Sudbury owned by and assessed to the appellants.     
	Commissioner Gorton heard these appeals.  Chairman Burns, former-Chairman Gurge and Commissioner Scharaffa joined him in the decisions for the appellee.
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to requests by the appellants under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.

	Joseph Landis, Esq., for the appellants.
	Daniel Loughlin, Assessor, for the appellee.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT

	At all material times, the appellants were the assessed owners of an undeveloped parcel of real estate located on Marlboro Road in the Town of Sudbury.  The parcel contains approximately 49.10 acres of land of which, for fiscal years 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1996, approximately 12.10-acres were valued, assessed, and taxed as agricultural land under the provisions of G.L. c. 61A. The 12.10-acres were not placed under the provisions of     G.L. c. 61A for fiscal year 1994.
Docket No. F238959
In fiscal years 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1996, the 12.10-acres of land were valued for agricultural use under chapter  61A  at  only $4,800.  On September 15, 1995, the 
appellants agreed to sell the entire 49.10-acre parcel along with some additional real estate to a developer for $4,558,000.  The parties agreed that the 12.10-acres of agricultural land became subject to a roll-back tax (but not a conveyance tax).  On September 21, 1995, pursuant to § 14 of chapter 61A, the appellants notified the Board of Assessors of Sudbury ("Assessors") of their intent to sell the 12.10-acres on or about October 20, 1995.  A preliminary subdivision plan encompassing all of the acreage that was to be sold was submitted to the local Planning Board in early 1996.  On March 21, 1996, the appellants applied to the Assessors for a certification of roll-back tax under § 19A of chapter 61A.  On April 15, 1996, the Assessors issued a corrected certificate of roll-back tax in the amount of $87,337.84.  


The Assessors calculated the roll-back tax as follows:

  
Fiscal Year	Additional Assessment	Commercial Tax Rate	Rollback Tax	
1992	$  688,360	$24.41	$16,802.87	
1993	$  667,400	$25.43	$16,971.98	
1995	$  797,000	$24.50	$19,526.50	
1996	$1,526,300	$22.30	$34,036.49	
						Total  $87,337.84



The appellants paid all but $100 of the roll-back tax on April 16, 1996.  The $100 balance was paid two days later.  The general property tax was also paid without interest being incurred.  The appellants timely filed their application for a modification or abatement of the roll-back tax on April 29, 1996.  The Assessors denied the appellants' application on July 23, 1996 and sent notice of the denial to the appellants on the following day.  The appellants seasonably filed their petition with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") on August 16, 1996.  On this basis, the Board found that it had jurisdiction over this appeal.
The appellants presented two arguments to the Board in support of their request for an abatement of the roll-back tax assessed for the four years that the 12.10-acres were specially classified as agricultural land.  First, they argued that the Assessors erred in applying the commercial tax rate, as opposed to the residential rate, when calculating the roll-back tax for the four applicable fiscal years here.  The appellants based their argument on the  premise  that  the  12.10-acres  were  located  in   a 
residential zone and that in fiscal year 1994, when the 12.10-acres were not under the provisions of chapter 61A, the Assessors taxed the property as residential, as opposed to commercial, real estate.    
The appellants further asserted that the Assessors overvalued the 12.10-agricultural acres in fiscal year 1996 and, as a result, assessed an excessive roll-back tax for that fiscal year.  It is stipulated between the parties that the 12.10-acres were over-valued, for roll-back tax purposes, in fiscal year 1996, by $377,900.  The Assessors conceded that they over-valued four "additional frontage sites."  Accordingly, in March, 1998, the Assessors abated $8,427.17 to the appellants.         
For reasons more fully explained in its Opinion below, the Board found that the Assessors did not err by using the commercial tax rate when calculating the roll-back tax for the four applicable fiscal years here.  The Board found that for communities that use multiple tax rates, the commercial tax rate is the proper rate to use when taxing agricultural property.  For the relevant tax years, Sudbury classified its property pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 2A and 38, employing multiple tax rates for various classes of property.  The definition of commercial property includes "agricultural enterprises."  It is uncontested that, at all relevant times, the 12.10-acres at issue in this appeal were agricultural as that term is used in the pertinent statutes, thereby presupposing their use for or as an agricultural enterprise.  Consequently, the appellants' reliance on this acreage's location in a residential zone and the Assessors taxing this acreage as residential property in fiscal year 1994, for the proposition that the commercial tax rate should not have been used by the Assessors in calculating the roll-back tax, was misplaced.  
The Board found that neither argument was determinative.  First, the commercial tax rate not only can, but should, be applied within a residential zone in these circumstances; and, second, a possible error by the Assessors in identifying a class of property in a prior fiscal year does not prevent them from correctly identifying it when later computing the roll-back tax.  Accordingly, the Board found that the Assessors use of the commercial tax rate for calculating the roll-back tax was appropriate under the circumstances.
	Furthermore, the Board found that, except for the $377,900 to  which the parties agreed in their stipulation, 

the Assessors did not over-value, for roll-back tax purposes, the 12.10-acres in fiscal year 1996.    The Board
found that the appellants failed to introduce any evidence that tended to show that this acreage was otherwise over-valued.  Instead, the appellants simply relied on the previous fiscal year's assessment of $801,800, for roll-back tax purposes, without offering any comparable sales or other valuation data or analyses.  The Assessors, on the other hand, explained their conservative formula for dividing "raw unsubdivided land" in fiscal year 1995 and their more "realistic" formula, which was based on the appellants' subdivision plan, for fiscal year 1996.  The Board found that their approaches, which are more fully explained in the Board's findings in Docket No. F238960, were reasonable under the circumstances and, essentially, uncontraverted.  Accordingly, the Board found that, except for the $377,900, the 12.10-acre portion of the subject property was not over-valued, for roll-back tax purposes, in fiscal year 1996.  
Therefore, the Board found that the value of the 12.10-acre agricultural portion of the subject property, for roll-back tax purposes, in fiscal year 1996 was $1,153,200.  The Board further found that, for purposes of calculating the roll-back tax, the additional assessment for fiscal year 1996 was $1,148,400.  On this basis, the Board determined that the roll-back tax for fiscal year 1996 was $25,609.32, and the entire roll-back tax for all four fiscal years at issue was $78,910.67.  This amount equaled the Assessors' assessment, after the $8,427.17 abatement in March 1998.  Accordingly, the Board decided this appeal for the appellee.    
Docket No. F238960
In fiscal year 1996, the parcel's remaining thirty-seven acres of non-agricultural land was valued for residential purposes at $1,807,000.  The actual tax bill was sent on or about March 29, 1996.  On Monday, April 29, 1996, the appellants timely filed an application for abatement claiming a value of only $400,000.  The Assessors denied the appellants' application on July 23, 1996,  and  the   appellants  seasonably  appealed 
to this Board on August 16, 1996.  The appellants paid the real estate tax without incurring interest.  On this basis, the Board found that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal.      
In fiscal year 1995, this non-agricultural acreage was valued at only $329,900.  The Assessors increased its value to $1,807,000 for fiscal year 1996 when they discovered that it was developable.  In previous fiscal years, the Assessors had regarded all 49.10 acres of the entire parcel as undevelopable.  However, as the actual sale of the subject property during fiscal year 1996 demonstrated, the Board found that a potential purchaser of the property on January 1, 1995 probably would have considered the subject property developable thereby supporting the Assessors' fiscal year 1996 assessment.  The sale price was $4,558,000 while the overall assessment was only $2,960,200, that is $1,807,000 for the thirty-seven-acre portion and $1,153,200 for the 12.10-acres.  
Furthermore, the Board found that the methodology that the Assessors used to estimate the value of the subject property in fiscal year 1996 was appropriate under the circumstances.  In fiscal year 1995, they applied a formula that conservatively determined "a reasonable number of lots that can be expected to be extracted from the parcel."  Their formula calculated six frontage lots along with eleven interior lots.  Their fiscal year 1996 formula, which was based on the appellants' subdivision plan, increased the number of developable lots and hence the subject property's value.  The Board found that the subdivision plan more accurately reflected the number of developable lots on the subject property as of January 1, 1995, than the conservative formula that the Assessors had used the previous fiscal year.  The mere fact that the subdivision plan was filed after the requisite assessment date for fiscal year 1996 is of little import because, regardless of the plan, the Board found that the subject property could have been developed to that same extent on January 1, 1995, and an informed buyer would have known it was so developable.  The plan simply confirmed that the Assessors had been too conservative in estimating the potential number of developable lots in previous years.  The plan also documented a better methodology that was just as available on January 1, 1995, as it was in early 1996, the time when it was submitted to the local Planning Board.  A summary of the Assessors' formula and methodology is contained in the following table.

AGRICULTURAL LAND	12.10 ACRES
	
1 primary frontage site @ $150,630 each	$  150,630	
4 additional frontage sites @ $150,630 each	$  602,520	
3 interior sites @ $127,500 each	$  382,500	
4.1 acres of excess land @ $4,274.88 each	$   17,527	
ASSESSMENT  (Rounded)	$1,153,200	
		
NON-AGRICULTURAL LAND	THIRTY-SEVEN ACRES	
14 interior sites @ $127,500 each	$1,785,000	
16 acres of wetland @ $427.50 each	$    6,840	
7 acres of excess landlocked @ $2,175 each	$   15,225	
ASSESSMENT  (Rounded)	$1,807,000	
		
TOTAL ASSESSMENT	$2,960,200	

	On this basis, the Board found that the portion of the subject property that contained the thirty-seven acres of non-agricultural land was not over-valued.  Therefore, the Board decided this appeal for the appellee.

OPINION
Docket No. F238959
	The appellants maintained that the Assessors erred in calculating and assessing the roll-back tax on the 12.10-acre portion of the subject property that was specially classified as agricultural land under c. 61A for fiscal years 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1996.  They first contended that the residential tax rate, as opposed to the commercial rate, should have been applied when calculating the roll-back tax for each of the fiscal years at issue because the property was located in a residential zone and, in fiscal year 1994, the year that it was not specially classified, it was treated as residential property by the Assessors.  The appellants further argued that the property was over-valued in fiscal year 1996 and, as a result, the roll-back tax that the Assessors calculated for that year was excessive.
	 When land which is valued, assessed and taxed under c. 61A, no longer qualifies as being actively devoted to agriculture, it becomes subject to an additional tax under § 13, termed a "roll-back tax."    The roll-back tax is calculated by multiplying the amount of the additional assessment for the tax years at issue "by the general property tax rate" for each of those years.  G.L. c. 61A,  § 13, enacted by St. 1973, § 7. For communities with multiple tax rates, "the general property tax rate" has been interpreted to mean the rate at which the property should have been taxed had the property not been specially classified.  See Hill v. Assessors of Sudbury, 17 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 46, 48-50 (1994).
	In the present appeal, the Board found that the 12.10-acre portion of the subject property that was classified under c. 61A was actively devoted to agricultural pursuits.  Indeed, to qualify for classification under c. 61A, §§ 1 and 3 of that chapter require the 61A land to be used "in the regular course of [an agricultural] business" and to support agricultural "sales," respectively.  
For the relevant tax years, Sudbury classified its property in accordance with G.L. c. 59, §§ 2A and 38, using multiple tax rates for different classes of property.  Under § 2A, class three, commercial property, consists of:
Property used or held for use for business purposes and not specifically includable in another class, including but not limited to any commercial, business, retail, trade, service, recreational, agricultural, artistic, sporting, fraternal, governmental, educational, medical or religious enterprise. (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, the Board ruled that the 12.10-acres here were part of an agricultural enterprise during the relevant fiscal years that should have been classified as commercial property if not valued, taxed, and assessed under c. 61A.  The Board further ruled that the Assessors' previous classification of the property as residential in fiscal year 1994 did not prevent their later classification of the property as commercial for roll-back tax purposes.  Taxing authorities are not bound or estopped by previous errors in assessments.  See Commissioner of Revenue v. Marr Scaffolding, 414 Mass. 489, 494 (1993); Cf. John S. Lane v. Commissioner of Revenue, 396 Mass. 137, 140 (1985) ("If the [taxing authority] has made a mistake in determining the classification of a corporation, unless specifically prohibited by statute or constitutional principles, he should not be estopped from correcting that mistake and from assessing a tax that is otherwise lawfully due.").  
The Board also ruled that the subject property's presence in a residentially zoned area did not preclude the property's designation as commercial property for roll-back tax purposes.  The appellants cited no persuasive authority for their arguments.  The Board ruled that the relevant statutes provide for commercial assessments in these circumstances.  See, e.g., G.L. c. 59, § 2A, which provides in pertinent part that "where real estate is used or held for use for more than one purpose and such uses result in different classifications, the assessors shall allocate to each classification the percentage of the fair cash valuation of the property devoted to each use."  
Finally, with respect to the appellants' argument that the 12.10-acre portion of the subject property was over-valued for roll-back tax purposes in fiscal year 1996, the Board found and ruled that, except for the $377,900 to which the parties agreed in their stipulation, the appellants failed to prove that the Assessors' estimate of that portion of the subject property's value was unreasonable under the circumstances.  The Board found that the Assessors' reliance on a post-assessment-date subdivision plan in their valuation methodology was not improper where the development concepts contained in that plan were just as viable on the assessment date as the date the plan was prepared or later submitted to the local Planning Board.  In determining market value, "[a]ll the uses to which the property is reasonably adapted may be considered . . ., 'with a view of ascertaining what the property is worth in the market for any use for which it would bring the most.'"  Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 Mass. 189, 193 91956), quoting Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297, 299-300 (1944).  Even "[p]otential uses to which property is reasonably adapted may be considered."  R.H. White Realty Co., Inc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 505, 507 (1975).  "The possibilities of the land for future use . . . and the nature and purpose of such uses [are] legitimate matters of inquiry and argument so far as they affect[] . . . present value."  Carlson v. Holden, 358 Mass. 22, 26 (1970).  Accordingly, the Board ruled that the value, which the Assessors' methodology produced for this portion of the subject property in fiscal year 1996, was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.  Therefore, the Board also ruled that the roll-back tax for fiscal year 1996 was $25,609.32, and the total roll-back tax for all four fiscal years at issue was $78,910.67.
Docket No. F238960
The assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  Generally, real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three approaches to determine the fair cash value of property: income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).  However, other methods, such as a development approach, may be appropriate under certain circumstances.  See, e.g., Hall v. Assessors of Barnstable, 20 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 176 (1997).  In the present appeals, the Board ruled that the development approach employed by the Assessors in estimating the value of both the 12.10-acre agricultural part and the remaining thirty-seven acre non-agricultural portion of the subject property in fiscal year 1996 was an appropriate approach to use under the circumstances.  The Board found and ruled that the subject property was a large tract of vacant land suitable for subdivision, which was purchased for just such development.  As in other appeals where the Board has relied on a development approach, the Board found and ruled here that the characteristics of the subject property and the factual circumstances associated with its sale supported this methodology for valuing the property.  See id.
"[S]ales of property usually furnish strong evidence of market value, provided they are arm's-length transactions and thus fairly represent what a buyer has been willing to pay for the property to a willing seller."  Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 682 (1982).  Actual sales of the subject "are very strong evidence of fair market value, for they represent what a buyer has been willing to pay to a seller for [the] particular property [under appeal]."  New Boston Garden Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 469 (1981), quoting First Nat'l. Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 560 (1971).  In the present appeals, the Board ruled that the sale of the subject property plus a fraction of an acre after the assessment date for $4,558,000 was still evidence of both the 12.10-acre agricultural part and the remaining thirty-seven acre non-agricultural portion of the subject property's value in fiscal year 1996.     
As of January 1, 1995, the Assessors assessed the parcel's remaining thirty-seven acres of non-agricultural land for residential purposes at $1,807,000.  The appellants contended that the property was considerably over-valued because the Assessors had valued it at only $329,000 in fiscal year 1995.  Similar to its findings and rulings above regarding the value of the 12.10-acres in fiscal year 1996, the Board found and ruled here that the assessment of the remaining acreage was reasonable considering the property's development potential on the requisite assessment date.  As previously stated, the Assessors' reliance on a post-assessment-date subdivision plan in their valuation methodology was not improper where the development concepts contained in that plan were just as viable on the assessment date as the date the plan was prepared or later submitted to the local Planning Board.  The Board found that an informed purchaser on January 1, 1995 would be aware of the subject property's development potential as depicted in the subdivision plan.  Accordingly, the Board ruled that neither this thirty-seven-acre part of the subject property nor the 12.10-acre agricultural portion were over-valued in fiscal year 1996.
	In reaching its opinion of fair cash value, the Board was not required to believe the testimony of any particular witness or to adopt any particular method of valuation that a witness suggested.  Rather, the Board could accept those portions of the evidence that the Board determined had more convincing weight.  Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. at 683; New England Oyster House, Inc., 362 Mass. 696, 701-702 (1972). 
	The Board need not specify the exact manner in which it arrived at its valuation.  Jordan Marsh v. Assessors of Malden, 359 Mass. 196, 110 (1971).  The fair cash value of property cannot be proven with "mathematical certainty and must ultimately rest in the realm of opinion, estimate and judgment." Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 72 (1941).  "The credibility of witnesses, the weight of evidence, the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for the [B]oard."  Cummington School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977).
Conclusion
	The burden of proof is upon the appellants to make out their right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax. Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  The appellants must show that the assessed valuation of their property was improper.  See Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. at 691.  The assessment is presumed valid until the taxpayers sustain their burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245. 
	In appeals before this Board, taxpayers "may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation."  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984), quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983).  In the present appeals, the Board ruled that the appellants failed to show that the amount, after the $8,427.17 abatement in March 1998, assessed for the roll-back tax was improper.  The Board further ruled that the appellants failed to show that the Assessors' valuation methodology in fiscal year 1996 was faulty or that the assessment over-valued the thirty-seven acre non-agricultural portion of the subject property in fiscal year 1996.
The Board made the foregoing findings and rulings and applied the above principles in deciding these appeals for the appellee.

						Appellate Tax Board




					By:____________________________
                             Abigail A. Burns, Chairman

A true copy,


Attest:______________________
         Clerk of the Board

 Originally, Brown Moore Meggs, Trustee of the Meggs Family Trust was the other appellant.  He died on October 6, 1997.  Sheldon G. Bardach was thereafter substituted as successor Trustee.
 The evidence clearly establishes that the twelve-acres were valued at $4,800 in fiscal years 1995 and 1996.  Without any definitive evidence for the prior fiscal years at issue here, the Board inferred that the value was equivalent for those years, as well.  
 The purchase and sale agreement between the appellants and the developer describes the property to be sold as containing fifty acres, more or less.  Accordingly, the Board found that the "additional real estate" was no more than 0.90 acres.
 Under G.L. c. 61A, § 12, when land that is classified as agricultural and/or horticultural under chapter 61A is sold for some other use, it becomes subject to a conveyance tax.  However, if the amount of the roll-back tax under G.L. c. 61A, § 13, exceeds the amount of the conveyance tax, then the roll-back tax is assessed instead of the conveyance tax.  
 The original certification that the Assessors rescinded and corrected with their April 15, 1996 certification was in the amount of $102,984.40 and dated March 29, 1996.
 In accordance with § 13 of chapter 61A, the roll-back tax was calculated by valuing the property at its highest and best use (as residential property) for the appropriate years; then subtracting from each of those values the agricultural-use value for those years; then multiplying the differences by the commercial tax rate in effect during each of the fiscal years to produce a yearly additional assessment figure; and finally, totaling all of the additional assessments.  See Hill v. Assessors of Sudbury, 17 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 46, 47 (Docket No. 212972, October 24, 1994). 
 The time limits for appealing the Assessors' refusal to abate or modify their determination of a roll-back tax to this Board appear in  § 19 of chapter 61A.  That section provides, in pertinent part:

Any person aggrieved by the refusal of the assessors to modify such a determination or make such an abatement or by their failure to act upon such an application may appeal to the appellate tax board within thirty days after the date of notice of their decision or within three months of the date of the application, whichever is later.

Because the Assessors acted and refused the appellants' request for an  abatement of the roll-back tax within three months of the application's filing, the appellants then had another thirty days from the date of notice of the Assessors' decision to file their petition with this Board.  See W.D. Cowls v. Assessors of Shutesbury, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 944, 946 (1993)("If . . . the assessors acted and refused an abatement on the eighty-ninth day after an application for abatement, . . . thirty days thereafter [would] be the deadline for filing an appeal to the Appellate Tax Board since the statute speaks of thirty days after the refusal of the application, or three months after the date of the application, 'whichever is later.'  Indeed, the plain words of the statute produce such a result.") 
 See G.L. c. 61A, § 3, which requires a minimum amount of agricultural sales for land to be considered actively devoted to agricultural uses.
 The Board calculated the roll-back tax for fiscal year 1996 as summarized in the following table:

Assessment under c. 59	Assessment under c. 61A	Additional Assessment	Tax Rate per $1,000	Roll-Back Tax	
$1,153,200	$4,800	$1,148,400	$22.30	$25,609.32	

 The Board's calculation in this regard is summarized in the following table:
Fiscal Year 92	$16,802.87	
Fiscal Year 93	$16,971.98	
Fiscal Year 95	$19,526.50	
Fiscal Year 96	$25,609.32	
TOTAL	$78,910.67	


 The Assessors sent written notice to the appellants on July 24, 1996 stating that they "deem denied" the application on July 23, 1996.  Because the deem-denial date was actually July 29, 1996, the Board considered the Assessors' notice as one of action, as opposed to inaction, for jurisdictional purposes.  At any rate, the appellants' petition to this Board was timely regardless of the characterization of the Assessors' notice.  
 Although the actual deed was never offered into evidence, the appellants conceded that the purchase and sale agreement accurately reflected the price at which the property sold.
 G.L. c. 61A, § 13, provides in pertinent part:

Whenever land which is valued, assessed and taxed under this chapter no longer qualifies as actively devoted to agricultural, horticultural or agricultural and horticultural use, it shall be subject to additional taxes, hereinafter referred to as roll-back taxes, in the current tax year in which it is disqualified and in such of the four immediately preceding tax years in which the land was so valued, assessed and taxed; provided that such roll-back taxes shall not be applicable unless the amount thereof as computed pursuant to this section, exceeds the amount, if any, imposed under the provisions of section twelve and, in such case, the land shall not be subject to the conveyance tax imposed under said section twelve.

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